

Cwk-42356-28-poll:945

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY


Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

28

Edited by
RY T. ROWELL

KEMP MALONE, BENJAMIN D. MERITT, JAMES H. OLIVER
EVELYN H. CLIFT: Secretary

Honorary Editor
DAVID M. ROBINSON



VOLUME LXXII



BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

LONDON: ARTHUR F. BIRD

PARIS: ALBERT FONTEMOING

LEIPZIG: F. A. BROOKHAUS

1951

CONTENTS OF VOL. LXX.

No. 285

	PAGE
Epicurus and Cosmological Heresies. By FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN, -	1
The Prytaneion Decree Re-examined. By MARTIN OSTWALD, -	24
The Composition of <i>Anth. Pal.</i> , VII, 476 (Meleager). By STUART G. P. SMALL, -	47
Amatinius, Lucretius, and Cicero. By HERBERT M. HOWE, -	57
Two Greek Names for the Truffle. By WERNER WINTER, -	63
REVIEWS: -	69

Hanell's Das altrömische eponyme Amt (LILLY ROSS TAXLOR).—"Mana." Introduction à l'histoire des religions—2: Les religions de l'Europe ancienne. III: *Grenier's* Les religions étrusque et romaine. *Vendryes, Tonnelat*, and *Unbegaun's* Les religions des Celtes, des Germains, et des anciens Slaves (ARTHUR DARBY NOCK).—*Schachermeyr's* Alexander der Grosse: Ingenium und Macht (TRUEDELL S. BROWN).—*Hadas' A History of Greek Literature* (NORMAN W. DEWITT).—*Hofmann's* Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen. 1. Teil (ROLAND G. KENT).—*Eranos Rudbergianus*, Opuscula Philologica Gunnaro Rudberg a. d. XVI Kal. Nov. Anno MCMXLV Dedicata (FRANCIS R. WALTON).—*Wil's* Horaz und die Augusteische Kultur (FRANK O. COPELEY).—*Thomson's* History of Ancient Geography (LIONEL PEARSON).—*Snell's* Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen. Zweite erweiterte Auflage (KURT VON FRITZ).—*Oeri's* Der Typ der komischen Alten in der griechischen Komödie, seine Nachwirkungen und seine Herkunft (PHILIP WHALEY HARSH).—*Paap's* De Herodoti reliquiis in papyris et membranis Aegyptiis servatis (LIONEL PEARSON).—*Wendel's* Die griechisch-römische Buchbeschreibung verglichen mit der des Vorderen Orients (NAPHTALI LEWIS).—*Labourt's* Saint Jérôme, *Lettres*, Tome I (ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE).—*Cohen's* La Grèce et l'Hellénisation du monde antique. Nouvelle (3ième) édition (STERLING DOW).—*Kahle's* The Cairo Geniza (W. F. ALBRIGHT).—*Benveniste's* Noms d'agent et noms d'action en indo-européen (JAMES W. POULTNEY).—*Diringer's* The Alphabet. A Key to the History of Mankind (KEMP MALONE).—*Wycherley's* How the Greeks Built Cities (J. H. YOUNG).—*Malcovati's* Imperatoris Caesaris Augusti operum fragmenta, 3rd ed. (JAMES H. OLIVER).

No. 286

	PAGE
Volscians and Umbrians. By JAMES W. POULTNEY, - - -	113
Alcuin's Epitaph of Hadrian I. A Study in Carolingian Epigraphy. By LUITPOLD WALLACH, - - -	128
Aristotle's Analysis of the Nature of Political Struggle. By MARCUS WHEELER, - - -	145
Titus and Berenice. By JOHN A. CROOK, - - -	162
Once or Twice? By GEORGE A. PAPANTONIOU, - - -	176
A Political Slogan in Ancient Athens. By LUDWIG BIELER, -	181
REVIEWS: - - -	185
<i>Carrière's Théognis de Mégare. Étude sur le recueil élégiaque attribué à ce poète; Carrière's Théognis, Poèmes élégiaques. Texte établi et traduit (CHRISTOPHER M. DAWSON).—Heinimann's Nomos und Physis. Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im Griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts (FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN).—Pisani's Testi arcaici e volgari con commento glottologico (ROLAND G. KENT).—Magie's Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ (JAMES H. OLIVER).—Souter's A Glossary of Later Latin to 600 A. D. (CORA E. LUTZ).—Kakridis' Homeric Researches (H. N. PORTER).—Haarhoff's The Stranger at the Gate. Aspects of Exclusiveness and Co-operation in Ancient Greece and Rome, with some Reference to Modern Times (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR).—Yavis' Greek Altars, Origins and Typology (ROBERT SCRANTON).—Aalto's Untersuchungen über das lateinischen Gerundium und Gerundivum (JAMES W. POULTNEY).—Goldschmidt's La Religion de Platon (G. M. A. GRUBE).—Schmalenbach's Griechische Vasenbilder; Schefold's Griechische Plastik, I: Die grossen Bildhauer des archaischen Athen (A. E. RAUBITSCHKE).—Schefold's Orient, Hellas und Rom in der archäologischen Forschung seit 1939 (HOMER A. THOMPSON).—Dela's Lukians Kenntnis der athenischen Antiquitäten (JAMES H. OLIVER).</i>	
BOOKS RECEIVED, - - -	219

CONTENTS.

v

No. 287

	PAGE
The Problem of Cratylus. By GEOFFREY S. KIRK, - - -	225
On the Chronology of Caesar's First Consulship. By LILY ROSS TAYLOR, - - - - -	254
The Megarian Decree. By P. A. BRUNT, - - - - -	269
Roman Names and the Consuls of A. D. 13. By ARTHUR E. and JOYCE S. GORDON, - - - - -	283
The Paradox of the <i>Oedipus</i> . By W. C. HELMBOLD, - - -	293
Περικέκκασα—Aristophanes, <i>Knights</i> , 697. By LILLIAN B. LAWLER,	300
REVIEWS: - - - - -	308
<i>Bonner's</i> Studies in Magical Amulets, chiefly Graeco-Egyptian (ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH).— <i>Pflaum's</i> Les procurateurs équestres sous le Haut-Empire Romain (JAMES H. OL- IVER).— <i>Dale's</i> The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama (RICH- MOND LATTIMORE).— <i>Kent's</i> Old Persian Grammar, Texts, Lexicon (LOUIS H. GRAY).— <i>Arnaldi's</i> Da Plauto a Terenzio, II: Terenzio (GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH).— <i>Le- grand's</i> Hérodote, Histoires, Livre VI. Texte établi et traduit (LIONEL PEARSON).— <i>Charlesworth's</i> The Lost Province or The Worth of Britain (GERTRUDE HIRST).	
BOOKS RECEIVED, - - - - -	335

No. 288

	PAGE
Ryck's Manuscript of Tacitus. By C. W. MENDELL and SAMUEL A. IVES, - - - - -	337
Greek μελλω. A Historical and Comparative Study. By OSWALD SZEMERENYI, - - - - -	346
Juvenal's Bookcase. By GILBERT HIGHET, - - - - -	369
The Platonic Synonyms, δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη. By CURTIS W. R. LARSON, - - - - -	395
REVIEWS: - - - - -	415
<i>Snell's</i> Bacchylidis Carmina cum Fragmentis (GILBERT NORWOOD).— <i>Nilsson's</i> The Minoan-Mycenaeae Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion (CAMPBELL BONNER).— <i>Pohlenz's</i> Die Stoa, Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung (LUDWIG EDELSTEIN).— <i>Høistad's</i> Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man; <i>Sayre's</i> The Greek Cynics (EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.).— <i>Barrington-Ward, Bell, Bowra, Bryan-Brown, Denniston, Highet, Platnauer's</i> Some Oxford Compositions (J. F. C. KILGARD).— <i>Marouzeau's</i> Quelques aspects de la formation du latin littéraire (GILBERT HIGHET).— <i>Stella's</i> Cinque Poeti dell' Antologia Palatina (STUART G. P. SMALL).— <i>Brown's</i> Onesicritus. A Study in Hellenistic Historiography (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.).— <i>des Places' Pindare et Platon</i> (H. N. PORTER).— <i>Mugler's</i> Platon et la Recherche Mathématique de son époque (HAROLD CHERNISS).— <i>Schmid's</i> Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, I, Die klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur, V, Die griechische Literatur zur Zeit der attischen Hegemonie nach dem Eingreifen der Sophistik, II, 2 (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR).	
BOOKS RECEIVED, - - - - -	452
INDEX TO VOLUME LXXII, - - - - -	453

405-
002

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

1951
Vol. LXXII, 1

Whole No. 285

EPICURUS AND COSMOLOGICAL HERESIES.

Twenty years ago anyone moderately at home in the field of Ancient Philosophy could have discoursed at length, and with reference to ample and incontestable evidence, about Epicurus' attitude to the Presocratic thinkers, but even an expert would have found it embarrassingly difficult to say anything precise about his reactions to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. So little was known about Epicurus' relations to the two thinkers who must have been remembered by not a few of his Athenian contemporaries and whose schools were well established institutions in Athens while Epicurus himself taught there.¹

Of late this situation has improved and we need no longer blush at our ignorance about what had too long remained a blank page in the history of Greek Philosophy. For this improvement, for help extended to us in a perplexing situation, we have to thank Professor Ettore Bignone. His important two volume work *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*²

¹ A statement of Cyril Bailey in *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (Oxford, 1928, p. 220) is quoted by Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, p. xi, as characteristic of the situation which prevailed before the publication of his own studies; see however *ibid.*, 391 ff. For evidence concerning Epicurus' hostile attitude to Plato and Aristotle see *Epicurea*, ed. Hermann Usener (Leipzig, 1887) frgs. 171, 237, 238 (yet see *ibid.*, pp. 387 f. and *Index s. v. 'Αριστοτέλης* for Usener's suggestions regarding instances of indebtedness to Aristotle). For a polemic against Plato's physics in Book XIV of Epicurus' *περί φύσεως* cf. Wolfgang Schmid, *Epicurus Kritik der platon. Elementenlehre* (Leipzig, 1936).

² Florence, 1935 and 1936.

has drawn our attention to numerous features of Epicurus' system which can be explained as a reaction to Plato's or Aristotle's doctrines (as one might expect, the Aristotelian doctrines which were a challenge to Epicurus are not those of the *Metaphysics* and *Nicomachean Ethics* but those embodied in his early dialogues and other "esoteric" writings). That a thinker who considered it necessary to defend his ἀρχαί against Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras³ should have remained indifferent to the great revolutionary changes that within the last two generations had been effected in Philosophy and Cosmology is indeed in the highest degree improbable. The intrinsic probability of his thesis is Bignone's strongest card; whether he plays it or not, it affects the discussion of almost every question taken up in the two volumes. It strengthens his position to the extent to which general considerations can strengthen specific arguments, and where the material evidence is incomplete such strengthening may make all the difference.

This paper is not written as a criticism of Bignone's fundamental work. It aims rather to supplement it in a few points and to bring into relief certain lines along which philosophical thought developed—and diverged—in the fourth, and possibly third, century. It is one thing to argue, as Bignone does, that Epicurus worked out answers and counterarguments to particular doctrines put forward in particular works,⁴ another to investigate the historical background of conflicting positions and to determine, as far as this is possible, the circumstances and motives which account for the divergences.

Subjects which lend themselves to this kind of study are the nature of the Soul and the questions concerning the eternity or limited life-time of the Universe. With regard to both issues Epicurus would think of the Platonists as committing something like intellectual treason by taking their stand on the side of popular misconceptions and superstitions and giving them vigorous support in the form of elaborate theories and arguments. In the present paper we shall confine ourselves to a set of problems related to the life-time and order of the Cosmos.

³ See Lucretius, I, 635 ff.

⁴ I refer in particular to Chs. 8-10 (II, 335-539) in which Bignone studies Epicurus' reactions to Aristotle's dialogue *περί φιλοσοφίας*.

That the Cosmos is mortal may have been a *res mira novaque*⁵ to Memmius and to some other Roman readers of Lucretius, but Epicurus is not likely to have characterized this important tenet as a revolutionary departure. Much rather may he have felt that he was upholding the orthodox opinion—or, if the term may be used, the majority opinion—of philosophers against a recent aberration and heresy. And yet the substantial arguments by which Lucretius in the Fifth Book refutes the doctrine of an eternal Cosmos and the no less substantial positive proofs by which he establishes the mortality of the world⁶ show clearly that the traditional position is considered in need of defense. Against whom must it be defended? Bignone is convinced that the entire polemical section (vss. 110-234) embodies Epicurus' critical reactions against Aristotle's dialogue *περὶ φιλοσοφίας*.⁷ For this thesis he may find support in every passage in which the opponents are represented as declaring the world to be *aeternum, immortale, fundatum perpetuo aevo*;⁸ for this doctrine is indeed characteristic of the late Platonic Academy and the Peripatos whereas the Stoics believed in the *ἐκπόρωσις*. Yet

⁵ V, 97. Cf. the similar remarks preceding the exposition of the Epicurean dogma regarding innumerable coexisting worlds, II, 1024. The final sections of Lucretius' Second Book include some references to the mortality of the Cosmos (see e. g. 1144), but it is only in Book V that we learn of the controversies raging around this subject.

⁶ V, 11-234; 235-415. As regards the polemical section V, 110-234, Bignone (II, 422 ff.), Bailey (*Lucretius*, p. 1337), and Karl Barwick (*Philologus*, XCV [1943], pp. 211 ff.) have shown—independently and along remarkably different lines—how essential the section V, 110-234 is to the plan of Lucretius' Book V. Although the transition at v. 235 is very harsh, the section must have been intended for the place where we read it.

⁷ See especially II, 410 ff., 422 ff. (on the section containing Lucretius' positive proofs, vv. 235-415, which according to Bignone is also a "rivolta contra Aristotele" see below pp. 5 ff.). Cf. also B. Farrington, *Science and Politics in the Ancient World* (New York, 1940), p. 143 and *passim* and Cyril Bailey's recent commentary (*Lucretius De Rerum Natura Libri Sex* [3 vols., Oxford, 1947]), p. 1338. So far as I can make out, Bailey is not in sympathy with Bignone's approach.

⁸ Vv. 116, 121, 159, 161. The assertion of eternity in the third section (vv. 156 ff.) is perhaps slightly less militant than in the first. If a Stoic ever made the statement reported in vv. 117 ff. he must have consigned many of his fellow-Stoics to punishment in the Underworld. Here Bignone's case remains strong.

what are we to say if in vv. 156 ff. we find the idea of an eternal Cosmos in close conjunction with a statement of anthropocentric teleology which fits the Stoics much better than the Academy or Aristotle? And can there be any doubt that the terrific battery of antiteleological arguments which Lucretius builds up at the end of this section (beginning with the emphatic *tanta stat praedita culpa*, v. 199) is aimed at the Stoic contention that everything in the world has been created for the good of man?⁹ Yet if this is admitted, new difficulties arise; for Epicurus can hardly have known this version of Stoic teleology. We cannot but agree with P. H. De Lacy¹⁰ that "Chrysippus was the great champion, if not the originator, of this doctrine" (that everything in the Universe is designed to serve man's interests) "and although it would be refuted in a general way by Epicurus' arguments against providence, yet it is unlikely that Epicurus ever had the occasion to answer it directly." De Lacy is quite confident that Lucretius' polemics against the Stoics derive not from the master's own work but from those of later Epicureans who had to defend his dogmas against the increasingly dangerous rival school. Regarding our section, what remains of Bignone's thesis is that some of the opinions here combatted by Lucretius originated in the Academy. It still is probable, for instance, that the comparison (at vv. 117 ff.) of those who deny the divinity and eternity of the Cosmos with the

⁹ Altogether three doctrines are refuted: 1) that the world and its parts are eternal and divine (vv. 114-145); 2) that the gods have their homes in the parts of the world (vv. 146-155); 3) that the world has been created for the benefit of man (vv. 156-234). Of these doctrines the first is certainly close to the position of the Academy. The second may be a statement of popular Greek religion—or else but another aspect of the first; it is so briefly stated that it is futile to try to identify its proponents. The Stoic character of the third is pointed out in the text. For Plato man is a part of the Cosmos, yet the Cosmos does not exist for man.

¹⁰ See his recent article "Lucretius and the History of Epicureanism," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIX (1948), pp. 12 ff., especially p. 16. A similar view is taken by Max Pohlenz, *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, CXCVIII (1936), p. 529 and in his new book *Die Stoa, Geschichte ein. geist. Bewegung* (2 vols., Göttingen, 1949), *Ergänzungsbd.*, p. 87. I admit that even the arguments in V, 122-145 may be "directed in part at least against the Stoics" (De Lacy, p. 15); yet vv. 114-121 offer effective resistance to the attempt to make the Stoics the sole target of this section.

Giants who attacked the gods and suffer punishment for it goes back to *περὶ φιλοσοφίας* in which Aristotle is known to have accused his adversaries of *δευρὴ ἀθεότης*. (frg. 18).

What we wish to do in the following pages is to point out certain basic antitheses between the Academic and the Epicurean cosmology. Our Epicurean text will again be Lucretius' Fifth Book, yet this time not the refutation of the rival doctrines but the immediately following section which presents the positive proofs for the mortality and eventual destruction of the world. Before we proceed to an examination of this part of Book V¹¹ it will be necessary briefly to review the stages by which the "static" world-view and the belief in an eternal Cosmos had evolved.

For the Academy, the eternity of the Cosmos is intimately connected with its divinity. Both beliefs have their root in the realization of the eternal, never broken regularity, the unvaried sameness of the heavenly movements.¹² Information that reached the Academy from Egypt and Babylonia¹³—where records covering long periods had been kept—convinced it that the planets, far from being "erring bodies" had for ever and ever completed their courses with wondrous constancy. This eternal order of the celestial world, along with the mathematical pattern of the various movements, suggested to Plato the existence of a divine Soul—or Mind—which inspired and directed these movements. The stars themselves were felt to be divine beings, alive, and animated by their own souls. Yet if the Heaven was "full of gods" and the heavenly movements eternal, the world could have had no beginning in time and could never perish. The evolutionary constructions of the Presocratics could find no favor in the Academy; in the works of Plato and Aristotle we see a new cosmology which is of a distinctly non-

¹¹ Vv. 235-416.

¹² The decisive passage on this is *Laws*, VII, 821A ff. I have dealt with the subject more fully in *Plato's Theology* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1942), pp. 86 ff. See also M. P. Nilsson, *H. T. R.*, XXXIII (1940), pp. 1 ff.; A. J. Festugière, *Rev. phil.*, XXI (1947), pp. 19 ff.; E. R. Dodds, *J. H. S.*, LXV (1947), p. 25. On the relation between Plato's cosmology, astronomy, and theology see W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 142 f., 158, and *passim*.

¹³ See especially Aristotle, *De coelo*, B12, 292a7 ff.; cf. also (Plato) *Epin.*, 987A.

evolutionary complexion take their place. Whether Plato when he wrote the *Timaeus* had made a complete break with the idea of cosmic genesis may be a matter for doubt,¹⁴ yet Aristotle certainly proclaimed the new dogma of the eternal Cosmos in his dialogue *περί φιλοσοφίας* and supported it by strong arguments—of physical, not theological character—in his *De coelo*.¹⁵ In fact this is the world-view which his scientific work presupposes throughout.

The new system clearly implies that the Earth has no more an end in "time" than the Heaven, yet does it exclude changes on the Earth's surface? Such changes formed part of Presocratic cosmogonies,¹⁶ and if the Academy as we have seen found essential phases of these cosmogonies and as a matter of fact cosmogony as such inadmissible, had it also to reject the notion that the boundaries of land and sea had changed and that where we now set foot on dry ground formerly the sea held sway? The Egyptian and Babylonian records can hardly have had a bearing on this question. In point of fact Plato and Aristotle, far from repudiating the idea of such changes, take considerable interest in them and we see them bend their efforts to fit this phase of the old cosmology into their new scheme. In three of his late works, the *Timaeus*, the *Critias*, and the *Laws*, Plato refers to great catastrophes—floods, widespread conflagrations, or earthquakes—which have left the surface of the Earth in a changed condition, without of course destroying it completely. A passage in the *Timaeus* is especially noteworthy because Plato here makes an attempt to link these periodic events on Earth to the heavenly *περίοδοι*.¹⁷

There have been, and will be hereafter, many and diverse destructions of mankind, the greatest by fire and water. Thus the story that Phaethon, child of the Sun-god, once

¹⁴ See below pp. 8-9.

¹⁵ Aristotle, *De philos.*, 18 (Walzer, 18 Rose), 20 (22 R.); *De coelo*, A 10-12.

¹⁶ Cf. *Vorsokratiker* (ed. Diels and Kranz, 5th ed., Berlin, 1934-1937), 12A27 (Anaximander), 21A33 (Xenophanes). See also Herodotus' theory regarding the origin of Egypt (II, 10 ff.) and Empedocles (*Vors.*, 31A49, 66). For the atomists see *Vors.*, 67A24, 4 (Leucippus), Aristotle, *Meteor.* B3, 356b10 (Democritus) and Lucretius, V, 480 ff.

¹⁷ *Tim.*, 22C ff.; for passages in other dialogues see below, note 21.

harnessed his father's chariot but could not guide it on its course and burnt up everything on the face of the Earth and was himself destroyed by the thunderbolt—this story has the character of a myth but the truth behind it is a deviation (*παράλλαξις*) of the bodies that revolve in Heaven around the Earth and a destruction, occurring at long intervals, of things on Earth by a great conflagration. At such times all who live on mountains and in high regions, where it is dry, perish more completely than dwellers by the rivers or the sea. . . . On the other hand when the gods cleanse the Earth with a flood of waters the herdsmen and shepherds in the mountains are saved while the inhabitants of cities are swept by the rivers into the sea.¹⁸

Thus the changes on Earth are still linked to changes in Heaven. The *παράλλαξις* to which Plato here refers reminds us of the *παράλλαξις* in the myth of the *Statesman*¹⁹ which marks the transition from periods of order and divine control of the Cosmos to others in which the Cosmos, being left to itself by God, drifts into disorder. In the *Timaeus* the idea of an alternation between such periods has been abandoned; there is every hope that the Cosmos will keep its God-given *τάξις* forever. Moreover while it is probable that the *παράλλαξις* mentioned in our passage of the *Timaeus* will take place at the end of an *annus magnus*—i. e., when all planets and the sphere of the fixed stars have simultaneously returned to their starting points—we should notice that in the actual cosmology of this dialogue Plato, when he refers to this cosmic juncture, refrains from specifying what will happen at it.²⁰ Does this silence indicate

¹⁸ On the subject of periodically recurring catastrophes see Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 139. Jaeger suggests that the "rationalistic" interpretation of the Phaethon myth and perhaps also the actual theory of catastrophes did not originate with Plato himself but with scientists close to him whom he followed.

¹⁹ 269C ff.; see especially E3 ff. where *παράλλαξις τῆς αὐτοῦ (scil. τοῦ κόσμου) κινήσεως* = ἀνακύκλωσις, reversal of direction. L. & S. s. v. ἀνακύκλωσις misinterpret this passage. Cf. F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London, 1937), p. 206, Paul Friedlaender, *Plato* (Berlin, 2 vols., 1930-1932), I, pp. 236 ff., Bignone, *op. cit.*, II, 379.

²⁰ 39D. A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford, 1928), p. 217, comments on this passage: "There is no suggestion that the end of the period is marked by any cosmic cataclysms." He goes on to say that we have no right to credit Plato with the Stoic idea of *ekpyrosis*. A destruction of the entire world or a transformation into

that he was reluctant to allow any break in the wonderful regularity of the heavenly movements—for the *παράλλαξις* would indeed be a break, however rare its occurrence? The other passages in which he refers to the catastrophes²¹ lend support to this conjecture; there is every probability that this construction of a cosmological link between Heaven and Earth was abandoned by the Academy. Floods, to be sure, were still supposed to take place and the boundaries between land and sea were held to be subject to change, yet Aristotle with his characteristic bluntness declares it *γελοῖον* to believe that such insignificant events on Earth should reflect developments in the much larger heavenly regions or should allow inferences with regard to the genesis and history of the Cosmos as a whole.²²

Before we return to Epicurus and Lucretius we must consider another complex of cosmological ideas which we find in the *Timaeus*. Whether or not we take literally Plato's assertion that the Cosmos has come into being (*γένεον*)²³ Plato is clearly

fire of the whole cosmic mass is in fact nowhere taught by Plato. For a very different view on the *annus magnus* and cosmic catastrophes see J. Bidez, *Eos ou Plato et l'orient* (Brussels, 1945), pp. 82 ff., 179 ff.

²¹ *Critias*, 108E, 111A, 112A; *Laws*, III, 677A. There is no reference to this *παράλλαξις* or to *ἐκπύρωσις* in the extant works of Aristotle. What kind of catastrophes at the end of cosmic periods he admitted in *De philos.* is not clear (neither Censorinus, *De die nat.*, 18, 11 who mentions the *ekpyrosis* nor Philoponus, *In Nicom. Geras.*, I, 1 ff. who does not mention it may with confidence be used for the reconstruction of this dialogue, *pace* Bignone, *op. cit.*, 473 ff., 511 ff.).

²² *Meteor.*, A14, 352a26; see also a17 ff. (the entire chapter A14 deals with changes between land and sea). Cf. J. Baudry, *Le problème de l'origine et de l'éternité du monde* (Paris, 1931), pp. 175 f.

²³ *Tim.*, 28B6. Whether or not the *γένεον* is Plato's last word on the subject has been a matter of controversy ever since the first generation of his pupils. That Plato knew strong reasons suggesting the eternity of the Cosmos I do not deny (for a recent statement of these reasons see Harold Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* [Baltimore, 1944], pp. 421 ff.), nor should I consider it impossible that in a different context Plato might have seen fit to treat them as conclusive. On the other hand, the arguments by which Plato supports his *γένεον* are weighty too and spring from fundamental philosophical distinctions. It cannot but be hazardous to reconstruct Plato's *true* views on a matter which he himself considered outside the range of *ἀλήθεια* and *ἀνέλεγκτοι* and *ἀνίκητοι λόγοι*. (29B) or to imagine that he should have seen a reason for making a dogmatic statement to an interviewer

anxious to make the fabric of this world, once it has been created, as durable and indestructible as possible. His demiurge says that his works are *ἅλυστα ἐμοῦ γε μὴ θέλοντος*; ²⁴ by rejecting the notion that the Cosmos will disintegrate Plato puts himself in opposition to most, perhaps to all, Presocratic systems. How does he—or his god—make sure that the Cosmos, although a visible and tangible thing, will not be destroyed? In two ways. He sees to it that the Cosmos is at peace within and that it is not exposed to destructive influences working from without. The peace within is safeguarded as follows: ²⁵ The physical material out of which Plato's Cosmos is constructed is the four Empedoclean elements, fire, air, water, and earth. Four elements are needed because they are to stand to one another in the harmonious relation of a geometrical proportion. The Demiurge actually fashions them *πρὸς ἄλληλα καθ' ὅσον ἦν δυνατόν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον*. This mathematical relationship is the best that can prevail and suffices to establish concord in the world; in fact not only concord but amity, *φιλία*. ²⁶ Commentators have realized that Plato here incorporates Empedocles' *φιλία* along with his four elements. ²⁷ However, Plato regards *φιλία* as a permanent condition prevailing between the elements, not, like Empedocles, as a temporary phase.

Plato next makes sure that no dangers will threaten the Cosmos from outside: *τῶν δὲ δὴ τεττάρων ἐν ὅλον ἕκαστον εἴληφεν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου σύστασις*. ²⁸ The entire substance of the four elements has gone into the making of the Cosmos. This is an important new departure; the thought here expressed is at vari-

who by asking him point blank: do you think that the Cosmos has come into being or not? exposed his inadequate comprehension of the *Timaeus*.

²⁴ *Tim.*, 41A8; cf. the whole passage including the following sentence or sentences; see also 38B7.

²⁵ Cf. 31B4-32C4.

²⁶ 32C2; cf. 34B6 ff.

²⁷ Cf. Cornford, *op. cit.* (note 19), p. 44, n. 4; Taylor, *op. cit.* (note 20), p. 99. J. B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues* (Cambridge, 1942), p. 63 speaks of a "Pythagorean refinement on the Empedoclean Philotes." At 58A ff. Plato draws a picture of a struggle going on between the elementary particles. Obviously this struggle can be ignored at 32C2 since it does not impair the fundamentally friendly relation between the elements.

²⁸ 32C5; cf. Aristotle, *De philos.*, frg. 19 Rose; Bignone, *op. cit.*, 476.

ance with the approach of Empedocles and Democritus, probably also of Anaxagoras (to say nothing of the very earliest thinkers like Anaximander). These men held that our Cosmos had absorbed only a small portion of the available material and that a large amount of matter—elements, atoms or seeds—was left outside, not used in the formation of this world, yet capable, at least for Democritus, of building up other worlds.²⁹ Plato states three reasons for his approach: he wants his Cosmos to be in the full sense of the word αἴν and ὅλον (that is to say he wants it to fulfil these Parmenidean requirements of true Being), and he thinks that only by incorporating the entire four elements can the Cosmos be secured against the danger of possible destruction. The demiurge “perceived that, if a body be composite, when hot things and cold and all things that have strong powers beset such a body and attack it from without (περιστώμενα ἔξωθεν καὶ προσπίπτοντα), they bring it to untimely dissolution and cause it to waste away by bringing upon it sickness and old age.”³⁰

We may now go back to Lucretius—yet not to prove that Epicurus must have polemized against the *Timaeus* but rather that, his system being what it is, he found it necessary to develop doctrines which are the opposite of the Academic.

This point of view, however, does not apply to Lucretius’ first argument for the mortality of the Cosmos. This argument may be summed up in Lucretius’ own statement that everything whose parts are *mortalī corpore* must itself have come into being and eventually perish.³¹ Bignone has reminded us that this argument was known to Theophrastus; in fact he believes, like other scholars before him, that Theophrastus refuted it in the course of a controversy with the Stoic Zeno.³² Unfortunately,

²⁹ Cf. *Vorsokratiker*, 12A10, 31A47, 68B4, and for Democritus’ innumerable coexisting worlds which may collide with one another *ibid.*, A 40, Epicurus, *Ad Pyth.*, 90, *Doxographi Graeci* (ed. H. Diels, Berlin, 1879), p. 327.

³⁰ 33A.

³¹ Lucretius, V, 240-243. The argument is developed at length and all four elements (the *maxima mundi membra*) are proved to be perishable (vv. 235-305). Vv. 306-317 are a part of this argument and the same is probably true of vv. 318-323.

³² *Op. cit.*, II, 455 ff. (for reference to earlier studies see *ibid.*, 456, n. 4). Cf. Philo (?), *De aet. mundi*, 117, 124, 143 ff. From *De aet.*

neither the controversy between Theophrastus and Zeno nor Zeno's authorship of the argument can be regarded as certain; ³³ all we can say is that Theophrastus was familiar with this type of reasoning on the part of those denying the eternity of the Cosmos. On the whole it seems more likely that proofs of the kind were formulated at the beginning of the Hellenistic period (when as we have seen the dogma concerning a limited life-time of the world stood in need of defense) than that they should have formed part of Presocratic systems. I am not aware that Plato or Aristotle ever betrays familiarity with this argument. ³⁴

Lucretius' second proof ³⁵ is the relative shortness of the period covered by historical records and the recent origin of the arts and crafts, some of which have made their most impressive advances only within living memory (N. B. of Epicurus, not of Lucretius). ³⁶ This line of thought culminates in the following verses:

Quod si forte fuisse antehac eadem omnia credis,
sed periisse hominum torrenti saecula vapore
aut cecidisse urbes magno vexamine mundi,
aut ex imbribus assiduus exisse rapaces
per terras amnis atque oppida coperuisse,
tanto quique magis victus fateare necesse est
exitium quoque terrarum caelique futurum.
nam cum res tantis morbis tantisque periculis
temptarentur, ibi si tristior incubisset
causa, darent late cladem magnasque ruinas. ³⁷

mundi not a little may be learned about the later history of some of the arguments which Plato advances in the *Timaeus*.

³³ See the recent studies of J. B. McDiarmid, *T. A. P. A.*, LXXI (1940), pp. 239 ff. and W. Wiersma, *Mnemosyne*, Ser. 3, VIII (1940), pp. 237 ff. Pohlenz (*op. cit.*, note 10, *Ergänzungbd.*, p. 44), however, is convinced that Theophrastus wrote against Zeno. It would be unwise to exclude the possibility that the argument V, 235-323 was worked out not by Epicurus himself but by a later generation of his pupils. Cf. De Lacy's article cited in note 10. On the other hand I see no reason why the arguments in vv. 324-415 should not go back to the founder of the school.

³⁴ Wiersma's (*loc. cit.*, p. 241) reference to Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.*, B 10, 337a7 is unfortunate since Aristotle here is not concerned with the destruction of the elements but with the possibility that each of them may come to rest in its "natural place" and that there might be no interaction; cf. Plato, *Tim.*, 58A.

³⁵ V, 324-350.

³⁶ Cf. Bignone, *op. cit.*, II, 463 ff.

³⁷ Vv. 338-347.

Here we have the same three causes and types of catastrophes that figured in Plato's scheme: conflagration, flood, and earthquake, and can see that Epicurus shrewdly turned the motif against its inventors. If Plato sought to confine the effects of these catastrophes to the Earth, holding indeed that after every catastrophe human civilization has to start again from its beginnings, Epicurus and Lucretius feel justified in coming back with the question: How can you be sure that if the same commotion happens in a more violent form it will not engulf the entire cosmic system? The Epicureans while accepting, if perhaps only for the sake of argument, Plato's theory of catastrophes insist that such events can bring about an *exitium terrarum caelique*; they would not regard the celestial or ethereal regions as immune against change and eventual destruction.

Lucretius now considers the ground prepared for him to come forward with some more technical arguments;³⁸ for on the subject of eternity and indestructibility the Epicureans have their definite and well-established tenets. They regard as eternal a) the atoms which by definition are unbreakable, b) the void, and c) the *summa summarum*, the Boundless, in a region of which our Cosmos has come into existence. These three entities are eternal and imperishable for good and irrefutable reasons, yet none of these reasons can be applied to the Cosmos. The Cosmos is not *solido corpore* as the atoms are; for void is interspersed everywhere.³⁹ It is not like the void either and, most important of all, while the *summa summarum* includes the whole of space (*locus*) as well as of bodies so that nothing can ever enter it from outside and work havoc, the Cosmos occupies only a tiny section of this *summa* and outside it are atoms infinite in number which may at any time make inroads with sufficient force to destroy its fabric.⁴⁰ This is the contingency against which Plato had tried to safeguard his Cosmos by insisting that the entire substance of the four elements had gone into the making of our Cosmos and that nothing had been left outside that could attack our

³⁸ Vv. 351-372 (cf. III, 806 ff.).

³⁹ Vy. 364 ff.

⁴⁰ See especially vv. 366 ff., *neque autem corpora desunt*, which points back to v. 362, *neque corpora sunt, scil.* outside the Infinite and ready to enter. Cf. VI, 483 *et al.*

world bringing about disease, old age, decline, or death.⁴¹ Incidentally, although Epicurus may no longer have bothered about Parmenides' definition of Reality, it is interesting to note that the *summa summarum* as well as the atoms owe their indestructibility in the last analysis to Parmenidean concepts. The latter are a *ἐν* and *ἅλον*—much more so in fact than the Cosmos for which Plato tried to secure these characteristics; the former represents τὸ πᾶν.⁴² And while the void, Democritus' μὴ ὄν, can perhaps not aspire to an ontological position of comparable dignity, it is as impassive to blows as the atoms and *summa* are (*nec ab ictu fungitur hilum*). To be immune against blows has evidently become an important qualification of eternity.⁴³ Plato tried to attach this quality to his Cosmos; Epicurus who denies it to the Cosmos connects it with the three concepts of which we have spoken.

Yet the fact that no material was left outside constituted only one of the two safeguards which Plato had provided for his Cosmos. He had also asserted that within the Cosmos the four elements are at peace and friendship. It is well to bear this in mind when we come to the last section in Lucretius' proofs for the mortality of our world:

Dénique tantopere inter se cum maxima mundi
pugnent membra, pio nequaquam concita bello,
nonne vides aliquam longi certaminis ollis
posse dari finem? ⁴⁴

The *finis* is of course the complete destruction of the world which will take place when one of the contending elements (*membra*)

⁴¹ The parallel argument based on the concept of space (*loous*, vv. 362, 370 f.) has no counterpart in the *Timaeus*. Plato's notion of τόπος or χώρα does not lend itself to a comparison or contrast. We may, however, remember Aristotle's theory that there is no τόπος ἔξωθεν (i. e. outside the Cosmos; see especially *De coelo*, A9, 279a17 f., a passage which for reasons of style as well as of content is likely to go back to *De philos.*; cf. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 317 f.).

⁴² τὸ πᾶν ἀπειρον εἶναι καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀφθαρτον (*Epicurea*, frg. 296).

⁴³ The word ἀπαθές does not occur in the fragments of the Presocratics, yet that τὸ πᾶν is ἀπαθές is the gist of Melissus B7 which represents a development of Parmenides' position. Plato, *Tim.*, 33A gives the ἀπαθές motif a new form; cf. Cornford, *op. cit.* (note 19), p. 53. On the ἀπαθές of the atoms see *Epicurea*, frg. 268.

⁴⁴ Vv. 380 ff.

attains a decisive superiority, a *πλεονεξία*. For the time being, the fiery element is greedily trying to "drink up" all moisture, the rivers threaten to bring about a deluge, and the winds (i. e. the element of air) sweep the seas, diminishing the substance of the water and striving to dry up everything.⁴⁵ So far they have not accomplished what they try to do (*neque adhuc conata patrarunt*)⁴⁶ but they are certainly engaged in a mighty war (*tantum spirantes . . . bellum*).⁴⁷

We should expect friends to behave differently; rather than of Empedocles' *φιλία* we may feel reminded of his *νείκος*, unless indeed we decide to go farther back to the very beginnings of cosmological thought when Anaximander spoke of the mutual encroachments of the physical principles upon one another.⁴⁸ Into this description of ceaseless cosmic strife Lucretius has thrown something of his own inner restlessness; in the outer world the Epicurean may find some of that tumultuous uproar which in his own heart he is no longer supposed to know. The *certamen* or *bellum* which Lucretius beholds in the Cosmos is one of heroic proportions; borrowing from the language of Ennius, he says that the elements *magnis [inter se] de rebus cernere certant*.⁴⁹

So far the *certamen* has been *aequum* and the precarious balance has been maintained. Yet *fama* has preserved a record of two great crises by which the Universe was brought to the brink of destruction. These crises are Phaethon's ride in his father's chariot and the great flood. Plato too had used these myths for his purposes, and he too—like Lucretius or, rather, like Epicurus—had distinguished between what *μύθου σχῆμα ἔχον λέγεται* and *τὸ ἀληθές* regarding the same events⁵⁰ (we may

⁴⁵ Vv. 383 ff. Note that there is no suggestion of a rhythmical alternation between the elements as *ἐν μέρει κρατέοντα*. G. Vlastos' paper "Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies" (*C. P.*, XLII [1947], pp. 156 ff.) sheds much light on the concepts of cosmic *πλεονεξία* and *μοναρχία*.

⁴⁶ V. 385 (*patrarunt* is Grasberger's emendation of *patrantur*).

⁴⁷ V. 392.

⁴⁸ See *Vorsokr.*, 12B1 with the comments e.g. of J. Burnet, *Early Greek Phil.* (4th ed., London, 1945), pp. 53 ff. Cf. also *Vorsokr.*, 31A66 (Tzetzes on Empedocles).

⁴⁹ V. 393; cf. Ennius, *Ann.* 555 (ed. J. Vahlen, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1913) and Bailey, *ad loc.*

⁵⁰ *Tim.*, 22C7 f.; see above p. 6. Bailey in his commentary on vv.

surmise that the Stoics too interpreted the Phaethon myth as corroborating their ἐκπύρωσις dogma).⁵¹ The Epicurean *vera ratio* teaches that the preponderance of the fiery elements comes about when large quantities of fire atoms rush from the surrounding Infinite into our world and by reinforcing one of the four elements upset the balance between these. If the excess of fire cannot be absorbed (or otherwise checked) universal destruction will ensue.⁵²

Thus Epicurus shows us the elements in a condition of *στάσις*, the opposite of Plato's *φιλία*, and while Plato had been at pains to exclude the possibility of disturbing and destructive influences working upon the Cosmos from the outside, Epicurus counts on the operation of such forces to decide the *στάσις* in favor of one of the warring parties and thereby to destroy the fabric of the Cosmos. Against the Presocratic tradition, Plato had attempted to give the Cosmos, visible though it is and only a copy of the Idea,⁵³ a reality in the Parmenidean sense of the word. This attempt Epicurus has thoroughly refuted; for him the Cosmos remains what it had been for the Presocratics from Anaximander onwards, a temporary formation brought about by a particular yet transitory arrangement of the more enduring and more fundamental entities. As in Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus it is these but not the Cosmos which fulfill the Parmenidean requirements of Reality.

The new cosmic religion of the Hellenistic era whose early manifestations Epicurus watched with suspicion and opposed with all his intellectual might drew much of its original strength

396 ff. rightly rejects the view that Lucretius in reporting the myth and going on to express a protest had any particular Hellenistic poet in mind. More important than the poetic treatment of the myth is the interest which philosophers had taken in it.

⁵¹ The evidence falls short of being conclusive, even though one may accept Pohlenz's (*op. cit.*, note 10, pp. 79 ff. and *Ergänzungbd.*, pp. 45 f.) thesis regarding a Stoic substratum of Dio Chrysostomus' *Borysthenicus* in which Phaethon's ride is mentioned (*Or.*, 36, 48). See also *St. V. F.*, II, 588 (181, 34), yet note the Epicurean motifs at the end of this fragment.

⁵² Vv. 405-410. This is followed by a brief reference to, and a scientific explanation of, the flood story (vv. 411-415); it is, however, not suggested that an excess of water might have fatal consequences for the Cosmos.

⁵³ *Tim.*, 28A ff.; 29A ff.

from the discovery of the eternal regularity and sameness of the heavenly movements. We have spoken of this discovery earlier; it remains to consider Epicurus' reaction to it and to the closely allied conviction that *τάξις*, not *ἀταξία*, governs the world. There are several facets to this reaction, some of them so well known by now that we may content ourselves with a brief reference to them before we proceed to others which, as far as I can see, have escaped attention.

The idea that the heavenly bodies by the intelligence of their movements and the beauty of their patterns suggest the existence of an ordering and controlling deity was anathema to Epicurus; for such a deity being engaged in incessant and troublesome activities could never attain the blessed state of quietude which is essential for the Epicurean gods.⁵⁴ Moreover, human beings who fancy themselves to be dependent on gods whose own movements are determined by an unbreakable Necessity (*ἀνάγκη*) acknowledge masters worse than the gods of popular religion. For whatever the weaknesses and wickednesses of the popular deities may be, it can still be said for them that they allow their worshippers to entertain hope. The stars cannot be swayed; they are impervious to sacrifices and prayers.⁵⁵

Along with astral theology and astrology (if the term is permissible) the new scientific astronomy is repudiated by Epicurus. Distrusting its elaborate mathematical explanations, he warns his followers against losing their heads in this abstruse study.⁵⁶

Yet even if Epicurus prefers other—and on the whole older—explanations for the heavenly movements, the fact of an *ordo certus* in the realm of celestial phenomena could not be disputed away. Moreover, Plato and Aristotle, when speaking of the divine powers which operate in the Cosmos, had not only dwelt on the eternal sameness of the heavenly movements but

⁵⁴ See *Epist. ad Herod.*, I, 76 f. Cf. A. J. Festugière, *Epicure et ses dieux* (Paris, 1946), pp. 83 ff.

⁵⁵ Cf. Festugière, *op. cit.*, pp. 104, 107; Bignone, *op. cit.*, 407 f. See Lucretius, V, 82 ff. (for the correct understanding of V, 86 ff. [= VI, 62 ff.] *rursus in antiquas referuntur religiones et dominos acris ad-sciscunt omnia posse quos miseri credunt* it is well to bear in mind that the names of the planets are those of the "ancient" gods).

⁵⁶ See e.g. *Epist. ad Pyth.*, 93, 113, *Ad Herod.*, 79. Cf. Bignone, *op. cit.*, I, 120, 152 and *passim*.

also referred to such obvious manifestations of cosmic order as the alternation of day and night, the recurrence of the seasons, and the phases of the Moon.⁵⁷ Epicurus "took account" of this world-view when he traced the history of civilization through its successive stages. In explaining the origin and rapid spread of superstition (Lucretius' *religio*) he specified the profound impression which the regularity of the cosmic phenomena made upon ignorant men as one of the main causes for this deplorable development.⁵⁸ It is interesting to compare this reaction of Epicurus with the Stoic response to the Academic theology. While some leading Stoics showed their sympathy with this theology by making the regularity of the star-movements one of their four proofs for the validity of religion,⁵⁹ Epicurus treated this regularity as one of the three (?) causes for the prevalence of a diseased condition of mind.⁶⁰ A dubious compliment for the Platonic theology. Yet that Epicurus made this concession to the Academic approach remains noteworthy if we consider how different an explanation of religion he found in his principal authority. According to Democritus, man's concept of the deity had been formed under the impression of *παράδοξα*, irregular and unexpected celestial events (e. g. eclipses of Sun

⁵⁷ Plato, *Laws*, 886A (τὰ τῶν ὁρῶν διακεκοσμημένα καλῶς οὕτως), 899B; Aristotle, *De philos.*, 18.

⁵⁸ V, 1184 ff.; cf. 1204 ff. (with the latter passage compare Aristotle, *De philos.*, 13).

⁵⁹ The *quattuor causae* of Cleanthes are set forth by Cicero, *De nat. deor.*, II, 5, 13 ff.; see especially 15. On Cleanthes' debt to Aristotle see Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 153, 166, 167, n. 1. and for some other points concerning these *causae* the same author's *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), p. 249, notes 29 and 35.

⁶⁰ It is possible to distinguish three *causae* in Lucretius, V, 1161-1240: 1) visions, especially dream visions of *egregiae facies*, 1169-1182 (a Democritean motif); 2) (*praeterea*) the *caeli rationes* and the alternation of the seasons *ordine certo*, 1183 ff.; cf. 1204 ff. (the development of this *causa* recalls Critias' famous fragment, *Vorsokr.*, 88B25); 3) (*praeterea*) events like lightning and thunder, gale, earthquake, 1218-1240. The last *causa* has again a Democritean basis, as Gregory Vlastos reminds me. Vlastos refers to *Vorsokr.*, 68A75 to which he adds Diodorus, I, 11, 5 (derived from a Democritean source; cf. Reinhardt as cited in note 61); on the strength of this passage and Philodemus, *De piet.*, 5a (*Vorsokr.*, *ibid.*) Vlastos suggests that the season motif too goes back to Democritus and that the emphasis on *ordo* is the only feature indicative of Academic influence.

and Moon, the covering up of one planet by another, thunder and lightning).⁶¹ In Lucretius' account of the origin of *religio* great importance is attached to the regular movements and changes in the Cosmos; yet irregular and startling events are likewise given a place among its causes.⁶²

Yet granted that Epicurus condemned the conclusions which men had drawn from the pattern of order in the firmament, could he deny or ignore the regularities? Why does the Sun rise every day *tempore certo*? Why are the various phases of the moon repeated over and over *ordine formarum certo*?⁶³ On the basis of the atomist theory it was desperately difficult to cope with these problems and one can hardly maintain that Epicurus acquitted himself of his task in a manner likely to enhance his stature as a scientist. We see him at pains to render the re-appearance of the Sun less astonishing by pointing out that regularity is found elsewhere in Nature; he asks us to remember that trees blossom at a fixed time and that a fixed law governs the growth and the development to maturity of human and other living beings.⁶⁴ Again, "why should not a fresh moon be created every day with fixed succession of phases and fixed shapes," since so many things come to pass at fixed times?⁶⁵ Among these "so many things" Lucretius gives pride of place to the Seasons whose regular recurrence he describes in verses justly famous for their beautiful imagery and the richness of their poetic colors.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Cf. Sextus, *Adv. math.*, IX, 24 (*Vorsokr.*, 68A75). Karl Reinhardt, *Hermes*, XLVII (1912), pp. 510 f. and Bailey, *ad vv.* 1183 ff., rashly identify Democritus' explanation (as recorded by Sextus) with the second *causa* of Lucretius. It is hard to see how the items adduced by Sextus could have as their common denominator *ordo certus* on which Lucretius lays stress and in which we recognize the Academic motif. See however note 60.

⁶² See the third *causa* (cf. note 60). Vv. 1191, 1193 which belong to the context of the second *causa* should probably be understood in the sense suggested by V, 675 f.: *non nimis incertis fiunt in partibus anni*; cf. VI, 357 ff.

⁶³ V, 656, 661, 667, 732.

⁶⁴ V, 669 ff., 736 ff.

⁶⁵ V, 731 ff. (I have borrowed from Bailey's translation.)

⁶⁶ Vv. 737 ff.; cf. 731 ff., 748 ff. Needless to say, for Plato the *τάξις* governing the alternation and recurrence of the *ἔργα* is another manifestation of an intelligent and divine principle in the Cosmos; see above note 57.

Yet can beauty of description make up for the weakness of the underlying theory? If we may base our judgment upon Lucretius, the best in the way of theory that Epicurus could offer to explain cosmic regularities is this:

namque ubi sic fuerunt causarum exordia prima
atque ita res mundi cecidere ab origine prima
consequē quoque iam redeunt ex ordine certo.⁶⁷

A somewhat oracular statement which seems to credit the atoms—for they must after all be responsible for the way in which *res cecidere*—with a mysterious power to effect what the philosopher cannot explain. It is tempting to comment that Epicurus here unwittingly betrays the limitations of his system, to wit the incapacity of his atomism to cope with the phenomena which the Academy ascribed to the operations of a divine Mind or Soul, phenomena whose “scientific” explanation had to wait for much later thinkers who could attack them with the help of far superior equipment. Yet this comment, while not entirely devoid of truth, would be unjust to Epicurus since it would base the verdict on Epicurus’ concept of *τάξις* on its application to cosmic phenomena which is its weakest aspect.⁶⁸

However, in crediting Epicurus with a concept of order we are probably at variance with the *opinio recepta* concerning the atomic system. The important rôle which Necessity (*ἀνάγκη*) and Chance (*τύχη*) play in the atomists’ explanation of physical events and processes is well known and not too difficult to understand;⁶⁹ but how can order arise out of the fortuitous *concursum* of atoms? The lines just quoted, however obscure and unsatisfactory the underlying thought, are perhaps sufficient to suggest

⁶⁷ V, 677 ff. *Consequē . . . redeunt*, instead of *consequiae rerum*, is a conjecture of Karl Lachmann; yet two passages in Apuleius (V, 24, X, 18) to which Lachmann refers in his famous commentary (Berlin, 1850) lend credence to the existence of the noun rather than of the adjective. The adverb seems nevertheless more satisfactory: if things have thus fallen out from the first beginnings of the world they return thereafter in a fixed sequence.

⁶⁸ It is also pertinent to remember that for the phenomena in question Epicurus makes it a point to offer a number of alternative solutions. In each instance only one of these solutions involves his problematic concept and explanation of cosmic law.

⁶⁹ Cf. Bailey, *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 142 (on Democritus), 317, 325 and *passim* (on Epicurus).

a modification of the current view—unless we resort to the desperate expedient of regarding them as Lucretius' own improvisation. Yet that the idea here expressed—or if not “expressed,” at least adumbrated—goes back to Epicurus himself is proved by its appearance in other parts of Lucretius' work. In the section of Book I which incorporates the arguments supporting the fundamental Epicurean tenet *nihil e nihilo gigni* we read:

praeterea cur vere rosam, frumenta calore,
vites autumnno fundi suadente videmus,
si non, *certa suo quia tempore semina rerum*
cum confluerunt, patefit quodcumque creatur.⁷⁰

Here and elsewhere in this section Lucretius actually proves more than that nothing can arise out of nothing. He proves that everything arises out of something definite (*certum*) and specific (*suum*).⁷¹ If we compare with the passage just quoted the reason which Lucretius gives us in Book V for the never varying reappearance of the Sun

aut quia conveniunt ignes et *semina multa*
confluere ardoris consuerunt *tempore certo* . . .
nec tamen illud in his rebus mirabile debet⁷²
esse quod haec ignis tam *certo tempore* possunt
semina confluere et solis reparare nitorem,

we realize that Epicurus applied—tentatively and indeed less successfully—to the explanation of celestial phenomena a principle that was firmly embedded in the fundamentals of his system. In fact, the principle represents his interpretation of the traditional physical axiom *οὐδὲν ἐξ οὐδενός*. It is easy to see that this interpretation makes clever use of the connotations of the word *σπέρμα* which, although a technical or semi-technical term,⁷³ had

⁷⁰ I, 174 ff.; see also 169, 203.

⁷¹ Cf. the note on v. 169 in A. Ernout and L. Robin, *Lucrèce, De R. N., Commentaire exégétique et critique* (Paris, 1926-1928, 3 vols.).

⁷² V, 660 f., 666 ff.

⁷³ On Epicurus' use of the term see Bailey, *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 343 f. There is evidence that Democritus—while making ample allowance for Chance in his cosmogony—recognized that growth from seed follows a more definite and determinate pattern. Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.*, B3, 196a24-b5; *De part. an.*, A1, 641b15-23. Sir David Ross in his commentary on the former passage (*Aristotle's Physics* [Oxford, 1936], p. 515) pertinently refers to Lucretius, I, 159-207, suggesting that

not become entirely divorced from its biological origins. In Epicurus' concept of order the biological motif predominates. Small wonder that the application of the concept to cosmic matters remains problematical.

It is curious that students of Epicurus' philosophy have given so little attention to this facet of his system.⁷⁴ Granted that the Letters and Fragments do not throw much light on this point,⁷⁵ it yet will not do to ignore Lucretius' eloquent testimony. Even if it were possible to dismiss the passages which we have adduced as insignificant or philosophically irrelevant—or, worst of all, to cling to the notion that Lucretius is for once embarking on a philosophical adventure *proprio Marte*—what justification could there be for minimizing the impressive sentence which may be looked upon as the epitome of this approach: *certum ac dispositumst ubi quicquid crescat et insit*? This proposition does not occur but may be said to be implicit in the arguments by which Lucretius supports the *nihil e nihilo*. It does occur twice in the context of a reasoning by which Lucretius proves that the only place where Soul can exist is the human body. In one of these two passages he seeks to refute the idea that the individual human soul could survive the dissolution of the body in which

Epicurus when using the growth from seed as argument for οὐδὲν ἐξ οὐθενός is in the debt of Democritus.

⁷⁴ See, however, the important *Excursus* in C. Giussani's edition (Torino, 1923), IV, pp. 169 ff. W. E. Leonard and S. B. Smith (*T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Nat. Libri Sex* [Madison, Wisc., 1942]), ad V, 677 ff. refer to their note on I, 75 in which they say that "only such things or beings exist whose parts because of natural law can harmonize and function together." This is indeed Epicurean doctrine yet in the passages which we are considering Epicurus while groping for an understanding of certain "laws of nature" is not primarily concerned with the ability of atoms to harmonize their movements and to comply with the *foedera naturai*. Robin's note on V, 677 (*op. cit.*, see note 71) is helpful, yet I am not sure that he and Giussani are correct in comparing the thought of V, 849 ff. where no *ordo certus*, no *períodos* or *τάξις* is discussed.

⁷⁵ *Ad Pyth.*, 77 *fin* (discussed by Giussani, *loc. cit.*, p. 170) is even less explicit than Lucretius, V, 677 ff.; see also *ibid.*, 97 (quoted below in note 80). The passage in the *Letter to Herodotus* which corresponds to Lucretius I, 159 f. merely states *πάν γὰρ ἐκ παντὸς ἐγένετ'* ἀν σπερμάτων οὐδὲν προσδεόμενον (38). It stands to reason that in the larger work on which Lucretius draws Epicurus developed some of the implications of this statement.

P 14945

it dwells.⁷⁶ The other passage occurs in the section of Book V in which Lucretius rejects the dogma of the divine quality of the Cosmos and its parts. More specifically his arguments are directed against the assumption of a World-Soul. This is indeed a fundamental dogma of the cosmic theology which had taken shape in the Academy—and been adopted by the Stoics,⁷⁷—and as the World-Soul had been introduced to account for the order and harmony of the Universe, especially its celestial phases,⁷⁸ the reader who bears the historical background in mind may justifiably take the view that, whoever the enemy against whom Epicurus' arguments are directed,⁷⁹ the issue is fundamentally between the Academic and the Epicurean conception of order. The fact that Epicurus here plays off his own, much less speculative, concept against the cosmic hypotheses of his adversaries gives his argument a peculiar piquancy. As we know, his concept is not founded on the harmony and the beautiful mathematical pattern of the heavenly spheres and movements, nor does it spring from the feeling of awe which fills a man while contemplating the starry heaven. It is much more empirical than the Academic or Stoic concept. Faithful to his epistemological and methodological principles, Epicurus refers to facts which are within the range of everybody's knowledge and experience.⁸⁰ Although in this passage the word *semina* does not occur and no

⁷⁶ The two passages are III, 784-805 and V, 122-143; note especially III, 787, 794 f., V, 131. On the relation between the two passages cf. Bailey's commentary (p. 1341). Vv. V, 142 f. which have a special relevance for the World-Soul do not recur in the other passage. Whether Epicurus himself used identical arguments and similar phrasing in both contexts or whether in one context he merely referred to the arguments elaborated in the other is a question which I must leave open. In any case, Bignone has proved, to my mind conclusively, that V, 128-141 have their appropriate place in Epicurus' polemic. The basic idea of V, 128-130 (III, 784-786) is close to that of I, 158 ff.

⁷⁷ Cf. Joseph Moreau, *L'Âme du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens* (Paris, 1939). See also above, note 10.

⁷⁸ *Tim.*, 30A f., 34B-39E; *Laws*, 896C ff.

⁷⁹ See above, p. 3.

⁸⁰ Cf. especially *Epist. ad Pyth.*, 97 (rightly quoted by Bailey, p. 1441, as throwing light on V, 731 ff.): ἔτι τε τάκτις περιόδου καθάπερ ἓνια καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν τῶν τυχόντων γίνεται λαμβανέσθω. Epicurus goes on to say, and we know against whom this is pointed, καὶ ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῇ προσαγέσθω κτλ.

reference is made to the growth of plants from a definite seed, the thought is basically the same as in the passage of Book I in which Lucretius argues that if anything could arise from nothing, i. e. could arise anywhere, *nil semine egeret*:

quippe etenim non est, cum quovis corpore ut esse
 posse animi natura putetur consiliumque;
 sicut in aethere non arbor, non aequore salso
 nubes esse queunt neque pisces vivere in arvis
 nec cruor in lignis neque saxis sucus inesse.
 certum ac dispositumst ubi quicquid crescat et insit.
 sic animi natura nequit sine corpore oriri
 sola neque a nervis et sanguine longius esse.⁸¹

FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

⁸¹ V, 126-133.

THE PRYTANEION DECREE RE-EXAMINED.*

After a lull of several years, the discussion about the exegetai has, in recent years, developed into a full-fledged controversy.¹ While our sources, both literary and epigraphical, give us some information about the functions and nature of these officials in the fourth century and later,² such information is most meager for their rôle in the history of Athens in the fifth century and earlier periods. For the fifth century, we have one inscriptional record of exegesis practised by the Eumolpids;³ but since this was confined to the Eleusinian rites alone, it does not help much in an attempt to ascertain the existence of public exegetai with partly secular functions in that period.

In all these discussions and those which preceded them,⁴ a prominent place is given to an inscription from the fifth century⁵ which is of considerable interest from many points of view. It contains a decree conferring the privilege of public maintenance in the Prytaneion at Athens on several groups of people and is the earliest record we possess of the award of this privilege on a permanent basis. The conjecture that the name of Pericles can be restored from the defective lettering as that of

* For many valuable suggestions the author wishes to express his thanks to Professors John Day and James H. Oliver.

¹ The most recent contributions are: Kurt von Fritz, "Atthidographers and Exegetae," in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXI (1940), pp. 91-126; Felix Jacoby, *Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford, 1949); James H. Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law* (Baltimore, 1950).

² The earliest literary evidence on the exegetai as officials is found in Plato, *Euthyphro*, 4 C-D; Isaeus, VIII, 39; [Demosthenes], XLVII, 68-71. The Eumolpid exegetai are officials in a different sense; see James H. Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

³ *I. G.*, I², 76. About another reference to exegesis in fifth century inscriptions (*I. G.*, I², 78) see below.

⁴ Notably those of Philipp Ehrmann, "De iuris sacri interpretibus Atticis," in *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, IV, 3 (1908), and Axel W. Persson, "Die Exegeten und Delphi," in *Lunds Universitets Årsskrift*, N. F., Avd. 1, Bd. XIV, no. 22 (1918).

⁵ It is most easily accessible in Hiller von Gaertringen's rendering in *I. G.*, I², 77. Its most recent publication is that of James H. Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-141.

the originator of the decree ⁶ only enhances its intrinsic interest. It is here, too, that we learn for the first time that at Athens honours were not given to the victors in the Olympic and Isthmian games alone,^{6a} but also to those who emerged victoriously from the Pythian and Nemean contests. But, although this part of the inscription can be read with some certainty, it is more difficult to identify other groups that were honoured by maintenance in the Prytaneion. For the stone is so badly broken on the left side that about one half of the original inscription is lost, and absolute certainty cannot be attained by restoration. Thus it is self-evident that the element of conjecture looms large in any attempt at restoration.

The lettering leaves no doubt that the inscription belongs to the fifth century, and the date has been variously fixed from the early 430's ⁷ to the period of the Archidamian War.⁸ The style is strict *στοιχηδόν*, except in line 12 where the mason corrected a mistake,⁹ and there are 45 letters to the line.¹⁰

I propose to read as follows:

ἐγγραμ[μάτευε]

[ἔδοχσεν τῷ βολεῖ καὶ τῷ δέμ]οι, Ἑρεχθεὺς ἐ[πρυτάνευε, ¹]
 [...?...] ἐγγραμμάτευε, Χσάν[θιππος ἐπεστάτε, [. ² .]ικ[λ]ες [ε-]
 [ἴπε· ἔναι τὸν οἴτεσιν τὸν ἐ]μ πρυτανεῖοι πρότον μὲν τῷ [h-]
 5 [ιεροφάντει γενομένοι κ]ατὰ τὰ π[ά]τρια· ἔπειτα τοῖσι Ἀρμ-
 [οδίῳ καὶ τοῖσι Ἀριστογέ]τονος, ἧδὲ ἄν τῷ ἐγγυτάτῳ γένος

⁶ H. T. Wade-Gery, *B. S. A.*, XXXIII (1932-1933), pp. 123-125.

^{6a} Plutarch, *Solon*, 23, 3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 126. Felix Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 237, note 3, wants to date the decree even earlier. He assumes the Athenian expedition to Delphi in 448/7 B. C. as the *terminus post quem* and puts the date tentatively in the second half of the forties.

⁸ Hiller von Gaertringen, *I. G.*, I², 77.

⁹ See the photograph and its caption in Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

¹⁰ The length of the lacuna at the beginning of the line can be determined by the certain restoration of the formulaic [ἔδοχσεν τῷ βολεῖ καὶ τῷ δέμ]οι in line 2. The end of the line is preserved intact in lines 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10. Although Schöhl in *Hermes*, VI (1872), p. 31, arrives at the same number, I do not understand his argument: "Da die erste durch eine schmale Linie von den folgenden isolirte Zeile, die in etwas grösseren Charakteren Reste von ΕΑΡΑΜ zeigt, nur den dem Dekret vorgesetzten Namen des Schreibers enthielt, so lässt sich die Breite der Zeile genau auf 45 Buchstaben, also ziemlich das Doppelte des jetzt Erhaltenen bestimmen." This may work in determining the length of the last part of the line; but how can we know the number of letters contained in the name preceding ἐγγραμμάτευε?

[ἀεὶ ὁ πρεσβύτατος, ἔναι κ]αὶ αὐτοῖσι τὲν σίτεσι[ν κ]αὶ ἐ[κ-]
 [γόνουσι ἡνπάρχεν δορεῖα]ν παρὰ Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὰ [δ]εδομ-
 10 [ένα· καὶ τὸν μάντεον ἡδὲ δ]ν ὁ Ἀπόλλων ἀνῆλ[ει] ἐχ[σ]εγόμε-
 [νος τὰ νόμιμα λαβὲν πάντα]ς σίτεσιν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὲ ἂν
 [ἀνῆλ[ει] τὲν σίτεσιν ἔναι] αὐτοῖσι κατὰ ταῦτά. κα[ὶ] ἡχοσό-
 [οι νενικέκασι Ὀλυμπίασι] ἔ Πυθοῖ ἔ ἡἸσθμοῖ ἔ Νεμέ[αι τὸς γ-]
 [υμνικὸς ἀγῶνας, ἔναι αὐτ]οῖσι τὲν σίτεσιν ἐν πρυτανε[ίῳ-]
 15 [ι καὶ ἄλλας ἰδίαι τιμὰς π]ρὸς τῇ σιτέσει κατὰ τα[ύτά·] ἐ[πε-]
 [ῖτα λαβὲν τὲν σίτεσιν ἐν] τῷ πρυτανείῳ ἡο[π]όσο[ι τεθρί-]
 [πποι τελεῖοι ἔ ἡίπποι κ]έλετι νεν[κ]έκασι Ὀλυμπ[ί]ασι ἔ Π-]
 [υθοῖ ἔ ἡἸσθμοῖ ἔ Νεμέαι ἔ] νικέσοσι τὸ λοιπό[ν·] ἐναι [δὲ αὐτ-]
 [οῖσι τὰς τιμὰς κατὰ τὰ ἐς τ]ὲν στέλε[ν] γεγραμ[μ]ένα...⁶...
²².....¹¹.....
 20²³.....δορεῖαν κ.....¹⁴.....
²³.....δε -----

As any attempt at restoration has to proceed from the preserved part of the inscription, the following observations should be made:

1. *ν-ἑφελκυστικόν* does not occur in the legible portions of the inscription, neither before vowels nor before consonants; neither in the dative plural (lines 5, 7, 11, 13) nor in the third person plural (lines 16 and 17). If, as I believe, Wade-Gery's reading in line 9 ¹¹ ἀνῆλ[ε]ν is incorrect, ἔδοχε in line 2 would be the only exception. However, as the expression in which it occurs is formulaic, and as all the Athenian inscriptions listed in the *Corpus* for the years 446/5 to 422/1 B. C.¹² in which the formula occurs ¹³ have the *ν-ἑφελκυστικόν*, we are not dealing with a real exception here.

ν-ἑφελκυστικόν occurs more rarely before 403 B. C. than in the inscriptions after that date; ¹⁴ but where it is used, it may or may not recur in the same inscription, regardless of whether a vowel or a consonant follows.¹⁵ This might tempt us to posit similar inconsistencies in the Prytaneion decree and to use the

¹¹ Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

¹² *I. G.*, I², 39-80.

¹³ *I. G.*, I², 39, 1; 52, 11; 56, 9; 57, 3, 32, [57]; 60, [3]; 63, 3, [54]; 65, [3]; 68, [4]; 70, [4]; 72, [1]; 76, 2; 78, [2]; 80, [1].

¹⁴ K. Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, 3rd ed. by E. Schwyzler (Berlin, 1900), pp. 113-114.

¹⁵ Examples from two fairly well preserved inscriptions of the same period may suffice: in *I. G.*, I², 39, we find the *ν-ἑφελκυστικόν* before a vowel in lines 19, 26, 48, 54, and 73; but it is missing before a vowel in

ν-ἐφέλκυστικόν in restorations. However, while in the inscriptions cited inconsistencies follow one another in rapid succession, its complete absence in the preserved part of our inscription is more likely to indicate that it was carefully avoided and should caution us not to use it in any restorations here.

2. The grant of the privilege of maintenance in the Prytaneion is motivated for each group upon which it is bestowed by a phrase beginning with κατά.¹⁶ This phrase always appears at the end of the sentence in which the grant is made: e. g. line 5: [κ]ατὰ τὰ π[ά]τρια; lines 8-9: κατὰ τὰ [δ]εδομ[ένα];¹⁷ line 11: κατὰ ταῦτά; line 14: κατὰ τα[ύτά]; line 18: [κατὰ τὰ ἐς τ]ὴν στέλε[ν] γεγραμ[μ]ένα.

3. The groups honoured are introduced by the article or by a relative pronoun, e. g. lines 4, 5, 11, and 15.

4. In the case of the group appointed by Apollo (line 10) and in the case of the victors in the hippic contests (line 17), the privilege is awarded to those honoured *and* their successors.

With this in mind, we may now turn to a discussion of the restorations proposed. For the introductory part (lines 1-4), the restorations are based on constantly recurring formulae; they can, therefore, be regarded as certain¹⁸ and have found general acceptance since Schöll. The name of the γραμματεὺς is lost and all we know is that it contained eight letters. The name of Xanthippus as the chairman of the prytanes has been generally accepted since Schöll and there is no objection to retaining his name as possible, although we know nothing else about the man.¹⁹ Wade-Gery's belief²⁰ that Pericles proposed the decree

line 45; again, it is found preceding a consonant in lines 15 and 52, but is missing before a consonant in lines 25, 50, and 58. In *I. G.*, I², 76, we find the ν before a vowel in lines 10, 18, 19, 31, and 43; in the same line 31 it is missing before a vowel, also in lines 15, 30, and 46; it occurs before a consonant in line 30, but does not in lines 13, 30, and 44.

¹⁶ This was already recognized by Schöll, *Hermes*, VI (1872), pp. 34-35.

¹⁷ About the award to the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton ending here, see below.

¹⁸ Cf. James H. Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

¹⁹ See J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica*, II (Berlin, 1903), no. 11161.

²⁰ H. T. Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-125. Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 139,

is neither supported nor contradicted by any external evidence.²¹

There can be no doubt that the first group upon whom the privilege of maintenance in the Prytaneion is conferred includes Eleusinian priests. The phrase *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια* which motivates the award strongly suggests a group of religious functionaries. For, although the phrase means no more than "in accordance with ancestral custom," it is found in Greek literature as well as in inscriptions very frequently in a religious context.²² Moreover, a number of inscriptions from the second century of our era have come down to us²³ in which the Eleusinian *ιεροφάντης*, *δαδούχος*, *ιεροκῆρυξ*, and the *ιερεὺς ἐπὶ βωμῷ* are prominently enumerated among the *αἵτιοι*. These officials might be subsumed under the designation *ιερείς*, and Schöll's suggestion, *τοῖ[σιν] ἱερεῦσι τοῖν θεοῖν* makes good sense and has been generally

mistakenly indicates four letters instead of three as missing before *ικ[λ]ες*.

²¹ Wade-Gery's reading of Pericles' name was accepted by F. Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 8 and 238, note 4.

²² In the inscriptions of the fifth century, it occurs exclusively in a religious context: *I. G.*, I², 76 (the decree concerns first-offerings to be dedicated at Eleusis), line 4: *ἀπάρχεσθαι τοῖν θεοῖν τῷ καρπῷ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*, cf. line 26; line 11: *οικοδομῆσαι δὲ σιρὸς τρεῖς Ἐλευσίνι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*; *I. G.*, I², 80 (a sacred law), line 8: [*ἀμφιένυσθαι τὸ ἥδος*] *τῆς θεῆς κατὰ τὰ πάτρι[α καὶ τὴν μαντεῖαν τῷ θεῷ]*; cf. line 13: [*τάδε*] *πάτρια Πραχσ[ιεργιδαις]*. Concerning literature, two statistics from Attic historiography may suffice: out of a total of 20 passages containing *πάτριος* and its forms in Thucydides, 7 deal with religious observances: II, 16, 2; 34, 1; III, 58, 5; IV, 98, 8; 118, 1; 118, 3; V, 18, 2. In Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*, *πάτριος*, etc. is used 7 times in a political or judicial sense and 5 times in connection with religion: *ibid.*, 3, 2; 3, 3; 21, 6; 39, 2; 57, 1. Particularly interesting for our purposes here is 39, 2 on the settlement regarding Eleusis after the overthrow of the Thirty: *τὸ δ' ἱερὸν εἶναι κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δὲ Κήρυκας καὶ Εὐμολπίδας κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*. In view of the fact that neither of these works specifically deals with religion, I find these figures remarkable.

²³ *I. G.*, II², 1769, 1773-1777, 1779, 1781-1782, 1788-1790, 1792, 1794-1798, 1800, etc.—These inscriptions are already cited by Schöll, *Hermes*, VI, p. 15, who also refers to the story related by Plutarch, *Quaestiones Convivales*, IV, 4, 1, p. 667 d, according to which Celeus, the founder of the Demeter cult at Eleusis (cf. [Homer], *Hymn to Demeter*, 296-298, 473-479 and *passim*), was the first to organize daily common meals for distinguished men and to call this assembly *πρυτανεῖον*.—To the inscriptions cited by Schöll add *Hesperia* XI (1942), nos. 6, 13, 18, 21, 36, and 84.

accepted to fill the gap at the end of line 4 and the beginning of 5. The cult of Demeter and Kore at Eleusis was the family cult *par excellence* which had been taken over by the Athenian state after the war with Eleusis and was open to all Greeks.²⁴ As a result its priests, who were chiefly drawn from the families of the Kerykes and the Eumolpids, enjoyed a privileged position in relation to the state,²⁵ and they were doubtless granted the privilege of maintenance in the Prytaneion at an early date.

The only objection to Schöll's restoration lies in his use of the ν - $\epsilon\phi\epsilon\lambda\kappa\nu\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ in the article; for, as has been observed, this phenomenon does not occur in the preserved portions of the inscription. As an alternative, $\tau\omicron\iota\iota[\sigma\iota \epsilon\nu \text{ '}\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu\iota \text{ '}\eta\epsilon\rho\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota]$ might be suggested to fill the gap, but a preposition is not found before $\text{'}\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu\iota$ until 315/14 B. C.²⁶ Another restoration consisting of 20 letters and comprising the whole group of Eleusinian priests I could not find.

In order to arrive at some conclusion, albeit conjectural, we shall have to examine the occurrence of $\delta\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\tau\omicron\iota$ ²⁷ in later inscriptions, especially in its relation to the Eleusinian priesthood. After the date of our inscription, there is a period of almost two hundred years from which we do have decrees granting permanent maintenance to certain individuals and their descendants as a token of honour, but none that mention priests or officials. Toward the middle of the third century B. C., the $\delta\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\tau\omicron\iota$ appear in two prytany lists as heading the citation of the treasurer,²⁸ but we learn nothing as to how they were constituted. Nor do we learn more about them when, from the last decade of the third pre-Christian century on, they are mentioned fairly regu-

²⁴ See especially the decree about the first-offerings, *I. G.*, I², 76.

²⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, 39, 2 and 42, 5.

²⁶ K. Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, 3rd ed. by E. Schwyzler, p. 208, where the earliest inscription quoted is *I. G.*, II², 2971; see Liddell and Scott, new edition, s. v. $\text{'}\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\varsigma$.

²⁷ For the present purposes, I accept Szanto's definition of $\delta\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\tau\omicron\iota$ as given in *R.-E.*, I, col. 478: "Diejenigen Teilnehmer an der Staatstafel nun, welche Beamte oder Priester, aber nicht Prytanen und nicht Ehrengäste sind, heissen nach einem späteren Sprachgebrauch $\delta\epsilon\lambda\sigma\iota\tau\omicron\iota$."

²⁸ S. Dow, *Prytaneis, A Study of the Inscriptions Honoring the Athenian Councillors* (= *Hesperia*, Suppl. I [1937]), p. 22 and no. 9, 89 and *I. G.*, II², 678, both of ca. 260/59 B. C.

larly in the main text of the prytany lists together with the prytanes,²⁹ although some very plausible inferences have been drawn about their identity.³⁰ The Eleusinian priests are not yet mentioned.

From about the middle of the third century of our era,³¹ the names and positions of the *ἀτῆται* are regularly appended to the official prytany lists, and it is here that we get for the first time definite information about their identity. In general, two groups of *ἀτῆται* can be distinguished in these lists. The first of these includes the *κῆρυξ βουλῆς καὶ δήμου*,³² the *γραμματεὺς βουλῆς καὶ δήμου*,³³ also simply referred to as *γραμματεὺς*,³⁴ the *περὶ τὸ βῆμα*,³⁵

²⁹ The earliest of these lists is *I. G.*, II², 912, 6 (= Dow, *Prytaneis*, no. 39) of 210/09-201/0 B. C. In the same period falls Dow, no. 40, 22, more fully restored by B. Meritt in *Hesperia*, XVII (1948), p. 15, no. 6, 36. For the second century B. C. see Dow, nos. 44, 6; 46, 19 (= *I. G.*, II², 864); 47, 6; 64, 31; 71, 14; 75 (= *I. G.*, II², 952, 6); 77 (= *I. G.*, II², 918, 2); 78, 2; 79, 42-43; 84, 48; 86, 6; *Hesperia*, XVII (1948), pp. 17-19, no. 9, 42; Dow, no. 95, 5. For the first century B. C., *Hesperia*, XVII (1948), p. 30, no. 14, 7-8; A. Raubitschek in *Hesperia*, XII (1943), p. 57, no. 14, 10; Dow, no. 112, 1; *I. G.*, II², 1048, 2; Dow, nos. 114, 2-3; 115, 2. For the first century of our era, *I. G.*, II², 1070, 2; J. H. Oliver in *Hesperia*, XI (1942), p. 37, no. 7, 2-3. For the remainder of the lists of the second and third centuries of our era see note 23 and below.

³⁰ S. Dow, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-24.

³¹ Perhaps already from the end of the first century of our era on, if Oliver's date for a fragment published as no. 2 in *Hesperia*, XI (1942), pp. 31-32, is correct.

³² *I. G.*, II², 1765, 1768, 1773-1775; *Hesperia*, XI (1942), pp. 50-51, no. 18; *I. G.*, II², 1776, 1781, 1790, 1794, 1795, 1798; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 32-33, no. 4; pp. 35-37, no. 6; pp. 70-71, no. 36. Here and in the following notes the inscriptions are cited in approximate chronological order.

³³ *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 40-43, no. 11; pp. 44-45, no. 13; *I. G.*, II², 1769; *Hesperia*, XII (1943), pp. 76-78, no. 23; *I. G.*, II², 1773-1775; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 50-51, no. 18; *I. G.*, II², 1776, 1781, 1789; *Hesperia*, XVI (1947), pp. 182-183, no. 87 B; *I. G.*, II², 1794-1798; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 35-37, no. 6 and pp. 70-71, no. 36.

³⁴ *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 31-32, no. 2; p. 32, no. 3; pp. 34-35, no. 5; XVI, pp. 182-183, no. 87 A.

³⁵ *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 40-43, no. 11; XVI, p. 176, no. 78; *I. G.*, II², 1773, 1775; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 50-51, no. 18; *I. G.*, II², 1776, 1781, 1790, 1794-1796, 1798; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 32-33, no. 4; pp. 34-35, no. 5; pp. 35-37, no. 6; pp. 70-71, no. 36.

the *ιεραύλης*,³⁶ the *υπογραμματεὺς*,³⁷ the *ἀντιγραφεὺς*,³⁸ and the *ἐπὶ σκιαδός*,³⁹ who is probably identical with the *ιερεὺς Φωσφόρων*.⁴⁰ The names of these officials vary from year to year and it can therefore be assumed that they enjoyed maintenance for the duration of their office only.⁴¹

The second group of *ἀσπιτοι* comprises the Eleusinian priests who, according to the generally accepted reading of the Prytaneion decree, received permanent maintenance in the Prytaneion as far back as the fifth century B. C. If they were publicly maintained in the second century of our era for their term of office only, as the other officials were, we must not forget that the *ιεροφάντης*⁴² and the *ιεροκῆρυξ*⁴³ were elected for life and, though we have no evidence to prove it, it would only be natural to

³⁶ *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 40-43, no. 11; XVI, p. 176, no. 78; XII, pp. 76-78, no. 23; *I. G.*, II², 1773-1775; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 50-51, no. 18; *I. G.*, II², 1776, 1781, 1794-1798; *Hesperia*, XVI, pp. 182-183, nos. 87 B and A; XI, pp. 34-37, nos. 5 and 6; pp. 57-58, no. 23; pp. 70-71, no. 36.

³⁷ *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 31-32, no. 2; *I. G.*, II², 1773-1775; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 50-51, no. 18; *I. G.*, II², 1776, 1781; *Hesperia*, XVI, pp. 182-183, no. 87 B; *I. G.*, II², 1794, 1795, 1798; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 35-37, no. 6; pp. 57-58, nos. 23 and 24; pp. 70-71, no. 36.

³⁸ *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 31-32, no. 2; pp. 40-43, no. 11; pp. 44-45, no. 13; XVI, p. 176, no. 78; XI, p. 32, no. 3; XII, pp. 76-78, no. 23; *I. G.*, II², 1773-1775; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 50-51, no. 18; *I. G.*, II², 1776, 1781; *Hesperia*, XVI, pp. 182-183, no. 87 B; *I. G.*, II², 1794-1798; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 57-58, nos. 23 and 24; pp. 32-37, nos. 4-6; pp. 70-71, no. 36.

³⁹ *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 40-43, no. 11; XII, pp. 76-78, no. 23; *I. G.*, II², 1774, 1775; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 50-51, no. 18; *I. G.*, II², 1776, 1790, 1794-1798; *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 34-37, nos. 5 and 6; pp. 70-71, no. 36.

⁴⁰ *Hesperia*, XI, pp. 57-58, nos. 23 and 24; XVI, pp. 182-183, no. 87 B. Cf. *I. G.*, II², 1795, 1796, and 1798.

⁴¹ Cf. Dow, *Prytaneis*, pp. 22-24. Dow's view that the *ἀσπιτοι* (*del* = "for the term of office") received their maintenance in the Tholos together with the prytanes for the duration of their office only and that they are to be distinguished from those who received permanent maintenance in the Prytaneion is in all probability true for these officials only and not for the Eleusinian priests, whom Dow, *ibid.*, p. 23 with note 5, omits from his citation of Schöll's restoration of the Prytaneion decree. For the names of the Eleusinian *ἀσπιτοι* in these lists remain the same over an extended period of time.

⁴² Pausanias, II, 14, as cited by Paul Foucart, *Les Mystères d'Éleusis* (Paris, 1914), p. 171.

⁴³ Paul Foucart, *op. cit.*, p. 203. Cf. also James H. Oliver in *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XLIII (1950), pp. 233-235.

expect the *δαδούχος* and the *ἐπὶ βωμῷ* to be appointed for a similar period of time. However, if we accept the restoration of all four Eleusinian priests, one remarkable feature in the *ἀΐουροι* lists of the Empire remains to be explained. When the Eleusinian priests are mentioned in these lists, we find frequent omissions: the earliest lists omit the *ἐπὶ βωμῷ* altogether;⁴⁴ in three instances, the *δαδούχος* is left out;⁴⁵ and twice the *ιεροκῆρυξ* does not appear.⁴⁶ Unless we assume that these omissions were made inadvertently or that their names are simply lost from the stones, which is unlikely to have happened in all these cases, we must conclude that not all the Eleusinian priests in the second century received the privilege of maintenance in the Prytaneion at all times. The only Eleusinian priest who is never omitted from the list is the *ιεροφάντης*, and it is, therefore, likely that he was the only member of this group for whom maintenance in the Prytaneion was already established; in that case, it was he who was originally awarded this privilege, which was later extended to the other Eleusinian priests, too, perhaps not until the second century of our era. This assumption receives further support from the fact that the *ιεροφάντης* was, in classical times, the only member of the Eleusinian priesthood who was a priest and a magistrate at the same time.⁴⁷ If the privilege was originally his, the Prytaneion decree probably mentioned him alone of this group, and we may restore him in our inscription. The exact form in which he was mentioned must remain doubtful; I have not found any instances in which a descriptive genitive, such as *τοῖν θεοῖν* or *μυστηρίων*, either of which would fill the lacuna, is added to the title, and have, therefore suggested a less colorful participle in the text.

The second group upon whom the privilege of public maintenance in the Prytaneion is bestowed are the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. This was already recognized by Keil⁴⁸ on the basis of the preserved *-τονος* in line 6, and because

⁴⁴ *I. G.*, II², 1769, 1773, 1774; *Hesperia*, XI, nos. 13 and 6; XVI, no. 84.

⁴⁵ *I. G.*, II², 1795; *Hesperia*, XVI, no. 84; XI, no. 6.

⁴⁶ *Hesperia*, XVI, no. 84; *I. G.*, II², 1794.

⁴⁷ Paul Foucart, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

⁴⁸ As quoted by R. Schöll, *Hermes*, VI (1872), p. 32. Schöll's restoration, *ibid.*, p. 33, of lines 5-6: *ἔπειτα τοῖς (π)αρ[ὰ Ἀρμοδίων καὶ Ἀριστο-*

the grant of the privilege is attested for them by Isaeus⁴⁹ and Dinarchus.⁵⁰ What has been and still is controversial is where the sentence bestowing the privilege upon them ends. Bannier⁵¹ wants to end it after *κατὰ ταῦτά* in line 11, and he is followed by Hiller von Gaertringen in the *Corpus*. An objection to that is the inordinate length of the resulting sentence and, furthermore, it is not clear what exactly Apollo should have to do with the grant to the descendants of the tyrannicides. Moreover, Oliver⁵² rightly objects that the reference to the future in line 10 would be inappropriate at that place for them. But his own solution to end the award after *τὲν σίτεσι*[ν] in line 7 is equally unfortunate. For, as we have observed, the privilege bestowed upon each group in the inscription is motivated by a phrase beginning with *κατά* which is placed at the end of each sentence. Schöll⁵³ correctly recognized that "in *κατὰ τὰ δεδ.* findet das vorhergehende *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια* seine Entsprechung und das in der Folge wiederholte *κατὰ ταῦτά* seine Beziehung," and Wade-Gery⁵⁴ and Jacoby⁵⁵ rightly accepted his view. Bannier⁵⁶ felt that this phrase in itself is insufficient and suggested the alternatives: *κατὰ τε* [τ]ὰ [ν]ομ[ιζόμενα καὶ (τῇν) μαντείαν ἣ]ν ὁ Ἀπόλλων ἀνείλ[ε] or *κατὰ τὰ τε νομ[ιζόμενα καὶ ἣν μαντεία]*ν ὁ Ἀπ. κτλ. The substitution of *τά τε νομιζόμενα* for *τὰ δεδομένα* as well as Schöll's alternative *δεδογμένα*⁵⁷ is contradicted by the stone;⁵⁸ but Hiller von Gaertringen, and Oliver too,⁵⁹ thought *τὰ δεδομένα* to be inadequate by itself and supplied [*κατὰ τὲν μαντείαν ἡ*]ν after it. Although this is not untranslatable, it is, in Jacoby's words,⁶⁰

γελ[τονος] is incorrect because of the wrong form of the article and was rejected by Hiller von Gaertringen.

⁴⁹ Isaeus, V, 47.

⁵⁰ Dinarchus, I, 101.

⁵¹ W. Bannier, *B. Phil. Woch.*, XXXVII (1917), pp. 1216-1217.

⁵² James H. Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, p. 141.

⁵³ Schöll, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

⁵⁴ H. T. Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁵⁵ F. Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 8.

⁵⁶ Bannier, *op. cit.*

⁵⁷ Schöll, *Hermes*, VI, p. 34.

⁵⁸ So Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, p. 126, note 1; Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 238, note 5.

⁵⁹ Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

⁶⁰ Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 238, note 5.

"hardly Greek." For, when the Delphic oracle enters into a *κατά*-phrase in inscriptions, the Greek runs: *κατὰ τὰ πατέρα καὶ τὸν μητέρα*,⁶¹ which restoration here would fall short by one letter. Moreover, I can see no reason why the phrase *κατὰ τὰ δεδομένα*, which I would freely translate "according to the terms on which (the privilege) was granted," should not be sufficiently clear by itself as a motivation.

It remains now to fill the lacunae in lines 7 and 8 in a convincing manner. The testimony of the orators⁶² makes it clear beyond doubt that the privilege was given to the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton for all time to come. As the original award was in all probability made soon after the overthrow of the tyrants, we should expect to find in our inscription a reference to the descendants living at the time the decree was passed as well as to their successors. The stone supplies *ἡς ἀν εἰ ἐγγυράτω γένος* as a most important clue toward a solution. Schöhl⁶³ read this phrase *ὅς ἀν ἡ ἐγγυράτω γένους* and believed it to be sufficient to designate the eldest surviving relative; for the beginning of line 7 he reluctantly suggested the neat restoration *ἡνιὸν γεστόν με ὄντον* which, though he considered it redundant,⁶⁴ would supply the motive why a close relative rather than a son should receive public maintenance. Both readings have since then found general acceptance. Still, there remain some difficulties in this reading. In the first place, even though it is unlikely that young Harmodius was married and had children, we have no evidence that Aristogeiton, too, had no male offspring. Secondly, I am not sure whether in a decree which, after all, is legally binding, the clipped *ἡς ἀν εἰ ἐγγυράτω γένος* would in itself make clear that the eldest surviving male relative is meant.

Fortunately, a number of honorary decrees from later times⁶⁵ have come down to us, in which maintenance in the Prytaneion is given to certain benefactors and their descendants. The

⁶¹ E. g. *I. G.*, I², 76, 4-5, 25-26, 34; *I. G.*, I², 80, 8.

⁶² See above, notes 49 and 50. Cf. also Demosthenes, XX, 18, 29, 127 ff., 159-160; XXI, 170; XXIII, 143.

⁶³ Schöhl, *Hermes*, VI, pp. 32-34.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 34, note 2.

⁶⁵ The earliest of them, *I. G.*, II², 510, comes from the end of the fourth century B. C.

formula that constantly recurs in these decrees runs: εἶναι δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ σίτησιν ἐν πρυτανείῳ καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκγόνων ἀεὶ τῷ πρεσβυτάτῳ.⁶⁶

That a phrase of this kind is much more explicit and unambiguous than ἡδὲ ἂν εἰ ἐγγυτάτο γένος alone goes without saying, and we should perhaps expect to find a similar phrase in our fifth century decree. In attempting to make the restoration, we must remind ourselves once again that the privilege is granted throughout the decree for the present and for the future: κατὰ τὰ πάτρια in line 5 includes past, present, and future, and τὸ λοιπὸν in lines 10 and 17 shows that the award is made there on a similar basis. Those who receive maintenance for the present are, in a sense, already successors: they are the eldest male descendants of the families of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and their descendants in turn are granted the privilege for the future. I am convinced that the latter are cited in the word beginning with ε, the second last letter of line 7,⁶⁷ and therefore propose to read lines 5-9: ἔπειτα τοῖσι Ἀρμ[οδίου καὶ τοῖσι Ἀριστογέ]τονος, ἡδὲ ἂν εἰ ἐγγυτάτο⁶⁸ γένος|[ἀεὶ—OR νῦν?—]ὁ πρεσβύτατος, εἶναι κ[αὶ αὐτοῖσι τὸν σίτησιν] ν κ[αὶ ἐκγόνοις] ὑπάρχεν⁶⁹ δορεῖά ν παρὰ Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὰ [δ]εδομ[ένα]. In this form, the phrasing not only gains in clarity, but corresponds more exactly to the usage in similar later decrees. The motivation ἡνιῶν γνησίων μὲ ὄντων is eliminated, to be sure, but Schöll himself considered it redundant, and as we saw, we have no indication whether Aristogeiton had sons or not. If Aristogeiton had sons, the phrase ἡδὲ ἂν εἰ ἐγγυτάτο γένος was added to define the grant to Harmodius' relatives only.

The identification of the next group, lines 9-11, has been the subject of the most heated controversy. The crux is that we

⁶⁶ See W. Larfeld, *Handbuch der griechischen Epigraphik*, I (Leipzig, 1907), p. 519; II (1902), pp. 780-781.—The second καὶ αὐτῷ is sometimes left out.

⁶⁷ Schöll's restoration, *op. cit.*, p. 35: ἐ[ς τὸ λοιπὸν] ὑπάρχεν δορεῖά ν, which was accepted by Hiller von Gaertringen, E. Preuner in *Hermes*, LXI (1926), p. 471, and by Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 8, was rightly rejected by Oliver, *The Athenian Epigraphers*, p. 140, on comparison with lines 10 and 17.

⁶⁸ Conventional spelling: ἐγγυτάτου γένους.

⁶⁹ The restoration, which I took from Schöll and Hiller von Gaertringen, makes here room for the aspiration in ὑπάρχεν which they had to omit.

have no strong external evidence to tell us what group of people in the fifth century might be selected by Apollo for the privilege. Briefly, two opposing camps of opinion exist: those who believe that the exegetai—or, to be more specific the ἐξηγηταὶ πυθόχρηστοι—are mentioned here and those who do not. Of the scholars who discussed the Prytaneion decree most recently, Jacoby belongs to the former camp and Oliver to the latter.

Schöll, who did the pioneer work toward any understanding of the decree, was the first to see the exegetai in this inscription in line 9 and to identify them with the ἐξηγηταὶ πυθόχρηστοι.⁷⁰ In his earlier discussion of the inscription, he arrived at this conclusion by correctly recognizing the word ἐχσεγομέ|νος at the end of line 9,⁷¹ and he read lines 9-11: (καὶ ἐξηγητὰς οὗς ἄ)ν ὁ (Ἄ)πόλλων ἀνέλ[η] ἐ(ξ)ηγουμέ(νους τὰ πάτρια, λαβεῖν πάντα)ς—Οἱ τούτου)ς—σίτησιν· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὁ(ς) ἄν (γένηται ? τὴν σίτησιν εἶναι) αὐτοῖσι κατὰ ταῦτά. To support the restoration of the exegetai, Schöll adduced, in a later discussion, the additional arguments that Lampon was exegetes and enjoyed maintenance in the Prytaneion and that the same was true of Hierocles.⁷² As a parallel for the linguistic usage οὗς ἄν ἡ Ἀπόλλων ἀνέλη, Schöll cited two passages from Plato's *Laws* concerning the exegetai. In one of these passages,⁷³ purification rites in cases of murder are assigned to the exegetai with the words τούτων δ' ἐξηγητὰς εἶναι κυρίους οὗς ἄν ὁ θεὸς ἀνέλη; while the second passage⁷⁴ describes the method of electing the exegetai and Delphi's rôle in the procedure. On this basis, he believed the exegetai in our inscription to be the same as those of Plato's *Laws*, and he identified both with the ἐξηγηταὶ πυθόχρηστοι which are mentioned in later times by lexicographers and in inscriptions.

Ehrmann⁷⁵ accepted Schöll's restoration of the exegetai with one slight reservation: "*etiamsi* ἐξηγηταὶ οὗς ἄν ὁ Ἀπόλλων ἀνέλη

⁷⁰ R. Schöll, *Hermes*, VI (1872), pp. 35-37; *Hermes*, XXII (1887), pp. 562-565.

⁷¹ *Hermes*, VI, pp. 36-37.

⁷² *Hermes*, XXII, pp. 563-564.

⁷³ Plato, *Laws*, IX, 865 D, cited in *Hermes*, VI, p. 36.

⁷⁴ Plato, *Laws*, VI, 759 D-E, cited in *Hermes*, VI, p. 36 and XXII, p. 564.

⁷⁵ Philipp Ehrmann, "De iuris sacri interpretibus Atticis," p. 368 (= 22).

inusitata est forma pro ἐξηγηταὶ πυθόχρηστοι." Persson⁷⁶ also found himself in agreement with Schöll, although, in line 10, he preferred to substitute νόμιμα for Schöll's πάτρια. Preuner⁷⁷ went a step further: as the view that there were three ἐξηγηταὶ πυθόχρηστοι at Athens has found wide acceptance,⁷⁸ he read, accepting Persson's emendation: [ἔπειτα τὸς τρεῖς ἡδὲ δ]ν ἡο Ἀπόλλων ἀνῆλ[ει] ἐχ[σ]εγομέ|[vos τὰ νόμιμα, λαβὲν τοῦτο]ς σίτεσιν· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὲ δν [ἀνῆλκει ἔναι τὴν δορεῖαν] αὐτοῖσι κατὰ ταῦτά.

The main difficulty about the readings of Schöll and Preuner is the participle ἐχσεγομένος; for, if we are to take it as an accusative plural depending on ἐχσεγετάς or τὸς τρεῖς respectively, we should expect a future rather than a present participle.⁷⁹ This obstacle was removed in the interpretation given by Wade-Gery.⁸⁰ He eliminated the comma which Schöll had placed after πάτρια and read: [καὶ ἐχσεγετὰς ἡδὲ νῦν]ν ἡο Ἀπόλλων ἀνῆλ[ει]ν ἐχ[σ]εγομέ|[vos τὰ πάτρια λαβὲν πάντα]ς σίτεσιν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὲ δν[ἀνῆλκει τὴν σίτεσιν ἔναι] αὐτοῖσι κατὰ ταῦτά. He translated this, "and the Exegetai, whom Apollo has now appointed by oracle, whilst they expound ancient custom shall all receive maintenance; and for the future whomever he appoints by oracle, maintenance shall be given them likewise." This reading found the approval of Jacoby,⁸¹ who, however, adopted Persson's νόμιμα in place of Schöll's πάτρια. Yet the νῦν in Wade-Gery's version still occasions some difficulty. For although, as Jacoby has rightly pointed out,⁸² νῦν need not necessarily mean "just now," we should expect it either immediately preceding or immediately following ἐχσεγομένος, if it is to refer to the exegetai of the present. As it stands in Wade-Gery's restoration, the implication that the election of several exegetai has taken place recently

⁷⁶ Axel W. Persson, "Die Exegeten und Delphi," p. 11 and note 4.

⁷⁷ E. Preuner, *Hermes*, LXI (1926), p. 471.

⁷⁸ This view is based primarily on the comment of Timaeus, *Lexicon in Platonem*, s. v. Ἐξηγηταί, on Plato's *Laws*, and has most recently been defended by Felix Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 33 and 250-251, note 59. On the other hand, Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 36-37, believes in the existence of only one ἐξηγητῆς πυθόχρηστος.

⁷⁹ This was pointed out by Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, p. 141.

⁸⁰ Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁸¹ Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 238, note 5.

is unavoidable,⁸³ and this assumption is unlikely to be true.⁸⁴ A further objection to Wade-Gery's restoration is his use of the ν - $\epsilon\phi\epsilon\lambda\kappa\upsilon\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ in $\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\epsilon\lambda[\epsilon]\gamma$. We have seen above that this phenomenon is carefully avoided elsewhere in this inscription and even if Wade-Gery believes that "a trace of the N can be read on the stone,"⁸⁵ we should beware of definitely restoring it, unless there is incontrovertible evidence to favour its retention. There are some further objections to retaining the exegetai. Ehrmann⁸⁶ already felt uneasy about the identification of $\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\eta\sigma$ 'Απόλλων $\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota$ with the $\acute{\epsilon}\xi\eta\gamma\eta\tau\alpha\iota$ $\pi\upsilon\theta\acute{o}\chi\rho\eta\sigma\tau\omicron\iota$. True, Plato used the phrase to describe the mode of election of exegetai in his state of the *Laws*;⁸⁷ but as he recognizes no Eumolpid or eupatrid exegetai, and as for his purposes all religion is to be dominated by Delphi, we cannot use him as a parallel to our inscription here. When Timaeus⁸⁸ described the Platonic exegetai as $\pi\upsilon\theta\acute{o}\chi\rho\eta\sigma\tau\omicron\iota$, he was, in all probability, using the terminology of his own time. For the office of the $\pi\upsilon\theta\acute{o}\chi\rho\eta\sigma\tau\omicron\iota$ is not attested before late in the second century B. C.⁸⁹ An additional objection to Schöll's restoration is that he has to leave out the article before $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\sigma\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$. For, we observed, all other groups are introduced by the article or by a relative pronoun.

We can now turn to the group of scholars who expelled the exegetai from our inscription. Bannier's restoration leaves no room for them, but he gives no specific reason why they should not appear.⁹⁰ Hiller von Gaertringen eliminated them from the text in the *Corpus* by letting the award to the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton run down to line 11 and by adapt-

⁸³ So essentially Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 141.—This does not imply that "the $\acute{\epsilon}\xi\eta\gamma\eta\tau\alpha\iota$ $\pi\upsilon\theta\acute{o}\chi\rho\eta\sigma\tau\omicron\iota$ were first elected in the Periclean times" which Jacoby, *loc. cit.* (see preceding note) sees as the consequence of translating $\nu\upsilon\nu$ by "just now." Some might recently have died and others elected to fill their place.

⁸⁴ See Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 238, note 5, and Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁸⁵ Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, p. 126, note 4.

⁸⁶ Ehrmann, *op. cit.*, p. 368 (= 22).

⁸⁷ Plato, *Laws*, IX, 865 D; cf. VI, 759 C-E.

⁸⁸ Timaeus, *Lexicon in Platonem*, s. v. 'Εξηγηται.

⁸⁹ *Fouilles de Delphes*, III, 2, no. 24 of 128/7 B. C.

⁹⁰ Bannier, *B. Phil. Woch.*, XXXVII (1917), p. 1216.

ing Bannier's reading. We have already dealt with the difficulties inherent in the language of the *Corpus* text at this point.⁹¹ Still, Hiller has a strong reason for rejecting the exegetai: he refers the participle ἐχσεγόμενος to Apollo and interprets it as a nominative singular, citing the usage in *I. G.*, I², 78, 4 as a parallel, where there can be no doubt that Apollo is described as exegetes. Oliver agrees with Hiller's elimination of the exegetai, but he creates a new category in their stead. He reads lines 7-11: [κ]αὶ ἐ[χ] | *τινες ἡελέφασιν δορεὰ* | ν παρὰ Ἀθeneαίον κατὰ τὰ [δ]εδομ[ένα κατὰ τὸν μαντείαν ἡέ] ν ἡο Ἀπόλλων ἀνῆλ[ε] | ν ἐχ[σ]εγόμε[ι] | νος τὰ νόμιμα, ἡέχεν τούτο | ς σίτεσιν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡὸς ἀν | [έτι προσέειπεν τὸν σίτεσιν ἔναι] αὐτοῖσι κατὰ ταῦτά. The chief objection to this restoration lies in the vagueness of the category thus established. For, since the decree specifies quite explicitly in all the other instances who is to receive maintenance in the Prytaneion, we have to expect a more specific definition of a group here. A second objection is the ν—ἐφελκυστικόν which Oliver posits in *ἡελέφασιν* and retains from Wade-Gery's ἀνῆλ[ε] | ν; and thirdly, as already stated, κατὰ τὰ δεδομένα κατὰ τὸν μαντείαν, originally proposed by Hiller, is awkward Greek and does not correspond to the usage in other inscriptions of the fifth century.

In attempting to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of the exegetai in this inscription, let us begin with an examination of the linguistic evidence. In the fifth century Attic inscriptions, the noun ἐξηγητής occurs only once, viz. in the passage concerning Apollo quoted by Hiller von Gaertringen. The verb ἐξηγέομαι, too, is found only once outside our inscription, if Hiller's plausible reading is correct, to wit, in the decree about the Eleusinian first-offerings,⁹² where we find the phrase: θύεν δὲ ἀπὸ μὲν τῷ πελανῷ καθότι ἂν Εὐμολπίδαι [ἐχσ]ε[ι] | γό | νται. Exegesis by the Eumolpids is also mentioned in one literary source close to the fifth century, pseudo-Lysias, VI, 10,⁹³ but it evidently does not concern us here. For not only do we possess no other

⁹¹ See above, pp. 33-34.

⁹² *I. G.*, I², 76, 36-37.

⁹³ The date of this speech is 399 B. C.—We need not here consider the thorny passage, Andocides, I, 116, where the question of whether the Kerykes, too, enjoyed the right of exegesis is, I believe, still unsettled. I hope to deal with this passage in a different context elsewhere.

evidence to indicate that the Eumolpid clan as a whole received maintenance in the Prytaneion or that their exegetai were chosen by Apollo's oracle, but also the fact that Eleusinian priests—or, if my argument be correct, the *ιεροφάντης* alone—received the privilege before in lines 4-5 of this decree makes an additional mention here unnecessary. Apart from that, those scholars who want to restore the exegetai here, all identify them with the *πυθόχρηστοι* and not with the *ἐξ Εὐμολπιδῶν*.

Other literary references to exegesis in a technical sense are exceedingly rare.⁹⁴ In fact, there are only two in the fifth century, a famous passage from Aeschylus and a fragment of the comic poet Eupolis. In the trial-scene in the *Eumenides*, the chorus describes Apollo's relation to Orestes in the murder of Clytemnestra with the words: ⁹⁵ ὁ μάντις ἐξηγείτό σοι μητροκτονεῖν; Two points are to be noted here. The first of these is that, as in the inscription which Hiller cited to support his elimination of the exegetai from our inscription, Apollo himself is the exegetes. We are reminded of the passage in Plato's *Republic* ⁹⁶ where Socrates insists that in the ideal state sacred legislation is to emanate from Apollo: . . . οὐδὲ χρῆσόμεθα ἐξηγητῇ ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ πατρίῳ· οὗτος γὰρ δῆπου ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πατήριος ἐξηγητῆς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος ἐξηγείται. The second point is that Apollo is described as a μάντις.

Both points are relevant as we now turn to the Eupolis fragment.⁹⁷ It is preserved by the author of the *Ἀντιαττικιστής* and reads: *Ἐξηγητῆς· Εὐπολὺς Χρυσῷ γένει Δάμπων οὐξηγητῆς· μάντις*

⁹⁴ For the following I am deeply indebted to the arguments presented by James H. Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, ch. III. An entirely different view is presented by Felix Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 28-41, who believes that the institution of the *ἐξηγηταὶ πυθόχρηστοι* goes back to the time of Solon, *ibid.*, pp. 33-39. What Jacoby says about the number of the exegetai applies equally to the problem of their existence in the fifth century, "it is not tradition but interpretation of the tradition" (p. 25). His reconstruction of their history is based on Schöll's restoration of the Prytaneion decree where, to say the least, mention of them is questionable. It might be added here that Oliver's thesis goes even further than Jacoby's in refuting Wilamowitz' theory of the existence of a semi-official chronicle kept by the exegetai in the fifth century.

⁹⁵ Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 595.

⁹⁶ Plato, *Republic*, IV, 427 C.

⁹⁷ Eupolis, *The Golden Age*, frg. 297 (Kock) (= frg. XXIII Meineke).

γὰρ ἦν καὶ χρησμοὺς ἐξηγεῖτο. This information is particularly interesting in view of the fact that we learn from two scholia on Aristophanes⁹⁸ that Lampon enjoyed the privilege of maintenance in the Prytaneion. Did Lampon receive the privilege of maintenance because he was an exegetes? He is called the ἐξηγητής of the Thurian colonists in the Suidas lexicon,⁹⁹ but the word is here not used in the sense of "expounder of the sacred law" and simply means "leader." Of the other references concerning Lampon that have come down to us from antiquity, including those already quoted, six describe him as a μάντις,¹⁰⁰ three as χρησμολόγος,¹⁰¹ and two as θύτης.¹⁰² There is one further scholion on Aristophanes which in mentioning Lampon combines the terms μάντις and ἐξηγητής:¹⁰³ in speaking of the Θουριομάντις, the scholiast remarks: ὃν καὶ Δάμπων ἦν ὁ μάντις, ὃν ἐξηγητὴν ἐκάλουν. If Lampon had been an exegetes, this explanation would hardly have been necessary;¹⁰⁴ there can be no doubt that "exegetes" was some sort of nickname for Lampon, perhaps to compare comically an authoritatively solemn bearing of the human μάντις with Apollo, the divine πάτριος ἐξηγητής. It is in this, as has Oliver has brilliantly shown,¹⁰⁵ that we have to seek the explanation for the term ἐξηγητής as applied to Lampon by Eupolis.

If, then, Lampon did not receive maintenance because he was an exegetes, why did he? In order to find an answer, we must turn to Aristophanes, in whose comedies several references to the grant of maintenance in the Prytaneion are made. We learn that Cleon enjoyed this privilege,¹⁰⁶ although we cannot determine whether he received it as a benefactor or as a state-official;

⁹⁸ *Scholia Graeca in Aristophanem*, ed. by F. Dübner (Paris, 1877), *Aves*, 521, and *Pax*, 1084.

⁹⁹ Suidas, s. v. Θουριομάντις.

¹⁰⁰ *Schol. in Aristoph. Aves*, 521; Plutarch, *Pericles*, 6; Athenaeus, 344 e; Hesychius, s. v. ἀγερσικύβηλις, Suidas, s. v. Θουριομάντις; Ἀντιαρτικιστής in Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca*, I, p. 96.

¹⁰¹ *Schol. in Aristoph. Aves*, 521 and 988; *Pacem*, 1084.

¹⁰² *Schol. in Aristoph. Aves*, 521; Hesychius, s. v. ἀγερσικύβηλις.

¹⁰³ *Schol. in Aristoph. Nubes*, 332.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-28.

¹⁰⁶ Aristophanes, *Knights*, 709, 766, 1404.

it is mentioned as an honour accorded to generals ¹⁰⁷ and foreign ambassadors; ¹⁰⁸ and in two passages ¹⁰⁹ jocular references to the enjoyment of the privilege by the victors of the great games seem to be intended. In addition to these, there is a passage that requires a more detailed analysis. As toward the end of the *Peace* Trygaeus and his servant are roasting meat to celebrate the end of the war, Hierocles, who is described as a *μάντις* in the *dramatis personae*, enters and a hilarious repartee at his expense develops. The scene reaches its climax when Hierocles solemnly pronounces oracles to prove the impossibility of peace at this time and Trygaeus ingeniously invents a number of mock-oracles to refute him.¹¹⁰ The following exchange of words takes place: ¹¹¹

Trygaeus: ἀλλὰ τί χρῆν ἡμᾶς; οὐ παύσασθαι πολεμοῦντας,
ἢ διακαυνιάσαι πότεροι κλαυσούμεθα μείζον,
ἔξδ' οὐ σπεισάμενοις κοινῇ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄρχειν;

Hierocles: οὐποτε ποιήσεις τὸν καρκίνον ὀρθὰ βαδίζειν.

Trygaeus: οὐποτε δειπνήσεις ἐπὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἢ πρυτανεῖω,
οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῷ πραχθέντι ποιήσεις ὕστερον οὐδέν.

The scholiast explains the last lines as follows: ὅτι καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγοι μετεῖχον τῆς ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ Δάμπωνος, ὃς τούτου ἠξίωτο. φησὶν οὖν οὐκέτι ἔσται πόλεμος· τούτου γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἐλάμβανεν οὗτος ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου. ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ πολέμου χρεία τῶν μάντεων.¹¹²

These two passages enable us to draw the following conclusions: like Lampon, Hierocles was called a *χρησμολόγος* and a *μάντις*, and both terms are again applied to him by the scholiast on line 1046 of the same play. When Eupolis ¹¹³ jocularly referred to him as *χρησμοφδός*, the term evidently implied nothing more than a parody on *χρησμολόγος*.¹¹⁴ Like Lampon, too, Hierocles enjoyed the privilege of maintenance in the Pryta-

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 573-576.

¹⁰⁸ Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 124.

¹⁰⁹ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 764; *Knights*, 535.

¹¹⁰ Aristophanes, *Peace*, 1063-1102.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1080-1085.

¹¹² *Schol. in Aristoph. Pacem*, 1084.

¹¹³ Eupolis, *Cities*, frg. 212 (Kock) (= XVI Meineke).

¹¹⁴ Cf. Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

neion, and since being *μάντις* is the only common bond between them, the reason why both were honoured in this way must have been that they were *μάντις*, for *exegetai* they were not.¹¹⁵

However, before we restore the *μάντις* in our inscription, we have to examine another point. The Prytaneion decree grants the privilege to the various groups on a permanent basis. Yet the scholiast to the Aristophanes passage quoted above explains that once the war would be over, Hierocles would be deprived of his privilege. However, he fails to make quite clear the reasons for the discontinuation of maintenance and leaves room for the following interpretations: (a) Hierocles was appointed as *μάντις* only for the duration of the war, and he would lose his position as well as the privilege that went with it as soon as the war would be over; (b) Hierocles would remain a *μάντις* even after the end of the war but would lose his privilege. These two interpretations are possible, if we are to take the scholiast's comment as a historical explanation. The first of these possibilities (a) is unlikely to be true in view of the fact that an inscription dated 446/5 B. C.¹¹⁶ refers to the same Hierocles and assigns religious duties to him. It might be argued that we are there again dealing with a war, the Euboean War, for which Hierocles may have been appointed as *μάντις*. But Lampon was a *μάντις* in time of peace, when the colonists left for Thurii,¹¹⁷ and we have no indication that some *μάντις* were appointed for war-time only. The second possibility (b) is ruled out by the text of Aristophanes in line 1085, where the loss of the privilege is made tantamount to the loss of the position.

The passage itself and the explanation of the scholiast are much better taken in a humorous vein, and what Trygaeus means to convey seems to be either (c) "You just wait; once the war is over we won't need *μάντις* any longer, and if you lose your job, you'll lose your maintenance with it"; or (d) "You just wait; once the war is over we're going to make cuts in the state budget,

¹¹⁵ Against Schöll, *Hermes*, XXII (1887), p. 563; Ehrmann, "De iuris sacri interpretibus Atticis," p. 385; Persson, "Die Exegeten und Delphi," p. 41; Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 255, note 85.

¹¹⁶ *I. G.*, I², 39.

¹¹⁷ *Scholia in Aristoph. Nubes*, 332; Suidas, s. v. *Θουριομάντις*; Photius, s. v. *Θουριομάντις*.

and then the *μάντεις* won't be fed at public expense any longer." This seems to be the tone of Trygaeus' remark, and whichever interpretation we accept, it appears impossible to use the passage to prove that Hierocles enjoyed the privilege only temporarily.¹¹⁸

One further point demands discussion. The group mentioned in lines 9-11 of the Prytaneion decree is characterized by being appointees of Apollo. Could the *μάντεις* be thus described? As we have absolutely no external evidence about any group of officials or priests whose appointment by Apollo vouchsafed them the privilege of public maintenance in the fifth century, any answer is necessarily based on conjecture. We saw already that in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* Apollo is described as the *μάντις par excellence* and the same term is used to describe him in a number of other passages in the tragedians.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, it is he who bestows the gift of prophecy on the human *μάντεις*.¹²⁰ To this tenuous evidence we may add Diodorus' report¹²¹ that the site of Thurii was chosen on the basis of an Apolline oracle. We remember that it was the *μάντις* Lampon who led the colonists, and a relation between the divine and the human *μάντις* may have existed in the foundation of the colony. What we know about Hierocles points in a similar direction. The Athenian decree concerning Chalcis states:¹²² τὰ δὲ *ἡιερά* τὰ ἐκ τῶν *χρεσμῶν* *ἡνπερ* *Εὐβοίας* *θῦσαι* *ὡς* *τάχιστα* *μετὰ* *ἡΙεροκλέος* *τρεῖς* *ἀνδρας*, and in all probability, the *χρησμοί* referred to came from Delphi. All this, of course, furnishes no proof that certain *μάντεις*—not necessarily every oraclemonger who called himself by that name—were appointed by Apollo, but it shows that such an appointment may have been possible. We need not hesitate on that count to restore the *μάντεις* in the Prytaneion decree. If our restoration be correct, the award would be given to those *μάντεις* whom Apollo would appoint, perhaps for public service,

¹¹⁸ As does Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

¹¹⁹ E. g. Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, 1202; *Choephoroi*, 559; *Eumenides*, 615; Euripides, *Ion*, 387; *Iphigenia Taurica*, 711, 1128.

¹²⁰ E. g. in *Iliad*, I, 72; *Odyssey*, XV, 252; Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, 1202.

¹²¹ Diodorus, XII, 10, 5.

¹²² *I. G.*, I², 39, 64-66.

in the immediate future and others who might be appointed by him in a more distant future.¹²³

The victors at the great games constitute the last two groups to whom public maintenance is given. Schöll¹²⁴ correctly recognized on the basis of -ελετι preserved in line 16 that a distinction is drawn between gymnastic and hippic contests. There can be no serious objection to his restoration of lines 11-14 and they have indeed found general acceptance. The wording may not be quite exact in line 14, but it certainly makes good sense.

In the passage concerning the victors in the hippic contests, on the other hand, Schöll's restoration did not meet with the same universal approval. Schöll believed that, in the gymnastic contests, the Athenian victors of all four of the great games received maintenance, but that, in the hippic contests, also mentioned in Plato's *Apology*,¹²⁵ only the victors of the Olympic games were honoured in this manner. He therefore read lines 14-18: ¹²⁶ ἔ(τι| δὲ εὐρέσθαι σίτησιν ἐν) τῷ πρυτανείῳ δ(π)όσοι (ζεύγε|ι ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ἵππῳ κ)έλῃτι νενικήκασι Ὀλυμπί(ασιν σ|τεφανωθέντες—οἱ τ|ὸν στεφανίτην—καὶ οἱ ἀν) νικήσωσι τὸ λοιπόν, εἶναι α(ὐτοῖ|σι τὴν σίτησιν κατὰ τὰ ἐς τῇ)ν στήλη(ν) γεγραμ(μ)ένα. . . . Hiller von Gaertringen accepted Schöll's version for lines 14-16, but he substituted all the four great games for the Olympic games with the result that νικέσσοι in line 17 became a future: Ὀλυμπί[ασιν ἐ | Πυθοῖ ἐ | Ἡλοισθομοῖ ἐ | Νεμέαι ἐ] νικέσσοι τὸ λοιπὸ[ν]. The final step toward a correct interpretation of the passage was taken by Preuner. While accepting Hiller's reading for all the rest, he showed that the ξυνωρίς τελεία and the πωλική were not introduced at Olympia until 408 and 264 B. C. respectively and at the Pythian games not until 398 and 314 B. C. respectively¹²⁷ and restored lines 15-16: ἡο[π]όσο[ι τεθρί|πποι τελείοι ? ἐ ἡίπποι κ]έλῃτι νενι[κ]έκασι κτλ. His restoration has now been generally accepted.¹²⁸ The improvements that might still be suggested are

¹²³ I prefer the reading ἀνέλεται at the beginning of line 11 by comparison with a similar repetition in lines 16-17.

¹²⁴ Schöll, *Hermes*, VI (1872), p. 39.

¹²⁵ Plato, *Apology*, 36 D.

¹²⁶ Schöll, *Hermes*, VI, pp. 39-40 with p. 40, note 1.

¹²⁷ E. Preuner, *Hermes*, LXI (1926), pp. 472-474.

¹²⁸ Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 238, note 11, and Oliver, *The Athenian Ex-pounders*, p. 140.

all of a minor character. *ἔτι δὲ λευρέσθαι σίτεσιν* in lines 14-15 sounds like an Anglicism or a Germanism rather than like idiomatic fifth century Attic, and I would prefer to substitute: *ἔπειτα λαβὲν τὸν σίτεσιν* for it, at the same time replacing the article before *σίτεσιν* whose absence Preuner found strange.¹²⁹ I further eliminated the *ν-έφελκυστικόν* in *Ὀλυμπίασιν* in line 16, thus gaining room for the aspiration in *ἡΙσθμοί* of the following line. Hiller's arrangement of the letters is based upon a mason's mistake in line 12 which was recognized as such by Wade-Gery.¹³⁰ The remainder of the inscription is in too mutilated a condition to attempt any restorations.

The changes and restorations proposed in this paper concern form rather than content. Only in the case of the exegetai have we ventured to introduce a radical change. Whether we were right in substituting the *μάντεις* for the exegetai or not, we hope to have demonstrated that the Prytaneion decree cannot be used to prove the existence of *ἐξηγηταὶ πυθόχρηστοι* in the fifth century.

MARTIN OSTWALD.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, MIDDLETOWN, CONN.

¹²⁹ Preuner, *op. cit.*, p. 471.—Still, it must not be forgotten that the article is missing in line 10.—Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 140, also feels uneasy about *ἔτι δὲ λευρέσθαι σίτεσιν*, although he accepts it.

¹³⁰ H. T. Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, p. 124 (photograph and caption).

THE COMPOSITION OF *ANTH. PAL.*, VII, 476
(MELEAGER).

Δάκρυνά σοι καὶ νέρθε διὰ χθονός, Ἡλιοδώρα,
 δωροῦμαι στοργᾷς λείψανον εἰς Ἀΐδαν,
 δάκρυα δυσδάκρυτα· πολυκλαύτῳ δ' ἐπὶ τύμβῳ
 σπένδω μνᾶμα πόθων, μνᾶμα φιλοφροσύνας.
 5 οἰκτρὰ γὰρ οἰκτρὰ φίλαν σε καὶ ἐν φθιμένοις Μελέαγρος
 αἰάξω, κενεὰν εἰς Ἀχέροντα χάριν.
 αἰαῖ, ποῦ τὸ ποθεινὸν ἐμοὶ θάλος; ἄρπασεν Ἀΐδας,
 ἄρπασεν, ἀκμαῖον δ' ἄνθος ἔφυρε κόνις.
 ἀλλὰ σε γουνοῦμαι, Γᾶ παντρόφε, τὰν πανόδουρον
 10 ἡρέμα σοῖς κόλποις, μᾶτερ, ἐναγκάλισαι.¹

Anth. Pal., VII, 476, Meleager's Lament for Heliodora, has long been admired.² The epigram has appealed to such widely different readers as the Palatine scholiast, C. A. Sainte-Beuve, Franz Susemihl, and Walter Leaf. Andrew Lang went to the trouble of translating it into elegant English verse.³ But why is the Lament a good poem? Wherein precisely does its undoubted effectiveness consist? In the past, critics have apparently made no serious attempt to answer this question. They seem to have

¹ The text as printed above is that of Hugo Stadtmüller (Leipzig, Teubner, 1899).

² Pierre Waltz (*Anthologie Grecque* [Paris, 1941], V, p. 59, n. 1) remarks that the epigram "a de tout temps été considérée comme une des plus belles et des plus émouvantes du livre VII."

³ The Palatine scholiast, who seldom expresses artistic judgments, so far unbends as to note beneath the poem *θαυμαστὴν καὶ πάθους μεστὴν ὕμνον τὸ ἐπίγραμμα*. Sainte-Beuve, in an interesting essay on Meleager (*Portraits Contemporains* [Paris, 1876], p. 437), declares that "cette pièce, après la mort d'une amante, m'a involontairement rappelé les suprêmes sonnets de Pétrarque"; apparently such poems as *Occhi miei, Poi che la vista, Quanta invidia*, and *Ite rime dolenti* are meant. Franz Susemihl in his *Geschichte der Griechischen Litteratur in der Alexandriner-Zeit* (Leipzig, 1892), II, p. 555, n. 189, speaks of the poem as "ein schönes, warm, und tief empfundenes Epitymbion." Similarly, Leaf maintains (*Little Poems from the Greek* [London, 1922], p. 89) that "the poems to Heliodora are full of real passion; their sincerity is plain, and nowhere more so than in the poignant lament on her death." For Lang's translation see T. F. Higham and C. M. Bowra, *Oxford Book of Greek Verse in Translation* (Oxford, 1938), pp. 630-1.

been satisfied to indicate their approval in vague, general terms, occasionally mentioning either the supposed "sincerity" of Meleager's grief,⁴ or the remarkable emotional impact of the poet's words. The purpose of the present note is to attempt to go somewhat beyond such generalizations, and to isolate and examine some of the means which Meleager employs to make of this particular poem a convincing and satisfying work of literary art.

Our analysis of *Anth. Pal.*, VII, 476 may reasonably begin with an account of the rhetorical structure of the Lament. One notices that there are two distinct shifts in tone and in dramatic point of view in this epigram. The first shift occurs at the beginning of verse 7, where Meleager ceases to speak to the shade of his dead mistress Heliodora, and apparently addresses himself. The second comes at the beginning of verse 9, where Meleager's attention turns from himself to Mother Earth, to whom he addresses a quiet prayer on Heliodora's behalf. These two shifts in attitude divide the epigram into three sections. In the first (verses 1-6), the emotions of the poet at Heliodora's grave are quickly sketched; the dominant note is one of sadness. In the second (verses 7-8), the emotional response to the given situation is carried forward to a bitter climax; the dominant note is one of helpless despair. In the final section (verses 9-10), despair yields to a certain hopefulness; an emotional resolution is effected, and the epigram is rounded off, as we shall see, with an implicit reference to the circumstances described in the first few verses. Within each of these three sections, the poet manages the sequence of his thought in such a way that the couplets are end-stopped, with but a single exception: at the end of verse 2, the thought is permitted to carry over to the caesura "after the

⁴ Those critics who praise the epigram for its sincerity apparently assume that Meleager actually knew, loved, and lost a sweetheart named Heliodora. This assumption cannot be proved, and in any case is irrelevant to a strictly literary analysis of the poem; for a good poem will achieve its effect independently of the biographical data surrounding its composition. Cf. Wilamowitz' excellent *obiter dictum* in *Hellenistische Dichtung* (Berlin, 1924), pp. 121-2: "Es ist für diese Poesie wirklich ohne Bedeutung, ob seine Knaben oder seine Heliodora gelebt haben, was ich übrigens gar nicht bestreite." See also R. Wellek and A. Warren, *Theory of Literature* (New York, 1949), Chapter VII, "Literature and Biography," especially p. 74.

third trochee" in the following verse, where the first clause of the poem ends.⁵

What might be called the *partitio* of the epigram is now clear. Our next task is to examine the workmanship of each of the three sections in somewhat greater detail.

Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of Meleager's opening words is the emphasis upon the word *δάκρυα*, which occurs twice in the first clause, at the beginning, and at the end, where it is reinforced by the intensifying adjective *δυσδάκρυτα*, "painful to shed." Bracketed by these words are a reference to love (*στοργᾶς*, v. 2), two references to death (*νέρθε διὰ χθονός*, v. 1 and *εἰς Ἀΐδαν*, v. 2), and the arrestingly ironical⁶ expression *Ἡλιοδόρα δωροῦμαι* (vv. 1 and 2). The juxtaposition of these two words underscores the pathetic contrast between the unhappy present and the joyous past. While she lived, Heliodora brought a "gift of sunshine" into Meleager's life;⁷ now she receives only a gift of tears, which are the last relic (*λείψανον*, v. 2) of the poet's love. Moreover, in the past Heliodora herself enjoyed the "gift of the sun", i. e. life on earth,⁸ whereas now she dwells in the nether world where

⁵ As a matter of fact, the Budé editor repunctuates the first clause, placing a semicolon at the end of the second verse; but this seems to me to interfere with the natural rhythm of the opening lines. Cf. the similar rhythm of *A. P.*, XII, 125, 3 (Meleager), V, 147, 3 (Meleager).

⁶ As Sainte-Beuve pointed out (*op. cit.*, pp. 431 and 438) Meleager likes to play upon the names of his mistresses; but the irony involved in the words *Ἡλιοδόρα δωροῦμαι* (which Sainte-Beuve does not mention) seems to me to go beyond mere punning.

⁷ *Sunshine* is a psychologically natural symbol for happiness, especially the happiness of love; cf. Catullus, 8, 3, *fulsere quondam candidi tibi soles*. By a simple extension of the same idea, *ἥλιος* was sometimes used as a term of endearment; cf. Philostratus, *Epist.* 12 and 29. In Latin, of course, *mea lux* and *lumen* are similarly employed, especially in elegiac verse.

⁸ It is scarcely necessary to point out that such expressions as *ἀγὰς ὄραν ἡλίου* had been synonymous with *ζῆν* from Homer (*Iliad*, XVI, 188) onwards. Cf. *A. P.*, VII, 219, 3 (Pompeius Junior), VII, 601, 3 (Julianus Aegyptius), X, 75, 2 (Palladas), XI, 28, 2 (Argentarius), VII, 471, 1 (Callimachus), Catullus, 5, 5-6. In an interesting passage in the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid plays upon two metaphorical senses of the word *lux* (= *life*, and = *beloved*), much as Meleager plays upon *ἥλιος* in the present epigram: *Non tamen ante tui curam excessisse memento / quam vitam geminaque simul mihi luce carendum* (Iphis addressing Anaxarete, *Met.*, XIV, 724-5).

no sun shines. Thus the sun has set, as it were, for both Meleager and Heliodora.

The second clause of the poem is carefully linked to the first by several verbal correspondences and parallels. The same three themes, tears, love, and death, reappear, but the principal emphasis is shifted from the theme of grief to that of love. The two words *πόθων* and *φιλοφροσύνας* in verse 4, balanced against each other in emphatic positions at the ends of the cola of the pentameter, reassert the idea of tender affection which had first been expressed in the *στοργᾶς* of verse 2. In verse 3, *ἐπὶ τύμβῳ* again brings in the idea of death, and also (incidentally) sets the scene of the poem, while the preceding adjective *πολυκλαύτῳ* reëchoes the *δάκρυα* of verses 1 and 3. The tears which in the first clause had been called Meleager's gift to Heliodora and the relic of this love have now become a libation (*σπένδω*, v. 4), the last gift that piety can offer the dead; and in the very next word they are further described as a *μνᾶμα* or a memorial of love, shed at Heliodora's tomb. At first glance the imagery of verses 2 and 4 may seem to be seriously mixed and disorganized; but closer consideration reveals that such is by no means the case. What makes the nouns *μνᾶμα* and *λείψανον* appropriate metaphors in the present context is the fact that both words have connotations and overtones which connect them with the idea of death. *Μνᾶμα* means both *memorial* and *tomb*; *λείψανον* frequently occurs in the plural in the sense of *remains*, i. e. the body of the deceased. Even the verbs *σπένδω* and *δωροῦμαι* may be interpreted as containing an allusion to the libations (*χοαί*) of honey, oil, water, wine, and the like, frequently offered up at the graves of the dead. Thus the imagery of verses 2 and 4 is not really confused, but unified by the associational values of the metaphors which Meleager has used to describe his tears.

The poet, continuing to address his mistress in the third couplet, refers to his love only once, in the adjective *φίλαν* (v. 5). Grief is stressed in the words *οἰκτρὰ γὰρ οἰκτρά*, where the insistent *iteratio*, the third case since the beginning of the poem, effectively adds to the impression of mounting emotional tension; and the word *αἰδέζω* (v. 6) links this distich to the tear motif of the first four verses. Of the three principal themes of the poem, however, that of death perhaps receives the greatest emphasis in the present couplet. The idea of the final separation of lover and

mistress, first suggested in verse 1 by *νέρθε διὰ χθονός* and repeated in verse 2 by the reference to Hades, is here strongly restated by the words *ἐν φθιμένους* (v. 5) and *εἰς Ἀχέροντα* (v. 6). Similarly *χάριν*⁹ (v. 6) refers back to the pious libation of tears mentioned in the preceding distich; but the epithet that goes with it, *κενεάν*, introduces a new idea, a dark hopeless one, that all the living can do for the dead is at best empty and futile. Those who dwell in Hades are irretrievably lost to us.

Exactly in the middle of the poem occur the words *Μελέαγρος αἰάλω* (vv. 5 and 6), each occupying six metrical *morae*. Together they constitute almost a précis of this simple, sensuous, and passionate little poem. The frank and direct outburst of grief contained in these two words specifies the exact nature of Meleager's emotion and stresses its subjective, personal character by the use of the poet's own name.¹⁰ In addition, the words look forward to what Meleager is about to say in verses 7 and 8, the second section of the epigram, in which the emotional climax is attained and all three themes are stated with the utmost force. The poet now admits that all he can do is vain; nothing will help. He realizes that henceforth he cannot even speak to Heliodora, and that it is useless to continue to apostrophize her shade. Desolate, he can speak only to himself, as he does in the brief, agonized words,

αἰαί, ποῦ τὸ ποθεινὸν ἐμοὶ θάλος;

One notices that the question is introduced by the emotional interjection *αἰαί*, which in position and sound, as well as meaning, recalls the *αἰάλω* of verse 6. Part of the intensity and force of this question probably proceeds from the fact that it contains the first metaphorical reference to Heliodora in the poem. She is a *ποθεινὸν θάλος*—doubly *ποθεινόν*, because once she was loved and also because she is now irreparably lost. The adjective re-

⁹ One observes the consonance of the words *Ἀχέροντα χάριν*. Here the repetition of the pattern of consonants binds together the end of v. 6 compactly, bringing the first section of the poem to a neat and orderly conclusion.

¹⁰ The poets of the Anthology are fond of referring to themselves by their own names: cf. *A. P.*, V, 170, 3 (Nossis), V, 191, 7 (Meleager), VI, 248, 7 (Argentarius), VII, 718, 4 (Nossis), XII, 50, 1 (Asclepiades), etc. So also the Latin elegiac poets.

ēchoes *πόθων* in verse 4, just as *φίλαν* in verse 5 had reëchoed *φιλοφροσύνας* in verse 4; and both pairs of words look back, of course, to *στοργᾶς* in verse 2. This pattern of repetition helps to link the first and second sections of the poem. But the poet perceives that his pathetic question is an unavailing one, and it is immediately answered in the bitter, despairing words

ἄρπασεν Ἀιδας,
ἄρπασεν . . .

Here the repetition of the verb not only stresses the idea that the loved one is irretrievably lost, but also (on the phonetic level) permits a further repetition of the *alpha* sound, the accent of lamentation, which is especially emphasized by the position of the second *ἄρπασεν* at the beginning of the verse. The flower in full bloom now lies in *κόνις*,¹¹ in the dust (v. 8), and Heliodora is herself dust and ashes.

But is it merely besmirching dust in which she lies? And is she merely a handful of insensate dust herself? No, we need not believe that: emotion has had its fling in the second section of the poem, and in the third, the speaker finds a way to resolve the intolerable feelings which had just overwhelmed him in verses 7-8. He consoles himself by restating in warm, personal terms the coldly impersonal formula, *sit tibi terra levis*.¹² This re-statement takes the form of a prayer,¹³ in which he begs *Gê*, the nurse of all, to fold the lamented body of Heliodora gently in her

¹¹ On another level, the expression *ἔφυρε κόνις* reminds us once again of the grief of Meleager. Perhaps by an intentional ambiguity, perhaps by a subconscious association of ideas, the poet uses in the present passage the same two words which Euripides had employed to describe Hecuba defiling her hair with dust after her daughter Polyxena had been led off to be sacrificed (*κείται, κόνει φύρουσα δύστηνον κάρα*, *Hec.* 496). The verb *φύρω* (without *κόνις*) frequently occurs in similar contexts to describe the behavior of persons transported by grief at funerals, etc.

¹² With vv. 9-10 of the present epigram compare *A. P.*, VII, 461 (Meleager): *Παμμήτορ γῆ, χαίρει· σὺ τὸν πάρος οὐ βαρὺν εἰς σέ / Αἰσιγένην καὶ τῇ νῦν ἐπέχουσ ἀβαρής*. The same formula recurs in Martial's poem on Erotion, V, 34, 9-10.

¹³ Characteristically, the prayer is introduced by the word *ἀλλά*. Prayers contained in dedicatory epigrams often begin with this conjunction. See *A. P.*, VI, 15, 76, 87, 106, 183, 188, 209, 235; also G. Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca* (Berlin, 1878), nos. 786 and 812.

arms and press her to her bosom (v. 10). Thus Meleager ventures to hope that it is not dust, not the cold earth (χθονός, v. 1) which possesses Heliodora now, but a gentle mother. And this is not all: the prayer to Gê also expresses a half-hope that Heliodora herself may not be merely inanimate κόνις. There is a possibility that she may somehow be able to feel the affectionate embrace of Mother Earth and that it may help to console her for her untimely¹⁴ death. And it is just this possibility which makes the embrace worth praying for.

Moreover, the idea of consolation is also suggested by the very quality of the language which Meleager uses in the final couplet. The expression is less excited and feverish here than in the earlier verses. There are fewer repetitions of words or sounds or ideas. To be sure, πανόδυρτον in verse 9 is played off against παντρόφε in the same line, and brings in once again the note of lamentation struck by πολυκλαύτῳ in verse 3 and by αιάζω in verse 6, but the whole tone is quieter now. Instead of crying out in grief or railing at Hades, the poet dwells on the motherliness of the earth in which his beloved lies. The speaker has thus won through to a kind of calm resignation in the end, and his emotional equilibrium has been restored. For all the complexity of its rhetoric, the epigram exhibits no straining after "point" in the final verses,¹⁵ but rather achieves the quiet "classic" close, characteristic of the Greek poetry of an earlier age.

We may note in closing that the art of Meleager as exhibited in this poem differs in several respects from that of Simonides and the other early epigrammatists. In the first place, the poet's preoccupation with his own emotions and his silence concerning the circumstances of Heliodora's death make it quite clear that

¹⁴ The motherly gesture ἡρέμα . . . κόλποις . . . ἐναγκάλισαι (v. 10) reminds us of the youth of Heliodora, who died prematurely (ἀκμαῖον, v. 8; there is a certain bitterness in this adjective, which means both *in her prime* and *at the proper time*). The word θάλος (v. 7), too, conveys the idea of Heliodora's youth; so also do the words στοργᾶς (v. 2) and φιλοφροσύνας (v. 4), both of which are frequently used to denote the affection of a parent for his child.

¹⁵ Cf. the oft-quoted remark of J. W. Mackail, that the better Greek epigrammatists seldom "sacrifice poetical substance to the desire of making a point" (*Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology* [London, 1911], p. 5).

we have to do here with a "literary" epigram, rather than with a funerary inscription suitable for a gravestone or other monument. By the same token, it is difficult to interpret the poem as a commemorative song intended to be sung by a company of friends over the wine-cups. In the second place, we should observe the length of Meleager's epigram, which permits the elaborate linking of couplet with couplet by the repetition of key words and ideas, and the development of a relatively rich, complex, and suggestive pattern of imagery. The brief compass of the best-known Simonidean epitaphs, which are usually limited to two, four, or at the most six lines, does not permit the creation of such patterns. Finally, mention should be made of the rhetorical method which Meleager employs in this poem, the direct opposite of Simonides' characteristic method, as seen, for instance, in the famous distich

᾿Ω ξείν,' ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.

In this distich, as Bowra points out, Simonides "says nothing about glory; there is no word about heroization, no word even about saving Sparta or Greece from the Persians."¹⁶ Yet these thoughts must have been present to Simonides' mind when he wrote the lines, just as they come vividly to the mind of the reader as he reads it. They are in fact the essential message of the poem, although they are not stated but left to inference. So too in Aeschylus' well-known epitaph (Diehl, I, 66, 3) nothing is said of his tragedies, but we are reminded of them all the more forcibly through this very reticence.¹⁷ In Meleager's poem, on the other hand, the Asianic rhetoric¹⁸ employed says everything

¹⁶ C. M. Bowra, *Early Greek Elegists* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), p. 194.

¹⁷ Of course, I do not mean to imply that such indirection is the cachet of fifth-century epigram. Simonides and Aeschylus can be perfectly explicit and straightforward when the circumstances so require. Cf. for example their official epigrams concerning the battle of Marathon, which were probably accompanied by a list of the 192 men who fell in that engagement (James H. Oliver, *Hesperia*, II² [1933], pp. 480-494, and *A.J.P.*, LVI [1935], pp. 193-201). Yet even epigrams of this sort possess a restrained simplicity which is altogether alien to the tumultuously excited tone of Meleager's Lament for Heliodora.

¹⁸ Although this term is frequently used by German scholars in discussing Meleager, I use it with some hesitation here, not only because it

explicitly and frequently. There is hardly a suggestion of any ulterior meaning lurking behind the words of the poem.¹⁹ Meleager seems to repeat his points deliberately, some of them several times over, securing his effects not by understatement and suggestion, but by intentional reiteration which dramatically reproduces the impression of unrestrained oriental lamentation.²⁰

Despite the explicit character of Meleager's statements, however, his art is not devoid of interest or subtlety; but for the most part the subtlety does not lie in the use of irony and allusive understatement. Rather it lies in the skillful manner with which the poet weaves together repetitions, parallels, and contrasts, both of sound and of sense, to form a surprisingly intricate pattern of semantic and phonetic interrelationships.²¹ By this method²² Meleager has carefully elaborated his Lament for

is perhaps historically inaccurate to speak of an epigram as being written in an "Asian" style, but also because the expression seems usually to possess a strongly pejorative connotation. (And yet Wilamowitz, as early as 1900, had protested against the facile assumption that Asianism = *corrupta eloquentia*: cf. *Hermes*, XXXV [1900], pp. 1-52, especially the reexamination of the ancient sources on pp. 1-8.) I cannot accept the Romantic view of rhetoric as mere stereotyped and heartless artifice espoused by Carl Radinger (among others), who maintains that *A. P.*, VII, 476 "durch die übertriebene Wiederholung einzelner Wörter verdorben wird" and goes on to say that "schädlich hat die Rhetorik auf Meleagros eingewirkt; durch sie hat er die edle griechische Einfachheit verloren" (*Meleagros von Gadara* [Innsbruck, 1895], pp. 47 and 70). Yet "Asiatic rhetoric" is at least a convenient expression to designate the epigrammatic style which I describe above, and I have accordingly employed it in this sense in the text.

¹⁹ The distinction between the poetry of direct statement and the poetry of indirect suggestion has often been drawn. For an interesting discussion of the entire subject, consult E. M. W. Tillyard, *Poetry Direct and Oblique* (London, 1934), *passim*, especially pp. 7-16.

²⁰ Sainte-Beuve (*op. cit.*, p. 437) notices this effect, terming the poem "une pièce toute pleine de sanglots."

²¹ One artistic device which Meleager does not employ in this poem is *synchysis* or interlocked arrangement of words, e. g., *aurave distinctos educit verna colores* (Catullus, 64, 90). This device, common in Latin verse, is rather rare in Greek; E. Norden (*Aeneis Buch VI* [2nd ed., Berlin, 1916], p. 393) points out that it is seldom used by the poets of the Anthology, apart from "Spätlinge" like Paulus Silentiarius (cf. *A. P.*, VI, 64 and 66) or Romans writing in Greek (e. g., VI, 165, which he attributes to Statyllius Flaccus).

²² *A. P.*, VII, 476 seems to have a more elaborate pattern of sound and

Heliodora into a highly coherent whole, which proceeds from a relatively low emotional key at the outset to a climax of grief in verses 7 and 8 and back again to quietness and resignation at the close. The impression of compactness and symmetry secured thereby helps to make of *Anth. Pal.*, VII, 476 an effective and satisfying work of literary art.

STUART G. P. SMALL.

YALE COLLEGE.

imagery than any other poem of Meleager, but extensive use of repetitions, parallels, and contrasts is to be seen in several of his amatory epigrams, especially those addressed to Heliodora and Zenophila; cf. *A. P.*, V, 24, 143, 144, 147, 176.

AMAFINIUS, LUCRETIVS, AND CICERO.

Until his own time, Cicero states, philosophy was available to the Romans only through Greek texts.¹ Those of his countrymen who had studied it were too intent on other matters to write about it in Latin; in consequence, only those of them who could travel to Athens or Rhodes, or who knew enough Greek to read that language easily, or who happened to make the acquaintance of wandering teachers were able to pursue philosophy. But while the other schools were producing nothing in Latin, the Epicurean C. Amafinius began to teach, orally at first. He presently published his books, which had many imitators; to his followers there flocked a great multitude from all over Italy.²

Modern scholars have debated the date of this man; the consensus of opinion has been that he worked at the end of the second or the beginning of the first century. A few writers have believed that he was a contemporary of Lucretius—a conjecture which is, perhaps, more in accord with our scanty evidence. Most of the debate has been carried on by scholars of Lucretius, examining the claim he makes in the *De Rerum Natura* (I, 922-950, V, 335-337) to being the first to expound Epicurean doctrines in Latin. But there is another aspect to the matter; if Amafinius lived only a few years before the composition of Cicero's philosophical works, it follows that popular Epicureanism had a meteoric rise in those years, and that the vigor of Cicero's attacks on the philosophy reflects his alarm at a serious

¹ *Tusc.*, II, 5, IV, 6; *Pro Cael.*, 40-41; *De Nat. Deor.*, I, 8; *Acad.*, I, 4-12.

² *Tusc.*, IV, 5-7: *Qui* (the *principes* of the time of the younger Scipio) *cum cetera litteris mandarent . . . bene vivendi disciplinam vita magis quam litteris persecuti sunt. . . . Itaque illius verae elegantisque philosophiae . . . nulla fere sunt aut pauca admodum Latina monumenta. . . . Cum interim illis* (the Peripatetics, Stoics, and Academics) *silentibus C. Amafinius eastitit dicens, cuius libris editis commota multitudo tulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam, sive quod erat cognitu perfacilis, sive quod invitabantur illecebris blandae voluptatis, sive etiam, quia nihil prolatum erat melius, illud, quod erat, tenebant. Post Amafinium autem multi eiusdem aemuli rationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt.*

and pressing threat to his own ideas, political as well as philosophical. The attacks found in the late works are different both in nature and intensity from those in the dialogues written before the Civil War; may not one of his purposes in writing the late dialogues have been to win over to the conservative cause a group of rich and influential Epicureans in the municipia of Italy?

These converts of Amafinius should be distinguished from the earlier Epicureans of whom we know from other sources. There are a few references to teachers of the sect in the late second and early first centuries, the most important of whom was Philodemus; but, with one possible exception,³ they all seem to have used Greek. We also know a little about the Romans who embraced this philosophy in this period; they were numerous enough at the dramatic date of the *De Oratore* (90 B. C.) to be mentioned as a group (*De Or.*, III, 63). Here too we find that in every case they were men of position, who would have had every opportunity to learn Greek. In all this there is no sign of a popular Epicurean movement.

The arguments of modern scholars about Amafinius, who started such a movement, have been summed up by G. Della Valle.⁴ They result from the indefinite expressions of time used by Cicero, and from the apparent contradiction between his statements and the claim of Lucretius (V, 336-337), *hanc primus cum primis ipse repertus / nunc ego sum in patrias qui possim vertere voces*. To reconcile the statements, most editors have assumed that Amafinius, although he lived before Lucretius, was ignored by the poet because (a) he wrote in prose, (b) Lucretius had never heard of him, or (c) Lucretius did not think him important enough to mention.

A few scholars avoid the need for such explanations by suggest-

³ *De Amic.*, 13: *Neque enim assentior iis, qui hæc nuper disserere coeperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire et omnia morte deleri*. In this speech Cato makes no mention of the language of these teachers. The dramatic date is 129 B. C.

⁴ G. Della Valle, *Tito Lucrezio Caro e l'epicureismo campano* (Naples, 1933), pp. 169-181. Among the editors who place Amafinius early are Tyrrell, Robin, Rostagni, Leonard and Smith, and Bailey; Della Valle and Giussani put him late. Except for the arguments given by Della Valle, I have not found any attempts to prove any date for Amafinius.

ing that Amafinius and Lucretius were contemporaries. Della Valle, who leans to this view, points out (p. 178) that Amafinius is coupled with C. Catius (Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, XV, 19, 2) who died a little before 45 (*Ad Fam.*, XV, 16, 1), and with one Rabirius (*Acad.*, I, 5), in terms which imply a *vient de paraître*. Cicero's expressions of time are vague,⁵ and the *primus cum primis* of Lucretius could mean "the first (in excellence) among the first (in time)," as well as "definitely the best," the usual rendering.

To the rather subjective arguments of Della Valle a few more might be added. To the first of the explanations of the failure of Lucretius to mention Amafinius it can be objected that *in patrias vertere voces* surely refers to translation and not to versifying; to the second and third, that the notoriety of Amafinius in 45 B. C. makes it most unlikely that he was unknown or unimportant ten years earlier—if, that is, he had worked a generation back. There are a few more indications of his date. When he is coupled with another writer, he is never mentioned as the introducer of his philosophy to Italy, but as the possessor of a barbarous style of writing. Since he had plenty of followers, there was no lack of horrible examples from which Cicero could have chosen; would not the case against the Epicureans be weakened if it were necessary to go back forty or fifty years for one who wrote badly? Again, it is hard to reconcile the Lucretian *volgus abhorret ab hac* (I, 945) with Cicero's account of the popularity of Epicureanism after Amafinius; we can only do so, if Amafinius had lived earlier, by assuming that his works lay unnoticed for many years, to enjoy sudden attention in the late fifties and early forties. Finally, even poetic license might hesitate to complain of the *egestas linguae* (Lucretius, I, 139) if a Latin technical vocabulary, however poor, had already been worked out before the time of Lucretius. Actually, we do know one word from the vocabulary of Amafinius, *corpuscula* = atoms, (Cicero, *Acad.*, I, 6); it is used five times by Lucretius. This,

⁵ Cf. *Tusc.*, I, 5: *Philosophia iacuit usque ad hanc aetatem nec ullum habuit lumen litterarum Latinarum*. If the *aetas* included the previous ten years, Cicero might have been thinking of Lucretius, whose poem was distinguished by *multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis* (*Ad Quint. Fr.*, II, 9 [11], 3). In the next sentence Amafinius is excluded from the literary lights.

of course, tells nothing about priority. The matter of vocabulary is the more significant because the two men were concerned with the same subject, physics; neither, so far as we know, showed any interest in the logical studies of the schools of Athens or Naples.⁶

Cicero's account enables us to form an idea of the sort of men attracted by Amafinius' teachings. They had money and leisure enough to buy and read books, but not enough education to be able to read Greek.⁷ Their learning was great enough for them to wrestle with the ideas of Epicurus, but they were not so sophisticated that they demanded the rhetorical flourish expected by the compeers of Cicero; better trained and more literate Epicureans like Cassius could smile at Amafinius and Catius as *mali verborum* [*Epicuri*] *interpretes* (*Ad Fam.*, XV, 19, 2). The naïveté of these converts appears in the reasons Cicero gives for their becoming Epicureans: the ease of learning the doctrines, the attractions of a philosophy of pleasure, and the absence of other teachings.⁸ These men came from all over Italy; they were presumably well-to-do citizens of the municipia, grown prosperous since the end of the Social War.⁹ Newly risen from low estate, they would be alive to the terrors of superstition, which in the eyes of Cicero could frighten no old woman (*Tusc.*, I, 48); they may have been the people for whom Lucretius wrote his diatribes against the blind fear of heaven, and to whom he offered Epicureanism as a refuge.

⁶ For Amafinius, *Acad.*, I, 6. The same passage mentions the Epicurean ignorance of geometry, a subject which had been treated with some care by the school, and especially by Zeno of Sidon (Proclus, *Comm. on Euclid*, 55 [Friedlein, p. 199]). On the logical inquiries of the school, P. and E. De Lacy, *Philodemus: on Methods of Inference* (Philadelphia, 1941), p. 148.

⁷ The Italian Epicureans do not seem to have known much Greek at the time Cicero was writing, *Tusc.*, V, 116: *Epicurei nostri Graece fere nesciunt*. The *Epicurei*, although it appears in all the manuscripts, was deleted by Madvig as a *foedum additamentum*. For a discussion of the passage, see the edition of the *Tusculan Disputations* of T. W. Dougan and R. L. Henry (Cambridge, 1934), II, p. 299.

⁸ Elsewhere Cicero gives a more reputable reason for the spread of the sect. *De Fin.*, I, 25: *multitudinem haec maxime allicit, quod ita putant dici ab illó, recta et honesta quae sint, ea facere ipsa per se laetitiam, id est voluptatem*.

⁹ Tenney Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome* (Baltimore, 1933), I, p. 274.

They do not seem to have been of much concern to Cicero before the outbreak of the Civil War. He makes no reference to Epicureanism in any of his works before his return from exile; from then until Pharsalus his attacks take two forms. Of his political opponents Piso and Gellius (and, in jest, of his friend Trebatius Testa), Cicero says that they used Epicureanism to cloak their personal vices; but their philosophy was a travesty of the beliefs of Philodemus (*Post Red. in Sen.*, 14, *Pro Sest.*, 110, *Ad Fam.*, VII, 12). The other accusation against the school is directed against an anonymous group rather than against individuals; it is that Epicureanism makes men unfit for statesmanship. Its devotees prefer reclining quietly in their gardens to doing their duty by the state (*De Or.*, III, 63, *De Rep.*, I, 12, *De Leg.*, I, 39). This is an odd charge to bring against a school whose members included Piso, Memmius, and Pansa. We can only conclude that these men were not typical of the school, but that there was a large group entitled by birth and wealth to influence in the state, who were not making use of their opportunities. If this group could be aroused to action, they could be counted on to ally themselves with the *optimates*. These were evidently not the disciples of Amafinius.

After Pharsalus the place of Epicureanism in the writings of Cicero changes; he no longer attacks it merely because it offers lazy or timid *optimates* a chance to shirk their duty to the state, but because it makes the state itself impossible. Before the death of Caesar, overt propaganda was unsafe—witness the fate of the *Cato*—and the references to Epicureanism as a political corrosive are guarded,¹⁰ but in the *De Officiis*, written after the assassination of the dictator, they come out into the open.¹¹

¹⁰ E. g. *De Nat. Deor.*, I, 4: *atque haud scio an, pietate adversus deos sublata, fides etiam et societas generis humani et una excellentissima virtus, iustitia, tollatur. De Fin.*, II, 74: *Quid enim mereri velis iam, cum magistratum inieris et in concionem ascenderis . . . ut te dicas in eo magistratu omnia voluptatis causa facturum esse?*

¹¹ Cicero defends his own judgments of recent politics by appeals to his philosophy of duty: so with agrarian legislation (II, 78), the fighting between Milo and Clodius (II, 58), measures for the relief of debtors (II, 84), the treatment of Marseilles (II, 28), and the assassination of Caesar (III, 19). The Epicureans, who reject the axioms of this philosophy, are attacked throughout the work, notably at the beginning, where they are numbered with the *disciplinae quae propositis bonorum*

Cicero admits (*Ad Fam.*, IX, 2, 5) that his philosophical works were intended partly as political tracts, and further remarks that the need for his works was the more pressing because of the number of Epicurean tracts in circulation (*Tusc.*, I, 6). The philosophical and the political aspects of Cicero's dialogues may, of course, be considered as unrelated; but it is more likely that they are closely connected: *si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, otiosi* (*Tusc.*, I, 5). It is, then, possible that Cicero's late dialogues, with their reiterated attacks on a school with many disciples in the municipia, constituted an attempt to win potential followers to his ideas of government; this could be done by first demolishing the structure built by Amafinius. These writings would then be an intellectual counterpart to the proselyting done by the Liberators after the Ides of March.¹²

In the absence, therefore, of definite evidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to regard Amafinius as a contemporary of Lucretius, and to assume that his followers were drawn from the municipia of Italy. Among them his influence spread rapidly, so rapidly, indeed, that Cicero was moved only a decade later to attack their Epicureanism as a political danger. Thus the obscure and derided popularizer appears, not as a very minor forerunner of Lucretius, but as the instigator of a philosophy which, being acceptable under contemporary political conditions, exercised for a time at least a considerable influence on Roman history, and, by calling forth Cicero's counter-propaganda, on Roman letters.

HERBERT M. HOWE.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

et malorum finibus officium omne pervertant (I, 5), and at the end (III, 116-120): *cum his "viris equisque," ut dicitur, si honestatem tueri ac retinere sententia est, decertandum* (III, 116).

¹² R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939), p. 101.

TWO GREEK NAMES FOR THE TRUFFLE.

The passage Juvenal, 5, 116 ff.:

post hunc tradentur tubera, si ver
tunc erit et facient optata tonitrua cenas
maiores

unites in itself the two aspects under which the truffle is mentioned in classical literature: the fungus as a characteristic of luxury and as an object of scientific interest. Juvenal's source for his biological statement is Pliny's description of the truffle, particularly the passage *Nat. Hist.*, XIX, 3, 13 (§ 37):

De tuberibus haec traduntur peculiariter: cum fuerint imbres autumnales ac tonitrua crebra, tunc nasci, et maxime tonitribus, nec ultra annum durare, tenerrima autem verno esse.

These remarks are based on informations from Theophrastus known to us by the quotations in Athenaeus, II, 62b:

περὶ δὲ τούτων ἰδίον τι λέγεται· φασὶ γάρ, ὅταν ὕδατα μετοπωρινὰ καὶ βρονταὶ γίνωνται σκληραί, τότε γίνεσθαι, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅταν αἱ βρονταί, ὡς ταύτης αἰτιωτέρας οὐσης. . . .

The scientific interest of the ancient writers is, however, confined to certain problems: that of the form (cf. Theophrastus, *H. P.*, I, 1, 11), of the reproduction (cf. Phaenias, *ap. Ath.*, II, 61f; Theophrastus, *ap. Ath.*, II, 62b), and of the places of origin. Nothing is said about the way of gathering the truffles¹ — a surprising omission which we may ascribe to the fact the informant (i. e. particularly Theophrastus) had no first-hand knowledge of this process.

Here, the etymology may provide us with some additional insight into a rather unimportant, but nevertheless interesting part of Greek everyday life.

The name for one species of *tuber* is *γεράνειον*. The manuscripts of Theophrastus give (*H. P.*, I, 6, 5) *κράνιον*, but the former spelling is confirmed by Athenaeus, II, 61f and II, 62a

¹ Except for one brief remark in Athenaeus, II, 62d: ὁδνόφυλλον δέ φησι Πάμφιλος ἐν Γλώσσαις τὴν φυομένην τῶν ὕδρων ὑπέρθε πόναν, ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ὕδρον γινώσκεται.

and Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, XIX, 3, 12 (§ 36) (MS Q) as well as by Eustathius, 1017, 19, who, however, is obviously giving an excerpt from Athenaeus, II, 61 f. The conjecture *κεραύνιον*, which Wimmer in all probability has taken from a *lectio vulgata* of the Pliny passage, is nothing but a popular etymology due to the remarks on thunderstorms given by Theophrastus.

The etymology of *γεράνειον* is, however, still obscure. The word must be an adjectival derivative, probably from *γέρανος*. But a connection of a word for "truffle" with a word for "crane" gives no plausible sense.

There is, however, another possibility left: The *Etymologicum Magnum* (227, 51) lists a word *γέρανος* = *δμβρος* as Cyrenaic. This reminds us of the fact that Theophrastus (Athenaeus, II, 62a) mentions the Cyrenaica as the region where a species of truffle, the *μίσον*, grows. An explanation of *γεράνειον* seems easy by connecting the rains mentioned in the Theophrastus quotation with the gloss from the *Etymologicum*. That means: *γεράνειον* would be "rain plant."

But this solution of the problem is in all probability wrong. Hesychius gives a gloss *δμβρος*· *χοιρίδιον*—and even if it seems farfetched at first glance, we have to use this gloss for the explanation of *γεράνειον*.

For the equation *γέρανος* = *δμβρος* = *χοιρίδιον* is supported by some additional evidence. Hesychius gives a word for the sow, *γρώνα* (cod. *γεωνα*) (and a plural, *γρονάδες*) which he ascribes to the Laconian dialect. The latter fact reminds us of the notice that *γέρανος* = *δμβρος* was Cyrenaic, i. e. Dorian.

Now, *γρώνα* is undoubtedly of the same origin as *γέρανος*. While the latter form contains full grade of the root and is to be analyzed as **geranos*, *γρώνα* has zero grade **gṛnā* (respectively, if the gloss is to be read *γρῶνα*, **gṛnyā*). From the morphological point of view, there is no problem left.

But what about the semantic aspects? Is it possible that the truffle was called "pig plant"?

This question may be answered in the affirmative. The relation between truffle and swine is quite clear. I quote from the *Encyclopaedia Americana*, in the fuller version of 1943 (XXVII, p. 104):

The tubers . . . are dug out, either laboriously by unaided man with a sharp spud, or by the aid of dogs or pigs. The latter are commonly used in Perigord, their rooting instincts and fine nose for scent being turned to account. A trained sow will sniff the peculiar pervasive odor exhaled by a ripe tuber, and will make directly for it, either laying it bare or uprooting the solitary tuber, to be rewarded with an acorn or chestnut. Good intelligent sows in a prolific forest will unearth 10 or 12 pounds of truffles in a day, which will bring a good price. Dogs are also used in the same manner, especially by poachers.

It seems probable that the Greeks used sows in the same way. At least, we may say they knew that pigs "hunted" truffles, and that for this reason they gave the fungus the name of "pig plant."

But the word from which *γέρανιον* was derived was probably a dialect word not understood by the majority of the Greeks: the transformations *κράνιον* and *κεραύνιον* show two results of popular etymology. *γέρας*, however, is of great interest—even if it were not possible to show any cognates in other IE languages, it had to be considered as an old word since it is in ablaut relation to *γρώνα*.

However, it seems possible to connect *γέρας* with the root **gher-* "shine," from which words for "grey" are derived in different IE languages (cf. Walde-Pokorny, I, p. 602). Several words for "swine" and particularly "young pig" are based on words with the meaning "grey," cf. ONorse *griss* and Gk. *χοῖρος* (cf. Walde-Pokorny, I, pp. 602 f.—different point of view p. 610—and Boisacq, p. 1065). The connection of *γέρας* with the root mentioned above is, however, possible only if the word is not of native Greek origin, but belongs to a language which changed IE media aspirata into a media. Since *γέρας* and *γρώνα* are ascribed to Dorian dialects, we may think of tentatively regarding these words (at least the "Laconian" one) as belonging to the "Hyllean" (Illyrian) part of the Dorian population of the Peloponnesus, if not to a substratum of the same origin (cf. Schwyzler, *Griech. Gramm.*, I, pp. 65 ff.). This would provide a sufficient explanation as to why other Greeks were

unable to understand the basic meaning of γεράνειον, so that they had to resort to popular etymology.²

II.

This way of naming the truffle has a striking parallel in the Germanic languages: "A plant of the genus *Cyclamen* . . . the fleshy tuberous rootstocks of which are eaten by swine" (*N.E.D.*, IX, p. 492) is called *sow-bread*, German *Saubrot* (Grimm, *Dt. Wb.*, VIII, p. 1860). And it is an interesting coincidence that Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, XXV, 9, 67, § 115) says about a species of the same genus: *a nostris tuber terrae vocatur*.

Keeping in mind these facts, we may feel encouraged to try to etymologize another Greek word for the truffle, probably designating a species other than γεράνειον (cf. Theophrastus, *H. P.*, I, 6, 5), namely ὕδνον.³

It seems possible that ὕδνον contains as its first part the stem of ὕς. We find the athematic stem preserved in some compounds, as in ὑφορβός, *Od.*, XIV, 3, etc., besides σφορβός, Homer, etc., and more recent σφορβός, Polybius, etc.; not, however, in ὑστρίξ, which actually contains the preposition *ῥδ- (cf. Walde-Pokorny, I, p. 189), whereas popular etymology connected it with ὕς—a connection still reflected in the Latin loan translation *porcus spinosus*, which in turn furnished the German loan translation *Stachelschwein* (cf. Kluge-Götze, *Etym. Wb.*,¹¹ p. 584).

² Since by many scholars (cf. e. g. Sommer, *Handbuch d. Lat. Laut- u. Formenlehre*, pp. 53 f.; Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.*, I, p. 368) -ρω is regarded as the normal Greek development from *-ῥ-, the ascription of γέπωνος and γρώνα to a non-Greek language may lead us to a reconsideration of Greek words showing this development in order to find out whether more might be of foreign origin. An assumption that γρώνα is a genuine Greek formation derived from the loan word γέπωνος, which would indicate that the ablaut was still effective at a relatively recent date, is less probable, and so is the possibility of an influence of the loan word γέπωνος upon a hypothetical Greek *χρώνα.

³ Earlier attempts to etymologize ὕδνον are found in Prellwitz, *K. Z.*, XLVI, p. 172 (from a locative *uden : r-stem in Skr. *udaram* "Bauch, Mutterleib, Höhlung, Inneres eines Dinges"), Walde-Pokorny, I, p. 253 (from the n-stem of ὕδωρ), and Strömberg, "Griechische Pflanzennamen," *Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift*, XLVI, 1 (1940), p. 79 ("Regenpflanze," derived from ὕω "rain," with reference to the passage from Theophrastus quoted above—Athenaeus, II, 62b).

But if we connect υ - in $\upsilon\delta\nu\nu$ with $*s\check{u}$ - in \check{s} , what about the second part of the word?

Here we may think of the other plant names mentioned, *sow-bread* and *Saubrot*. Is there any word meaning "food" or something of this kind, which may be connected with $-\delta\nu$ -?

In Sanskrit, we have a word *annam* "food," which is to be analyzed as $*ed-no-m$. In Greek, there is a very close parallel formation, viz., an adjective $\epsilon\delta\nu\acute{o}s$ "eatable"; as for the difference $-v$: $-av$ - compare $\sigma\tau\epsilon\gamma\nu\acute{o}s$: $\sigma\tau\epsilon\gamma\nu\acute{o}s$ "covering."

Is it now possible to analyze $\upsilon\delta\nu\nu$ as composed of $*s\check{u}$ - and $*ednom$?

There are some difficulties which should not be overlooked:

1) $\upsilon\delta\nu\nu$ contains a short v . Since, however, as far as I know, no ancient grammarian has discussed this word, and since our manuscripts are not older than the end of the first millennium of our era, we may concede that the accentuation might just as well be $*\upsilon\delta\nu\nu$, especially since there are preserved *variae lectiones*, $\omicron\delta\nu\nu$ and $\omicron\iota\nu\nu$.

2) Why did the $*-e$ - of $*-ednom$ disappear? As I find no parallel for a contraction $*-v + \epsilon > -\check{v}$ (Homeric $\epsilon\rho\nu\tau\omicron$ [: $\rho\acute{\upsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$] could perhaps be an athematic form), I think we may better resort to another explanation: Besides nouns with full grade of the root syllable preceding a $-no$ - suffix (like $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\nu\nu$, $\epsilon\delta\nu\nu$, etc.), there are others with zero grade of the root (like $\upsilon\pi\nu\nu$ < $*supnos$: Skr. *svapnas*).⁴ This zero-grade formation would, however, not be $*\acute{d}nom$, but $*Adnom$, since the root of $\epsilon\delta\omega$ originally had an initial laryngeal consonant,⁵ and therefore we would have to adhere to a spelling $*\upsilon\delta\nu\nu$, because this would be the normal development from $*su-Adnom$.

It would be hazardous to base the etymology of $\upsilon\delta\nu\nu$ on such, at least partly, hypothetical evidence as provided by the word itself. But since we have the parallel $\gamma\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$ and the argu-

⁴ Cf. Brugmann, *Grundriss*, II, p. 132.

⁵ The former existence of an initial laryngeal consonant in the root of $\epsilon\delta\omega$ is shown by different facts—"prothetic" vowel in $\acute{o}\delta\omicron\upsilon\acute{s}$ (?), $*\check{q}$ - in $\nu\eta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$, $-\eta$ - in $\epsilon\delta\eta\delta\acute{o}\varsigma$. An antecorsonantal laryngeal lengthens preceding vowel. (I use the sign Λ which E. H. Sturtevant applies for an undefined laryngeal, in order to avoid lengthy discussions of the character of the laryngeal consonant.)

ments drawn from material evidence, the proposed etymology seems to have at least a certain degree of verisimilitude.

III.

Appendix.

The word ἰδνεῖν · τρέφειν . . . given by Hesychius has in all probability nothing to do with *ἰδνον. It may, however, be connected with **Adnom* as a denominative verb. If we identify ἰ- with the preposition ἰ- occurring in Cyprian and elsewhere, instead of the more common ἐπι-, we may regard ἰδνέω as an equivalent of *ἐπιτροφέω, denominative to ἐπιτροφή.

In the same way ἰδναι · ἔγγονοι · σύντροφοι, Hesychius, may be explained. It should be mentioned that the meaning "descendant" represented in the gloss by ἔγγονοι, is to be postulated for a noun *ἐπίτροφος too because of the meaning "to grow up after" of ἐπιτρέφομαι in passages like ἐκ τουτέων σφι ἐπετράφη νεότης, Herodotus, IV, 3, etc.

WERNER WINTER.

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS.

REVIEWS.

KRISTER HANELL. Das altrömische eponyme Amt. Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, 1946. Pp. 226. (*Skrifter Utgivna av svenska Institutet i Rom*, II.)

This is a belated review, for the reviewer, who read the book when it was received in 1947, did not feel competent to discuss the author's views until time could be found for some detailed work on the problems involved. The book is so suggestive and arresting that it deserves consideration even at this late date. Whether or not the main thesis is accepted, the book should be carefully read by every serious student of the early Roman Republic.

The investigation is limited to eponymous magistrates, leaving out of account the development of plebeian offices. According to Hanell, all ancient and most modern historians (he excepts Beloech, and he could well have mentioned de Sanetis) are under the influence of a view that became current at Rome soon after 300 B. C., the period to which Hanell attributes the arrangement of the consular *fasti*. This view is that the king was driven out at the end of the sixth century (509 Varr.); that the chief officers of the republic established at that time were two colleagues known originally as praetors and eventually as consuls; and that with interruptions provided by the appointment of *decemviri* in 450 and by the frequent substitution in 444-367 of three or more military tribunes with consular power, the two consuls remained the chief officers throughout the republic.

This view of Roman constitutional history is, in Hanell's opinion, a creation of the new nobility which developed after the Licinian Sextian laws of 367 put an end to the military tribunate and established permanently the college of two consuls, one of whom was usually, and always after 343, chosen from the plebs. After this time the consulship ennobled a man and his descendants, and there developed a new nobility which, except in certain sacred matters, displaced the old birthright patriciate. According to Hanell, the noble families, who through the pontificate had control of the record of eponymous officers, assumed that at the time when the eponymous officers were instituted in 509 the consulship of two members was established as a substitute for the monarchy; records of the past were prepared accordingly; they were based not on deliberate falsification of history but on a natural attempt to interpret the past from the present.

Hanell's revised outline of early constitutional history is as follows. In 509, with the dedication of the Capitoline temple, the Romans, while still under a monarchy, began to list each year one eponymous officer, the *praetor maximus*, who served under the king as commander of the army. Meanwhile the development of hoplite tactics, introduced, according to Nilsson's date, at the end of the sixth century, weakened the kingship, and led finally in 451 to its dissolution. The commanders of the new army enrolled in the

centuriate *comitia* were substituted as chief magistrates of the city. They consisted of colleges of two, three, or more men, known either as *consules* or as *tribuni militum*, to whose title the words *consulari potestate* were added. These officials served until 366 when, as a result of the conflict between the orders, two consuls, usually one from each order, were substituted. Thus 451 marks the end of the monarchy and 366 the beginning of the college of consuls limited to two in number.

Hanell has made an important contribution in his investigation of eponymous officers in the East and in Greece. He associates the institution of these officers in Greece with the spread of the alphabet for which he is inclined to accept Carpenter's date. Since the lists of ephors of Sparta and archons of Athens begin not with the institution of the two offices but with the introduction of the principle of eponymy, he argues that similarly at Rome there had been praetors long before they became eponymous officers in 509. The new system was, he thinks, associated with the dedication date of the Capitoline temple preserved in religious records, the most reliable documents of early Roman history.

Hanell's argument that a new form of time reckoning accompanied the establishment of the new cult is admirably presented. The cult was, he believes, Greek in origin, and it came to Rome through the influence of Delphi; with it came not only a new system of recording the years by eponymous officers but also the pre-Caesarian lunar solar calendar, the establishment of which Nilsson attributed to the year 509. Hanell finds a residue of truth in Livy's account (VII, 3) of the ancient law providing that the *praetor maximus* should every year on the Ides of September drive a nail in the wall of Jupiter's *cella*. Hanell does not believe in the nail driving except as an occasional expiatory ceremony, but he interprets the date, the dedication day of the Capitolium, and the title *praetor maximus* as evidence for the institution of an eponymous list of magistrates who, he holds, originally entered office on the Ides of September. Hanell is right in associating with the eponymous list the calendar which gave the name *fasti* to the list, for the records of years and of months seem to have been maintained together by the pontifices. But I cannot follow him in accepting 509 as the date when the pre-Caesarian calendar was instituted. Nilsson's "Entdeckung" that the cult of the Capitoline Triad is a central feature of the calendar has been questioned, most recently by Professor Agnes Kirsopp Michels (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXX [1949], pp. 320-346). Minerva is completely lacking in the calendar, and, though Jupiter and Juno are all important, their rites seem to be associated with the *ara* rather than with the Capitolium. There is no evidence that either the eponymous list or the calendar was ever kept in the Capitolium. In my view the identity of date between the dedication year of the Capitolium and the beginning of the eponymous list does not justify Hanell's conclusion.

Nor am I convinced by Hanell's view that Horatius' dedication of the Capitolium, the occurrence of Cassius' name alone in the *Foedus Cassianum* or the doubtful traces of the name Lucius in the Forum stele indicate that there was only one eponymous magistrate after

509. The evidence for the continuance of the monarchy after that date, and particularly for the dedication of the temple of *Dius Fidius* by a *Tarquin*, is very shaky. Equally doubtful is the evidence that consuls and military tribunes were alternate terms, both used for chief magistrates in a college of varying size. There will be few who can follow Hanell in finding proof of the identity of the two terms in the title of *A. Cornelius Cossus* that *Augustus* (*Livy*, IV, 20) professed to have found in the temple of *Juppiter Feretrius*.

But the greatest problem is how, if there was only one eponymous officer from 509 to 451, a list of two names for each year could, as Hanell believes, have been made without falsification of history. He suggests that the list might have been put together in some such manner as *Beloch* assumed. But *Beloch* (*Römische Geschichte* [Berlin, 1926], pp. 225-236) accounted for the preservation of two names by the theory that the regular chief magistrates from the beginning of the republic until 451 were dictators with their masters of horse. I agree with Hanell that the dictator must always have been an emergency office and not an annual magistracy, but I think he ought to tell us how the second name was added to each year.

It could not have been added without falsification of history. *Enmann* and *Kornemann* (to whom Hanell refers), *Neumann*, *Stein*, *Schön* (see the bibliography cited by him, *R.-E.*, Suppl. V, col. 367) and others have tried to show how the great nobles of the *Samnite* war used their influence in putting the early lists together. These scholars have attributed to the influence of the mighty *C. Iunius Bubulcus* the insertion of *L. Junius Brutus* in the first year of the *fasti*. They have explained the repeated consulships of the early *Fabii* as a result of the power of *Q. Fabius Rullianus*. They have argued that plebeian *Minucii*, *Genucii*, *Sempronii* and *Volumnii*, who held consulships between 307 and 303, managed to get their supposed patrician ancestors inserted in the pre-decemviral period of the *fasti*. But the whole college of pontifices, eight of the noblest men of a great period in Roman history, would have had to be a party to such a fraud. It happens that we know the names of the four new plebeian members chosen by the patrician pontifices after the *lex Ogulnia* opened the pontificate and the augurate to the plebs in 300 (*Livy*, X, 9). Besides a *Sempronius* they included a *Decius*, a *Marcus*, and a *Livius*, all three *consulares*, the first two of them distinguished members of families that were important at the time. Would these men have falsified records? Even supposing that they were not above such dishonesty, would they have put into early consulships the families of their colleague *Sempronius* and of two of the new members of the augurate, *Minucius* and *Genucius*, while at the same time their own houses were left in obscurity? There was plenty of room in the records for more insertions. In eight of the years 509-486, the period of the *fasti* that *Beloch* considers most suspicious, neither colleague belongs to a family which held the consulship between 320 and 260.

In my opinion the best explanation of the pre-decemviral list is that, except for certain years and notably for the first year of the republic, 509, it is substantially correct in the family names of the

magistrates, less reliable in *praenomina* and genealogies, and distinctly untrustworthy in *cognomina*. The comments of Livy (VIII, 40) and Cicero (*Brutus*, 62) on the damage that funeral laudations have done to the records of Roman history may, if they apply to the magisterial list, refer to interpolations in such details rather than to falsification of family names. It is to be noted that Cicero, in suggesting that he might, following a plebeian custom of claiming ancestry from a patrician house, say that he was a descendant of the Tullius who was consul ten years after the expulsion of the kings, actually provides support for the genuineness of the consular *fasti*. If the list is in the main reliable for family names, the development of the Roman constitution represented in the list cannot be rejected.

I have not accepted Hanell's thesis, but I have profited greatly from his lucid and stimulating discussion. I cannot praise too highly his success in putting complicated constitutional problems into simple terms, his ability to see the development of the constitution in its relation to social history, and his discussion of the Oriental and Greek background of the Roman eponymous officer.

LILY ROSS TAYLOR.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

"MANA." Introduction à l'histoire des religions — 2: Les religions de l'Europe ancienne. III: Les religions étrusque et romaine par ALBERT GRENIER. Les religions des Celtes, des Germains et des anciens Slaves par JOSEPH VENDRYES, ERNEST TONNELAT et B.-O. UNBEGAUN. Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1948. Pp. 467. 500 francs.

Histories of religion have multiplied during and after the late war. The series called *Mana* has many merits, among them being the notes on the "état des questions" which follow the chapters, like the *Gesichtspunkte und Probleme* in Wide-Nilsson, *Griechische und römische Religion* (in Gercke-Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft*). The present volume contains five independent sections, all of interest to the student of the ancient world, since the Celtic and Germanic material concerns him for its own sake and the Slavic for the analogies which it presents or has been thought to present.¹

This review must in the main be confined to Grenier's sections; even here I cannot properly judge the Etruscan one, but it is certainly clear and attractive. One chapter, *La Révélation étrusque*, brings out in its title as in its contents the fact that Etruscan ritual and prophecy rested on a sacred literature which was practical and

¹ I am not in a position to deny Unbegaun's right to pass over Usener's use of Lithuanian data as evidence for *Sondergötter*; yet in view of the place of *Götternamen* in the history of these studies (cf. W. Kroll in Hastings, *Enc. Rel. Eth.*, VIII, pp. 778 f.), a few remarks in a future edition would be welcome.

not speculative (p. 70) and which for all its systematization did not produce anything like a theocratic state (p. 69). Grenier warns us well against the danger of drawing religious inferences from the scenes on mirrors (pp. 47 f.), as contrasted with the liver of Piacenza, "un instrument d'instruction sacerdotale" and follows de Ruyt in minimizing supposed fears of the hereafter, "Les images horribles expriment simplement la terreur qu'inspire naturellement la mort" (p. 62).² All this is very much to the point.

The Roman section begins with *numina*, etc., and thereafter analyzes first the Roman calendar and the old cults and secondly the new deities introduced under the Republic. The remaining chapters are devoted to public worship and those to whom it was entrusted, the Augustan restoration, and the changes which followed. The whole makes a pleasant, sympathetic picture; I welcome such a remark as (p. 159), "C'est une religion, encore simple et primitive, mais non plus une magie" and again the recognition (p. 192) that what Augustus did rested on a widespread sentiment. P. 200 gives a needed warning against the supposition that astrological theory, as distinct from astrological predictions, was widespread. Further, the notes contain many useful references to work which owing to present conditions is not as well known as could be wished.

In so large a topic there is room for difference of opinion. To say of religion under the Empire (p. 201), "Elle ne sera même plus gréco-romaine comme sous Auguste, c'est l'Orient qui lui fournira ses mythes, sa théologie et ses rites" seems to me to go too far;³ and so does (p. 222), "Le temps de la vie apparaît peu de chose en comparaison de la durée indéfinie de la survie. La religion devient essentiellement une préparation du sort qui, pour chacun, suivra la mort."

Some points of detail may be noted. On p. 96 *dies nefastus* is defined as "jour néfaste et funeste," a meaning familiar in popular nontechnical language, like Horace, *C.*, II, 13, 1; but cf. Wissowa, *Rel.*, 443. On the Argei and Saturnus (pp. 114, 118) the reader should certainly turn to H. J. Rose's articles in *Oxford Classical Dictionary*; as for the supposed Pythagoreanism of Appius Claudius Caecus (p. 143), cf. *J. R. S.*, XXXVIII (1948), p. 157. The "fêtes sacrilèges" (p. 196) ascribed to Octavian may safely be dismissed as Antony's propaganda; cf. *Camb. Anc. Hist.*, X, p. 474. The Porta Maggiore basilica may conceivably have been the meeting place of some Neopythagoreans; but to call it a "témoignage précieux" of their symbolism (p. 203) is too much. The college of *pastophori*⁴ at Rome claimed to have been founded in the time

² Cf. J. D. Beazley, *Etruscan Vase Painting*, pp. 9 f. ("all terrors of transit"). The same point of view is to be used in interpreting a much later Roman epitaph, *Carm. lat. epigr.*, 2121 (cf. indeed Plutarch, 1105 A).

³ For the issues involved cf. H. C. Puech, *Rev. hist. rel.*, CXXVI (1943), pp. 71 ff.

⁴ On whom cf. now W. Otto's magnificent *Beiträge zur Hierodulie im hellenistischen Ägypten* (*Abh. Bayer. Akad.*, N. F. XXIX [1950]), pp. 19 ff. Zucker has deserved very well of us all for the devotion and skill with which he has edited this work.

of Sulla (Apuleius, *Met.*, XI, 30), not as is here said (pp. 206, 228) by Sulla.

To sum up, Grenier's sections are helpful as well as attractive, but a few revisions are desirable in the next edition. His colleagues, Vendryes, Tonnelat, and Unbegaun have given extremely clear and cautious presentations of their themes. Many as are the gaps in our knowledge of Roman religion, we do have a large body of native material for it. For Celtic and Teutonic, we depend on foreign observers, often with a schematic point of view,⁵ on native records given in the medium of *interpretatio Romana*, whether linguistic or artistic, and on indigenous literature of a later time; for Slavonie, we depend mainly on the scanty evidence of hostile witnesses. The three writers have nevertheless succeeded in producing statements which are both intelligible and so formulated as to let the reader know all the time the relative solidity of the ground on which he is treading. I may refer in particular to what Vendryes has to say about the Druids and their relation to society at different periods, to his list of Celtic deities associated with Roman divine names, and to Tonnelat's handling of the differences between Scandinavia and Germany proper. There is much here for all readers of Caesar and Tacitus⁶ and the classical student who reads Unbegaun may be surprised to find Trajan among the deities;⁷ this came from the Balkans⁸ (as did the Rosalia).

In conclusion, our thanks are due to writers and publisher alike for a useful volume in a good series.

ARTHUR DARBY NOCK.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

FRITZ SCHACHERMEYR. *Alexander der Grosse: Ingenium und Macht.* Graz-Salzburg-Vienna, Anton Pustet, 1949. Pp. 535.

It is to be regretted that the author was obliged to abandon his original plan of publishing this book in two volumes. In its present form the narrative is not only long, but crowded with novel interpretations inadequately defended in the abbreviated notes. There is some hope that this deficiency may be remedied at least in part by later articles (see note 191). However, Schachermeyr has made his position abundantly clear on most of the controversial points, and

⁵ Cf. H. M. Jones, *Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc.*, LXXXV (1942), pp. 448 ff. for a similar early attitude to the American Indians.

⁶ J. G. C. Anderson's edition of the *Germania* should be added to the bibliography. The curious inscription at Ardea relating to Velea (*Ann. épigr.*, 1948, no. 48; last discussed by J. and L. Robert in *Rev. ét. gr.*, LXII [1949], pp. 160 f. and J. Bousquet, *ibid.*, pp. 88 ff.) was presumably not available in time for mention. On the official Roman attitude towards Druidism, cf. now H. Last, *J. R. S.*, XXXIX (1949), pp. 1 ff.; on certain basic questions of Celtic religion in relation to Arthurian romance cf. T. P. Cross, *Philologica, The Malone Anniversary Studies*, pp. 110 ff.

⁷ R. Paribeni knew this (*Optimus Princeps*, II, p. 316).

⁸ Did the towering mass of the mound of Adamklissi exercise some influence on this development?

his portrait of Alexander is carefully woven into the texture of the narrative, then summarized unmistakably in the last short chapter. We may begin with his general views on Alexander and Alexander's purposes.

Logically, Schachermeyr's Alexander has been deduced from certain general principles on the behavior of the man of genius with unlimited military authority, whose successes ultimately upset his mental balance so that he believes in his own magical powers, and comes to regard even the impossible as possible for him (p. 477). Such a genius is always a contradictory twisted personality combining right and wrong, good and bad; but special circumstances of the time in which he lived make Alexander the most extravagant example of all (p. 468). This is a dangerous approach for two reasons: first, because neither Alexander nor anyone else is a "type"; second, because a contradictory Alexander can do *anything*, however noble or degrading, and we are left with no test for separating the true and false stories about him in our sources. The impression persists that Schachermeyr invented an Alexander who would be capable of all the deeds attributed to him in all our accounts, instead of first attempting to separate the possible from the impossible.

Consistently with this hypothesis we find the boy Alexander dreaming of conquering the world as soon as Aristotle has shown him a map of the *oecumene* (pp. 72-73), though an older Alexander modifies his plans after seeing India (pp. 361-362). Meanwhile he has eliminated the armies of Persia by a new strategy of annihilation based on allowing the enemy all the time needed to put his strongest forces in the field and then defeating him (pp. 51, 196, 474-475). Meanwhile, too, Alexander has beaten down the opposition of the Macedonian nobility by the sheer force of his personality, and by using his popularity with the common soldiers. The judicial murders of Philotas and Parmenion (pp. 266-275), the condemnation of Callisthenes and the Pages (pp. 315-321), and the murder of Clitus (pp. 295-302) illustrate this. Later the marriages at Susa show how the nobles have been reduced to lifeless instruments (pp. 398-403), and the mutiny of Opis finally gives Alexander the opportunity to crush the opposition of the infantry whom he had once needed to check the nobles (pp. 407-411). His plans for the brotherhood of man show Alexander's original philosophic mind (p. 490) but also serve the purpose of feeding his insatiable ego (p. 483). His later reckless confidence in his ability to accomplish the impossible is shown particularly by the tragic march through Gedrosia (pp. 382 f.), and by the Arabian expedition projected at the time of his death (p. 450).

Nothing would be more unfair, however, than to judge Schachermeyr's book on the basis of his general interpretation of Alexander alone. Its true merits lie in the many episodes handled individually with real insight, and in scores of observations.

His remarks on the Alexander historians (pp. 126-135) make good sense. Especially noteworthy is his insistence on the importance of Callisthenes and Clitarchus, as well as his rejection of the "mercenaries' source" invented by Tarn (see note 69). The special information on the Persian army in the *vulgata* he explains by pointing

out that in Alexandria Clitarchus would be sure to find many former Greek mercenaries, including some who fought for Darius.

Of special interest is Schachermeyr's discussion of the Gordian knot (pp. 159-162). He does not attempt to decide what Alexander actually did at Gordium. Instead, he emphasizes that the popular story of slashing the knot is more dramatic and therefore more effective. It is the way Alexander wished to have the incident remembered whether he thought of it himself or, as seems more likely, he was inspired by Callisthenes. This interpretation is useful in judging Aristobulus, for it was he who said Alexander pulled back the pole and unravelled the knot. Probably he did. Then Aristobulus is literally accurate, but he misses the whole point of this minor episode, its propaganda value in Greece. If accepted, this view threatens Tarn's theory that Aristobulus enjoyed the very special confidence of Alexander (W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, II, Sources and Studies, p. 40).

Schachermeyr has treated the *proskynesis* question in considerable detail (pp. 302-315). He recognizes, of course, that for the Persians there was no personal degradation in the custom, though the Persians would have been horrified at the idea of acknowledging Alexander as a god. For the Greek or Macedonian the *proskynesis* had implications of worship and also involved loss of personal dignity. In this account emphasis is placed on Alexander's clever stage management, arranged by Hephaestion and others in advance. Each Persian was to perform the ceremony before Alexander as usual. But to one side a sacred fire was burning by a hearth, and Schachermeyr identifies this with the "Royal Fire" of Persia. Each Greek or Macedonian when the cup was presented to him was supposed to proceed to the hearth, drain the cup, prostrate himself before the fire, then cross over to Alexander for his kiss. It was good theater and Alexander might well count on the hypnotic influence of the ritual as man after man, carefully briefed in advance, made his obeisance and received his reward. Feelings would be spared by performing the *proskynesis* at the side of the room, not directly before the king, and the kiss would restore a sense of equality. Once this had been done by a selected group its use would gradually be extended. Callisthenes, to be sure, broke the spell by his failure to prostrate himself, and still more by his stinging reply to Alexander. Alexander abandoned the ceremony, but in appearing to do so voluntarily he increased his hold over the Greeks and Macedonians.

Unfortunately Schachermeyr disregards the spirited controversy over the *proskynesis* which kept subscribers of the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* eagerly awaiting each new installment for a period of three years (viz. 1927-1930. Schachermeyr refers to one of these articles in n. 198). Consequently he has failed to take into consideration Farnell's brief but expert argument that the "hearth" referred to is Greek not Persian (*J. H. S.*, XLIX [1929], pp. 79 f.). Also our author does not answer the serious objections that were made to Schnabel's view (*Klio*, 1923-5, pp. 113-127) connecting the worship of Alexander with the *proskynesis*. It may be that a new defence of this older view can be made. It will not be made, however, by a scholar who chooses to ignore the current arguments against it.

Perhaps the most interesting passages in the book have to do with geography, including excellent descriptions, based on the author's own travels such as his unforgettable sketch of the route through Mesopotamia (pp. 219-221), and discussions of ancient geographic theories (pp. 364-372). We are also reminded of the difficulties of the march of the Macedonians through India and Baluchistan in a few well-chosen photographs. Why did the army finally refuse to go on? According to Schachermeyr they were demoralized by some seventy days of tropical rains (pp. 357-359). His formulation of the Caspian-Azov-Aral problem and its relationship to contemporary views about the *oecumene* (pp. 367-371) differs widely from that of Tarn (*Alex.*, II, pp. 5 ff.). One suggestion appears very questionable, that Alexander was misled by the sight of crocodiles in the Indus into believing he had found the source of the Nile (p. 366). On Schachermeyr's own premise, if the writers with Alexander deliberately suppressed any reference to the earlier voyage of Seylax to increase the credit Alexander would receive (p. 366), *a fortiori* they would have suppressed any reference to the king's very bad guess—had he made it. That being so, the Indus-Nile theory was the work of a later writer when notions of Indian geography had become fuzzy once more. It may well have been suggested by careless reading of Onesicritus' elaborate comparison between Egypt and India.

In Alexander's identification of himself now with Achilles, later with Heracles, and then with Dionysus one may see the influence of Radet (*Alexandre le Grand*, 1931). But it is unfortunate that Schachermeyr tries to save something of that picturesque but discredited story of the Bacchanalian revel of the Macedonian army through Carmania. Knowing the story is weak he merely says the revel took place *without Alexander's orders* (p. 385). That is simply incredible. His treatment of the visit to Siwah (pp. 204-212) is not particularly novel, but it is much more detailed than the state of our evidence allows. He does gratify our curiosity with a photograph of the oasis. This is not the only occasion when one feels that Schachermeyr is over subtle in his attempt to picture what went on in Alexander's mind. It is *possible* that Alexander was not sorry to turn back at the Hyphasis because he realized the impossibility of integrating India in the empire (pp. 360-362), but we have no evidence.

In conclusion it will be fair to say that no student of the period can afford not to read Schachermeyr's book. He will be sure to find stimulating suggestions, ideas, and a fresh approach to old problems. He will find useful sketches of many even minor figures in the style of Berve, and interesting bits of information on a variety of matters. But he will not find another Alexander fit to rank with those of Droysen, Hogarth, Wheeler, Wilcken, and Tarn.

TRUEDELL S. BROWN.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES.

MOSES HADAS. *A History of Greek Literature*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1950. Pp. vi + 327. \$4.25.

A prodigious amount of care has been spent upon this excellent book. It is intended for the use of the interested layman as well as the college student and the forbidding aspects of erudition are studiously avoided. Spellings such as Hekabe, Aischylos and Kimon are shunned. There are no footnotes; essential references are bracketed in the text. Translations are sparingly quoted. Twenty pages of bibliographical notes are assembled at the end; few foreign works are cited. The index is restricted for the most part to proper names; some translators are listed, others omitted; mere mention in the text seems to have justified the inclusion of Charles Chaplin and the Marx Brothers while Lang, Leaf and Myers do not appear. Only here does the diligence elsewhere exhibited seem to have slackened.

Excellent judgment is displayed in the organization of material. The basis of arrangement has been a compromise between subject matter and chronology. Certain divisions were almost mandatory, such as Homer, Lyric, Drama, Historians, Philosophers and Orators but the epic of Apollonius Rhodius was rightly relegated to Alexandrian Literature, while Quintus of Smyrna found his place in a chapter covering miscellaneous poetry from the Anthology to Musaeus. Menander is suitably joined with Epicureanism and Stoicism in the Hellenistic group. Unusual but commendable are chapters on History, Travel and Criticism in the Roman Period; the Literature of Religion; and Orators and Encyclopedists of the Second Sophistic. Lucian and the Novel make a suitable combination. The general aim has been to omit nothing of importance down to the time of Justinian and the criterion of space and coverage has been usefulness. The author watches his temperature closely and avoids blowing hot and cold. No favorites are played. His writing is clear and succinct and often bright and crisp. Obscurities are extremely rare.

Neither care nor caution, however, will save an author from all errors. The Herculean papyri (p. 14) are crumbly but not "charred"; the town was buried in mud. The Big Epitome used by Lucretius (p. 15) cannot be called the "longer catechism"; only the Authorized Doctrines can be likened to a catechism. Thersites (p. 23) was hardly a demagogue, rather a chieftain misbehaving in a council of chieftains. The word canon (p. 160) was not applied to the Ten Orators in antiquity. It is imprecise to write of Epicurus (p. 186) that by atoms "he meant molecules," a distinction of recent origin.

Among other slips are some hardy perennials. On p. 75 we read "the heroic legends were conned in childhood" but Aristotle says (*Poetics* 9, 8) "even the familiar stories are familiar only to a few." When the question is raised (p. 76) "What has this to do with Dionysus," the answer should be that, though as god of wine he stood for license, as god of the vine he stood for self-discipline; pruning is catharsis in Greek. Epicurus (p. 187) is said to have "eclipsed all before him in the number of his writings." Hicks in

the Loeb Diogenes inserted "before him" to save an absurdity; Epicurus made a fetish of brevity; his number was 300 rolls. For Theophrastus the list of Diogenes adds up to 484, for Aristotle nearly 600; Hadas himself (p. 148) credits Aristotle with 1000 or 400 according to a tradition; he also mentions (p. 268) the 6000 ascribed to Origen.

On p. 187 the word cosmopolite was used by Diogenes the Cynic to mean a man without a country rather than "a citizen of the world" in the sense of a world state (Epictetus, III, 22, 47). The gratitude of Marcus Aurelius to his benefactors is mentioned on p. 247; his whole chapter on this topic is Epicurean; gratitude was inconsistent with the original Stoic apathy but from Seneca onward the two creeds were syncretized. Celsus is called a Platonist (p. 268); this is the verdict of church scholars but his very title *True Word* (*alethes logos*) is the "true philosophy" of Epicurus, the *vera ratio* of Lucretius; Origen himself considers him Epicurean and the dates favor identification with the Celsus for whom Lucian eulogizes Epicurus at the close of the treatise on Alexander the False Prophet.

As a final appraisal it may be added that the book makes no claim to be a literary history of Greece. Its merits are its general accuracy, its sanity, and the completeness of its coverage in small compass. It deserves wide circulation.

NORMAN W. DEWITT.

VICTORIA COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

J. B. HOFMANN. *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen*. 1. Teil. München, Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1949. Pp. [viii] + 176.

This is the prior half (ending in the article on λέκος) of a brief dictionary of Greek etymology, the second half of which is announced as to appear in 1950. If the second part is of the same size as that which is here under review, the entire work will be no larger than the first edition of Prellwitz's *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der griechischen Sprache* (1892; 2d ed., revised and enlarged, 1905), and will have about one third the print content of Boisacq's *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, first issued in parts from 1907 to 1916 (reprinted unchanged in 1923 and 1938, with an added index of Italic words in the third issue). The brevity of Hofmann's work is achieved by omitting caption words which are merely glosses not found in Greek literary texts, unless they occur in derivatives or are clearly old inherited IE words; by omitting references to modern articles; by omitting a great number of remoter or dubious cognates. But he has, he states in the Vorwort, utilized the literature which has appeared since the works of Prellwitz and Boisacq.

The product is a book which is convenient for the use of a classicist who wants merely the results of etymological research, as evaluated by a master—and Hofmann is a master in this field—but it will not suffice for a scholar who wishes to do his own research in the

field; for example, I should find the book infinitely more valuable if the post-Boisacq literature had been listed. This would not have increased the bulk of the volume very much, for research in Greek etymology has not been very active in these last decades; Boisacq himself told me, when I saw him in 1932, that he was working on a revision of his *Dictionnaire* (unhappily the changes were not embodied in the 1938 issue), but very little of real significance had appeared since his work first came out. Now the researcher must have recourse to the annual summaries such as appeared in *Glotta* and in the (British) *Year's Work in Classical Studies*, and the toilsome examination of the periodicals.

For this restriction upon the contents of the present volume, Hofmann is, I fancy, not to blame; but the brevity of the articles often leads to dissatisfaction. For instance, there is no mention of what the prior element is in *ἐπέι*, nor of how *κρίθη* gets its long radical vowel, nor of how the final *t* (Skt. *yāvat*) became *s* in *ζῶς* "wie lange"; nor how *ἄμαξα* "vierräderiger Wagen" can come from "zugleich eine Achse habend," which would be proper for a two-wheeled wagon—Boisacq is better here, "(having wheels) attached to (= in one piece with) the axle(s)," as apparently also Prellwitz took it.

Though a caption in Prellwitz's work, the interesting word *ἀμβροσία* "food of the gods" has failed of mention either in Boisacq or in Hofmann, as being perhaps perspicuous of origin; and the prior *o* in *βροτός* "mortal" is taken by Hofmann, as seemingly also by Boisacq in his Addenda 1101, as an Aeolism rather than as assimilated from **βρατός*—though the latter seems to me preferable in view of the universality of the *o*-vocalism in Greek of all dialects in which the word is found. The Persian coin *dāreikós* is taken by all three etymologists as from the OP word for gold, *dāranīyam* (in any other Iranian dialect the word for gold begins with *z*), but derivation from the name of Darius is more probable; cf. the use of *Louis*, *Napoleon*, *Maria Theresa dollar*, and *sovereign* as coin names. I do not know why one must posit three IE forms for "six": from an original **ueks* the forms **sueks* and **seks* can be derived by contamination with IE **septm* "seven," and numerals are notoriously subject to the influence of higher numerals with which they are serially associated. On the variant orthographies of *εἰρήνη* "peace," merely listed in part by Hofmann, a good interpretation is to be found in Meillet's *Aperçu d'une histoire de la langue grecque*,³ pp. 219-20. The initial vowel of *ἐκατόν* "hundred" still seems to me not to be connected in any way with the numeral **sem-* "one"; I refer to my discussion of the subject in *T. A. P. A.*, XLII (1912), pp. 69-89, especially pp. 80-81, where I built upon a suggestion of E. W. Fay.

The differences between Hofmann's views and Boisacq's are not very numerous, and most of the differences seem to be a return by Hofmann to Prellwitz; but in some cases there are quite new views. Such are to be found under *θέμις*, and under *ἴδιος* (where there is new inscriptional material), and elsewhere; but as Boisacq said, there has been no great amount of etymological discoveries in recent years. Those who wish to study the literature on the

topic may do so most easily, where there are Italic cognates, by consulting Hofmann's revision of Walde's *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, where practically everything is listed and evaluated. The first volume of this work, through the letter *L*, was briefly noticed by me in this Journal as the fascicles came out (LII, pp. 81-85, to LXI, pp. 513-514). The first four fascicles of the second volume (*M-Praeda*) have now appeared, issued in 1939, 1948, 1949 (two in 1949), and reviewed by me in *Language*, XXV (1949), pp. 513-514, XXVI (1950), pp. 306-310. Perhaps the fact that the recent literature is given in this work excuses the omission in the work on Greek etymology, because one can readily turn from the one to the other. Yet there are many Greek words which have no Italic cognates, and even many which have no sure connections outside Greek. For these Hofmann has adopted the wise procedure, the only sound procedure, of labeling them as of "unklarer Herkunft" or as borrowed from some non-IE language of the region.

With these limitations, Hofmann's *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen* will be a handy and convenient reference book where we may find the matured judgments of such a distinguished etymological scholar as Dr. Hofmann.

ROLAND G. KENT.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Eranos Rudbergianus, Opuscula Philologica Gunnaro Rudberg a. d. XVI Kal. Nov. Anno MCMXLV Dedicata. Göteborg, Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1946. Pp. 510. 25 Kronor. (*Eranos, Acta Philologica Suecana*, Vol. XLIV.)

This volume of *Eranos* reflects in its rich and varied contents the broad interests of the distinguished Upsala Professor, Gunnar Rudberg, to whom it is dedicated. The contributors are for the most part Scandinavian, although Paris, Oxford, London, and Harvard are also represented, and the roster of names includes some of the outstanding figures of contemporary classical scholarship. While a number of others are less well known, at least in this country, the prevailingly high level of the papers is striking, and comes as a welcome reminder of the vigor and distinction with which classical studies continue to be pursued in that relatively fortunate part of Europe.

Faced with a collection so varied and so large (there are 40 papers), the reviewer can hope to do little more than facilitate use of the volume by a classification of its contents and a brief description of the several articles. It will be evident that many articles might have been classified differently; in particular the heading *Religion* might have claimed a larger number of papers.

Greek Literature. L. R. Palmer ("Mortar and Lathe," pp. 54-61) shows that the *holmos* of *Il.*, XI, 147 is not (*pace* Hesychius) a "smooth, round stone," but simply a primitive mortar made from a short log of wood—a far more effective and gruesome image. An examination of primitive lathes leads to a brilliant and convincing

emendation of the notoriously obscure simile in Euripides' *Bacchae* (1065-7).— In "Atthis et Andromeda" (pp. 62-7), Carl Theander examines the fragments of Sappho for further light on these two figures. Of particular note is his reconstruction of α 15 L, 5 ff.— In "Zu den äthiopischen Episoden bei Herodot" (pp. 68-80) T. Säve-Söderbergh emphasizes Herodotus' lack of contact with educated Egyptians and his almost complete dependence on Greek-speaking circles in Egypt for his information, a fact which accounts for the sharp contrast in historical accuracy in the periods before and after Greeks had settled in Egypt. This thesis is tested by a detailed study of the Ethiopian episodes.— Eduard Fraenkel ("A Passage in the Phoenissae," pp. 81-9) discusses a type of interpolation found in the text of most of Euripides' plays, marginalia which have crept into the text. Lines 555-7 and 558 are two separate fragments, both Euripidean, but neither belonging here. Such interpolations, he suggests, derive from anthologies of the early Hellenistic period, which were arranged topically.— Three essays are concerned in one way or another with the figure of Socrates. There is an apparent contradiction between Socrates' condemnation of the verdict in the *Apology* and his insistence on obedience to this verdict in the *Crito*. In "Socrates' Valedictory Words to his Judges" (pp. 90-104), Ingemar Düring relates this to certain problems which had been eagerly canvassed by the Sophists, especially the concept of the unwritten law, the contrast of *physis* and *nomos*, and the relation of truth and appearances. For all his similarities to the other sophists, Socrates yet differs from them in his deeply religious conviction of a divine order of right, and in his self-abnegating conception of his duties as a citizen.— The question of "Socrates and the Immortality of the Soul" is discussed by Erland Ehnmark (pp. 105-22), who argues for the essential faithfulness of the views ascribed to Socrates in Plato's *Apology* and *Phaedo*. In both there is the same lack of dogmatism and in both the same alternatives are presented: annihilation or a judgment after death and a state of bliss (not, be it noted, the Homeric concept of Hades). However much the arguments have been elaborated by Plato, this much, and a firm personal belief in the second alternative, Ehnmark feels may safely be considered Socratic.¹—"Xenophontea" by Olof Gigon (pp. 131-52) attempts to prove, by an examination of the Charmides dialogue in *Mem.*, III, 7, and of one recurring motif in the *Memorabilia*, that Xenophon gives us, not genuinely personal recollections of Socrates, but a conscious reworking of a previously existing Socratic literature.— In "A New Greek Word in Plato's Republic" (pp. 123-130), Werner Jaeger convincingly emends ὀφειδές in *Rep.* 590 b to ὀργωδές, used as a synonym for θυμοειδές, and finds the origin of Plato's conception of the "spirited" part of the soul in Hippocratic medicine, as represented particularly in the treatise *On Airs, Waters, and Places*.—Several essays relate to a much later period. Harold Riesenfeld in "Remarques sur les hymnes magiques" (pp. 153-60), shows by a literary analysis of the invo-

¹ In the general discussion (pp. 108 ff.) of the historicity of the *Apology* there should be a reference to H. Gomperz, *Wiener Studien*, LIV (1936), pp. 32-43, and to W. A. Oldfather's elaboration of this in *C. W.*, XXXI (1937-8), pp. 203-11.

cations in Preisendanz, *P. G. M.*, no. II, 101-4 and 118-26, that these hymns, though in Greek, are true to the tradition of Egyptian cult hymns, both in form and content. — Anton Friedrichsen opposes the interpretation of I Clement V offered by Dibelius, and in "*Propter Invidiam*" (pp. 161-74) notes that διὰ φθόνον here as in several NT passages seems to have a special significance for the Church at Rome, with reference either to the Jewish leaders or to Judaizing Christians, and that so far from being a mere rhetorical schema the passage has real historical value for the martyrdom of Peter and of Paul. — Reinhold Strömberg contributes a general survey of the personality and significance of Damascius, "a transitional figure . . . at the boundary between two worlds . . . that of Hellenism . . . [and] that of Byzantinism and of the Middle Ages" (pp. 175-92).

Latin Literature. There are only a few papers which fall in this category. In "Les thèmes du Songe de Scipion" (pp. 370-88) A. J. Festugière notes that the main themes, the ascent of the soul in a dream, celestial immortality, and scorn of worldly glory as a result of the soul's *anabasis*, are all commonplaces. What is original with Cicero is the Roman coloring, and especially the idea of immortality won by patriotic service. — Two odes of Horace are discussed, by Gunnar Carlsson and Dag Norberg. Carlsson, taking exception to a recent interpretation offered by Norberg, provides an excellent analysis of the ideas and composition of *Ode* I, 1 (pp. 404-20). Norberg, in "La divinité d'Auguste dans la poésie d'Horace" (pp. 389-403), shows that whereas elsewhere Horace bases the imperial claims to divinity on Roman ideas, *Ode* I, 2 reflects instead Hellenistic concepts. He argues therefore that the poem must be earlier than the date assigned to it by Heinze, and puts it in the winter of 29, before Octavian's return from the East, while his policy was still in doubt. — T. Kleberg looks for traces of Juvenal in the *Carmina latina epigraphica*, and finds slight but additional confirmation of his popularity in the 4th and 5th centuries (pp. 421-5). — Finally, in "Some Classical Etymologies of *μᾶνία*" (pp. 337-9), G. Bendz proposes several emendations to the text of Caelius Aurelianus, *Tard.*, I, 144 ff.

Grammar, Linguistics, and Semasiology. An important group of studies in these fields may be noted briefly. Hjalmar Frisk, in "*Μῆνις*. Zur Geschichte eines Begriffes" (pp. 28-40), examines the "Eingangswort der ganzen europäischen Literatur." The word is regularly used only of the higher powers, the gods or the dead, and throughout antiquity it retains its religious connotations. Achilles is the only human to whom Homer applies the term, and the ethical character of his wrath is thereby emphasized. — Comments are made on two late authors by Sture Linnér in "Sprachliches und Stilistisches zu Genesios" (pp. 193-207) and by T. Hedberg in "Das Interesse des Eustathios für die Verhältnisse und die Sprache seiner eigenen Zeit" (pp. 208-18). — "Eine Art Transitivierung von Denominativa auf -έω" (pp. 244-8), by Albert Wifstrand, is a study of the transitive use of compounds such as *ναυπηγέω*; rare in the classical period, this use is common in Hellenistic prose, but thanks to the influence of the classicists, appears much less frequently in writings of the Imperial age. — Arnold Svensson

presents his observations "Zum Gebrauch des generalisierenden bestimmten Artikels im Griechischen" (pp. 249-65). — In "Notes on the Periphrases of the Imperatives in Classical Greek" (pp. 266-79) Henrik Zilliacus observes that while the various expressions reveal emotional and psychological nuances, these distinctions are drawn less consistently in the earlier literature than, for example, in Menander. — Anders Cavallin offers a paper "Zum Verhältnis zwischen regierendem Verb und Participium coniunctum" (pp. 280-95). — In "Ein paar Beobachtungen zum spätgriechischen Sprachgebrauch" (pp. 296-305), David Tabachovitz comments on *ἐν οἷς καὶ* in Aristotle, *Poet.*, 4, 1448b (as evidence for the close connection of Aristotle's language and the Koine) and on the use of *ἐαυτῶ* in John 19, 17. — Einar Löfstedt discusses "Some Changes of Sense in Late and Medieval Latin" (pp. 340-54). — Erik Wistrand rejects Axelsson's change of *invidiam* to *iniuriam* in Seneca, *Dial.*, 5, 10, 4 and examines the meaning of the contested word in "*Invidia*. Ein semasiologischer Beitrag" (pp. 355-69).

Religion. Axel W. Persson draws on the archaeology of prehistoric Greece for his paper on "Earliest Traces of the Belief in a Life after Death in our Civilization" (pp. 1-13). All that concerns the disposal of the dead (the type of grave, burial position of the body, orientation both of the bodies and of cemeteries, offerings, relic cults) is rightly regarded as significant, though only the cenotaph of Dendra is here discussed in detail. The survival of pre-Hellenic practices into classical times is properly accented.² But while the treatment is suggestive throughout, it should be made clearer that the interpretations are often purely conjectural. And are we justified in describing prehistoric ideas of survival after death as "a belief in the immortality of the soul of man"? — S. Eitrem presents in "De Prometheo" (pp. 14-19) a few observations on the myth. — "The New Conception of the Universe in Late Greek Paganism" (pp. 20-7) is the subject of a compressed but stimulating article by M. P. Nilsson, and makes us ever more eager for the appearance of volume II of his great *Geschichte der Griechischen Religion*. Here he discusses the delayed but revolutionary effect of Anaximander's thesis that the earth was freely suspended in space. — G. Björck's "ONAP ΙΔΕΙΝ. De la perception de rêve chez les anciens" (pp. 306-14) can perhaps best be classed with the articles on religion. Apart even from literary necessity, ancient accounts of dreams owe their peculiar clarity in part to the belief in oneiromancy, but even more to the fact that they were considered as visual experiences. This conception of dreams as *eidola* is probably reflected in the philosophy of Epicurus. — A posthumous paper of Claes Blum, on "The Meaning of *στοιχεῖον* and its Derivatives in the Byzantine Age. A Study in Byzantine Magic" (pp. 315-25) supplements and modifies, for the later period, the monographs of Diels and Lagercrantz. From the use of letters in magic, *στοιχεῖον* came to mean first a magical sign, then a demon bound by such signs, a talisman, and finally in modern Greek any sort of demon. — Axel

² For a more searching examination of Homeric and Mycenaean burial customs see now G. E. Mylonas, *A. J. A.*, LII (1948), pp. 56 f.

Nelson offers (pp. 326-36) a new interpretation of *Abacadabra*.—In addition to these articles, those of Frisk, Ehnmark, Riesenfeld, Fridrichsen, Festugière, and Norberg also contain matters of interest in the field of religion.

Archaeology and Epigraphy. Those who seek to minimize the Mycenaean elements in Homer will find comfort in Arne Furumark's "Nestor's Cup and the Mycenaean Dove Goblet" (pp. 41-53). On the basis of a detailed analysis of Homer's description of the cup and of the comments of ancient authorities (preserved chiefly in Athenaeus), Furumark argues that the two cups are in many important respects dissimilar. For the crucial word *πυθμῆν* he seeks to establish the meaning "foot of a cup or vessel."—Ake Akerström, in "Ein missverstandenes Fundstück" (pp. 426-441) identifies a bronze object from the Bernardini Tomb as the arm-band of a round shield of the classical Greek type, possibly the earliest known. Consideration of the ornamentation leads to a lowering of the date for the tomb—and hence for the height of the Orientalizing period of Etruscan art—from the usual dating of 700-650 B. C. to the following half-century, and perhaps close to 600 B. C.—In his discussion of "Nero's Golden House" (pp. 442-59), Axel Boëthius accepts the suggestion of L'Orange that the rotunda was borrowed from the same Parthian architectural tradition which found expression over 500 years later in the throne-hall of Khosro II; he rejects however as unlikely the idea that it was intended to symbolize oriental theocratic ideas. The Domus Aurea probably had no religious significance, but it is an important—if isolated—early borrowing from the Eastern culture.—There are only two epigraphical papers. Erik Gren presents "Einige griechische und lateinische Inschriftenkopien aus dem Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts" (pp. 219-227), 14 inscriptions from the Constantinople area of which only two, one Byzantine and one modern, are unpublished.—More important is H. S. Nyberg's "Quelques inscriptions antiques découvertes récemment en Géorgie" (pp. 228-243) relative to finds made at Armazi, the ancient *Ἀρμαζική*, in 1940. There are two brief inscriptions on gems, and one on a silver cup, all in Greek. Of chief interest, however, is a bilingual stele in Greek and in Pehlevi, in which the Pehlevi is represented by Aramaic words used as ideograms. It is not earlier than the reign of Hadrian.

Miscellaneous. "Les Citations grecques de Montaigne" (pp. 460-83), by B. Knös, "Ein Orpheuszitat bei Platon als Stütze jüdisch-christlicher Zeitrechnung" (pp. 484-99), by C. M. Edsman, and "The Itacistic, Etacistic and Henninian Pronunciations of Greek in Sweden" (pp. 500-10), by E. Wikén, complete the volume.

This is, undoubtedly, an impressive and rewarding collection of papers. Yet it is questionable, in the reviewer's opinion, whether this type of miscellany is really desirable, and if Festschriften might not profitably take the form of a collection of related studies, such as the *Athenian Studies* presented to Ferguson, or the *Anatolian Studies* presented to Ramsay and to Buckler. And in any such volume it would seem both appropriate and worthwhile to include a bibliography of the scholar in whose honor the volume is prepared.

FRANCIS R. WALTON.

WALTER WILL. *Horaz und die Augusteische Kultur*. Basel, Benno Schwabe & Co., 1948. Pp. 414. 28 Swiss francs.

This book is a comprehensive, minutely detailed, thoughtful, serious, and very serious-minded study of the life and literary activity of Horace. It is divided into four sections, of which the first ("Schicksal") deals with Horace's birth, education, and experiences up to the time of the gift of the Sabine farm, the second ("Resignation") with his early literary activity, the period of the Epodes and Satires, the third ("Zweites Leben") with the period of the Odes, and the fourth ("Pax Augusta") with the Epistles, the fourth book of Odes, and the *Fortleben*.

The division is the traditional one, but as the *Stichwörter* used for each section suggest, the treatment is far from traditional. Wili is not content to investigate and relate the facts of Horace's career; rather, it is his aim to interpret the poet's life, and specifically to show how, out of the maze of influences which were brought to bear on him, there emerged a figure who was peculiarly Roman, peculiarly Horatian, and, above all, peculiarly Augustan. With meticulous care, and with a sometimes bewildering attention to detail, Wili weaves out of the events of Horace's life, his contacts with various important—and unimportant—figures of his times, his study and reflection, a harmonious and unique pattern, into which he allows no single incongruous element to intrude. Nowhere in Horace's life or writings does Wili find a strand which he cannot fit into his fabric. Horace's development as man, poet, and Augustan, is presaged by his birth, carried on by every event of his life, expressed at every turn by his writings, and capped by his last years and his death.

The fault of the picture lies, of course, in its perfection and complete harmony. Yet, out of it there emerges a definition of the "Augustan" and the "Horatian" which is quite convincing, and which should be very helpful in clarifying our somewhat nebulous ideas of what it is that makes Rome and her writers "Roman."

To put it briefly, the thing which Wili finds is peculiarly Roman, Horatian, and Augustan is a kind of syncretism ("Mischung, Synkretismus"). In philosophy, it is an amalgam of the Stoic, Peripatetic, and Academic; in poetry, a compound of the Hellenic, Hellenistic, and native Italian. The result is not a mere mixture; on the contrary, the Roman always finds himself standing somewhere *between* these various points of view, absorbing something from each, yet never identifying himself with any. He accepts the Greeks as his masters and teachers, as Horace accepted Pindar, Alcaeus, Sappho, the Old Comedy, and Callimachus, yet he listens, too, to the great voices of his own people, as Horace did to Lucilius and Cicero, and to all this he adds his own experiences, his own Self, and his own native impulse to the Mean. Thus Wili says of Horace, "Hatte er sein Leben begonnen als ein Mensch zwischen den Sprachen und Kulturen, so hatte er diesen 'Zwischen' durch seine Wandlungen einige neue beigefügt: nämlich das 'Zwischen' Stadt und Land, Zwischen Altgriechenland und Alexandrien, Zwischen Altrom und revolutionärem Kunstwillen, Zwischen Erhabenheit und

Groteske, Zwischen überhohem Denkmal und tenuis modus, Zwischen typisierender Sprache und peripherischem Sagen, Zwischen generellem und persönlichem Ich. Das innerste Geheimnis dieser 'Zwischen' lag wohl darin, dass die 'Diät' des Schicksals und des Lebens mit jener des Geistes und der Kunst eins geworden war, dass mit erstaunlicher Konsequenz der Mensch und sein gesamtes Streben sich auf die Mitte zweier Enden ausrichteten" (pp. 378-379). This is no more than could be said *mutatis mutandis* for the literary figures of any "derived" culture. Our fault, and one which Wili strives hard to correct, is our unwillingness to recognize and appreciate the phenomenon as it appears in Rome.

It is unfortunate that in establishing this sound thesis, Wili should have let himself be too deeply influenced by his enthusiasm for it. He seems to feel that on no account must he allow any facet of Horace's life and work to be out of harmony with it. Everything Horace said and did, everything that happened to him, must contribute to this central theme, and Horace's life must be made to appear an organic, Augustan whole, a very "Roman syncretism" in itself. Much of the discussion by means of which Wili seeks to prove his point is excellent. His thorough analysis of the Epodes and early Satires deserves our appreciation, for this part of Horace's literary activity has been all too often lightly brushed aside as juvenile and crude. His account, too, of Cicero's influence on Horace—an influence to which Wili refers on many occasions—brings out an aspect of Horatian and Augustan thought that has seldom received due attention. But the reader is bound to be left with the feeling that the author has labored too hard at his task.

For example, Wili makes much of Horace's conversion from a previous position of Epicurean agnosticism to a profound religious belief. This conversion, he says, is signaled by *Odes* I, 34 and II, 13 (pp. 121, 125-126) and further expressed in the various hymns which Horace wrote from time to time (pp. 192-213). Yet is it likely that any educated man, after the age of Cicero, and in the age of Vergil, could have taken the Roman gods as seriously and as literally as Wili makes Horace do (see especially pp. 193 ff.)? Does not Horace's attitude toward the established religion seem to be one of tolerance, coupled with a sentimental love for its picturesque old ceremonies, and with a full appreciation of its value as a vivid, if rather naive, representation of things unseen? Is it correct to say of Horace's predilection for Faunus, "In der Verehrung des Faunus sammelt sich das Land- und Landschaftsgefühl des Dichters; es sagt für dessen Tiefe alles, dass es mit dem Todes- und Liebeserlebnis, in C. II, 17 und I, 17, sich vereinigt" (p. 198)? Should one not rather say that Horace found the hobgoblin-god a charming old character, rough and a bit lusty (*Nympharum fugientum amator*), whose cult was a comfortable, pleasant thing to keep up and who represented in plastic form one of the aspects of that never-to-be-fully-fathomed Power which ruled the world? That he drew serious reflection from his contemplation of the gods is no contradiction to this position, for Horace is never above drawing a serious lesson even from a trivial incident, as *Odes* I, 13 shows.

In point of fact, was there any "conversion" at all (p. 122:

"Ein nicht zu übersehendes Bekenntnis zum numen, zur augenblicklich wirkenden Gewalt des Göttlichen ist also dieses Gedicht"). Did that clap of thunder in a clear sky really make Horace see the error of his ways and send him prayerfully back to Jupiter's temple? Is not the audacious oxymoron, *insaniens sapientia*, with its dig at the musty Stoic paradox, evidence of a certain lack of seriousness in Horace's attitude? Horace seems to say, "Dear me! A clap of thunder in a clear sky! I wonder if I've been quite right in thinking more of the philosophers than of the temples? In any case, this strange phenomenon does prove that with god—whoever and whatever "god" may be—all things are possible." The question may appear to be an unimportant one, but for Wili it is profoundly significant. To him, Horace's conversion from agnosticism to religious conviction, together with his political conversion—signalized by *Odes* I, 14 (pp. 117 f.)—from Republicanism to the party of Octavian, is an important aspect of that Roman-Augustan "syncretism" of which Horace is the great exponent.

Wili's conviction of Horace's religious belief has tended on occasion to warp his literary judgment. For example, he styles the *Carmen Saeculare* as "Die Krone der römischen Hymnendichtung" (p. 199). Yet Catullus 34 is certainly vastly superior, both as a hymn and as a poem. Again, of *Odes* III, 4 Wili says (p. 207): "Es ist Horazens längstes Lied, aber auch sein grösstes geworden." Finally (p. 199, n. 3), he speaks of the "grandiose Horazische Schichtung" of *Odes* I, 35, which Wilamowitz, whom Wili quotes with disapproval, rightly judged to be a "wenig gelungenes Gedicht." It is, in fact, one of the few odes in which Horace tried to say too much at once: cf. the confused imagery of vss. 17-28.

Another example of Wili's excessive preoccupation with his thesis may be seen in his treatment of the love-lyrics. His introductory discussion of this topic is sound and helpful, for among other things he shows quite clearly how the actual social conditions of the day influenced Horace in his choice of the women who figure in his poems (pp. 167-172). His analysis of the various poems, too, demonstrates beyond much question their syncretistic character. He says (p. 192): "Dieser Mischung der Mittelmeerfrauen . . . entspricht merkwürdig die Mischung von alexandrinischer und griechisch-römischer Welt, die geschichtliche Mischung von sapphischen, elegischen und bukolischen Motiven." But he never admits to the light touch, nor does he ever betray consciousness of any humor in these love-lyrics. They are studied and analyzed with a seriousness which cannot but surprise anyone who has felt, for himself, the brightness of their wit and the charm of their self-inclusive irony. Sooner or later this seriousness was bound to lead Wili astray, and it does so most signally in his analysis and discussion of *Odes* I, 22. Of this he says, "Thema und Motivführung sind 'innerster Horaz': es ist der homo candidus, der sich der Liebe ergibt und dadurch in dieser Entrücktheit gegen jede Gefahr geschützt ist. . . . Neben der klassischen Komposition herrscht in dem Gedicht ein gewaltiges typisierendes Denken, nach dem der homo candidus, der Liebende und der Dichter eins sind. Sie sind in ihrer Vereinigung die schönste Daseinsform überhaupt und als solche vom Himmel gleich-

sam anerkannt, auch von einem besonders bösen Tier der Erde, vom Wolf, der hier anekdotisch und symbolisch erscheint. . . . Das Lied ist also ein Preis der *vita contemplativa* vom Archimedespunkt der Liebe aus und damit zugleich eine Form menschlicher Vollendung, die zarteste Form, 'hoch erhabenen Haupts die Sterne zu berühren'" (pp. 187-189).

Wili has totally missed the humor of this ode, a humor which should have been immediately suggested by the address to Horace's fun-loving friend, Aristius Fuscus, made obvious by the exaggerated geography and the ridiculous tale of the wolf, and clinched by the incongruity between the solemn beginning and the almost, if not quite, flippant end. No doubt there is, as Wili suggests, a "Ver-einigung" of poet, philosopher, and lover in the ode, but scarcely as "die schönste Daseinsform überhaupt," rather as a picture of the poet chuckling to himself over a moment in which he had become a little too serious about his eternal verities. Horace is not "funny," and one wearies of well-intentioned souls who insist on making him so, but like Mark Twain, he has a disconcerting way of sticking his tongue in his cheek at unexpected moments, and his critics must always be on guard for the move. In his discussion of *Odes* I, 22, Wili's guard was distinctly down.

A similar unawareness of the light touch causes Wili to make too much of the influence of Pindar on Horace. Thus he raises Horace's styling of himself as *apis Matina* into a virtual boast to be the Roman Pindar (pp. 257-259), and by means of numerous parallels between the two poets, strives to make Horace imply, even though he admittedly did not say, that he stood to Augustus as Pindar stood to Hiero of Syracuse. In this connection he writes (p. 259): "Unabweisbar sind die ersten drei pythischen Oden . . . mit den 'Römeroden' verwandt und deuten gerade hierdurch eine von Horaz mit Worten nicht berührte Parallele doch an: dass der Dichter Horaz zu Augustus steht, wie Pindar zu Hieron." In his effort, too, to make the fourth book of *Odes* into a sort of capstone to the "syncretism" of Horace, Wili fails to recognize the signs of declining genius. *Odes* IV, 13 he styles as *dezent*, and thereby contrasts it favorably with *Odes* I, 25 and *Epodes* 8 and 12, failing to see that Horace no longer has the spirit or the energy to turn out such bits of venom (p. 356). In spite of all apologies, Book IV of the *Odes* is dull and heavy, lightened only here and there by an occasional *sententia* which shows that Horace had not lost all his skill with words. To style it a "wahre augusteische Friedensaltäre des Wortes" (p. 370) is to claim for it far more than it deserves.

If the reader will discount Wili's over-enthusiasm for his thesis and his over-seriousness in interpretation, he will find this book eminently worth while, for in spite of these faults it is basically sound and in certain individual instances, e.g. in the treatment of the *Ars Poetica*, shows careful thought and excellent judgment (especially pp. 331-333, where Wili discusses the influence of Cicero). Not the least of its values is the fact that it should stimulate a renewed and more reasonable study of the peculiar qualities of Roman literature, as exemplified in Horace and in other writers as well.

The book is beautifully printed, and marred by only a few typographical errors: p. 101, note 4: "this" for "these" and "seams" for "seems"; p. 163: *paternis* for *paterni*; p. 310: "beliebten" for "beliebten." There is a chronological chart, an index of quotations, and an index of names and topics.

FRANK O. COPLEY.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

J. OLIVER THOMSON. *History of Ancient Geography*. Cambridge University Press, 1948. Pp. x + 427. £2.2.0.

The appearance of a new comprehensive book on ancient geography is an important event for classical scholars. There have been books on map-making and the scientific side of Greek geography, books on Greek and Roman exploration (like the recent publications of Ninck and Hyde), and countless works dealing with special geographical questions. But for a general treatment of ancient geography on a generous scale there has hitherto been no substitute in English for Bunbury's *History of Ancient Geography*, in two bulky volumes, the latest edition of which appeared in 1883.

The author of this new *History of Ancient Geography*, who is Professor of Latin in the University of Birmingham, pays due tribute to Bunbury, whose work (he says) "remains indispensable," as well as to his other predecessors. Indeed the first impression that the book may make on a reader is the author's remarkable command of the bibliography of his subject. A reviewer may feel bound to call attention to recent work which appeared too late to be noticed by him, like Rhys Carpenter's article on "The Greek penetration of the Black Sea" (*A. J. A.*, LII [1948], pp. 1-10), but there are not many omissions of this sort; although the book was originally sent to the press in 1943, the author has taken advantage of the delay in printing to bring it up to date with eighteen pages of additional bibliographical notes. At the same time he contrives to offer complete documentation without giving the impression that the footnotes are more important than the text; his footnotes are kept within reasonable bounds because they are written with an extreme terseness, which is puzzling to the reader until he grows accustomed to it.

The text as well as the notes has been written with an eye for strict economy of space, with the result that it is not always easy reading. In particular, this reviewer would have preferred more extensive quotations from ancient authors instead of or in addition to a summarized presentation of their views. Some sample passages from descriptive writers, like Herodotus, Strabo, and Pliny, would help to make clear their special interests and peculiarities and even their shortcomings. For ancient writers whose importance lies in their contribution to scientific theory direct quotation is particularly desirable; but when the original words of an ancient writer are not preserved, it may be preferable to present a reader with the reasoned conclusions of modern scholars instead of giving him, for example, the polemical paragraphs of Strabo in which he sets the arguments of Hipparchus against those of Eratosthenes. It is cer-

tainly necessary to present the views of different ancient authors independently of one another, if a reader is to observe the progress, or lack of progress, through the centuries. Professor Thomson has quite rightly taken pains to do this, even at the cost of some repetition.

The book is arranged on a chronological basis, with alternating chapters on the theoretical views expressed in an age and the extent of current practical knowledge as revealed in its general literature. It opens with a chapter entitled "Early horizons" including a section on "Early theory." Chapter II, "The Greek horizon to Herodotus," with an appendix on the age between Herodotus and Alexander, is followed by a chapter on "Greek theory to Aristotle." "From Alexander to Eratosthenes," "The Roman republic," "The great days of the Roman empire," and "The decline" are the headings under which he describes subsequent developments, with separate attention to theory and practical knowledge. The Roman empire is given more space than any other age, with separate chapters on Europe, Africa, and Asia, but the chapter on theory which follows shows that scientific understanding did not increase in proportion to the increase in economic, imperial, and diplomatic interests.

This arrangement of material makes it necessary for anyone who is seeking information on some particular topic or some particular remote part of the world to consult a number of different chapters; and it means that individual ancient authors are sometimes discussed separately in the chapters on practical knowledge and theory; for example, the practical knowledge which Tacitus shows of Britain and Germany is discussed in one chapter, the antiquated geographical notions of the *Agricola* in another. The evidence of ancient geographical knowledge as revealed in classical literature is so irregular that the chapters on practical knowledge must inevitably seem less well organized than those on theory. The blame for this should fall on the ancient authors themselves; but a more elaborate classification of subject matter in the index would make the book more convenient to use as a work of reference.

Literary tradition and antiquarian taste are largely responsible for the apparent ignorance of many classical and post-classical writers. Thomson is well aware of this, though he never ceases to be amazed at their "queer" distortions of geography. He might perhaps have considered more fully how far these geographical blunders are proof of a gulf which separated the literary class from the practical world of seamen, traders, and minor government officials. One is constantly driven to the conclusion that many ordinary people, who never published a line, knew more geography than historians, poets, and philosophers; it is certainly hard to believe that seamen in Roman imperial times could be misinformed about the direction of the Italian coast line, as Marinus seems to have been. On the other hand, the failure of the ancients to conduct the experiments which were necessary to advance scientific map-making is an old story and is adequately discussed in this book. The last chapter, on "The decline," is an admirable commentary on the failure of this branch of science.

No history of ancient geography will satisfy everyone. Some

readers will be disappointed to find their favourite topics treated more briefly than they had hoped. But if they read further they will discover that this is a thoroughly sound book, which has been put together with careful and unostentatious scholarship. It is well illustrated with sixty-six text-figures in addition to two pages of plates.

LIONEL PEARSON.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

BRUNO SNELL. *Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen. Zweite erweiterte Auflage.* Hamburg, Claassen und Goverts, 1948. Pp. 299.

This book, which has just come out in a second edition, though the first edition was published not so long ago and has not yet been reviewed in this Journal, is so full of new and original observations that it is very difficult to give anything like an adequate account of its content within the short compass of a review. It consists of twelve treatises on a great variety of subjects most of which had previously been published separately. All of them, however, in one way or another, illustrate a phase in the process by which, in the course of the development of Greek thought, man—or the human spirit—appears to have become more and more conscious of himself. This is the meaning of the general title *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*.

The first article *Die Auffassung des Menschen bei Homer* shows that in the Homeric poems one does not find a unified concept either of the living human body or of the human soul. The word *σῶμα*, which later is used to designate the body, occurs in Homer only as a designation of the dead body, the corpse. When Homer speaks of the living body in motion he usually uses words which properly mean "the limbs"; when he wishes to speak of the appearance of the living body he uses a word that means "the shape," "the build," and in most other cases he uses the word *χρῶς*, which means the surface of the body, the skin. Snell points out that there is an interesting analogy to this Homeric linguistic usage in the fact that archaic Greek drawings of men have no belly, but emphasize the muscles and the joints of the limbs, in contrast to the drawings made by our children who draw a man by making a circle in the middle, a smaller circle above to indicate the head, and a few thin lines to indicate the limbs. There does not seem to be a Homeric word for the living soul either. For the word *ψυχή* is used in the Homeric poems only when the soul leaves the body, when it goes to Hades. When Homer speaks of a living man he speaks of his *νοῦς*, his *θυμός*, his *φρένες*, which designate different functions of the soul, but not of his *ψυχή*. This is very different from Plato's concept who speaks of *νοῦς*, *θυμός*, and *ἐπιθυμίαι* as different parts of the one *ψυχή*. It is perhaps not quite beside the point to observe

that modern functionalism in psychology is in a way a return to the Homeric point of view.

In the second article *Der Glaube an die olympischen Götter* Snell stresses the "naturalness" of the Olympic religion and points out the difference between the way in which the early Greeks and the Jews believed in their god or gods. To the Jews the gods of other nations were false gods. To the early Greeks the existence of their gods was so natural that they were always inclined to regard the gods of other nations as the same gods as their own, only under different names. The naturalness of the Homeric religion expresses itself also in the fact that the Greek gods do many wondrous things, but hardly ever work miracles which are against the course of nature. The presence of these gods is felt whenever something wondrous happens either in the external world or, above all, when it happens in a man. To the beautiful examples given by Snell one may perhaps add another instance because it throws, at the same time, some light on the way in which new Greek myths originated. In the beginning of the *Theogony*, Hesiod says that the Muses talked to him at the foot of Mount Helicon but that he could not see them. This latter addition is the best proof to show that to Hesiod the Muses were not merely a poetical expression but that he really felt their presence when he was inspired to write his poem. But it is also interesting to observe that Hesiod's personal experience changed the abode of the Muses for all times to come. For there is no trace before Hesiod of the notion that the Helicon was the place in which the Muses lived. On the contrary, Hesiod himself, in all the other places in which he speaks of them, states or implies that they lived on Mount Olympus, though he himself happened to meet them on Mount Helicon. But because Hesiod met them there for the later Greeks Mount Helicon became their customary abode; and there developed a whole host of legends around Hippocrene and the horse of Bellerophon, etc., none of which had existed before Hesiod.

In the third article *Das Erwachen der Persönlichkeit in der früh-griechischen Lyrik* Snell tries to show how in early Greek lyrical poetry the individual for the first time begins to set his own beliefs and values against those generally accepted. It is an expression of this new tendency that in this period it becomes a poetical *topos* to set what the poet believes to be the most wonderful thing against the ideals of other people. This self-assertion of the individual against his environment, as Snell correctly points out, is not an expression of unrestricted subjectivism, but, on the contrary, an attempt to distinguish between what is really good, really beautiful, or really true and what is generally accepted in the existing society. In this respect one might say that the early Greek lyrical poets are forerunners of the pre-Socratic philosophers, many of whom began their works with the statement that the common opinions of men are entirely wrong, and then proceeded to reveal the truth which they had discovered. But there is the very fundamental difference that, before Solon at any rate, the new truth which the early poets discovered concerned individual things or individual aspects of life and did not develop into a complete new philosophy. This is perhaps also the reason why, instead of the pride of the pre-Socratic phi-

losophers, who believed to be in the possession of the whole truth, one of the feelings most often expressed in early Greek lyrical poetry, as Snell points out, is that of ἀνυχνία, the feeling of helplessness in the face of a changing and confusing world.

In the fourth article, *Pindars Hymnos auf Zeus*, Snell first tries to prove that the praise of Delos in frg. 156 of Turyn's new Pindar edition (frgs. 87-88 Schroeder) belongs to the same hymn on Zeus as frg. 19 Turyn (29-30 Schroeder), and then discusses the relation of Pindar's poetry to Hesiod and to the early Greek lyrical poets.

The title of the fifth article is *Mythos und Wirklichkeit in der griechischen Tragoedie*. In the first part of this treatise Snell discusses the relation between Greek tragedy and the ritualistic drama or dramatic ritual from which it appears to have originated. He shows that the "reality" of the former is quite different from that of the latter. For in ritualistic drama a mythological event is represented in the full etymological sense of the word: by its reproduction it becomes actually present. The "reality" of fully developed tragedy—and even the earliest extant tragedies are fully developed tragedies in this sense—is of an entirely different kind. They have the reality or truth of works of art, a truth *οἷα ἀν γένοιτο*, as Aristotle said. When performed at a religious festival these tragedies are offered to the god as works of art and are not reenactments of divine occurrences in which this god had a part. But this had not always been so; and Snell points out how in some poems of Sappho and Bacchylides and in the earliest Satyr plays one can observe various phases of the transition from one form to the other.

In the second part of this article Snell takes up again, in a more concentrated form and with some new observations, the results of his well-known book on *Aeschylus und das Handeln im Drama*.

The sixth article, *Aristophanes und die Aesthetik*, is a defense of Euripides against the criticism of Aristophanes, which, in somewhat different forms, was later renewed by Schlegel and Nietzsche. Snell admits that in a way Euripides, in spite of his superior skill as a dramatist, destroyed Greek tragedy by destroying the myth on which Greek tragedy, and to some extent all Greek poetry, was based. But he tries to show that the theoretical reflection on good and evil, which gradually undermined the traditional religious concepts of the myth and finally led to the replacement of mythological poetry by theoretical philosophy, was first introduced by Aeschylus, and that Euripides merely brought to its logical conclusion what his great predecessors Aeschylus and Sophocles had begun. From this point of view Aristophanes appears as a romantic reactionary who fought against a historically inevitable development, of which Euripides and Socrates, both of them objects of Aristophanes' attacks, were the chief exponents. There is, however, a certain violence in Euripides' break with the past which makes Aristophanes' reaction perhaps more understandable. Aeschylus and Sophocles remain within the myth and give it a new meaning, while Euripides, at least in some of his plays, especially the *Orestes*, destroys the myth completely. There is also a significant difference between Socrates and Euripides. Snell himself has observed that in Euripides' plays youthful enthusiasts, like Iphigeneia in Aulis,

are the only characters who are morally pure. Characters like Medea and Phaedra, who are driven by their passion to act against their better insight, are depicted as comparatively innocent and noble. It is the men like Jason and Agamemnon—men who act after conscious deliberation—who in Euripides' plays appear as the most shabby characters. This is a great difference from Socrates who based morality on mature thought and insight.

The seventh article, *Mahnung zur Tugend. Ein kurzes Kapitel aus der griechischen Ethik* traces the history of Greek moral concepts from Homer to Socrates.

While the chapters or articles discussed so far try to show in different ways how from the Homeric period to the time of Socrates man in Greece became ever more conscious of himself as an individual and how this development expresses itself above all in an ever increasing consciousness in moral deliberations, the following two articles, *Gleichnis, Vergleich, Metaphor, Analogie. Der Weg vom mythischen zum logischen Denken* and *Die naturwissenschaftliche Begriffsbildung im Griechischen* try to trace a somewhat analogous development in Greek poetic and early scientific language. The determining factor in this case is the development of analytical thinking, of a different kind of abstraction, and of a new concept of causality. In the first of these two articles Snell discusses the enormous influence of Homer's metaphors and similes on later poetry and even prose, but also how these similes are given a new form and are adapted to new purposes. The two most interesting topics of the second article are the development of the use of the definite article and the history of the concept of motion from pre-Socratic philosophy to Aristotle.

In the first part of the tenth article, *Die Entdeckung der Menschlichkeit und unsere Stellung zu den Griechen*, Snell tries to determine the ultimate origin of those modern derivatives from the Latin word *humanus*, like human, humane, humanities, humanism, etc. which have so widely divergent meanings. Starting from observations made by E. Kapp, Snell points out that to the early Greeks to be a human being did not appear as something very great and wonderful, that, when something was emphasized as "human" it was usually contrasted with the divine, and that therefore the Greek adjectives corresponding to the word "human" do not have the positive connotations which this English word and its derivations or its German equivalents now have. It is only with the sophists, when man becomes the measure of all things, that man as man, not as the member of a noble family and descendant of a god, acquires a new dignity. In the fourth century, especially through Isocrates, this dignity became specifically connected with *παιδεία*, *Bildung*, education. An anecdote told of Aristippus, though it may be of later origin, even identifies *ἀνθρωπισμός* with being educated. But this meaning of the word never became common in Greece and thus the Greek language never developed a word corresponding to the Latin *humanitas*.

Most interesting also is the fact that the word whose meaning comes nearest to that of the English word "humane" is *φιλάνθρωπος*. But this Greek word does not primarily express an attitude of

human beings as human beings but an attitude *towards* human beings; and while we call the society for the protection of animals a humane society Aristotle on the contrary uses the word *φιλάνθρωπος* often of animals who are friendly to human beings, for instance the dolphins, who like to follow ships, who play with bathing people, and who saved Arion from drowning. Where, as most frequently in Xenophon, *φιλανθρωπία* does designate a quality or attitude of human beings, this quality is usually the result of pity and of the realization of the general weakness and misery of the human race. The word, therefore, does not, like the English word humane or its Latin antecedent, imply that man is better than the animals and therefore should behave better, namely in a "humane" fashion.

Thus it is only in Latin literature that the two qualities have come together and that the same word *humanus* can designate those qualities by which an human being is or should be distinguished from wild beasts as well as those by which he distinguishes himself or should distinguish himself from the *pecus*. But in most modern languages, including English, these two meanings have become separated again and are now connected with different derivatives from the word *humanus*, in English "humane" for the *φιλάνθρωπον*, and "humanities" for the *ἀνθρωπισμός* acquired by *παιδεία*, or rather for the subjects a person is supposed to learn if he is to acquire this *παιδεία*.

The second half of this article deals with the history of humanism in Germany and the weaknesses of the so-called "Neue Humanismus," a movement which began in Germany immediately after the first world war.

The last two chapters or articles, *Das Spielerische bei Kallimachos* and *Arkadien, die Entdeckung einer geistigen Landschaft*, deal with the development and history of what one might be tempted to call a *l'art pour l'art* poetry in ancient Greece and Rome. In the early period poetry had dealt with all aspects of human life, religion, philosophy, politics, history—for the epic was also history to the Greeks in the time before history in the modern sense was developed. It was the only means of literary expression. When prose literature developed poetry was gradually deprived of most of its original content; and, as the literature of the greater part of the fourth century shows, poetry almost died, or at least went into an eclipse, under the impact of this development. When there was a rebirth of poetry in the last decade of the fourth and the first half of the third century the leaders of the new literary movement, above all the most outstanding of them all, Callimachus, did not try to regain for poetry its original content, but they concentrated on the form. The contents, whether it was a myth, a religious ritual, philosophy, science, or even the personal feelings or passions of the poet himself, were no longer communicated or expressed directly and for their own sake. They became the material for the display of the virtuosity of the poet. But within this type of poetry Callimachus has achieved a beauty and charm of the form, a refinement in handling the metre and the language, and a sophistication in playing with his subject that has remained unequalled to the present day.

In the first of these two articles Snell discusses these qualities of

Callimachus' poetry and tries to show at the same time how, in a similar situation, Goethe followed the opposite road and tried to regain and actually regained for his poetry all the content that it had lost under the influence of the development of prose literature. One might, however, add that Goethe, and perhaps to some extent Schiller, made this conquest only for themselves and that in all European literatures there was a development of a *l'art pour l'art* poetry in the later 19th and in the 20th century. It is perhaps also noteworthy that Callimachus and his Greek followers never developed an "absolute" poetry of the Mallarmé type. For to Callimachus poetry is not merely a beautiful melody of words. All of his poems have a definite beginning and end and a most elaborate structure, within which no line is superfluous. A poem which can be enlarged or condensed at liberty or in which one can retain the rhymes at the end while changing the rest of the lines so as to give them an entirely different meaning would probably not have been to his liking. Callimachus' sophistication, furthermore, consists rather in making his reader see the story on two levels at the same time, on the level of the simple-minded actors in the story and on the level of the sceptical poet who is in love with a simplicity that he himself does not share, but on both levels with limpid clarity. He does not try to create a *clair-obscur* in which the contours are deliberately blurred.

In the last chapter Snell compares the bucolic poetry of Theocritus with that of Virgil. Theocritus was not a pure city dweller like Callimachus. He knew the countryside well, and there can be hardly any doubt that he was familiar with the rustic poetry and the songs that were actually sung by shepherds and peasants in Sicily and other parts of Greece and which, if one may judge from some of Theocritus' examples, may have resembled the *Schnadähupfln* of Bavarian peasants. But his attitude towards this poetry was anything but sentimental. He plays with it and can, so to speak, transpose it into any key. He can emphasize the rusticity of his shepherds or the beauty of country life, or he can make his shepherds talk and sing like *poetas docti* so that they become masks for Theocritus himself and his sophisticated friends. But whatever he does, it always remains a play. There is no sentimental desire to flee from civilization nor is the rustic life idealized.

When Virgil imitated the bucolic poetry of Theocritus and his followers it became something entirely different. The scene is transferred from Sicily or Cos to Arcadia, a land that nobody visits; and this country becomes an ideal land. As Snell points out, Virgil's shepherds are neither really rustic nor are they sophisticated like the shepherds of some of Theocritus' poems. They live in an unreal world of simplicity and peace that reminds one of the golden age in Hesiod and the like of which has never existed. But the desire to flee from the troubled world of the present to this dream world is now quite true and sincere. Thus there is the paradox that the true and direct expression of the feelings and sentiments of the poet, which had been almost completely absent in the works of the greatest Greek poets of the Hellenistic age, is brought back into poetry at the moment when the world described in this poetry has

lost all connection and similarity with the real world. But the poetical dream world which Virgil was the first to create has had an enormous influence on modern poetry and there have been times in which the creation of such a dream world has been considered the very essence of poetry.

I have done my best to summarize the contents of the many chapters of the book under review. But its main value is not in the results that can be summarized but in the subtlety of the detailed analysis that each chapter contains. I hope that nevertheless my summary will make the reader of this review feel that Snell's book will amply reward the closest study.

KURT VON FRITZ.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

HANS GEORG OERI. *Der Typ der komischen Alten in der griechischen Komödie, seine Nachwirkungen und seine Herkunft.* Basel, Benno Schwabe & Co., 1948. Pp. 100. 5 Swiss francs.

In this dissertation Oeri exhibits a mastery of scholarly procedure and the pertinent bibliography. He usually shows good judgment as well, as, for instance, in considering the Dioscurides mosaic (p. 37) or in preferring Coppola's line assignments of *Epitrepontes* 704-717 Körte³ to the assignment retained by Wilamowitz and Körte (p. 54). But the subject of this dissertation is a dull and not very profitable one. The result is largely a catalogue of characters and motives already familiar (in more interesting surroundings) somewhat broadened and enlightened from the comic fragments and other genres.

The most important source of the type of the old woman in comedy, as Oeri sees (pp. 96-97), is life itself; and, as Oeri does not see or at least does not point out, the peculiar characteristics of this comic type (with the exception of a few specific characters, such as the nurse as confidante) are so ordinary that influence from or upon other literary genres is doubtless trivial, and comparison of this Greek old woman with the old women of other societies, which Oeri briefly undertakes, is probably without much significance.

As always in such catalogues, one may find items open to question. Oeri says (p. 27, n. 2) that it is not common in Old Comedy to parody such high gods as Aphrodite. This statement suggests sanctimonious piety on the part of the poets that is foreign at least to Aristophanes.¹ If such gods as Aphrodite are not frequently burlesqued, explanations other than that based on piety are possible. But in point of fact, are not Olympian divinities burlesqued more frequently than one would expect in Old Comedy? Zeus the Adulterer was a familiar figure even there, especially in plays concerning Alcmena. He appears popular in the Phlyakes, where

¹ Oeri is informally quoting L. R. Farnell, "Plato Comicus: Frag. *Phaon* II.: A Parody of Attic Ritual," *C. Q.*, XIV (1923), p. 146. On the absence of piety in Aristophanes, see Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (1941), pp. 737-41.

Ares, Hephaestus, and Hera also appear (e. g., Bieber, *The History of the Greek and Roman Theater*, fig. 370); and Oeri himself (p. 78) uses the Phlyakes as evidence for the traditional material of comedy. Poseidon appears in the *Birds*, and Hermes seems to have been a very common character even in the period of Old Comedy.² Apollo plays an undignified rôle in some versions of the myth of Alcestis and Admetus and may possibly have appeared as a character in comedies on this subject. It is the spirit of Old Comedy to laugh at everything, including itself, and to assume that divinities have an equally pervasive sense of humor.

Oeri (p. 44) accepts Leo's supplement of *Truculentus* 902:

puero opus est cibum, opus est matri autem, <opus est> quae
puerum lavit.

Leo in his edition cites parallels for the omission of an antecedent, and this licence is readily admitted. But if one examines this passage, it appears likely that verses 902-8 refer exclusively to the demands of a baby, and that the insertion of a reference to Phronesium herself is a false note (see vs. 935). The indicative immediately after *opus est*, furthermore, is more difficult than it is as an exegetical clause after *matri*.³ The reading of the manuscripts, then, seems preferable: hiatus at the diaeresis is allowable and *matri* with the meaning "nurse" occurs elsewhere (Nonius Marcellus, 343 M, with citation of *Menaechmi* 19).

Oeri (p. 50) concludes that the old woman as *Verkäuferin* seems not to have occurred in Middle and New Comedy. Perhaps she was not as common there as in Old Comedy; but she seems to have appeared occasionally. Witness the Plautine titles *Carbonaria*, *Faeneratrix*; Eubulus, *Stephanopolides*; Naevius, *Corollaria*, *Carbonaria*; Apollodorus of Carystus, *Himatiopolis*.⁴

Oeri (p. 56, n. 1) cites the statement of Duparc (*Vrouwenfiguren in de Werken van Menander* [University of Amsterdam dissertation, 1937], p. 64) that Euripides' Medea unburdens her heart to her nurse; Oeri then concludes that the reference is to *Medea* 214 ff., and objects that these verses are addressed to the chorus. But Duparc is correct (Oeri himself [p. 85] later almost admits as much); she may be thinking of the tenor of the play as a whole, but if necessary, one can cite *Medea* 821:

ἐς πάντα γὰρ δὴ σοὶ τὰ πιστὰ χρώμεθα.

Throughout Oeri's study, one misses a clear definition of the term "old woman." It is something of a shock to find him (p. 65) including in his study the wife of Menaechmus, an *adulescens* (*Men.* 1066). In comedy, at least, a wife need not necessarily be old to have become burdensome to her husband. Again (p. 60),

² One may note also that Hermippus wrote a play apparently about the birth of Athena, and Nicophon and Polyzelus plays apparently about the birth of Aphrodite, Polyzelus another on the birth of Ares.

³ For clauses with the subjunctive after *opus est*, see *Curc.* 519, *Epid.* 727. Cf. *Amph.* 318. For the indicative after *matri*, see *Men.* 19-20.

⁴ The precise significance of such titles as *Carbonaria*, of course, is uncertain, and the relation of all such titles to their lost plays even more so. But, at least, such titles should have been cited by Oeri.

Astaphium in the *Truculentus* can hardly be considered an old woman. Diniarchus has had commerce with her (*Truc.* 94), and she would seem to belong to a quite different type—the gay young maid of a gayer mistress. Compare Milphidippa in the *Miles* (1003-8), and Ovid, *Ars*, I, 375-386. Nor is mere wine-bibbing evidence of old age in comedy (cf. *Stich.* 715, *Truc.* 854-55), and one would like to see more substantial evidence for including Pardaliscia in the *Casina* in the category of old women (p. 60). Incidentally, if Pardaliscia's monody (*Cas.* 621-26) owes something to that of the Phrygian in Euripides, *Orestes*, it owes much more to that of Ennius' Andromache (86-91 Vahlen). Still again, Lykainion in Longus (3, 17-19) cannot properly be considered an old woman (Oeri, p. 75), since the author states that she was the young wife of an old husband (Longus, 3, 15).

These criticisms, largely dealing with the Roman material, which is not the major concern of the study, should not be allowed to obscure the essential soundness of Oeri's work.

PHILIP WHALEY HARSH.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

A. H. R. E. PAAP. De Herodoti reliquiis in papyris et membranis Aegyptiis servatis. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1948. Pp. 101. 20 guilders. (*Papyrologica Lugduno-Batava*, IV.)

When Viljoen's *Herodoti fragmenta in papyris servata* was published in 1915, only nine papyrus texts were available, including the fragment of Aristarchus' commentary. In 1932, when Legrand published his introduction to the Budé text of Herodotus, the grand total had risen to eighteen. There are now three more papyri to add to his list: *P. S. I.*, X, 2 (1932), no. 1170 edited by Vitelli (I, 196-199); *Pap. Rendel Harris* (1936), no. 40 edited by J. E. Powell (VIII, 126-129); and *Pap. Dura Europus*, 83 edited by C. B. Welles in *T. A. P. A.*, LXX (1939) (V, 113-114). All twenty-one texts are now edited by Paap in this volume of *Papyrologica Lugduno-Batava*, and it will be a great convenience for students of Herodotus to have them collected in one place. Paap who, like Viljoen, is a pupil of Vollgraff, has followed his predecessor's pattern in arranging his work: First the texts with critical commentary; then brief discussions "De Dialecto et Orthographia" and "De Ratione quae papyris cum codicibus intercedit." Readers who are not proficient in Dutch will be grateful to the author for writing in Latin. It must be admitted, however, that his Latin leaves something to be desired on the score of elegance and even of lucidity. "Correcturum iri" (instead of *correctum iri*) on p. 26 can be dismissed as a regrettable slip; but the description of *Pap. Oxy.*, 18 as "litteris uncialibus rotundis codicibus Biblicis manuscriptis similibus scriptum" may distress or even puzzle a reader who has not the original English of Grenfell and Hunt before him ("written in a good-sized round formal uncial resembling the handwriting of the great biblical codices"). And this is by no means the only example of clumsy expression.

Paap never indicates that he has seen any of the actual papyri or even photographs of them apart from such few photographs as are already published. He is therefore dependent on the original editors for palaeographical details and sometimes holds back information that they offer. On the other hand, his collation of the texts with readings of the codices is generally careful and thorough and he has some new contributions to make—for example, in discussing *P. S. I.*, 1170 on which Vitelli's notes are very brief, though it is a text with many peculiarities. For the famous *varia lectio* in II, 162, 5 offered by *Pap. Oxy.*, 1092 he follows Viljoen and Legrand in adopting Schmidt's restoration. But he proposes a new restoration of *Pap. Oxy.*, 1619 in III, 49, 1—ἀλλή]λοισι δια[φόρως ἔχοντες. τοῦ]των εἵνεκεν κτλ. where the codices have the unsatisfactory ἀλλήλοισι διάφοροι ἔοντες ἔωντοῖσι (ABCP, ἔωντοῖ DRSV) τοῦτων ὧν εἵνεκεν, for which various corrections have been suggested. Paap maintains that the papyrus as restored by him offers the correct reading (except for the mistake of omitting ὧν) and his view has much to recommend it.

It is perhaps unfortunate that Paap has printed all the texts complete with breathings, accents, and punctuation, instead of following the form used in the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* where only the marks put in by the scribe are shown; and he always inserts *iota* as adscript no matter what the practice of the scribe is; one is obliged to turn to the notes for exact information on these points. It would have been useful also if he had indicated where each papyrus is to be found.

The section on dialect and orthography lists the evidence of the papyri on the forms of E contract verbs, the use of *nu* epheleysticon, aspiration, and the accusative singular form of masculine first declension nouns; so far the papyri have consistently shown the form -ην and not -εα, but Paap does not think this is evidence enough to deny Herodotus the use of the latter form.

The final section "De ratione quae papyris cum codicibus intercedit," though only six pages long, offers new answers to the following familiar questions: (1) If there is an archetype from which all existing codices are drawn, is it older than the papyri or not? and (2) When did the division into the Florentine and Roman branches of the text tradition take place? It was maintained by Pasquali (*Storia della tradizione e critica del testo*, pp. 306-318) that the two branches of the tradition represent two ancient editions, but that as late as the second or third century A. D. a purer tradition still survived, its readings represented in the papyri. Paap thinks this view unlikely and would prefer to believe that the archetype of the codices is medieval. Some errors (he admits only four as significant) are common to papyri and all codices and must therefore be due to mistakes made in ancient times. But as evidence of a medieval archetype he claims eleven significant instances in which the papyri show a different reading from all the codices, in all but one instance a correct reading. And on this evidence he rejects, without ceremony, Pasquali's answer to question (2) and Legrand's view of an archetype older than the papyri.

These eleven instances, however, on closer examination turn out

to be not so convincing. One is his own restoration in III, 49, 1 (see above); another is VII, 166 where the codices read *καὶ ὡς ἔσσοῦτο* and the papyri *καὶ ἥσσωτο* (Paap would read *καὶ ἔσσοῦτο*, a compromise between papyrus and codices); of the remaining nine readings in his list, three are not certainly correct (different word order in I, 200, 1 and II, 98, 2 and an added definite article in III, 59, 3) and are not accepted by Legrand in his text; there remain I, 105, 4 (*ἦ* for *ὁ*); I, 107, 1 (*ὑπερθέμενος* for *ὑποθέμενος*); I, 115, 3 (*τούτου* for *τούδε*); I, 116, 1 (*ἔσῃε* for *ἔσῃει*); I, 132, 2 (an added *τε*); and II, 175, 1 (*οἶα* for *οἱ*). These seem very small textual differences on which to base conclusions and they can hardly be looked upon as the only evidence relevant to this complicated problem. A more complete statistical table of the variations between the papyri and the codices would be a valuable addition to this book; it should be expected from anyone who claims to offer a final solution to the main problems of the text tradition.

As a collected edition of the papyri this work will be welcomed by all students of the text and language of Herodotus. The author announces his intention of studying the Thucydides and Xenophon papyri and it is to be hoped that collected editions of these texts will be forthcoming in due time.

LIONEL PEARSON.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

CARL WENDEL. Die griechisch-römische Buchbeschreibung verglichen mit der des Vorderen Orients. Halle (Saale), Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1949. Pp. viii + 149. RM. 16. (*Hallische Monographien* herausgegeben von Otto Eissfeldt, No. 3.)

The present monograph is the latest in a series of studies by the author on ancient libraries and bookmaking. The problem is succinctly stated in the Foreword: to compare "die unterscheidenden Merkmale, die eine antike Rolle zu kennzeichnen pflegten, mit den entsprechenden Merkmalen der vorderasiatischen Tontafel und der ägyptischen Papyrusrolle . . . um . . . die Frage aufzuwerfen, woher und auf welchem Wege der Gebrauch dieser Merkmale zu den Griechen gelangt sein könnte. Die Summe der Merkmale nenne ich die Buchbeschreibung" (p. vii).

The subject is treated in four chapters: Die Buchbeschreibung im Vorderen Orient (pp. 1-17), Die ältesten griechischen Bibliotheken (18-23), Die griechisch-römische Buchbeschreibung (Ort des Titels, Zeilenzählung, Rolle und Werk, etc.; 24-75), Fragen und Ergebnisse (76-97). The volume concludes with copious notes (98-135) and indexes (136-149).

The far-flung data—archaeological, literary, papyrological—have been carefully assembled, and the principal conclusion convincingly documented. It used to be thought that in their bookmaking practices, as in other matters, the Greeks adopted Oriental devices during the Hellenistic age. Wendel now shows that this borrowing must have taken place in the pre-classical period, when Greek book production first began. He demonstrates further that the Greek book, though cast in the mould of the Egyptian papyrus roll, shows

in the details of "Buchbeschreibung"—e. g., title at end of work, line count, etc.—influences which for the most part have their ultimate source in the clay-tablet traditions of Mesopotamia rather than in the roll techniques of Egypt. If this conclusion seems at first paradoxical, it becomes understandable when one recalls the centuries-long contact between the Asia Minor littoral and the outposts of the Tigris-Euphrates civilizations.

Thus far Wendel's general results appear solidly founded. However, he does not always resist the ever-present temptation to push speculatively toward precision of detail far beyond where the available evidence leaves off. Thus, while the establishment of libraries is an obvious and demonstrable concomitant of the "cultural awakening" of Archaic Greece, it is futile to try, on the basis of a passing mention in Diogenes Laertius of a personal relationship between Thales and the tyrant Thrasybulus, to single out the latter as the founder of the first Greek library (p. 23). Similarly, when probing this misty borderland of cultural history where lacunae are more prevalent than facts, one should be more than ordinarily wary of the *argumentum ex silentio* (e. g., p. 94). Happily, these flaws remain in the periphery of the study, and may be discounted without damage to the central results.

NAPHTALI LEWIS.

BROOKLYN COLLEGE.

JÉRÔME LABOURT. Saint Jérôme, *Lettres*, Tome I. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1949. Pp. lxxvii + 331 (1-160 with the same page-numbers on the Latin verso and the French recto). (Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé.)

This translation, by a canon of Notre-Dame de Paris, rests upon a text which is for the most part that of I. Hilberg in the *C. S. E. L.*, 54-56. Though on p. xlv the translator recognizes that Hilberg, from excess of devotion to *lectiones difficiliore*s, has at times fallen into absurdity, yet in most cases Hilberg's text is treated as the *textus receptus*, for which Labourt occasionally reserves the right to substitute a perferable variant. Since the Budé series very properly insists upon complete works, rather than selections, this is merely the first of a series of volumes of Jerome's *Letters*, and it contains the first twenty-two epistles, only four of which appear in F. A. Wright's selection in the Loeb Classical Library. Upon the present scale about five or six more volumes will be needed to complete the series. Though individual letters naturally differ much in their appeal to that *rara avis*, the general reader, there are probably few who could not find something of interest in at least the 14th (to Heliodorus, on the ascetic life) and the 22nd (to Eustochium, on virginity), the latter containing the account of Jerome's famous dream.

A readable introduction, based particularly upon F. Cavallera's

biography of Jerome, discusses, first, Jerome's life: his youth, sojourn in the desert of Chalcis, second stay at Rome, and his monastic establishment at Bethlehem, with further remarks upon the Origenistic controversies, Jerome's friendship with Augustine, his Biblical translations, and his last years. A second section is devoted to the *Letters* in particular, and to editions of the work, its language and style, and the history of the present translation, together with the numerous *sigla* of the MSS used by Hilberg for his edition. A brief but adequate apparatus criticus accompanies the text, and for the translation there are a few concise notes further expanded in a seven-page appendix at the end of the volume. The translation appears both accurate and felicitous in style, and the whole work seems carefully produced, the very few misprints noted being unimportant and not seriously deceptive. It is perhaps worthy of note that this volume of Jerome, edited and translated by his namesake Jérôme Labourt, is dated on the feast of St. Jerome, 30 September, 1947.

ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

ROBERT COHEN. *La Grèce et l'Hellénisation du monde antique*. Nouvelle (3ième) édition. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1948. Pp. xlvii + 696. 700 fr.; \$5.25. (*Clio, Introduction aux Études Historiques*, Vol. II.)

A review of the second, revised edition (1939) pointed out that the Notes in this book, despite flaws, are an indispensable aid for the study of Greek history; the sections labelled *État actuel des questions*, and especially those consisting of critical *Bibliographie*, are a first port of call (*A. J. P.*, LXVIII [1947], pp. 98-100). A new printing of such a book deserves a brief note, especially since, with much better paper, the volume doubtless could stand binding, though when bound it would not lie open. (Its predecessor could not be bound, so poor was the paper.) The price for this is up from 300 francs in 1945 to 700 now. Described as a "nouvelle édition" on the title page, and as the "third" on page iv and on the back cover, there is no change other than those just mentioned; like the latest printings (1928-1929) of the five volumes of A. and M. Croiset's *Histoire de la Littérature grecque*, or again like the 1938 printing of G. Glotz, *Histoire grecque*, Vol. I (1925), it is an *édition* in the French sense. I have noticed that letters which had dropped off the ends of lines in two places have been replaced, but apparently not one of even the most obvious misprints has been corrected. There is no other addition or subtraction whatever. A worthy successor to Robert Cohen could increase considerably the usefulness of this book.

My review spoke of Cohen as a son-in-law of Gustave Glotz, but I had been misinformed. Cohen's devotion to the master is shown on many pages, but he was not related.

STERLING DOW.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

PAUL E. KAHLE. *The Cairo Geniza*. London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1947. Pp. xii + 240. 12 s. 6 d. (The Schweich Lectures of the British Academy, 1941.)

In this closely-printed large octavo volume of the Schweich Lectures of the British Academy, Professor Kahle has digested an important part of his life work. Though ostensibly devoted to the contents of the fabulous Cairo Geniza, it is really a complete summary of his research and present views on the liturgical poetry of the Jews (Chapter I), the Hebrew text of the Bible and Hebrew grammar (Chapter II), and the translations of the Hebrew Bible into Greek, Aramaic, Syriac and Arabic (Chapter III). The third chapter is as long as the first two together, and the survey of the Greek translations occupies some fifty pages, in spite of the fact that almost all light on them from the Geniza is indirect.

The famous Geniza of Cairo is a room in an ancient synagogue, into which miscellaneous discarded written matter was thrown in order to avert any possible profanation of the name of God. Somehow or other it escaped attention and was never cleared out until it was rediscovered by European scholars toward the end of the nineteenth century. Most of its contents belong to the Middle Ages and to early modern times, but there are fragments which may go back to the eighth century of our era or even earlier. Many important literary works had been completely forgotten until their partial recovery in the Cairo Geniza. In this book Kahle deals almost exclusively with the categories mentioned above; he does not attempt to survey the rich documentary material bearing on mediaeval Jewish history.

As a result mainly of Kahle's Geniza studies, he came to the unquestionably correct conclusion that our current Hebrew Bible, the so-called Massoretic text, is the immediate result of a process of textual convergence, instead of being the outcome of the more common divergence of text, as errors were multiplied by mediaeval copyists. In other words, according to Kahle, the Massoretic scholars of the eighth and ninth centuries set up a standard text which gradually displaced all others, and which was followed by scribes with extraordinary faithfulness until the introduction of printing. On the other hand, he does not mention the usual view that the consonantal Hebrew text was fixed for all practical purposes as early as the second century of our era.

Applying this principle of convergence to the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, Kahle maintains that there was no true "Septuagint," translated by a committee of scholars from Hebrew into Greek during the third and second centuries B. C., according to the traditional view. On the contrary, he believes, there were numerous partial and complete renderings into Greek, which became conflated as time went on and new generations of scholars tried to correct their texts. The corollary to this theory is naturally that De Lagarde and his successors have been quite wrong in thinking that minute analysis of manuscript readings with a view to classifying the genetic relationship of uncials and older minuscules would ultimately lead to the reconstruction of the *Ur-Septuaginta*.

In the reviewer's opinion, which he shares with such specialists as J. A. Montgomery and his pupils H. S. Gehman and H. M. Orlinsky, Kahle goes much too far here, since the differences between the "recensions" of the Septuagint (not including different later translations, such as that of Aquila and Symmachus) are much too slight, as a rule, to permit a hypothesis of distinct original versions of the Hebrew Bible in Greek. However, his warnings will undoubtedly have a salutary effect on scholars who overestimate our ability to reconstruct the text of the original Septuagint.

The book is fascinating reading, and is at the same time a mine of bibliographic information. The distinguished author is to be congratulated on his ability to interest and instruct at the same time that he gives us a comprehensive survey of fifty years of research, in which he himself took a leading part.

W. F. ALBRIGHT.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

E. BENVENISTE. Noms d'agent et noms d'action en indo-européen. Paris, Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1948. Pp. 175.

The present work, written as a sequel to *Les origines de la formation des noms en indo-européen*, deals with semantic problems arising in connection with several Indo-European noun-classes, and includes a section on the comparative and superlative. In each case the objective is to discover the functional distinction between two suffixes generally regarded as having little difference apart from their distribution.

First the *nomina agentis* in Vedic, Avestan, and Greek are subjected to careful examination, and in each language a distinction is found which leads the author to recognize two proethnic types: **-tōr*, the person who actually performs some action, and **-tēr*, the person whose proper function or natural tendency is to do a certain thing. The second section deals with the verbal abstracts in *-ti-* and *-tu-* in Indo-Iranian, Greek, and Latin (*-ti-* usually replaced by the extended suffix *-tiōn-* in Latin). Here the situation is found to present a partial parallel with the *nomina agentis*: **-ti-* (*-tiōn-*) is the operation itself, actually effected, while *-tu-* is the proper or characteristic function of the person. Unfortunately Benveniste has not always escaped the temptation to force the meaning of a passage in order to make it fit the semantic principle which he has set up. This is my only real criticism against the book, and I hope that I am not doing him an injustice in calling attention to a few examples. ἐπιβώτορι μῆλων, ν 222 (p. 29) is surely one whose occupation is feeding sheep, not a man in the act of feeding them. On the same page it is hard to see how καλήτωρ, Ω 577, by its use as an epithet of κῆρυξ loses any of its value as denoting one whose proper or characteristic action is to call out. So also Ζεὺς νεμέτωρ, Aeschylus, *Sept.* 485 (p. 32; compare with the remark on Savitrī, p. 17). ὀλετήρ, Σ 114 (p. 35), seems to show forcing in the oppo-

site direction, since it is not a question of Hector's customary behavior but of his having slain Patroclus. I mention briefly also ἔδηνρός, several times coördinated with πόσιος (p. 67), and ὀρχηστρόν, α 421 = σ 304 (p. 69). Not that the whole argument is invalidated by rejecting these few passages as evidence; in its main features it is fully supported by the abundant material which the author has assembled, but he has perhaps underestimated the various factors which may interfere with semantic distinctions of this kind. It is well known, for example, that the unfitness of most Latin nouns in *-tiō* for dactylic verse has led to a very extensive coinage of *tu*-stem verbal nouns, some of which were carried over into the prose of the Silver Age along with other features of poetic style. There are also unmistakable signs of a tendency to prefer different types in different syntactical environments, with *tu*-stems favored in expressions like *aliquem contemptui habere* and in causal or circumstantial ablatives like *coactu meo*, but *tiōn*-stems in nominative, genitive, and accusative (apart from the supine in *-tum*). The facts are well reported in Nägelsbach's *Lateinische Stilistik*⁸, pp. 216-18, but the origin of the usage is a problem that seems to call for further study, in which connection a comparison with the Sanskrit infinitives and gerunds might be profitable. To return to *-tōr* and *-tēr*, *-ti-* and *-tu-*, the distinctions which Benveniste has set up may be regarded as sound and as marking an advance over earlier attempts; but it is doubtful to what extent these distinctions had real vitality throughout the history of the languages and to what extent they were merely vestigial. The semantic values attached to form-classes, instead of being more sharply defined as a language develops, may sometimes be altered or largely effaced.

The content of the later portions of the book may be very briefly summarized. The tendency to use *-ti-* as second member of compounds against *-tu-* in the simplex, which has been noticed, especially in Gothic, by several scholars, is more fully examined and ingeniously brought into connection with the semantic distinctions established earlier in the work. The two principal Indo-European comparative types are found to differ in the fact that *-yes-* is "dimensional" and "evaluative," while *-tero-* is "positional" and "separative." Of the two constructions usual after comparatives, the ablative or its equivalent represents a person or object of recognized character chosen as a standard of measure, while the disjunctive construction with *quam*, *ἤ*, etc., shows the two terms of the comparison as if weighed in a balance. (In this connection a study of the frequency of type *-yes-* + case-comparison and of type *-tero-* + conjunctive comparison might lead to some interesting results.) The morphological similarity of ordinals and superlatives is ascribed to the function of the suffix as indicating the completion of a numerical series or of a scale of value. Here he makes extensive use of semantic parallels from exotic languages, without however making the hazardous attempt to assign etymological values to the Indo-European suffixes involved.

On p. 41 in Aesch. Ag. 1227 read Ἰλίου τ' ἀναστάρης for Ἰλίου τ' ἀναστάρης, which might be misconstrued as an example of a type of accusative extremely rare in Greek. On p. 67 the reference to (T)

260 should be to 209. On p. 74 *τρικτός* where cited as Attic should be *τρικτός* (see Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik*, I, 597). On p. 108 for *(νίο)θεσία* read *(νίο)θεσία*.

JAMES W. POULTNEY.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

DAVID DIRINGER. *The Alphabet. A Key to the History of Man-kind.* New York, Philosophical Library, 1948. Pp. 607; 256 figs. \$12.

The first 38 pages of this book are given over to preliminary matter (title-page, acknowledgments, table of contents, foreword, preface, and introduction). Of these preliminary pages, the first 12 are numbered with roman numerals (through the foreword), whereas pp. 13-38 are numbered with arabic numerals, beginning not with 1 but with 13. The main body of the book falls into two parts, called respectively "Non-Alphabetic Systems of Writing" (eleven chapters, pp. 39-192) and "Alphabetic Scripts" (ten chapters, pp. 193-565). There follow an 8-page "Conclusion," a 3-page "General Bibliography," and a 31-page index. The value of the work is heightened by 256 figures, a number of them full-page. The book is well printed on good paper.

Since part one is devoted to non-alphabetic systems of writing, the title which the author has given to his book is misleading. Even more misleading is the division into parts, since part two deals with syllabaries as well as alphabets, although a few of the syllabaries are taken up in chapter ten of part one, under the heading "syllabic systems of writing." The author evidently feels uncertain about the alphabetic classification he has given to some of the syllabaries. Thus, in his discussion of the Brahmi script he notes that "the Indian writing is in appearance a syllabary" (p. 336). But he seems to feel (I say "feel" rather than "think" advisedly) that this is an appearance only; at any rate he includes the Brahmi script in his alphabetic part. And he insists (p. 217 bottom) that the North Semitic script "was from the first moment of its existence a true alphabet; at least, from the Semitic point of view." This dictum hardly agrees with his earlier statement that "in a true alphabet each sign generally denotes one sound only, and each sound should be represented by a single, constant symbol" (p. 197). Certainly the Hebrews did not read the word *ktb* without vowels, as the author himself is compelled to admit (p. 336), and it follows that the letters represent, not only the consonants [k, t, b], but also the accompanying sonants. Actually the Semitic script started as a kind of shorthand, a syllabary which represented each syllable by its initial element, and to this day it has not got far beyond this stage. See Holger Pedersen's masterly discussion in his *Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 172 f., 180 f.

The author, committed as he is to the thesis that the Semitic script is alphabetical, necessarily does injustice to the Greeks, the true inventors of alphabetic writing. The term *alphabet* in scien-

tific parlance should be restricted to scripts which, like that of the Greeks, systematically break down the syllable into sonant and consonant (or consonants). This analysis, or, rather, its expression in a system of writing, was the great contribution of the Greeks to phonological science. As we have seen, the Semites did not achieve it. The Semitic script was itself a great achievement, of course, and one may well believe that the Greeks would never have made their analysis of the syllable had they not come in contact with the shorthand syllabary of the Semites. But it remains true that the Greeks, not the Semites, gave us the alphabet.

In the course of his narrative the author gives a summary account of a very large number of scripts. Indeed, his book may be reckoned an encyclopedia of writing systems, although its entries are not arranged as one would find them in an ordinary encyclopedia. Because of its inclusive character, the book does not give extended treatment to any script, but it provides a short bibliography at the end of each entry, through which the seeker after full information can learn where to go. These bibliographies are perhaps the most useful feature of the book. Those that I have checked actually list standard works which will enable the student to pursue the subject further, but the titles were not always chosen with the care and discrimination needful. The runic bibliography, for instance, does not list H. Arntz, *Bibliographie der Runenkunde* (Leipzig, 1937) or the learned journal *Berichte zur Runenforschung* (cut short by the war) or even the great two-volume work, *Danmarks Runeindskrifter*, by Lis Jacobsen and Erik Moltke, which came out in 1941-1942 and supersedes the older edition of Wimmer.

The author in the nature of the case is not equally at home in all the scripts of which he writes. His inability to control the material he found on the runes is evident wherever he mentions the subject, and seekers after knowledge are advised to skip his runic section, except for the bibliography; indeed, even this must be used with caution, as it includes items like the *Handbook* of Stephens, a guide to be shunned. His discussion of Ogham script is also not always up to the mark. On the other hand, he gives us a competent discussion of Etruscan scripts and makes a convincing case for the derivation of the Latin script from the Etruscan. I am incompetent to evaluate what he says about many (indeed, most) of the scripts with which he deals; thus, those of Mexico and Central America, and of Further India.

The author's English now and again needs revision. Example (p. 149): "this term covers so many words which a self-respecting native would prefer not to confess to know how to write them." I have come upon a number of miscellaneous items which call for comment or correction. In Fig. 102, 4 (p. 201) the letters marked cuneiform are actually North Semitic and *vice versa*. The three alephs of the Ras Shamrah "alphabet" (p. 204) ought to be enough to convince even the author that this is no alphabet but a syllabary. It is irritating to find a quotation without indication of its source, as the one on p. 215 (second paragraph). The explanations given for Fig. 141 (p. 305) are badly arranged. The language of the Avesta is best called Avestan, a term the author ignores (p. 309).

The famous Danish linguist was named not Wilhelm but Vilhelm Thomsen (p. 314). One is puzzled to know just what the author means by the following statement (p. 458): "by adopting this system of rough and smooth breathing . . . the Greek alphabet helped to preserve flexibility in the Greek speech." The author is very wrong indeed when he says (p. 473): "this early Gothic civilization . . . had not the slightest influence on the subsequent Germanic culture." I make no attempt to correct the many mistakes in the section on runes (pp. 507-523), except to exclaim over the insertion of a paragraph called "Slavic Runes" (p. 518) in the midst of it. The spelling of the name "Spurious Carvilius" (p. 538) might be improved. The author's view that "the influence of French orthography [on English] in the middle ages was disastrous" (p. 555) is exaggerated; the French influence was bad, no doubt, but hardly so bad as that. The nasality of the vowel in French *un* is hardly on all fours with that of the vowel in English *king* (p. 559). In general, the author is weak on the linguistic side.

KEMP MALONE.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

R. E. WYCHERLEY. *How the Greeks Built Cities*. London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1949. Pp. xxi + 227; XVI Pls., 52 figs. \$4.50.

In this modest volume, Professor Wycherley gives us a work of thorough scholarship in a form which laymen as well as scholars may read with ease and enjoyment. The title hardly suggests the scope of the book. The author has gone through whatever ancient literary testimony bears upon the plan of the Greek city and its principal architectural elements. To supplement and illustrate this testimony, he has examined the archaeological evidence from some fifty excavated Greek sites, ranging from Olbia on the Black Sea to the main Greek cities of Sicily.

Beginning with the growth of the Greek city and Greek town-planning, he goes on to a discussion of fortifications, the agora, shrines and official buildings and the gymnasium, stadium and theater, ending with Greek houses and fountain-buildings. For most of these separate elements studies already exist, but they have never before been brought together with attention focused on the city as a whole; moreover, in almost every case fresh material is here added to the older studies. Thus von Gerkan's *Griechische Städteanlagen*, to which the author acknowledges his considerable debt, is, for all its excellence, now outdated (it was published in 1924, before many of the great modern excavations had been begun). Scranton's *Greek Walls*, which in any case deals chiefly with construction methods, is here supplemented by examples from Magna Graecia, and the fortifications are studied in their relation to the city itself. Recent American excavations have furnished Wycherley with new information of vital importance for two of his main subjects: Olynthus

for the Greek house, and Athens for the agora. At the latter, excavation had hardly begun when Tritsch's *Die Agora von Elis und die altgriechische Agora* was written.

The sections on official buildings, on gymnasium and stadium, and on fountain-buildings, are perhaps the most valuable, since they are for the most part without predecessors. Aside from McDonald's *Meeting-places of the Greeks*, we have no good general studies of official buildings; Wycherley's discussion of the stoa is especially useful, and for the prytaneum (although our information is unsatisfactory) he puts down what we know. The gymnasium, a building of much greater importance in Greek civic life than its name today suggests, has never before been given the attention it deserves; Wycherley's treatment of it is excellent. The section on the stadium is less successful. There has been no good account since that by Dorigny in Daremberg-Saglio (Fiechter's article *Stadion* in Pauly-Wissowa, to which Wycherley refers, is unaccountably careless). On p. 159, the statement that "The semi-circular end . . . probably only became customary in Hellenistic times" apparently has Fiechter as its authority; but the examples Fiechter cites as evidence are, in fact, Roman. The only plan Wycherley gives is of the stadium at Delphi in its Roman form (the plan itself is incorrect, see *B. C. H.*, XXIII [1899], p. 603); while the photograph of the stadium at Epidaurus is poor in contrast to the other well-chosen plates. The latter structure is the only Greek stadium which has been thoroughly excavated. It is a pity that Wycherley did not reproduce here Cavvadias' excellent plan (*Praktika*, 1902, Pl. A), and supplement this with the extraordinarily interesting cross-section of the stadium at Olympia (Kunze-Schleif, *II. Bericht über die Ausgrabungen in Olympia*, 1938, Taf. 2) recently published. The section on the theater is wisely brief and avoids the controversies which this subject inevitably provokes. In the light of Professor Dinsmoor's new paper on the theater of Dionysus at Athens, even the statement that "this has been studied again very carefully by archaeologists in recent years" seems open to suspicion (Professor Dinsmoor's paper was read at the meetings of the Archaeological Institute, Baltimore, 1949, and will appear in the forthcoming studies in honor of David M. Robinson).

Perhaps the most useful feature of this useful book is the wealth of illustration. Especially helpful to the layman are plates of all the great models of Greek cities, along with several reconstructions by Schede and Krischen. There are also some good photographs, and many plans, both of cities and of individual buildings. Nor has the author been content merely to reproduce plans from other works. Several have been re-drawn, among which are valuable composite plans which are brought together for the first time. A simplified version of Judeich's plan of Athens is given, as well as the most recent plan of the Agora by Travlos. A composite plan of the two would have been most welcome (and not difficult, since the scale in their published forms is almost identical). The only plan which is disappointing is that of Thasos (fig. 2); this city contains almost all the elements of the ideal Greek city, yet the plan

ignores most of them. The French excavators owe us a large and detailed city-plan, but, lacking this, a reasonable sketch-plan could be made up from Pl. 17 in *B. C. H.*, LIX (1935). Finally, orientation is of great importance in ancient town-planning as well as modern, and in another edition it is suggested that North be indicated on fig. 1 (Athens), fig. 6 (Priene), and fig. 24 (Megalopolis).

How the Greeks Built Cities should have a wide sale. To the archaeologist it offers an excellent compendium of archaeological research in the last half-century. Its use should be even greater to teachers and students of classical literature, since it presents to them, in pleasant readable form, the setting of ancient Greek life. Many years spent in thoughtful study of the Greek city and its evolution have led Wycherley to the following conclusion: "The essential link lies in this—the architecture of the Greek city grew out of the needs, ways of life, traditions and ideas of its citizens, and followed these at every point, without pursuing the artificial and the extravagant." We may hope that modern architects and town-planners will give this book their earnest attention.

The price, quoted at \$4.50 in this country, is listed in Great Britain at 12 s., 6 d.

J. H. YOUNG.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

HENRICA MALCOVATI. *Imperatoris Caesaris Augusti operum fragmenta*. 3rd ed. Turin, G. B. Paravia & Co., 1948. Pp. lx + 178. Lire 820. (*Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum*.)

When in 1921 Enrica Malcovati printed a text of the *Res Gestae*, the epistles, the fragments from the orations and other writings of Augustus, again in 1928 when she published a second edition augmented by edicts, decrees, and a collection of memorable remarks (*dicta et apophthegmata*), the offering was well received and the care highly praised. The same scholar has now brought out a third edition in which she has made some, for the most part, minor revisions and brought her footnotes up to date. The most important revisions will be found in the text of the *Res Gestae*, which has benefited from W. Weber's new readings of the Greek text of the *Monumentum Ancyranum* and from H. Volkmann's edition in the *Jahresbericht*, Supplementband 276 (1942). Of course, the bibliography of the Cyrene Edicts—the *senatus consultum* is not included—has grown but without reaching A. Wilhelm's "Zu dem dritten der Edikte des Augustus aus Kyrene," *Wien. Anz.*, 1943, pp. 1-6. Among the new additions the most important texts are the famous *Διάταγμα Καίσαρος* (where the suggestion to emend *ἐποική<θη>σαν* should have been attributed to Franz Cumont) and above all the long Greek inscription concerning Seleucus of Rhosos (for which a glance at *A. J. A.*, 1941, pp. 537-539 might have done no harm). Within the limitations of her plan the work has been very successful, and in the present scarcity of texts the publication of this inexpensive and careful edition may be welcome even to those who need a broader collection.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.



AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXXII, 2

WHOLE No. 286

VOLSCIANS AND UMBRIANS.

Our knowledge of the Volscian language depends almost entirely on a bronze inscription four lines in length found at Velletri, the ancient Velitrae, in 1784, the text of which is given below:¹

DEVE : DECLVNE : STATOM : SEPIS : ATAHVS : PIS : VELESTROM
FAOIA : ESARISTROM : SE : BIM : ASIF : VESCLIS : VINU : ARPATIV
SEPIS : TOTIOV : COVEHRIV : SEPV : FEROM : PIHOM : ESTV
EC : SE : COSVTIES : MA : CA : TAFANIES : MEDIX : SISTIATIENS

The alphabet is Latin of the same early type found in the Marrucinian bronze inscription from Rapino (Conway, No. 243 = von Planta, No. 274), with vertical stroke in the middle of the A. Of the *o* in *faeia* more will be said later. The dialect is customarily classified in the Sabellian or intermediate division of the Italic group, but while its sister dialects Paelignian, Marrucinian, and Vestinian have a close resemblance to Oscan,

¹ The principal bibliography on this inscription is as follows: Mommsen, *Die unteritalischen Dialekte* (Leipzig, 1850), p. 320 and Table XIV; Corssen, *De Volscorum lingua* (Naunburg, 1858; not accessible to me; reviewed by Schweizer-Sidler, *K. Z.*, VII [1858], pp. 446-50); Zvetaieff, *Inscriptiones Italiae inferioris dialecticae* (Moscow, 1886), p. 20; von Planta, *Grammatik der oskisch-umbrischen Dialekte* (2 vols., Strassburg, 1892-97), II, no. 240, and general discussion of Volscian-Umbrian resemblances I, pp. 21-23; R. S. Conway, *The Italic Dialects* (2 vols., Cambridge, 1897), I, No. 252; Skutsch, *Gl.*, III (1912), pp. 87-99; Thurneysen, *Gl.*, XI (1921), pp. 217-19; Grienberger, *K. Z.*, LVI (1929), pp. 28-35; Ribezzo, *R. I. G. I.*, XIV (1930), p. 86; Vetter, *Gl.*, XX (1932), pp. 21-22; Pisani, *Arch. Gl. It.*, XXVII (1935), pp. 153-63. Hereafter I cite dialect inscriptions by number from the collections of Conway and von Planta.

students of Italic dialectology are practically unanimous² in recognizing for Volscian an especially close kinship with Umbrian, and that despite the fact that the two speech-areas are separated by a considerable distance.

It is not my intention here to add to the already rather long list of interpretations of the Velitrae bronze, but rather to examine some old and new evidence, partly phonological and partly of other kinds, bearing on the Volscian dialect and its connections. The effect of this, I believe, will be to confirm the idea of a close connection between Volscian and Umbrian and to fill in the gap between them by calling attention to some similar phenomena in the geographically intermediate dialects.

The *e* in the first syllable of *deve* < **deiwdōi* or **deiwāi* may be merely graphic, and in any case has no great significance for our purposes, since monophthongization of *ei* is widely distributed in Italic (cf. von Planta, I, p. 144), but the final *e* in *deve* and in the divine name *Declune* is important. This otherwise unknown deity may be male (so Ribezzo takes it) or female (so the majority, taking account of the Latin goddess-names in *-ona*; von Planta, I, p. 99, II, p. 91, discusses several etymologies and interpretations). By either view we have a dative singular in *-e* similar to the Umbrian forms *tute tote* (first declension: Buck,³ p. 113; von Planta, I, p. 143, II, p. 91) or *kumnakle, pople* (second declension: Buck, p. 116; von Planta, I, p. 154, II, pp. 109-11). The diphthongs *ai* and *oi* are regularly maintained in Oscan and Paelignian, and in Marrucian so far as forms are quotable. In Latin *oi* > *ē* is not a normal development, though *oi* had the same history as *ē* in Romance.⁴ The change *ai* > *ae* > *ē* is a feature of rustic Latin, and the resultant monophthong had the same history as accented *ē* in Romance.⁵ An example of *-e* for *-ai* is also found in *Vesune*, dative of the

² The dissenting view of Bartholomae, *B.B.*, XII (1887), p. 89, who prefers closer connection with Oscan, appears to have found no followers.

³ C. D. Buck, *A Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian* (Boston, 1928).

⁴ R. G. Kent, *The Sounds of Latin*³ (Baltimore, 1945), §37; E. H. Sturtevant, *The Pronunciation of Greek and Latin*² (Philadelphia, 1940), §138 b.

⁵ Kent, *op. cit.*, §38; Sturtevant, *op. cit.*, §§131-2. Sturtevant's remarks on the distribution of *ē* < *ai* (Faliscan, Volscian, Umbrian, and the Latin of these and the Sabine districts) have a particular interest for our problem.

name of the goddess Vesuna, on the bronze tablet from Antinum (Conway, 253, who treats the text as Volscian; von Planta, 242, who, with most others, treats it as Marsian). Other examples, or possible examples, of monophthongization on the Velitrae bronze are: *esaristrom*, with *e* < *ai* if from *aisar*- according to the usual view (otherwise Skutsch); *uesclis*, ablative plural with *i* < *oi* as in Umb. *uesclis* (Oscan and Paelignian maintain the diphthong; Marrucinian *aisos* and Marsian *e]sos* on Conway, 261 = von Planta, 243 seem to present a different type of case-ending but the latter example is too mutilated to be of much use); *toticu* with *o* < pIt. *ou* as in Umb. *totcor*, whereas Oscan, Paelignian, and Marrucinian maintain the diphthong (von Planta, II, pp. 158-61); *sepis* with *se* probably = Lat. *si* < **sei*, but in any case with *e* of diphthongal origin (discussion in von Planta, I, pp. 147, 194, II, p. 462).

One of the commonly cited pieces of evidence for close Volscian-Umbrian connection is the palatalization of *k* before *i* inferred from the spelling *faia*, which all scholars identify with Umb. *faċia*, Lat. *faciat*. The reversed C used to represent the sound does not agree with the Umbrian symbols, but shows a curious resemblance to the character *o* (actually C, but functioning as *o* since the writing is retrograde) in *seure* on a bronze statuette from Auximum in Picenum (von Planta, 289 = Whatmough,⁶ 347). For this short and obscure inscription, which Whatmough classifies as East Italic (= von Planta's *altsabelisch*) Grienberger⁷ attempted an interpretation on the basis of Umbrian, but regards the *o* as simply a mistake, since his equation of *seure* with Lat. *seuro* does not call for a palatalized *c*. Pisani,⁸ also taking the language as Umbrian, interpreted *seure* quite differently, as a 3 pl. pf. verb form from root **sek-* with palatalization either before an earlier *e* for *u*, or analogically.

atahus, which the great majority of scholars regard as a fut. pf. roughly equivalent to *attigerit*, is generally taken as evidence for loss of final *t* in the group *-st*. If this explanation is correct, we have a parallel to the occasional loss of final *t* shown in Umb. *fus*, *heries*, etc., as against regular preservation of *-st* in Oscan

⁶ J. Whatmough, *The Prae-Italic Dialects of Italy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1933), p. 221, with detailed discussion.

⁷ *Gl.*, XIII (1924), p. 72.

⁸ *Gl.*, XX (1932), pp. 97 f.

and Paelignian (von Planta, I, pp. 575 f., with statistics for early and late Umbrian). Pisani,⁹ because of the difficulty of explaining the *h* by the standard interpretation, makes a totally different conjecture, whereby *atahus* is from **aktāius*, a bahu-vrihi compound = *maggiorenne, cuius aevum plenum est*. We would thus lose one of the evidences for Volscian-Umbrian connection (*-st > -s*), while at the same time *-kt- > -t-*, as in Umb. *satam < *sanktām* (Buck, p. 89, von Planta, II, pp. 352 f.) presupposes close connection, or at least resemblance, between the two languages on general grounds. But Pisani's admittedly conjectural proposal serves less to convince me of its own correctness than to raise doubts against the usual equation of *atahus* with *attigerit*.

More certainly attested, if more widely distributed in the dialects, is loss of final *d*. The possible or probable cases are: abl. sg. *toticu, couehriu, sepu, uinu*; subjunctive *fasia* (with loss of *-d < -t*, the secondary ending); imv. *arpatitu, estu*; all appear to have etymologically long vowels before the lost final *d*. The dialectal distribution is: loss of *-d* in Umbrian¹⁰ and Marrucinian,¹¹ fluctuation in Paelignian,¹² preservation in Oscan,¹³ loss in Latin after long vowels around 200 B. C.¹⁴

The word *bim* has been cited as showing a parallel to the Umbrian change *ū > ü > i*, as in Umb. *pir*: Gk. *πῑρ*, etc. The Umbrian material, together with some limited or doubtful occurrences in Oscan and Paelignian, is treated in von Planta, I, pp. 129-36, Buck, p. 41. Since the *ū* of proto-Volscian **būm*, if taken as equivalent to Umb. *bum*, Lat. *bovem*, would be of diphthongal origin, it is hard to account for the change to *i*, which in Umbrian affects only original *ū*. Von Planta, I, p. 131, suggested vowel change by analogy with semantically similar **sim* (Lat. *suem*, Gk. *ῑν*) where *i < ū* would be regular, and many follow him,¹⁵ but this single example is not sufficient to

⁹ *Arch. Gl. It.*, XXVII (1935), pp. 158 f.

¹⁰ Von Planta, I, pp. 577-80.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Kent, *op. cit.*, §141, 10.

¹⁵ Ribezzo, *R. I. G. I.*, XIV (1930), p. 86, interprets quite differently, equating *bim* with Pael. *biam* 'sacellum.'

provide sure evidence of $\bar{u} > i$ in Volscian. I make only passing mention of the fact that von Planta, *loc. cit.*, suggested a change $\bar{u} > \bar{i}$, with u maintained in the writing, as a merely possible method of accounting for the palatal \bar{o} in *securē* on the bronze statuette from Auximum.

The final f in *asif* may possibly be evidence of special Volscian-Umbrian connection. Final ns of almost any origin (except after syncope of a vowel between n and s) became $-f$ in Umbrian, but in Oscan original $-ns$, as in accus. pl. forms, became $-ss$.¹⁶ Here Marrucian seems to go with Umbrian, while for Paelignian the development is unknown. Thus we have agreement of Volscian and Umbrian against Oscan if and only if *asif* is an accusative plural. In favor of such an interpretation are Bréal (= *oves*, cited by Conway, p. 602), Skutsch (= Lat. *asses*, of a fine for unauthorized removal of the object from the temple), Ribezzo (< **āsins*, as a heteroclit or stem-variant to Lat. *aras*), Pisani (cognate with Lat. *asserēs*). In favor of interpretation as a pres. pcpl. nom. sg. are von Planta, II, p. 651 (= Lat. *arens*, *ardens*, with transitive value), Grienberger, p. 32, similarly Thurneysen (with value of *assans*, 'indem er das Rind brät'). By any interpretation we feel the need of a verb to follow *se*, generally taken as the conditional particle, but the choice between *asif* as pres. pcpl. and as accus. pl. is a most difficult one to make.

arpatitu has been variously interpreted, but for us the important fact is that, whatever the etymology and sense of the body of the word, we have in the prefix a virtually certain example of *ar-* < *ad-*. The dialectal distribution of this phenomenon is:¹⁷ Umb. *arfertur* (but also *arfertur*, *arsfertur*), *arueitu* (but also *arsueitu*); not in Oscan, which, however, has a few cases of $r < d$ in other situations; Lat.¹⁸ *arbiter*, etc., *arveho*, Cato, *Agr.*, 135, 7, *arfuise*, *C. I. L.*, I², 581. The Marsian-Latin inscription

¹⁶ Buck, pp. 71-73; von Planta, I, pp. 505-12. The evidence for the development of $-nts$ (pres. pcpl.) in Oscan is extremely tenuous. The type represented by Osc. nom. sg. *fruktatiuf* (n -stems) need not concern us here, since no interpretation of Volsc. *asif* is based on a stem of this class.

¹⁷ Buck, p. 83; von Planta, I, pp. 408 f.

¹⁸ Kent, *op. cit.*, §141, 5; Ernout, *Les Éléments dialectaux du vocabulaire latin* (Paris, 1928), pp. 111-14. Both favor dialectal origin for the Latin examples.

from Lake Fucinum (Conway, 267 = von Planta, 307) has the closely similar *apur finem*. In every case the change is before a labial consonant.

Among the foregoing phonological evidences of special Volscian-Umbrian connection most have been challenged, though in every case for reasons connected with the interpretation of the Velitrae inscription and not for the purpose of invalidating the Volscian-Umbrian hypothesis. The most securely established data are the monophthongization of diphthongs, the loss of final *d*, and the change *ad* > *ar*-, and these in general have some currency outside of Volscian and Umbrian. In the second half of this article I intend to examine some other types of evidence, mostly connected with personal and local names.

A particularly striking fact, and one which has received considerable attention,¹⁰ is the position of the father's name in the so-called onomastic formula. The typical Latin order *Q. Marcius L. f. S. Postumius L. f.* (*C. I. L.*, I², 581) is followed also in Oscan, Paelignian, and Marrucinian, while in Volscian and Umbrian the father's name follows the praenomen as in *Ec. Se. Cosuties Ma. Ca. Tafanies medix* on the Velitrae bronze. Other examples are: Umbrian: *La: Ma Tuplei* (Conway, 353 = von Planta, 293, 4, from Todi), *V. L. Varie T. C. Fulonie* (Conway, 354 = von Planta, 295, from Fossato di Vico), *C. V. Vistinie Ner. T. Babr* (Conway, 355 = von Planta, 296, from Assisi), and several others badly mutilated; Marsian: *Pa. Vi. Pacuies* (Conway, 253 = von Planta, 242, from Antinum, regarded by Conway as Volscian); Aequian: *Po. Ca. Pomposiues* (Conway, II, p. 532, no. 45, = von Planta, 277, from near Collemaggiore; by many regarded as a forgery). Von Blumenthal, *loc. cit.*, gives the dialectal distribution of the second type as Umbrian, Picene, Volscian, Marsian, and Aequian, to which he adds a possible instance in a Sicel inscription. His view that it represents the older of the two arrangements seems plausible on the face of it, and has some interest for our purpose as suggesting the intrusion of a wave of culturally backward people through Umbria into southern Latium and perhaps beyond.

Among the gentile names in Latin inscriptions from dialect

¹⁰ Von Planta, I, p. 24; G. Devoto, *Gli antichi italici* (Florence, 1931), p. 187; von Blumenthal, *I. F.*, L (1932), p. 234; E. Fraenkel, *R.-E.*, XVI (1935), p. 1660.

areas classified in the various lists in Conway's *Italic Dialects* a considerable number are common to the Volscian and adjacent Latin territories and to Umbria, but are not found in the areas where Oscan and closely similar dialects were spoken. Since the inscriptions to a large extent reflect conditions existing in imperial times, and since it might also be possible to show some names common to Volscian and Oscan territory but absent from Umbria, I am not unaware of the danger of overemphasizing this line of argument. The occasional occurrence of names in Etruria or Picenum, however, may not work against the argument, since the existence of Umbrians²⁰ in much of northern Italy at an early period is well recognized. The following are a few names whose occurrence is limited in the manner described above: *Amelius*, *C. I. L.*, X, 6743 (Antium), *Amilius*, XI, 5537 (Assisium); *Braetius*, X, 6139 (Caieta), XI, 3040 Polimartium), 5845 (Iguvium), 7838 (Ameria); *Codennius*, X, 5368 (Fratte Maggiore), XI, 4125 (Narnia; *Coden[nius]* with restoration on the basis of the former example); *Precius*, X, 5678 (Arpinum), XI, 6189, 6190 (Ostra), IX, 5615 (Septempeda); *Suestidius*, X, 6447 (Privernum), XI, 5276 (Hispellum), XIV, 3453 (Treba Augusta). My basis of selection here has been very narrow; I refer briefly to the additional names *Bet(t)uedius*, *Burbuleius*, *Masonius*, *Mestrius*, *Mussius*, *Ogulnius*, *Roesius*, *Rubranus*: *Rufranius*, *Travius*, *Tutius*, *Utilius*, *Uttiedius*, most of which show some occurrences in and immediately around Rome. Their distribution can be followed in detail through Schulze's *Eigennamen*.

A study of cognomina would have no value in the present connection, since they came into use at a time much later than the period which would have to be assumed for an Umbrian

²⁰ Probably in an ethnic as opposed to a linguistic sense. For a discussion of the "Ουμβροι or Umbri of ancient writers see Whatmough, *The Foundations of Roman Italy* (London, 1937), pp. 193 f., where the Umbrian language known to us from the Iguvine Tables is taken to be a distinct language, and much more limited in range, than that of the traditional inhabitants of all north central Italy. Our names may have been current among the Umbri in the north and have been brought into Volscian territory by speakers of the Umbrian language. I have not attempted the task of assigning etymologies to the names themselves, some of which are shown to have Etruscan origin by W. Schulze, *Lateinische Eigennamen* (Berlin, 1904), *passim*.

migration into Volscian territory. Place-names are hardly more satisfactory, and, in fact, the short list discussed by Devoto (*op. cit.*, pp. 122-5) in support of the linguistic unity of the Italic ends with a warning against undue faith in them. It may not be out of place, however, to call attention to Pliny's mention (*N. H.*, III, 5, 63) of the *Auximates* in a long list of Campanian local and ethnic names. I have already mentioned Auximum in Picenum as the source of an inscription which seems to afford a parallel to the Volscian sign for a palatalized *c*. The name *Interamna* is also of interest, occurring in the Volscian territory as well as in Umbria, while there was an Interamnium in Picenum; but the existence of an Interamnium in Bruttium does nothing to advance the general line of argument in this paper, and in every case we must probably assume that *Inter-* represents a latinizing of the dialectic **Ander-* (the name is not found in any dialect text); at least this view seems preferable to viewing *Inter-* as reflecting a Latinian sub-stratum. More significant than the distribution of individual place-names may be the use of suffixes to form names denoting the inhabitants of the places. The suffix *-ti-*, especially in forms like *Arpinas*, *Arpinates*, bears closely on our problem. Conway²¹ has not only given detailed figures, but has pointed out the significance of the distribution of these names for Volscian-Umbrian connections. Among the form-classes which he tabulates 10 out of 42 Volscian ethnica and 35 out of 73 Umbrian ethnica use *-ti-*, and no other national groups where totals of 15 or more are involved show such a high ratio. A casual examination of the *-āti-* forms for Italy in general in Pliny, *N. H.*, III, 5, or in Conway's lists of place-names, or, for dialect texts, in von Planta, II, p. 51, will show that the suffix in question is particularly favored when *-enas*, *-inas*, *-nates* results: that is, in such correspondences as *Capena*: *Capenates*, *Aquinum*: *Aquinates*, and in fact a large majority of the rather thinly scattered ethnica in *-ates* from southern Italy will be found to be of this type. Since over half of the Volscian examples also are in *-nates*, we must not overwork the ethnica in making a comparison with Umbrian.

²¹ *Atti del Congresso internazionale di scienze storiche* (Rome, 1903-5), pp. 14, 15, 18; *Cambridge Ancient History*, IV (New York, 1926), p. 460 a. The statistical tables are based on and may be supplemented by the lists of place-names in the *Italic Dialects*, I, *passim*.

How far the suffix *-ati-* is significant in itself and how far it is merely a reflex of certain tendencies to form town-names in *-na* and *-num* it is hard to say, and various complicating factors make exact statistical method very difficult here despite Conway's excellent lists. Yet in general it may be said that the Umbrian and Volscian areas tend to favor the type *Trebia: Trebiates, Asisium: Asisinales, Tadinum: Tadinates*, etc., while the Oscan-speaking areas to the south favor the suffix *-no-*. In fact even for the Volscian territory the suffix *-no-* is in terms of actual numbers much more frequent (29 out of 42) than *-ti-*, whose frequency is thus purely relative. On the origin of the ethnic suffix *-ti-* I refrain from comment, but its frequency in the far north of Italy (20? examples among the Ligures) is striking when observed in the light of Kretschmer's theory²² of a migration of Umbri into Liguria.

Other lines of investigation might be followed in the attempt to find still more features of language or culture common to the Umbrians and Volscians. Archaeological questions I have left untouched, and in regard to religious cults I make only brief mention of several whose geographical limits agree with the area in which we are interested. Feronia was an Etruscan goddess whose cult was introduced into Rome from Capena. It flourished also among the Picenes, Umbrians, Vestinians, Sabines, and Volscians, but not among the Oscans nor in most parts of Latium proper.²³ The goddess Marica, who was especially worshipped at Minturnae, and whose tentative identification with Diana or with Venus need not concern us here, reappears in Pisaurum on one of a well-known group of early Latin dedicatory inscriptions (*C. I. L.*, XI, 6296), but we cannot be certain that the cult was indigenous, since a Roman colony was established there in 184 B. C.²⁴ The goddess Vesuna, known from several references in Iguvine Table IV, reappears in the Marsian-Latin dedication Conway, 264 = von Planta, 308, and in Conway's Volscian, 253 = von Planta's Marsian, 242.

Among all the evidence discussed up to this point a certain

²² *Gl.*, XXI (1933), p. 120.

²³ Wissowa, *R.-E.*, VI, pp. 2217-19; *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (Munich, 1912), pp. 285 f.; E. C. Evans, *Cults of Sabine Territory* (American Academy in Rome, 1939), *passim*.

²⁴ Livy, XXXIX, 44, 10.

amount can be set aside as questionable. Those who prefer to see a closer connection between the Volscians and their Oscan-speaking neighbors might emphasize such points of cultural agreement as the magisterial title *med(d)ix*, found on the Velitrae bronze and among the Oscan-speaking nations but not in Umbria.²⁵ Yet the cumulative weight of the evidence is so strong that Conway²⁶ was surely not in error in insisting on a very close connection between Volscians and Umbrians. The present paper attempts to show that certain other nations, especially the Marsians, shared some of the features establishing the connection, and the accompanying table is an attempt to present the evidence schematically.²⁷

SOME PHONOLOGICAL AND ONOMASTIC FEATURES.

	OSCAN	UMBRIAN	VOLSCIAN	MARSIAN	PIEONE	OTHER
<i>ai</i> > <i>e</i>	—	+	+	+		rustic and late Latin
<i>ki</i> > <i>gi</i>	—	+	+		+	
- <i>st</i> > - <i>s</i>	—	+	+			
loss of final <i>d</i>	—	+	+		+	Latin Marrucinian
<i>ū</i> > <i>ī</i>	very rare	+	+			
original - <i>ns</i> > - <i>f</i>	—	+	+ if <i>asif</i> is acc. pl.			
<i>ad-</i> > <i>ar-</i>	—	+	+	(+)		Latin

²⁵ A. Rosenberg, *Der Staat der alten Italiker* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 15-30.

²⁶ *Atti del Congresso*, p. 11, where his stemma showing the grouping of dialects joins Umbrian and Volscian together, with Oscan one degree removed.

²⁷ + shows the presence of the feature in question. — shows the positive absence of the feature in question. () indicate that the conditions for the sound-change in question are slightly different. Absence of any notation means that the evidence provides us with no answer. The presentation in the table is necessarily very succinct, and reference must be made to the sections where the various phenomena are discussed. The section on -*ns* > -*f* is of course applicable only if *asif* is taken as accus. pl.; for -*ns* of other origins Oscan and Umbrian do not disagree.

	OSCAN	UMBRIAN	VOLSCIAN	MARSIAN	PICENE	OTHER
onomastic formula of type <i>Ec. Se.</i>						
<i>Cosuties</i>	—	+	+	+	+	Aequian?
ethnic of type	22 out	35 out	10 out	4 out	5 out	
<i>Arpinās</i>	of 207	of 73	of 42	of 9	of 34	
selected place-names		<i>Interamna</i>	<i>Interamna</i>		<i>Interamnina</i>	<i>Interamnium</i> in Bruttium
			<i>Auvinates?</i>		<i>Auvinum</i>	

The linguistic connection between the Volscian and Umbrian dialects is too close to be explained merely by the spread of isoglosses from a center, especially when the separation of the two areas is taken into account. There is no strong tradition of a migration of Umbrians toward southern Latium, yet something of the sort must have taken place. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. Rom.*, VII, 2, 1, the city of Cumae was the victim of an unsuccessful attack by Etruscans, Umbrians, and Daunians in the year of the archonship of Miltiades in the 64th Olympiad (= 524/3). Whether the Umbrians participating in this attack came from the north or were already residents of the interior of Campania is not quite clear,²⁸ but the mere presence of Umbrians in southern Italy at this time has some interest for our argument. Devoto²⁹ decides on the last part of the sixth century as the probable time for the Volscian migration into the region between Latium proper and Campania, and their route was the valley of the Liris. The problem now is to establish connecting links between the Volscians and the Umbrians far to the north.

Unfortunately the inscription from Antinum (Conway, 253 = von Planta, 242), which might be most representative for the Marsian dialect, proves to be an unsafe piece of evidence because its very language has caused some³⁰ to regard it as Volscian, while in support of their view they cite Livy, IV, 57, 7 . . . *caesi*

²⁸ See P. N. Ure, *C. A. H.*, IV, p. 117, who speaks of the aggressors as "Etruscans and other barbarian invaders of Campania."

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 137.

³⁰ Mommsen, *op. cit.*, p. 321; Conway, *Italic Dialects*, p. 269; von Planta and most others class it as Marsian.

ad Antium hostes; victor exercitus depopulatus Volscum agrum; castrum ad lacum Fucinum expugnatum, and suppose that Antinum rather than Antium is meant, and that Antinum, which was generally reckoned as a Marsian city, must at one time have been under Volscian control. No other Marsian inscription shows the patronymic between the praenomen and nomen, and in fact nearly all are in a language basically Latin. Typically Umbrian features in Marsian, however, are: monophthongization in *i]ouies pucl.* (Conway, 260 b = von Planta, 244) with *-es* < *-ois*; *apur* (Conway, 267 = von Planta, 307) with *-r* < *-d* as in Umb. *ar-* < *ad-*; the name of the town *Cerfennia* with *-rf-* < *-rs-*.³¹

For Aequian we are, if possible, even more in the dark than for Marsian. The poorly attested inscription from Collemaggiore (Conway, II, p. 532, no. 45* = von Planta, 277) is believed to be a forgery, as mentioned above, although it is rather curious that the forger should have arranged the parts of the name according to the Umbrian-Volscian formula instead of in the usual Latin order. An inscription from Nesce (Conway, II, p. 531, no. 43* = von Planta, 278), which might have some interest because of the case-ending in *hereklei*, is also regarded as a forgery.

The Sabine material is exceptionally difficult to deal with, both because of the scarcity of non-Latin inscriptions and because of the looseness in the traditional use of the term Sabine. Perhaps no better illustration of this freedom of usage can be offered than the fact that the Sabine dialect has been cited both as the bridge over which rhotacism spread from Umbrian into Latin³² and as the source of a number of words in Latin which fail to show rhotacism.³³ I have hitherto avoided mention of rhotacism in this article simply because our remains of the Volscian dialect, the main center of interest, fail to show evidence either for or against it,³⁴ but where Sabine is concerned, we should not

³¹ Buck, §115, 2; von Planta, I, pp. 487-93. The name *Cerfennia* occurs in *C.I.L.*, IX, 5973. The initial *C* is proof neither for nor against palatalization.

³² Devoto, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

³³ Ernout, *op. cit.*, pp. 73 f.

³⁴ *esaristrom* is no evidence for its failure to occur, because the intervocalic *s* may be dissimilatory, as sometimes assumed in Lat. *miser*

expect absolute uniformity at an early period in a dialect extending over mountainous country from the Tiber nearly to the Adriatic.³⁵ The single inscription of any consequence classed as Sabine in von Planta's collection (280, *mesene flusare poimēnien atrno aunom hiretum*) shows no striking parallels with Umbrian or Volscian. Its exact provenance is uncertain, but in any case it comes from a region well to the east, in the Aternus valley, and in fact Conway (no. 248) classes it with the Vestinian inscriptions. For possible Umbrian-Sabine connections more can be learned from the statements of ancient writers than from the phonology of the above inscription or of the Sabine glosses. The word *dīra* is cited by Servius on *Aen.*, III, 235 as an Umbrian and Sabine equivalent of *mala*, but there is no assurance in the *d* < *d̥*.³⁶ that the word cannot be Oscan also. *cyprium*, cited by Varro, *L. L.*, V, 159, as Sabine for *bonum*, is generally equated with *cubrar* in the divine name *Cubrar Matrer* on the Umbrian inscription from Fossato di Vico (Conway, 354 = von Planta, 295). More important than these lexical coincidences, which may have had a much wider dialectal range, is the statement of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. Rom.*, II, 49, Ζηρόδοτος δ' ὁ Τροϊζήνιος συγγραφεὺς * * * Ὀμβρικοὺς ἔθνος αὐθιγενὲς ἱστορεῖ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἰκῆσαι περὶ τὴν καλουμένην Ῥεατίνην· ἐκείθεν δὲ ὑπὸ Πελασγῶν ἐξελασθέντας εἰς ταύτην ἀφικέσθαι τὴν γῆν ἔνθα νῦν οἰκοῦσι καὶ μεταβαλόντας ἅμα τῷ τόπῳ τοῦνομα Σαβίνους ἐξ Ὀμβρικῶν προσαγορευθῆναι.³⁷ The Umbrian Sabines of Dionysius of Halicarnassus may have formed one of a series of dialectal groups reaching from Umbria to the country of the Volscians, but the Latin and Umbrian rhotacism must have spread subsequent to the time assumed for the southward migra-

(which, however, Ernout, *op. cit.*, pp. 197 f., explains differently); *asif* is of uncertain origin and meaning and its *s* may be a geminate written single, as is indeed the case for *Osoities*.

³⁵ Substantially the same view is expressed by Devoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 119 f.

³⁶ Von Planta, I, pp. 413 f., and the etymological dictionaries of Walde³ and Meillet-Ernout, *s. v.* On the whole question of *dīrus* and its alleged Umbrian origin see Whatmough, *Lang.*, XXVI (1950), p. 301.

³⁷ post συγγραφεὺς excidisse οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, Σαβίνους μοῖραν εἶναι ἀποφαίνων τοῦ c. Ambrosch, παλαιὸς vel λόγου ἄξιος c. Kiessling Ὀμβρικοῦ ἔθνους αὐθιγενεῖς O corr. Reiske.

tion and may never have reached the Volscian dialect.³⁸ The source of the Latin words commonly alleged to be Sabine, as well as of von Planta's inscription no. 280, if it is really Sabine, may have been a non-rhotacizing dialect in the eastern part of the Sabine territory.

The possibility of bringing Picenum into the dialect group with Umbrian and Volscian depends largely on the interpretation of the East Italic or Old Sabellian inscriptions. Von Blumenthal³⁹ subjected several of these texts to a searching examination on the basis of membership in the Oscan-Umbrian division of the Italic group. The presumable cases of special agreement with Umbrian are: dat. sg. in *-e* in the 2nd decl. name *Pqude Pepie* (Whatmough, 351 = von Planta, 285); loss of final *d*, as in *estu* (Wh, 350), Umb. *este*, *este*, Lat. *istud*; *e* (Wh, 348) = Umb. *et*, *et*, Lat. *et*, against Osc. *ínim*; 3rd decl. abl. sg. *ehvelí* with case-ending as in Umbrian and Latin against Oscan, which uses the 2nd decl. ending; patronymic between praenomen and nomen in Petr. H: *Púpún-* (Wh, 351 = vPl, 285), Tetis: T. *Kúm*: *Alies* (Wh, 352 = vPl, 283). In the preservation of final *-m* and in the development of anaptyxis the dialect of these inscriptions seems closer to Oscan than to Umbrian. The classification of the dialect as belonging to the Oscan-Umbrian sub-group is upheld by Vetter (*Gl.*, XX [1932], pp. 24-6) and its special kinship with Umbrian is affirmed by Brandenstein (*R.-E.*, XX, 1 [1941], p. 1190). The hypothesis of such a connection offers many attractive possibilities and may some day turn out to be correct, but the normal difficulties in interpreting the non-Latin inscriptions of Picenum are aggravated by the mutilated condition of the writing and by the uncertain value of some of the characters themselves. It is partly for this reason that I have thought it best not to incorporate the alleged Umbrian features of the dialect into the various paragraphs in the first part of the article. It is es-

³⁸ Rhotacism was completed in Latin around 350 B. C. (Kent, *op. cit.*, §§54, 166; Buck, *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*, §166). In Umbrian it was already in effect at the time of the oldest Iguvine Tables, which few scholars place earlier than the fourth century B. C.

³⁹ *I. F.*, XLVII (1929), pp. 48-72. For convenience I follow his reading of the inscriptions here, but it must be borne in mind that the phonological and morphological features here discussed can be no more certain than the readings on which they depend.

pecially significant that Whatmough in the *Prae-Italic Dialects* and in the *Foundations of Roman Italy*, both published after the appearance of von Blumenthal's article, still does not treat the inscriptions in question as Umbrian.

The results of this investigation may be summarized with a few conclusions and comments. The existence of the Velitrae bronze, despite the uncertainty of many details of interpretation, is a piece of good fortune, since to it we owe almost all our knowledge of the Volscian dialect. The similarity between the language of this inscription and that of the Iguvine Tables is very great, and the idea of a close connection between the speakers of the two dialects receives additional confirmation from some evidence outside of the inscription, so that we must assume a migration of Umbrians to the region between Latium proper and Campania. The lack of any Marsian, Aequian, or Sabine texts comparable to the Velitrae bronze as dialect monuments may be an unfortunate accident, but more probably it is a result of early Roman expansion. In any case this region, lying as it does in the very center of Italy, must have been peculiarly susceptible to overlapping of dialectal strata and crossing of isoglosses. Here northern dialects predominantly Umbrian in character must have been contiguous with or have been superimposed upon closely related southern dialects of the type known to us chiefly as Oscan and Paelignian, and Latin, more remote from both of them, came into collision with them and eventually superseded them. Yet even with the very little that we know of Marsian, Aequian, and Sabine we find an occasional hint of characteristics that seem to mark them as connecting links between Umbrian and Volscian. For Picenum there are rather many indications of Umbrian connection, but every individual piece of evidence is quite uncertain. At the present time it seems safe only to admit the possibility of an Italic dialect akin to Umbrian in parts of Picenum, and at the same time not to ignore the strong indications of a population largely Illyrian in culture and language.⁴⁰

JAMES W. POULTNEY.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

⁴⁰ On this question see Whatmough, *Foundations of Roman Italy*, especially pp. 240-1, 253-8.

ALCUIN'S EPITAPH OF HADRIAN I.*

A Study In Carolingian Epigraphy.

Alcuin is the author of many metrical inscriptions (*tituli*) for the altars and walls of churches and monasteries, and for epitaphs¹ and book dedications. None of his biographers has paid proper attention to this aspect of his many-sided activities. But even in the role of epigrapher, the versatile Anglo-Saxon is deserving of our interest. Edmond Le Blant² initiated the critical appraisal of Alcuin's epigraphic work, but since 1856 the subject has been neglected. There is sufficient material available to speak not only of the much discussed Scriptorium of Tours but also of the Epigraphic School of Tours.³ The best-known inscription of the school is the epitaph of Pope Hadrian I (772-795), placed on his tomb at Rome upon the request of Charlemagne. J. B. de Rossi⁴ concludes that the lapidary workmanship and the style of the inscription are without equal among contemporary epigraphic products of Rome or elsewhere. Its well-executed Roman square capital is fashioned after older Roman inscriptions, many of which were undoubtedly still extant at Tours during the time of Alcuin (796-804).⁵

The metrical epitaph consists of thirty-nine elegiacs and one dateline. There are never more than forty full-sized capitals to

* For more on Alcuin see my forthcoming study "The Via Regia of Charlemagne. The Rhetoric of Alcuin as a Treatise on Kingship." I am indebted to Professor Harry Caplan and to Professor James Hutton of Cornell University for critical reading of this paper.

¹ Cf. J. B. de Rossi, "Tituli et epitaphia vetera mixta carminibus Alcuini," *Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romae Septimo Saeculo Antiquiores*, II, 1 (Rome, 1888), pp. 280-2.

² *Inscriptions Chrétiennes de la Gaule antérieures au VIII^e Siècle*, I (Paris, 1856), pp. cxxxiii-iv.

³ C. Chevalier, *Les Fouilles de Saint-Martin de Tours* (Tours, 1888).

⁴ "L'Inscription du Tombeau d'Hadrien I, composée et gravée en France par ordre de Charlemagne," *École Française de Rome, Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire*, VIII (1888), pp. 478-501.

⁵ See J. Boussard, "Étude sur la ville de Tours du I^{er} au IV^e siècle," *Revue des Études Anciennes*, L (1948), pp. 312-29; H. Auvray, "La Touraine Gallo-Romaine," *Bulletin de la Société Archéologique de Touraine*, XXVII (1938).

a verse. The space-saving ligatures of two letters (*litterae contiguae*)⁶ are identical with those in inscriptions of the early Roman empire. In addition to the ordinary capital T, we thus encounter the archaic form of the letter as used during the empire, the heightened T, which extends above the upper rim of the letters so that its transverse line is above the preceding and the following capitals. The same form of the letter is used for the ligature of T and R, in which case the rounded arch of R is below the right branch of the elevated crossbeam of the letter, while the normal-sized T is used for the ligature of T and E. Other space-saving devices are the insertion of a small capital in the cavity of a rounded, large capital (*litterae insertae*) such as v in Q and C, and A in C, and finally the small capitals A, O, I, suspended halfway between two normal-sized letters. The *nomina sacra* of the inscription are identical with those occurring in manuscripts from the Scriptorium of Tours.⁷ The significance of the use by the engraver of two different ways of writing KAROLVS seems to have escaped the attention of de Rossi. The name is written KAROLVS (v. 24) and KRoLVS (v. 17). The occurrence of the second spelling in an inscription which originated, literally and technically, upon the request of the Frankish king, possesses more than a merely epigraphic meaning. The monogram spelling resembles the legend on the coins of Charlemagne.⁸ The public display of such a *nomisma nominis nostri* was an exclusive royal prerogative, a fact which was undoubtedly known to the engraver of the inscription.

The question that interests us is the disputed authorship of the inscription. Some scholars ascribe it to Charlemagne, relying on v. 17:

POST PATREM LACRIMANS KAROLVS HAEC CARMINA SCRIBSI,

⁶ See the lists of ligatures in René Cagnat, *Cours d'Épigraphie Latine* (4th ed., Paris, 1914), pp. 24-26; J. E. Sandys, *Latin Epigraphy* (2nd ed., by S. G. Campbell, Cambridge, 1927), p. 52.

⁷ E. K. Rand, *Studies in the Script of Tours*, II (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), pp. 44-45.

⁸ See the reproductions of Carolingian coins in *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, III (Paris, 1913), 685; Anatole de Barthélemy, "Les Monnaies de Charlemagne," in A. Vétault, *Charlemagne* (3rd ed., Tours, 1888), pp. 523-30; *Capitulare Francofurtense* of 794, *M. G. H., Concilia*, I, p. 166, art. V: *nomisma nominis nostri*.

others assume Alcuin's authorship or reserve their judgment. Orazio Marucchi⁹ ascribes it to the king, Arthur Kleinclausz¹⁰ to Alcuin. The Bollandist Ianning¹¹ suggested the authorship of Alcuin on the basis of seven locutions in the epitaph for which he adduced parallels from the poems of Alcuin. L. Duchesne¹² mentioned Alcuin with reservation, while E. K. Rand¹³ concluded with de Rossi that the Anglo-Saxon is indeed the author of Hadrian's epitaph. Ernst Dümmler¹⁴ who noticed three stylistic parallels between the inscription and Alcuin's poetry, but not those previously listed by Ianning, did not include the metrical inscription among the poems of Alcuin. His edition of the epitaph is not based on the epigraphic evidence, but on the transmission in manuscripts. One of these contains a revision of the original text. Dümmler accordingly reads v. 14:

Urbis et orbis honor, inclyta Roma, tuas,

while the inscription offers:

VRBS CAPVT ORBIS HONOR INCLYTA ROMA TVAS.

The scribe of the manuscript used by Dümmler in this instance thus revised Alcuin's words after the epitaph of Hadrian I composed by Alcuin's friend Theodulph of Orléans,¹⁵ *Super Sepulchrum Hadriani Papae*, v. 9:

Tu decus ecclesiae, fax splendens *urbis et orbis*.

The following edition of Hadrian's epitaph¹⁶ endeavors to

⁹ *Christian Epigraphy* (tr. by J. A. Willis, Cambridge, 1912), p. 455.

¹⁰ *Alcuin* (Paris, 1948), p. 248; see my review in *Speculum*, XXIV (1949), pp. 587-90.

¹¹ *Acta Sanctorum Junii*, VII, 2 (1867), pp. 98-100.

¹² *Le Liber Pontificalis*, I (Paris, 1886), p. 553.

¹³ *Studies in the Script of Tours*, I (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), p. 41.

¹⁴ *M. G. H., Poetae*, I, pp. 112-13.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 489-90, no. XXVI.

¹⁶ See de Rossi (note 4), pp. 478-9, and the facsimile of the inscription provided by him; L. Duchesne (note 12), p. 523; Fedor Schneider and Walther Holtzmann, *Die Epitaphien der Päpste und andere stadtrömische Inschriften (Texte zur Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters)*, VI [Rome, 1933]; Ferdinand Gregorovius, *Le Tombe dei Papi* (sec. ed. ital. riv. et ampl. da C. Hülsen, Rome, 1931); H. Leclercq, "Épitaphe d'Hadrien Ier," *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, VI (Paris, 1925), 1964-7; also XIII (1937), 1255-64; an English trans-

prove the authorship of Alcuin on the basis of the numerous parallels between the inscription and Alcuin's poetry.¹⁷

The Epitaph of Pope Hadrian I (772-795)

(today in the Portico of St. Peter's at Rome)

- 1 Hic pater ecclesiae, *Romae decus, inclytus auctor*
Hadrianus requiem papa beatus habet.
- Vir cui vita Deus, pietas lex, gloria Christus,
Pastor apostolicus, promptus ad omne bonum,
- 5 *Nobilis ex magna genitus iam gente parentum,*
Sed sacris longe nobilior meritis,
Exornare studens devoto pectore pastor,
Semper ubique suo templa sacrata Deo,
- 10 *Ecclesias donis, populos et dogmate sancto*
Imbuit et cunctis pandit ad astra viam.
Pauperibus largus, nulli pietate secundus,
Et pro plebe sacris pervigil in precibus,
Doctrinis, opibus, muris erexerat arces,
Urbs caput orbis honor, inclyta Roma, tuas.
- 15 *Mors cui nil nocuit, Christi quae morte perempta est,*
Ianua sed vitae mox melioris erat.
Post patrem lacrimans Karolus haec carmina scribsi,
Tu mihi dulcis amor, te modo plango, pater.
- 20 *Tu memor esto mei, sequitur te mens mea semper,*
Cum Christo teneas regna beata poli.
Te clerus, populus magno dilexit amore,
Omnibus *unus amor*, optime praesul, eras.
Nomina iungo simul titulis, clarissime, nostra,
Hadrianus Karolus, rex ego tuque pater.
- 25 *Quisque legas versus, devoto pectore supplex:*
'Amborum mitis,' dic, 'miserere Deus.'
Haec tua nunc teneat requies, carissime, membra,
Cum sanctis anima gaudeat alma Dei.

lation of Hadrian's epitaph is provided by Jacob Isidor Mombert, *A History of Charles the Great* (New York, 1886), pp. 337-8.

¹⁷ Abbreviations used in the commentary:

- C. L. E. — *Carmina Latina Epigraphica*, ed. Buecheler and Lommatzsch;
de Rossi — J. B. de Rossi, *Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romae*, I-II, 1 (Rome, 1888);
Diehl — Ernestus Diehl, *Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres*, I-III (Berlin, 1926-1931);
Fortunatus — Venantius Fortunatus, ed. Friedrich Leo, *M. G. H., Auctores Antiquissimi*, IV, 1; IV, 2, ed. Bruno Krusch;
Ianning — *Acta Sanctorum Junii*, VII, 2 (1867), p. 99;
Dümmler — *M. G. H., Poetae*, I, p. 112.

- 30 *Ultima quippe tuas donec tuba clamet in aures,*
Principe cum Petro surge videre Deum.
Auditurus eris vocem, scio, iudicis almam:
'Intra nunc domini gaudia magna tui.'
Tunc memor esto tui nati, pater optime, posco:
'Cum patre,' dic, 'natus pergat et iste meus.'
 35 *O pete regna, pater felix, caelestia Christi;*
Inde tuum precibus auxiliare gregem.
Dum sol ignicomo rutilus splendescit ab axe,
Laus tua, sancte pater, semper in orbe manet.
Sedit beatae memoriae Hadrianus papa
 40 *Annos XXIII menses X dies XVII obiit VII Kalendas*
Ianuarias.

- 1 *Romae decus*] Cf. Publ. Optat. Porfyrius, *Carmina*, X, 21 ed. Elsa Kluge (Teubner, 1926): *Concordi saeclo Romae decus*; II, 19:
Alme, salus orbis, Romae decus, inclyta fama;
 cf. Alcuin in Poem on York, v. 455 (p. 179):
Inclyta fama viri nec solum iure Britannos
inlustrat populos. Cf. Bede, *Hist. Eccl.*, III, 13.
inclytus auctor] Alcuin, *Epit. Pauli Monachi Turonensis*, CXIII,
 17 (p. 344), cited by Ianning:
Mox Martinus amor rapuit me inclitus auctor;
Vita Willibrordi, II, 3, 1 (p. 210):
Crescere Pippinus dum viderat inclytus auctor;
 in Poem addressed to Paulinus of Aquileia, XVII, 14 (p. 239),
 cited by Ianning:
O laus Ausioniae, patriae decus, inclytus auctor;
Epit. Civitatis Papias, M. G. H., Poetae, I, p. 102, no. I, 1, 3:
Et pater et pastor, patriae decus, inclitus auctor;
 cf. Virgil, *Aen.*, VII, 134: *Dardanus . . . pater urbis et auctor.*
 4 *Pastor apostolicus*] Alcuin, XLV, 69 (p. 259); *Vita Willibrordi*
 II, 3, 6 (p. 210).
promptus ad omne bonum] *Vita Willibrordi*, II, 34, 38 (p. 219),
 cited by Dümmler; in two epitaphs: XCIX, 13, 4 (p. 325), and
 XCII, 2, 6 (p. 319): *Hic decus ecclesiae, promptus in omne*
bonum; Alcuin's model is Fortunatus, II, 11, 19-20:
Ecclesiae fultor, laus regum, pastor egentum,
Cura sacerdotum, promptus ad omne bonum;
 the locution occurs in the following Carolingian epitaphs: *Ep.*
Folradi, ed. *M. G. H., Poetae*, I, p. 404, no. XII, 14, cited by
 Dümmler; *Ep. Grimoaldi*, p. 430, 16; *Ep. Godefridi, M. G. H.,*
Poetae, II, p. 652, no. IV, 6; Diehl, 4766, 4 (Rome), without
 reference to Fortunatus.
 5-6 Alcuin, *Vita Willibrordi*, II, 33, 1-2 (p. 218), cited by Dümmler:
Nobilis iste fuit magna de gente sacerdos,
Sed magnis multis nobilior meritis;
 in the Poem on York, vv. 752-4 (p. 186):

Accepit sponsam Adiltrudam nomine dictam,
Nobilium genitam regali stirpe parentum,
Nobilior longe casta quae mente manebat;

ibid., vv. 1250-1 (p. 197):

Hic fuit Egbertus regali stirpe creatus,
Nobilium coram saeclo radice parentum,
Sed domino coram meritis praeclarior almis.

Alcuin uses consistently the figure of *antimetabole* in these characterizations; see also Otto Weinreich, "Ueber einige panegyrische Topoi der Schönheits- und Charakterschilderung," *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft*, I (1946), pp. 121-3. Alcuin's source is Fortunatus, IV, 8, 11-12:

Nobilis antiquo veniens de germine patrum,
Sed magis in Christo *nobilior* meritis;
Nobilis et merito nobiliore potens (IV, 13, 4);
Nobilis antiqua decurrens prole parentum,
Nobilior gestis nunc super astra manet (IV, 2, 5);
Nobilitas in gente sua cui celsa refulsit
Atque suis meritis additur alter honor (IV, 26, 37).

- 7 *Exornare studens*] Alcuin in the Poem on York, v. 1027 (p. 192):

Exornans ovibus Christi *studiosus* alendis;
devoto pectore] Alcuin, *ibid.*, v. 1256 (p. 197):
Pauperibus tribuens *devoto pectore* gazas;
Alcuin, LXVIII, 22 (p. 287); Sedulius, *Carm. Pasch.*, V, 350;
Iuvenius, *Evangel. Libri Quattuor*, I, 610; Diehl, 611, 1 (Rome).

- 8 *Semper ubique*] A favorite locution of Alcuin; cf. CXIII, 30 (p. 344), cited by Ianning:

Vosque valete mei *semper ubique* deo;
Atque dies nostros precibus rege *semper ubique*
(XCIX, 12, 11);
Semper ubique vale, dic dic, dulcissime David,
David amor Flacci, *semper ubique* vale
(XXXVII, 7-8, p. 252);
Semper ubique deo, peto, vos estote fideles
(X, 16, p. 230);

cf. *Act. Apost.*, 24, 3: *Semper et ubique* suscepimus.
templa sacrata deo] Alcuin, LXIX, 118 (p. 290); Ovid, *Fasti*, I, 706: *templa dicata deis*.

- 9 Alcuin in the Poem on York, v. 275, p. 175:

Extruit *ecclesias donisque* exornat opimis;
ibid., v. 1228, p. 196:
Ecclesias alias donis ornavit opimis.

- 10 Alcuin in the Poem on York, v. 1652, p. 206:

Imbuit et primis utcumque verenter ab annis;
cf. *C. L. E.*, 669, 2 (Rome): . . . fecit *ad astra viam*; cf. Propertius, III, 18, 34: *ab humana cessit in astra viam*.

- 11 *Pauperibus largus*] Alcuin, *Versus ad Leonem Papam*, XV, 6 (p. 238):

Pauperibus largus, clarus honore pio;

Ad Friducinum, XLVI, 14 (p. 259):

Pauperibus largus ceu miserisque pater;

in the Poem on York, v. 269 (p. 175):

Pauperibus largus, parcus sibi, dives in omnes;

ibid., v. 1018 (p. 192):

Pauperibus largus, sibimet sed semper egenus;

cf. Epitaph of Pope Felix IV, Diehl, 986, 5 (Rome):

Pauperibus largus, miseris solatia praestans;

epitaph of Marea, Diehl, 989, 9 (Rome):

Pauperibus largus vixisti, nulla reservans;

sylloge of Tours, ed. de Rossi, II, 1, p. 67, no. 25, 3-4:

Pauperibus larga distribuere manu;

sylloge of Verdun, Diehl, 1135, 7 (Rome):

Largus pauperibus dives tibi carus amicis;

Diehl, 1678, 11 (Vienne):

Semper devota suis, *pauperibus larga*;

epitaph *Siconis principis* of 832, *M. G. H.*, *Poetae*, II, 648, no. 2, 36:

Largus et in cunctis *pauperibusque* pius;

epitaph of Hugo Lausannensis episcopus (d. 1038), *M. G. H.*, *Scriptores*, XXIV, p. 799, 25:

Pauperibus largus fuerat viduisque maritus;

Pseudo-Turpin, epitaph of Roland, *M. G. H.*, *Poetae*, I, p. 110, 10:

Largus pauperibus, prodigus hospitibus.

Cf. Arator, *Act. Apost.*, I, 835: *pauperibus quae larga fuit*; Bede, *Hist. Ecol.*, III, 6: *pauperibus et . . . largus*.

- 11 *nulli pietate secundus*] Alcuin, CIX, 24, 11 (p. 340), cited by Ianning:

Vir pius et prudens, *nulli pietate secundus*;

Alcuin, *Vita Willibrordi*, II, 4, 3 (p. 210):

Vir bonus et prudens, *nulli pietate secundus*;

cf. Alexander Riese, *Anthologia Latina*, I (1894), p. 8, cited by Dümmler:

Vir magnus bello, *nulli pietate secundus*;

epitaph of Louis the Pious of 840, *M. G. H.*, *Poetae*, II, p. 654, 5:

Hic fidus, fortis, *nulli pietate secundus*;

cf. Fortunatus, IV, 9, 11-13:

Egregius, *nulli de nobilitate secundus*;

Virgil, *Aen.*, XI, 441: *ulli veterum virtute secundus*.

- 12 Alcuin, XCI, 2, 3 (p. 317):

Pervigiles precibus iam, vos insistite *sacris*;

in the Poem on York, v. 1196, p. 195:

At *vigil in precibus* perstabat nocte sacerdos;

XCI, 3, 7 (p. 318):

Pervigil idcirco magnum tibi conde triumphum.

- 13 Alcuin, XXV, 1, 1-3 (p. 245), cited by Ianning:

Salve, *Roma* potens, mundi decus, *inolyta* mater;
Et *caput orbis*, honor magnus, Leo papa valet.

XXI, 5 (p. 242), cited by Ianning:

Urbs, *caput orbis*, habet te maxima *Roma* magistrum;

XLV, 31, 63 (p. 258), IX, 37 (p. 230):

Roma, *caput mundi*, mundi decus, aurea *Roma*;

Vita Willibrordi, I, 32 ed. Wilhelm Levison, *M. G. H.*, *Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum*, VII, p. 139, 7: *Roma* urbs, orbis caput; cf. Ovid, *Fasti*, V, 93: hic, ubi nunc *Roma* est, orbis caput; *Amor.*, I, 15, 26: *Roma* triumphati dum caput orbis erit; *Met.*, XV, 435; *Trist.*, III, 5, 46. The Roman Church is called by Hadrian in letters to Charlemagne: caput totius mundi; see *Codex Carolinus*, ed. Gundlach, *M. G. H.*, *Epistolae Meroving. et Karolini Aevi*, I, 72, pp. 602-3, no. 94, p. 636, 5.

inolyta Roma] Virgil, *Aen.*, VI, 781; Prudentius, *Contra orationem Symmachi*, I, 553; II, 357; Alcuin was familiar with Prudentius; see CXXIII, 13 (p. 350):

Cur Tyrio corpus *inhias* vestirier ostro,

and Prudentius, *Peristephanon*, 388: corporisque piis *inhias*; *Psychomachia*, 39: floribus ardentique iubet *vestirier ostro*; cf. Virgil, *Georg.*, III, 17: Ego Tyrio conspectus in ostro; Ovid, *Ep.*, XII, 179; *Met.*, X, 211.

- 15 Alcuin, XXII, 3, 7 (p. 319):

Sed quem Christus amat, illi mors nulla nocebit;

cf. I. Cor. 15, 54-55; Diehl, 64, 7 (*Rome*): nil tibi mors nocuit; Diehl, 244, 9 (*Rome*): non multum, mors dira, nocet; Diehl, 170, 7 (*Salerno*): sed tibi nil potuit mors haec tam saeva nocere; *Epitaph. Marii episcopi Aventicensis*, ed. Th. Mommsen, *M. G. H.*, *Auct. Antt.*, XI, p. 227:

Mors infesta ruens quamvis ex lege parentis,

Moribus instructis nulla nocere potest;

C. L. E., 1361, 8 (*Ansa, Lugdunensis*): mors nihil est; *Epit. Grimoaldi* of 807, *M. G. H.*, *Poetae*, I, p. 43, 37:

Mors tibi non nocuit;

cf. Lucretius, III, 830 on the folly of the fear of death:

Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum.

morte perempta] Dracontius, *De laudibus Dei*, I, 649:

Ac sine morte tamen vitali in *morte perempta*;

Virgil, *Aen.* VI, 163: indigna morte peremptum.

- 16 Alcuin, IX, 147 (p. 232):

Sed magis ad studium *vitae melioris* abundet;

CVII, 2, 13 (p. 334): *ianua vitae*; XCIX, 22, 3 (p. 327): *vitae melioris amator*; cf. Alcuin in *Epistle* 266, p. 424, 33 (*M. G. H.*, *Epistolae*, IV): novi . . . et renovetur *vita mea* in melius (i. e., after death).

- 17 Alcuin in the Poem on York, vv. 1653-4, p. 206:
Haec ideo cui propriis de patribus atque
Regibus et sanctis ruralia carmina scripsi;
 cf. *C.L.E.*, 1988, 35 (Rome): hos tibi dat versus *lachrimans* sine fine patronus; Eginhard, *Vita Caroli*, ch. XIX, reports: Nuntiato sibi Adriano Romani pontificis obitu, quem in amicis praecipuum habebat, sic flevit acsi fratrem aut filium amisisset karissimum. On references in the letters of Alcuin on the death of Hadrian see Bernhard Simson, *Jahrbücher des Fränkischen Reiches unter Karl d. Gr.*, II (Leipzig, 1883), p. 109, note 4.
- 18 Alcuin, LV, 1, 10 (p. 266):
Dulcis amor lacrimis absentem plangit amicum;
Tu requies mentem, tu mihi dulcis amor;
 IX, 191 (p. 234):
Tecum plango tuos casus, karissime frater.
- 18-19 Alcuin, XXIX, 3-4 (p. 248):
Tu mihi dulcis amor, cordis tu carmen in ore,
Tu memor esto mihi, tu sine fine vale;
Tu mihi dulcis amor (already cited by Ianning) is a favorite locution of Alcuin; see XLI, 1 (p. 253), XXXV, 3 (p. 251), XC, 6 (p. 313). Cf. Bede, *Vita S. Cuthberti*, XLV, 924, ed. Werner Jaager, *Palaestra*, 198 (Leipzig, 1935): Hoc te, dulcis amor; Sedulius, *Hymnus*, I, 2: Dulcis amor; Ovid, *Fasti*, V, 653: dulci . . . amore.
- 19 Alcuin, *Versus ad Leonem Apostolicum*, XLIV, 1 (p. 255):
Te mea mens sequitur, carissime Candide, triste;
Ad Amicos, LII, 3 (p. 265):
Te mea mens sequitur, magno cum corde amore;
Versus ad Carolum Imp., XLV, 17 (p. 257):
Te mea mens sequitur, sequitur quoque carmen amoris;
 Hrabanus Maurus, Alcuin's pupil, repeats this locution in his *Carmina*, *M. G. H.*, *Poetae*, II, p. 188, no. XXV, 7, p. 170, no. VI, 15; cf. Virgil, *Aen.*, X, 182: mentes omnibus sua sequendi.
- 20 Alcuin, *Versus ad Carolum Imp.*, XLV, 14 (p. 257):
Cum Christo teneat regna beata poli;
 Alcuin in letter to Beatus of Liebana, ed. Wilhelm Levison, *England and the Continent in the Eighth Century* (Oxford, 1946), p. 323, 18:
Cum sanctis teneas regna beata poli;
 cf. Ovid, *Ep.*, I, 106: regna tenere potest; *Ep.*, XII, 24: regna beata.
 Alcuin, LXIX, 176 (p. 292):
Vel praecepta dei, aut regna beata poli;
 Diehl, 1043, 2 (Milan):
Aurelius penetrans regna beata poli.
- 21 Cf. *C.L.E.*, III, 2107, 3 (Madaura): non inmerito *magno dilexit amore*; Virgil, *Aen.*, I, 344: et magno miserae dilectus amore.

- 22 Alcuin, *De fide s. trinitatis*, XX (Migne, *P. L.*, CI, 54B): *Unus amor omnibus*;

Alcuin, LXV, 4a, 18 (p. 285):

Unus amor, lector, qui sit tibi semper in aevum;

cf. *Epit. Pippini*, *M. G. H.*, *Poetae*, I, p. 405, 13-15:

Unus amor populi, virtus, pax omnibus una,

Dilexit cunctos, unus amor populi;

cf. *O. L. E.*, 491, 2 (Faventia):

Unus amor mansit, par quoque vita fidelis;

cf. Fortunatus, VI, 1, 68: *amor populi*.

- 23-24 This idea of friendship is the same as that expressed by Alcuin, LII, 17-18 (p. 265):

Quos caritate pia terris coniunxit amicos,

Gaudentes pariter iungat in arce poli;

on the close friendship between king and pope see Erich Caspar, "Hadrian I und Karl der Grosse," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, LIV (1935), pp. 150-214. Hadrian calls the Frankish king *compater spiritalis* in the *salutatio* of many letters; cf. *M. G. H.*, *Epistolae Merov. et Carolini Aevi*, I, pp. 594 ff.; also *M. G. H.*, *Epistolae Karolini Aevi*, III, p. 6, 16.

- 25 *Quisque legas versus*] Alcuin in the two inscriptions LXXXVII, 14, 5 (p. 308); XCIX, 44 (p. 324); the locution expresses the wish that travelers will read the inscription; see the examples collected by Ewald Lissberger, *Das Fortleben der Römischen Elegiker in den Carmina Epigraphica* (Tübingen diss., 1934), p. 134.

devoto pectore supplex] Alcuin, LXV, 1a, 17 (p. 285):

Quae pater Albinus devoto pectore supplex;

Diehl, 1810, 2 (Vienne):

Tu quaecumque (venes) devoto pectore supplex.

- 27 Alcuin, CXXIII, 12 (p. 350): *me tenet hic requies*.

- 29 *Ultima* . . . a reminiscence of Virgil, *Ecl.*, IV, 4-7:

Ultima Cumaei venit iam carminis aetas.

- 29-30 Alcuin, CXXIII, 20-23 (p. 350) in his own epitaph, written by himself shortly before 804:

Personet angelica donec ab arce tuba:

Qui iaces in tumulo, terrae de pulvere surge,

Magnus adest iudex milibus innumeris;

XV, 9-13 (p. 338), *In Cimiterio S. Amandi*:

Donec ab aetheria clamet pius angelus arce:

Surgite nunc prumptim terrae de pulvere, fratres,

Vos vocat adveniens iudex ex culmine caeli;

cf. I. Cor. 15, 52: *tuba: canet enim, et mortui resurgent incorrupti*;

cf. I. Thess. 4, 16; Matth. 24, 31.

- 31-33 Alcuin, L, 27-30 (p. 263):

Felix ille dies, vocem qua iudicis almi

Auditurus eris, proque labore tuo.

Tunc gaudens: 'Intra, nimium me serve fidelis
Aeterni aeternus regna beata patris.'

Tunc memor esto mei et dic . . .

LXXXVIII, 2, 9-10 (p. 309), *Ad Corpus Sancti Vedasti*:

Audiet idcirco vocem mox iudicis almi:

'Intra nunc domini gaudia sancta tui';

cf. Ovid, *Met.*, VI, 548: *Audiet haec aether et si deus ullus in illo est*; cf. Lestocquoy, "Notes sur l'épigraphie de l'abbaye de S. Vaast. Les Inscriptions d'Alcuin," *Commission départementale des Monuments Historiques du Pas-de-Calais, Bulletin*, N.S. VII (1941); Alcuin imitates Fortunatus, V, 2, 57-60:

Ecce tui domini modo gaudia laetior intra

Proque labore brevi magna parata tibi.

Auditurus eris vocem, Martine, beatam,

Sed Fortunati sis memor ipse tui. Cf. Psalm. 94, 8.

32 Cf. Matth. 25, 21 (Luc. 19, 17); Ovid, *Amor.*, II, 9, 44: *Gaudia magna feram.*

33 Alcuin, *Versus ad Paulinum*, XX, 40 (p. 241):

Qua memor esto tui nati, te posco per illum;

pater optime] Alcuin, CII, 14 (p. 329) and in letter to Hadrian of 794, *M. G. H., Epistolae*, IV, 27, p. 68, 15.

35 Alcuin, XX, 41 (p. 241):

Ut tibi cum sanctis tribuat caelestia regna;

also X, 19 (p. 236); LXII, 4 (p. 275); v. 994, p. 191; cf. Ovid, *Ex Ponto*, IV, 8, 59: *caelestia regna*; *C. L. E.*, 671, 3:

confessus Christum caelestia regna petisti;

cf. *C. L. E.*, 1400, 1 (Rome).

36 Alcuin, *Epit. Monachi Pauli Turonensis*, CXIII, 9-10 (p. 344):

Auxiliare piis, te precor, et precibus;

also LI, 6, 7 (p. 264), CIX, 16, 1 (p. 338), L, 36 (p. 263), II, 34, 82 (p. 220), IX, 178 (p. 233).

37 Alcuin, XCV, 7 (p. 320):

Sol rutilans radiis domibus splendescit in altis;

Alcuin's source is Iuvenecus, *Evang. Libri Quattuor*, IV, 149-51, 158:

Abcondet furvis rutilos umbris radios sol,

Amittet cursum lunaris gratia lucis

Ignicomaeque ruent stellae caelumque relinquent;

. . . . ab axe;

Iuvenecus, III, 1:

Fuderat in terras roseum iubar ignicomus sol.

38 Alcuin, *Ad Leonem apostolicum urbis Romae*, XLIII, 11-12 (p. 255):

Ut laus et merces maneat tibi, sancte sacerdos,

Tempore perpetuo pacis in orbe sacro;

XXI, 33 (p. 243):

Sic tua laus crescit, merces sic magna manebit

Pastori summo sedis apostolicae;

IV, 19 (p. 221):

Dic: *Tua laus mecum semper, dilecte, manebit*;
Since Alcuin connects *sol* (v. 37) and *laus* (v. 38), it seems that he imitates Fortunatus, *Ad Justinum et Sophiam Augustos* (p. 276, 47):

Haec tua laus, princeps, cum sole cucurrit in orbe;
Hrabanus Maurus, *M. G. H., Poetae*, II, p. 161, no. III, 17, addressing Pope Gregory IV (827-844), seems to copy Alcuin:

Ut tua laus maneat, merces et gloria semper.

- 40 Bernhard Simson, *Jahrbücher des Fränkischen Reiches unter Karl dem Grossen*, II (Leipzig, 1883), p. 108, note 2, assumes that VIII Kal. Ian. is the correct date.

The numerous parallels in Hadrian's epitaph with the phraseology and the diction in Alcuin's metrical inscriptions and in his occasional poetry which we adduce in the notes of the commentary provide, as we hope, ample evidence that Alcuin is indeed the author of the inscription whose unity of composition and spontaneity of expression cannot be the work of a versifier who imitated the style of Alcuin's poetry.

Alcuin's interpretations of death, immortality, and resurrection pose a problem.¹⁸ Death is pictured as the separation of body and soul by which another life (16) better than the earthly is introduced; death therefore does not cause harm to man (15). The body is held in the tomb (21), while the soul makes for the stars (10), *spiritus astra petit* (see below), joining with the Saints (28). He believes in the immortality of the soul, and the disintegration of the body in dust, as may also be deduced from his own epitaph, where the traveler (*viator*) is asked (CXXIII, 9-10, p. 350):

*Quapropter potius animam curare memento
Quam carnem, quoniam haec manet, illa perit.*

References in Hadrian's and Alcuin's epitaphs reveal their author's belief in an immortal soul freed of its body. "The soul returns to the judgment of Him who gave it," Alcuin wrote to his friend Arno of Salzburg;¹⁹ "I tremble with terror at the

¹⁸ On the contents of epitaphs see now Richmond Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (*Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, XXVIII, nos. 1-2 [Urbana, 1942]), pp. 301-40; especially pp. 309-11, on heretical concepts in Christian inscriptions.

¹⁹ Alcuin, *Epistle*, 239, p. 384, 29-33 (*M. G. H., Epistolae*, IV, ed. Ernst Dümmler): *Spiritus revertatur ad iudicium illius qui dedit eum.*

thought of Judgment Day . . . lest He finds me unprepared." His vision of an incorporeally immortal soul is a remnant of ancient Greek thought that is contrary to the orthodox Christian point of view of a corporeal resurrection of the flesh from the dust of the grave. But the heretical concept is also found in other epitaphs of the early Middle Ages. Both concepts of resurrection appear in a rather incongruous fashion simultaneously in Alcuin's epitaph written by himself shortly before 804. Not only the resurrection of the soul (see above), but also the resurrection of the body is mentioned in the same epitaph (CXXIII, 21, p. 350):

Qui iaces in tumulo, terrae de pulvere surge.

The idea of the harmlessness of death (15) and the belief in the immortality of the soul determine Alcuin's expression of consolation in Hadrian's epitaph. They make it rather futile to deplore the loss of the departed; instead the *consolatio* is directed toward the living. This results in the panegyric and didactic praise of the virtues of Hadrian (3-6, 11-12), and the laudatory description of his achievements (7-9, 13-14). The inscription appears accordingly as a biographical *encomium* whose climax in the concluding *laudatio*²⁰ of v. 38,

LAVS TVA SANCTE PATER SEMPER IN ORBE MANET,

is inspired by Virgil's famous phrase (*Ecl.*, V, 78 = *Aen.*, I, 609):

Semper honos nomenque tuum laudesque manebunt,

a verse which is literally quoted by Alcuin in the epic poem on his native York (v. 1595, p. 205).

The extremely literary character of Hadrian's epitaph is obvious from the use made of Roman and Christian literary

Huius vero iudicii terrore totus contremesco . . . ne me minus paratum dies illa per omnia inveniat.

²⁰ On the classical *laudatio* see Marcel Durry, "Laudatio funebris et Rhétorique," *Revue de Philologie*, LXVIII (1942), pp. 105-14; cf. Konrat Ziegler, "Panegyrikos," *R.-E.*, XVIII, 1 (1949), cols. 559-81; on *consolatio* see Skutsch in *R.-E.*, IV, cols. 933 ff.; thus far, the literary genres in medieval epitaphs and in the panegyric Latin poetry from Fortunatus to Alcuin have not been investigated; they continue frequently the corresponding classical traditions.

sources. The influence of Porfyrius (1), Iuencus (37), and Prudentius (14), is surpassed by that of Fortunatus²¹ (4, 5-6, 11, 14, 31-33), a favorite author of Alcuin. There are a few quotations and possible traces of Virgil and Ovid. A faint echo of the *Fourth Eclogue*²² (29), for the Middle Ages the messianic eclogue which foretold the birth of Christ and the return of Saturn's golden age of peace, seems to be contained in verse 29 in connection with the belief in the resurrection.

Formulae of medieval epigraphy are the traditional HIC . . . REQUIE[SCIT] (1-2), PROMPTVS IN OMNE BONVM (4), PAVPERIBVS LARGVS (11), NVLLI PIETATE SECVNDVS (11); literary *topoi* are the obligation to top noble birth by a nobler life (5-6), the harmlessness of death (15) as the portal leading to a better life (16), and the incorporeal resurrection of the immortal soul (27-30).

A third source of Alcuin seems to be a *sylloge* (or several collections) of inscriptions which furnished him with some of those locutions for which parallels from Carolingian epitaphs, prior and posterior to Hadrian's, are adduced in our commentary (4, 11, 15, 20). Wilhelm Levison²³ has already called attention to the use made by Alcuin of the *Sylloge Cantabrigiensis*,²⁴ a collection of papal epitaphs and inscriptions. Alcuin was, in all probability, also familiar with the *Sylloge of Tours* (cf. 11). The use of the locution *iustitiae cultor*, for instance, which occurs in Roman and Christian inscriptions, becomes understandable if we assume Alcuin's possible familiarity with some *sylloge*. Compare the following examples: Alcuin, *Inscriptio in Monasterio Nobiliacensi*, XCIX, 22, 3-4 (p. 327):

*Iustitiae cultor, vitae melioris amator,
Providus ingenio, cautus in eloquio;*

²¹ On Alcuin's use see D. Tardi, *Fortunatus* (Paris, 1927), p. 277; Max Manitius in *M. G. H., Auctores Antiquissimi*, IV, 2, pp. 137-8.

²² Karl Strecker, "Iam nova progenies caelo demittitur," *Studi Medievali*, V (1932), pp. 167-86.

²³ *England and the Continent in the Eighth Century* (Oxford, 1946), p. 162, note 2.

²⁴ Edited by Wilhelm Levison, "Englische Handschriften des Liber Pontificalis," *Neues Archiv*, XXXV (1910), pp. 350-66. Angelo Silvagni, "La Silloge Epigrafica di Cambridge," *Rivista di Archeologia Cristiana*, XX (1943), pp. 49-112.

Versus ad Leonem Papam, XV, 5-6 (p. 238):

Iustitiae cultor, verae et pietatis amator,
Pauperibus largus, clarus honore pio;

Versus ad Paulinum (of Aquileia), XVII, 15 (p. 239):

Iustitiae cultor, sacrae pietatis amator;

Versus ad Leonem Apostolicum, XLIII, 5 (p. 254):

Iustitiae cultor, sancte et pietatis amator,²⁵
Firmus in officiis, verus in eloquiis;

In the Poem on York, v. 138 (p. 172):

Qui fuit ore simul verax et pectore prudens,
Iustitiae cultor, verus pietatis amator.

The last verse is identical with the third in a poem by Alcuin's teacher Aelbert or Koaena of York attached to a letter addressed to Lullus of Mayence.²⁶

The unknown Carolingian author²⁷ of the epic poem *Karolus Magnus et Leo Papa*²⁸ says of his hero:

Iustitiae cultor, cultores diligit omnes.

The original source of *iustitiae cultor* is Lucan, *Pharsalia* II, 389:

Iustitiae cultor, rigidi servator honesti,

a passage frequently referred to in Roman and Christian epitaphs. It appears in the *Sylloge of Tours* (Diehl 1195, 9-10):

Iustitiae cultor, vitae servator honestae,
Pauperibus dives, sed sibi pauper erat.

Occasionally, the passage from Lucan is connected with Martial, IX, 84, 4:

ille tuae cultor notus amicitiae,

²⁵ *Pietatis amator* is often used as *Verschluss*, also by Paul the Deacon, *M. G. H., Poetae*, I, p. 68, no. XXXIV, 10; Fortunatus, III, 22, 5; Dracontius, *De Deo*, III, 16; *iustitiae cultor*, see also in Diehl, 1011, 7; 1051, 6; Fortunatus, VI, 1a, 21; *Epit. Marii Episc. Aventicensis*, ed. Th. Mommsen, *M. G. H., Auct. Antt.*, XI, p. 227.

²⁶ *M. G. H., Poetae*, I, p. 201, note 1.

²⁷ D. Tardi, "Fortunat et Angilbert," *Bulletin Du Cange*, II (1925), pp. 30-38, ascribes the fragment to Angilbert; Otto Schumann, "Bernowini episcopi carmina," *Historische Vierteljahrsschrift*, XXVI (1931), p. 226, denies Angilbert's authorship.

²⁸ *M. G. H., Poetae*, I, p. 367, no. VI, 31-32.

as in the following epitaphs of two Roman senators: Diehl, 243, 7-8:

*purus amicitiae cultor, servator honesti,
eloquio miseros vel pietate iuvans;*

Diehl, 135, 11-12:

*fidus amicitiae custos, ambitor honesti,
iustitiae cultor, pacis amator eras.*

The identification of *cultor* with *amator* in the last inscription is traceable to another interpretation of the passage from Lucan with the help of Ovid, *Ars Amatoria*, I, 722:

Qui fuerat cultor, factus amator erat,

as for instance in Diehl, 1024, 3:

Cultor iustitiae, doctrine et pacis amator,

and in the examples adduced from Alcuin's poetry.

Alcuin employs *iustitiae cultor* not only for epigraphic but also for merely literary purposes. In the same way he used the epigraphic formula *spiritus astra petit* (Diehl, 990, 3), *Vita Willibrordi*, II, 28, 4 (p. 216):

Spiritus astra petit meritis vivacibus alta;

in the Poem on York, v. 739 (p. 186):

*... sub quo
Spiritus astra petit sancti terrena relinquens.*

Alcuin's method conforms to the custom followed by Carolingian writers of fashioning dedicatory verses, for instance, after the inscriptions of a sylloge. A good example is found in the *Versus Godescalci in Carolum*, *M. G. H., Poetae*, I, p. 94, no. VII, 2, 6-9:

- 6 *Praelatus multis, humili pietate superbus,*
Providus ac sapiens, studiosus in arte librorum.
- 8 *Iustitiae custos rectus verusque fidelis,*
Pauperibus largus, miseris solacia praestans.

Ernst Dümmler, the editor of these verses, overlooks the fact that vv. 6 and 9 are from the epitaph of Pope Felix IV (Diehl, 986, 3, 5) and v. 8 is from that of Boniface III (Diehl, 992, 9-10):

*Iustitiae custos, rectus patiensque benignus,
Cultus in eloquiis et pietate placens.*

The same verses are inserted in an epitaph by Alcuin's pupil Hrabanus Maurus, *M.H.G., Poetae*, II, 237, 7-8:

*Iustitiae custos, rectus patiensque benignus,
Fidus in eloquiis et pietate placens.*

A future study of the epitaphs and the other metrical inscriptions collected in the four volumes of the *Poetae Latini Aevi Carolini* will not only reveal the survival of Roman and early Christian epigraphic elements in Carolingian epigraphy, but also bear out the assumption that a sylloge of model inscriptions²⁹ was often used by Carolingian writers. The use of such a literary manual for the composition of various types of inscriptions parallels that of professional handbooks³⁰ of Roman and medieval stone-cutters and engravers as an aid in the technical fabrication of lapidary and bronze inscriptions.

LUITPOLD WALLACH.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

²⁹ Karl Strecker, *M.G.H., Poetae*, IV, p. 1020, assumes for instance that Flodoard of Reims (saec. X) used such a sylloge of papal inscriptions; cf. also Scheffer-Boichorst, "Zur Kritik Flodoards von Rheims und päpstlicher Epitaphien," *M.I.O.E.G.*, VIII (1887), pp. 423-30; cf. A. Silvagni in *Diss. della Pontificia Accademia Rom. di Arch.*, II, 15 (1921), pp. 181-226; I have not seen A. Silvagni, *Monumenta epigraphica Christiana saeculo XIII antiquiora quae in Italiae finibus adhuc exstant*, I (Rome, 1938); on new discoveries cf. the report by Attilio DeGrassi, "Epigrafia Romana," in *Doxa, Rassegna Critica di Antichità Classica*, II (1949), pp. 111-19; *Iscrizioni sepolcrali-cristiane*.

³⁰ Cf. Edmond Le Blant, "Sur les graveurs des inscriptions antiques," *Revue de L'Art Chrétien*, 1859; René Cagnat, "Sur les manuels professionnels des graveurs d'inscriptions Romaines," *Revue de Philologie*, XIII (1889), pp. 51-65. See also the discussion of the problem by Ewald Lissberger, *Das Fortleben der Römischen Elegiker in den Carmina Epigraphica* (Tübingen diss., 1934), pp. 9-13.

ARISTOTLE'S ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE.

I. INTRODUCTORY.

This essay is a study of the notion of *στάσις* in the light of Aristotle's treatment of the subject in the *Politics* and in the form of an examination of the analysis made by him of that notion. It seems hardly necessary to defend at length the view that this topic is one of considerable interest and importance. Two reasons for holding the view, however, are the following. First, our historical texts make it clear that *στάσις* is a fundamental and persistent feature of Greek politics of the classical period. It follows, therefore, that we cannot expect to acquire an adequate grasp of the nature of Greek public life without first understanding the phenomenon which we call *στάσις*. Second, it appears to be the case that the meaning of the word *στάσις*, in so far as it can be at all precisely delimited, contains an element which is not adequately represented by any of the English equivalents which have been suggested. This is not so small a point as it might seem. The use of the word "revolution," as in Jowett's translation, for instance, and in most translations of Thucydides, is, I believe, thoroughly misleading. The connotation of *στάσις* is distinctly narrower than that of social and economic disintegration which has been acquired in modern times by the word "revolution." If we say that "revolution" is a correct description of the events known collectively as the French Revolution and as the Russian Revolution, I do not think we can apply the term to the kind of events referred to by the Greeks as *στάσις*, even though such events were frequently due, as Aristotle saw, to conflicts of an economic and social rather than of a purely political character.

It may be claimed, in conclusion, that, if translators have failed adequately to represent the meaning of the word, commentators have failed sufficiently to stress the importance of the notion of *στάσις* as discussed by Aristotle. The majority¹ confine

¹ E.g. F. Susemihl and R. D. Hicks, *The Politics of Aristotle* (London, 1894), pp. 56-66. E. Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier*

themselves to bare exposition of Aristotle's doctrine and leave little or no space for criticism. What comment is to be found is seldom more than an uncritical reference to the "ripe political wisdom" ² displayed by Aristotle in Book V of the *Politics*. Newman and Barker have more to say, proportionately to the size of their works. The former's commentary is, however, largely expository rather than critical, although he does note the important distinction of *στάσις* and *μεταβολαί* in the subject-matter of Book V, also the fact that the English word "revolution" does not exactly correspond to either. ³ Barker, unfortunately, does not include a discussion of the meaning of *στάσις* in his excellent introduction to the vocabulary of the *Politics*, and relegates comment on the word to a footnote. ⁴

The historical data on which Aristotle bases his treatment of the subject are sufficiently known not to require much discussion. He himself takes the greater part of his collection of case-histories of *στάσις* from events of the 4th century, but we can trace the phenomenon in our extant authorities from at least the beginning of the 6th century. Not to pursue the inquiry further, we find the word *στάσις* already used in the technical sense which we are considering in Solon ⁵ and Theognis. ⁶ The former is described as observing his city *πολλάκις στασιάζουσιν*, and the assignment to him of a law requiring all citizens to take sides in times of *στάσις* may be further evidence that this was already an established feature of Athenian politics. ⁷ Perhaps the *locus classicus* for the meaning of the word *στάσις* and for the usage of it and its derivatives is Herodotus, I, 59, 3, describing the rise to power of Pisistratus: (*Πεισίστρατος*), *στασιαζόντων τῶν παράλων*

Peripatetics (trans. by B. F. C. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead, London, 1897), ch. xiii. T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, IV, ch. xxxi. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Eng. trans., Oxford, 1934), ch. x. G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York, 1937), ch. vi.

² Susemihl, p. 60. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London, 1923), ch. viii.

³ Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford, Vols. I-II, 1887; Vols. III-IV, 1902), I, p. 522.

⁴ E. Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford, 1946), p. 204 n.

⁵ 4, 19 (J. M. Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus* [Loeb Class. Lib., 1931]).

⁶ 43-52, 781.

⁷ Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 8, 4.

καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου Ἀθηναίων, . . . καταφρονήσας τὴν τυραννίδα ἤγειρε τρίτην στάσιν, συλλέξας δὲ στασιώτας, . . . μηχανᾶται τοιάδε. We shall have later to consider the evidence of 6th century history in deciding to what extent it is permissible to analyse the notion of *στάσις* in economic terms. The passage of Herodotus just quoted, however, is also interesting as illustrating a causal connection which, I believe, can be shown to hold between an element in the meaning of *στάσις* which is lost in renderings like "revolution" and "sedition" and what may be called a characteristic method of classical Greek politics. This method is one by no means invariably, but with considerable regularity employed, and its principal features are a greater or less recourse to force or fraud, and a greater or less degree of "unconstitutional" behaviour. It is outside the scope of this essay to consider whether there is any sense in which the concept of "parties" can be successfully applied to Greek city-states, but in so far as it will be conceded that nothing existed approximating to the modern conception of a political party, the prevalence and distinctive character of *στάσις* may be explained as arising from the fact that, if an influential or an organized "opposition" group does come into being, its aim cannot be, as it often is under a modern party-system, merely to substitute its policy for that of the group in power: it must be to capture power and, wholly or partially, modify the constitution.⁸ This latter point requires more emphasis than it has previously received. It is probable that the notion of "constitution," at any rate in its modern usage, is no more applicable to the majority of Greek city-states than that of "party." We are inclined to think of a constitution as sovereign and immutable, set up above the tendencies of a particular government or piece of legislation—"all the rules which govern the government." But Aristotle, although he has a glimpse of the ideal of the "Rule of Law," sees that the goodness or badness of laws varies of necessity with the constitutions of states, and that constitutions are governed by and do not govern the group in power.⁹

⁸ For exs. cf. the rise to power of Cleisthenes and the "revolution" of the Four Hundred at Athens. The former needed to acquire influential support (Herodotus, V, 66, 2). The oligarchical "clubs" were evidently highly organized.

⁹ III, 1282 b 1-15 (references to the text of the *Politics* are given

It is no doubt the flexibility and mutability of the *πολιτεία* in Greek cities which account for the interest taken by Plato, Aristotle, and others in the classification of constitutions and for the pains which Aristotle takes in elaborating in detail the varieties of each form.

II.

The principal criticism of the analysis of *στάσις* in the *Politics* to be made in this essay is that Aristotle exaggerates the importance of exhaustiveness of treatment at the expense of lucidity, and that in consequence he obscures the distinction between the different types of phenomena which are his subject-matter, frequently confuses symptom and cause, and fails to make sufficiently precise his evaluation of the various factors involved in *στάσις*. In the first place, it is important not to confuse *στάσις* with *μεταβολή πολιτείας*. It has been suggested that it is difficult to change the constitution through any medium but that of *στάσις*, but it is not necessarily impossible to achieve a change by other means.¹⁰ Instances might be taken from early Greek history of the employment of a *νομοθέτης* who devised a new constitution with "general consent,"¹¹ although it should be noted that the legislation of Solon at Athens, for instance, was followed immediately by a further period of *στάσις*.¹² Similarly *στάσις* may occur completely divorced from the desire for *μεταβολή*. Thus Thucydides says of the *στάσις* at Corcyra that "the members of the factions had not in view the blessings derivable from established institutions, but were formed by ambition for their overthrow."¹³ Possibly *μεταβολή* is a more comprehensive term than *στάσις*: we may suggest tentatively the following distinction. *μεταβολή* describes a completed act, the establishment or revision of a constitution: *στάσις* describes a

in the traditional order of the books or in the pages of Bekker's first edition). Plato has the same idea in suggesting that "the worst of all enemies to the whole state" is he who enslaves the laws . . . and makes the State subject to a faction (*Laos*, 856 B; cf. also Aristotle, *Politics*, III, 10, 5).

¹⁰ V, 3, 8.

¹¹ See II, 12.

¹² Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 13, 3.

¹³ III, 82.

situation, the essential feature of which is the use of violence or "illegal" behaviour by two or more groups.¹⁴

We wish, therefore, to discover the nature of this characteristic situation. It is perhaps unwise to speak of seeking the cause of *στάσις* rather than of discovering some fundamental conflict or conflicts of which everything that is properly described as *στάσις* is a manifestation. Aristotle does not use the word *αἷτια*, but distinguishes three factors:¹⁵ (1) psychological motive or principle; (2) concrete objectives; (3) *ἀρχαί*. We may consider briefly each of these. Aristotle makes the generalization (1) that *στάσις* is everywhere due to inequality.¹⁶ Not all, however, are prompted by a desire for literal equality, but they seek a share in the *πολιτεία* compatible with their due *κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν*.¹⁷ Thus oligarchs will not in fact be content with equality, but demand superiority for the few. This aspiration is probably misrepresented if thought of as the desire for *ισότης* as an abstract principle and in fact is closely bound up with (2), the concrete objectives of *στάσις*, namely political privilege (*τιμή*) and profit (*κέρδος*). That the latter is used in a comparatively narrow sense to refer to profit accruing directly from the holding of office is suggested by the statement in a later chapter that "the most important precaution in every type of state" is that office be not made profitable.¹⁸ If this interpretation of *κέρδος* is correct, the objectives at any rate of *στάσις*, or some of them, appear to be of a purely political character. We come now to (3) the *ἀρχαί*. Newman remarks that "Aristotle perhaps rates

¹⁴ The word "illegal" is apostrophized in view of what has been said about the connotation of *πολιτεία* as contrasted with that of "constitution." In Aristotle's view, a *πολιτεία* may be said to be "illegal" in the same sense in which a group of revolutionaries are thought to act illegally. See IV, 4, 1292 a 4-20; 5, 1292 b 5; cf. the comment on Theramenes in *Ath. Pol.*, 28, 5.

¹⁵ V, 2, 1.

¹⁶ V, 1, 11.

¹⁷ V, 1, 5.

¹⁸ V, 8, 15. Barker's note (p. 230) that Aristotle here anticipates Marx in saying that political power tends to be used to secure economic advantage surely confuses some such observation as this with the far more important Marxian doctrine that political power is itself a manifestation of economic advantage (e.g. *Communist Manifesto*, 1948 ed., p. 128).

rather too highly the share of these 'occasions' in causing constitutional change." This is not an entirely justified criticism, since Aristotle does see that, if the issues of *στάσις* are great, the occasions of it are small.¹⁹ A juster objection is that he does not discriminate between the occasions with which he deals, although in fact they are of very varying importance. The eleven *ἀρχαί* enumerated by him in *Politics*, V, 2 are adequately grouped by Newman under three heads:²⁰

- (α) Some emotional state of the minds of the citizens, e.g. resentment of the political power and profits of others, fear or contempt of rulers²¹ (*ὑβρις*, which is especially a source of dissension in monarchies,²² is presumably an emotional state of the ruler).
- (β) Social causes. The most important of these is in fact a deep-rooted economic cause of *στάσις*, namely the disproportionate increase in size or power of one class in the state. In view of the charge made against Aristotle and other ancient political theorists that they ignore economic forces, it is important to notice the statement that disproportionate increase occurs "sometimes also *διὰ τύχας*, as due to wars, or to an increase in the prosperity of a state."²³ It is clearly not the case that Aristotle fails to recognize such forces, but simply that he uses unfamiliar language in designating them. It is perfectly plain, moreover, how it is that a modification of the *πολιτεία* resulting from a rapid alteration of the value of currency seems to be the work of "chance" when contrasted with production of the same modification as a result of the struggle of the underprivileged.
- (γ) Negligence on the part of the authorities of the State, etc., e.g. *ὀλιγωρία*²⁴ and *μικρότης* (possibly *ὑβρις* would be thus classified by Newman).²⁵

Consideration of these *ἀρχαί* leaves the conviction that the kind

¹⁹ V, 4, 1.

²⁰ IV, p. 275.

²¹ See the view of Ephorus that *διχοστασία* arises *διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ τρυφὴν* which cause *φθόνος*, *ὑβρις*, and *μίσος* (*F. H. G.*, I, 249, fr. 64); cf. also Thucydides, III, 82, 16.

²² V, 10, 13.

²³ V, 3, 7.

²⁴ V, 2, 4. Barker translates "neglect of duty." Cf. *Decret. ap. Dem.*, 18, 74.

²⁵ Cf. V, 11, 23.

of incitements to *στάσις* classed under heads (α) and (γ) at any rate might, as Newman suggests, be eliminated with the aid of the precautions proposed by Aristotle in V, 8-9 without really eradicating the basic conflict or conflicts which constitute *στάσις*.

III.

The remark that "the occasions of *στάσις* are small, but the issues are great" has already been mentioned. We have now to inquire what are the "great issues." It has been suggested that in part *στάσις* is a political procedure resulting from the absence in Greek city-states of anything approximating to the modern party-government system: we have also seen that, in Aristotle's view, the rewards to be gained from *στάσις* are of a political nature. Nevertheless a plausible case has been made out for holding that the underlying conflict is in fact an economic one and that the phenomenon *στάσις* should be analysed in terms of an economic and social class-struggle. It is further held that Aristotle himself saw the necessity of an analysis of this kind. Professor Lerner, for instance, says: "Aristotle was interested in the rise and fall of political systems, but he did not make the mistake of tracing that rise and fall to autonomous factors within politics. His view on the economic basis of revolutions had to be rediscovered by later thinkers—by Harrington, Sir Thomas More, James Madison, Karl Marx."²⁶ What is there to support this view?

The most relevant piece of evidence from Book V is the assertion that every division tends to produce *διάστασις* and the most fundamental *διάστασις* is that of *ἀρετή* and *μοχθηρία*, the next that of wealth and poverty.²⁷ This statement, if it is representative of Aristotle's opinion, indicates that he conceived *στάσις* to be a complex phenomenon, comprising, first, certain distinctively moral or political issues, and, secondly, a social and economic struggle. I propose to consider first some evidence for the economic element in *στάσις*. It is not necessary to dilate on certain historical examples. The fact that the *στάσις* with which Solon,

²⁶ *Aristotle's Politics*, translated by Benjamin Jowett, with an Introduction by Max Lerner (New York, The Modern Library, 1943), p. 24.

²⁷ V, 3, 16.

for instance, was confronted was derived from predominantly economic causes is generally recognized.²⁸ The connection, again, between the rise of tyrannies in the 6th and 7th centuries B. C. and the introduction of coinage with the consequent increase in financial power has been sufficiently heavily stressed already²⁹ not to require further elaboration. That the influence on the political association of the property system was appreciated by Solon and others *τῶν πάλαι* is observed by Aristotle, who notes regulations laid down by *νομοθέται* (i) prohibiting possession of more than a fixed maximum of land, (ii) prohibiting sale of property, (iii) enforcing preservation of original lots.³⁰ The chapter which Aristotle devotes to criticism of the scheme proposed by Phaleas of Chalcedon contains other information of the utmost value. Some theorists, he tells us, adopted in its entirety an analysis of *στάσις* in terms of economic class-struggle: "all *στάσις* is about the regulation of property."³¹ The implication is that Aristotle does not regard this as the sole cause, and this is made explicit in his detailed criticism of Phaleas' "socialistic" recommendation that property in land should be equalized. In the first place, "it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equalized, and this is impossible, unless a sufficient education is provided."³² This is to modify the economic interpretation of the causes of *στάσις* by reference to what may for convenience be called the *ἀρετή—μοχθηρία* analysis. In criticising the community of property advocated for the Guardians in the *Republic*, Aristotle makes still plainer his rejection of anything like a thoroughgoing economic interpretation. Of all the evils attributed to the possession of private property, he says, none in fact occurs *διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν*.³³ Secondly, Aristotle thinks, although equalization of property is part of the remedy for *στάσις*, it is not a very large part.³⁴ Once again the economic element is relegated

²⁸ Cf. Solon, *ap. Ath. Pol.*, 12, 1.

²⁹ By esp. P. N. Ure, *The Origin of Tyranny* (Cambridge, 1922), *passim*.

³⁰ II, 7, 6.

³¹ II, 7, 2.

³² II, 7, 8.

³³ II, 5, 1263 b 23; cf. Plato, *Rep.*, 416C5 ff., 422A ff., 464C5.

³⁴ II, 7, 18.

to second place. "For," he continues, "the nobles³⁵ would resent this arrangement since they think that they are entitled to more than an equal share."³⁶ Again "the *πονηρία* of mankind is insatiable."³⁷ It is to be noted that Aristotle totally fails to remark the possibility that, if the radical proposals of Phaleas were to be implemented, the term "noble" might become obsolete. This fact in turn raises the question, strictly outside the subject-matter of this essay, to what extent Greek writers thought of the aristocracies which developed in the 7th and 6th centuries as resting on economic power.³⁸ In this connection Aristotle provides a definition of the term *εὐγένεια* which is interesting because it is given in terms of the same combination of ideas as that we are examining in his analysis of *στάσις*. It is, he says, *ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή*.³⁹ Are we to suppose that, in the event of a scheme like that of Phaleas being practicable, a stratified society could still be made possible by means of the application of the criterion of *ἀρετή*? Phaleas, it is true, prescribed equality of land only, but Aristotle's comment shows that he can envisage the extension of the principle to slaves, cattle, and money.⁴⁰

On the other hand it may be argued that the analysis of *στάσις* in terms of economic class-struggle is vindicated by Aristotle's view as to the essential characteristics of oligarchy and democracy respectively and as to what distinguishes them. And this argument does carry much weight: Aristotle states categorically that "the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy."⁴¹ This unmixed economic interpretation, however, is, I believe, mislead-

³⁵ *οἱ χαριέντες*. The translation is Jowett's.

³⁶ Cf. V, 1, 1301 a32.

³⁷ II, 7, 19.

³⁸ It is suggested that where "rich" and "noble" are distinguished, the distinction is in fact one of two forms of wealth, money and land. Solon's revised constitution perhaps recognised "wealth" in the narrower sense as the basis of political privilege. *Ath. Pol.*, 7, 2.

³⁹ IV, 8, 9, 1294a22.

⁴⁰ II, 7, 21.

⁴¹ III, 8, 7.

ing, particularly in the light of the connotation which Aristotle attaches to the word "democracy." We are accustomed to mean by "the class-struggle theory" the theory according to which there is a struggle between two classes, one of which is animated by the desire to achieve a form of society in which classes, or at any rate the existing class-division, will have been abolished. We might, to be more precise, say that those who hold this theory to be a valid account of "the facts" believe that one possible solution of the struggle which it describes is the achievement of a society of this form. To some of those who maintain the theory it seems possible that a society of the form envisaged might be achieved by means of the equalization of either all or some kinds of possession. It further seems possible that some such society as this might, in the current usage of the word, properly be described as a democracy. This way of thinking, however, is alien to that of Aristotle. In Greek political thought, equality of some kind—perhaps the notion of "equality before the law"⁴²—had come to seem characteristic of democracy, but not equality in the sense of abolition of economic distinctions. γῆς ἀναδασμός was the slogan of tyrants,⁴³ not the practice of democracies. Solon, who was recognized as the founder of the πάτριος δημοκρατία,⁴⁴ had expressly refused to countenance any scheme for land distribution in Attica. It was not his pleasure that πειράς χθόνος | πατρίδος κακοῖσιν ἐσθλοὺς ἰσομοίριαν ἔχειν.⁴⁵ In the light of this tradition⁴⁶ concerning the conception of "democracy" the statement made by Aristotle does not appear as paradoxical as at first sight, namely that a democracy cannot exist anymore than an oligarchy unless it preserves the division of εὐποροὶ and πλῆθος. If equality of property is introduced, there is at once "some different form of πολιτεία."⁴⁷ Barker well points out that "democracy, in Aristotle's sense of the word, is the government

⁴² Herodotus, III, 80, 6; cf. 142, 3. Thucydides, IV, 78, 3. On the significance of Solon's establishment of the Heliæa, see II, 12, 1274 a2. On the *ισότης* of democracy, Plato, *Rep.*, 558 C 4.

⁴³ Plato, *Rep.*, VIII, 566 A 1.

⁴⁴ II, 12, 1273 b37; cf. *Ath. Pol.*, 6, 1.

⁴⁵ *Ath. Pol.*, 12, 1.

⁴⁶ The striking similarity of political outlook of Solon (as portrayed in the fragments) and Aristotle is noticed below.

⁴⁷ V, 9, 9.

of one of the social sections, as oligarchy is that of another. If all social sections disappear, both of these forms of government will also disappear.”⁴⁸ The same belief, that democracy must preserve the framework of class distinction, is expressed in the exhortation to “spare the rich,”⁴⁹ by refraining, for instance, from making confiscations or from imposing superfluous and wasteful *λειτουργίαι*.

We may sum up this discussion by saying that Aristotle's analysis of *στάσις* may well be less correct than that suggested by Phaleas and others, that the conflict underlying *στάσις* is unquestionably an economic conflict to some considerable extent in the sense that it is one of classes mutually antagonized by the possession of divergent economic interests and that it arises from the structure of property-relations peculiar to the Greek *πόλις*, but that to apply to the phenomenon *στάσις* certain modern theories about the nature of social conflicts or, in particular, to identify it with “the class-struggle” in the Marxian usage of that term, is, for reasons which have been suggested, unwise. The idea of a radical redirection of the economic basis of society was conceivable to Plato, Phaleas, and perhaps other theorists, but was discounted in practice. Aristotle was able to imagine a *πολιτεία* in which the experiment of *ισομοιρία* was made: but such a State fits none of the recognised categories.⁵⁰ In practice what the groups of *στασιῶται*, whether oligarchs or democrats, organize themselves to obtain is concrete *τιμὴ* and *κέρδος*,⁵¹ dignified by the name of “justice.”⁵² Thucydides has a case which almost exactly fits this specification: “Corcyra gave the first example of . . . the reprisals exacted by the governed who had never experienced equitable treatment, . . . of the iniquitous resolves of those who desired to get rid of their accustomed poverty.”⁵³

⁴⁸ P. 232, n. 3.

⁴⁹ V, 8, 20. For evidence that this advice was not in practice considered sound see pseudo-Xenophon, *Ath. Pol.*, I, 4, etc.

⁵⁰ V, 9, 1309 b 40.

⁵¹ V, 3, 1.

⁵² III, 9, 1.

⁵³ III, 84, 1.

IV.

We come now to the second part or aspect of Aristotle's analysis of *στάσις*. We saw that there is reason to believe that Aristotle held that there was more than one, and more than one kind of conflict underlying the phenomenon, and that in fact what he called the primary *διάστασις* was that of *ἀρετή* and *μοχθηρία*.⁵⁴ Judgment of political phenomena in normative terms is peculiarly difficult to criticise. It is easy to see, for instance, that what I have called Aristotle's *ἀρετή—μοχθηρία* analysis might well be superimposed on a thoroughgoing economic interpretation of *στάσις* without modifying the latter by the addition of any description of fact. Before considering this analysis, however, I wish briefly to refer to the use by some early Greek writers of normative ethical words in a meaning which is held to be descriptive and non-ethical. Thus *ἀγαθός*, *ἐσθλός* (*ἐσλός*) clearly often mean "belonging to the party approved by me," *κακός* often "belonging to the party of which I disapprove." There is, moreover, a more than incidental connection between *ἀγαθοί* and wealth, and between *κακοί* and poverty. Thus Alcaeus says that no poor man was ever *ἔσλος οὐδὲ τίμιος*.⁵⁵ So Theognis too says that "*χρημοσύνη* teacheth all evil"⁵⁶ and that "with the aid of wealth even a *κακός* may become an *ἐσθλός*."⁵⁷ It is interesting, moreover, in the light of Aristotle's definition of *εὐγένεια* and of the suggestion made as to the meaning of "the good" when contrasted with "the rich," to note a remark of Theognis about *ἀρετή*:

*πλήθει δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀρετὴ μία γίνεται ἥδε,
πλουτεῖν.*⁵⁸

Consideration of this usage is relevant to the subject of this essay in that it might seem to support, though it will be maintained that it does not, the view that the *ἀρετή—μοχθηρία* analysis is wholly reducible to the economic analysis as a result simply of elucidation of the meaning of terms like *ἀρετή*. One such term

⁵⁴ V, 3, 16.

⁵⁵ Fr. 81 (Edmonds).

⁵⁶ 389.

⁵⁷ 1117-18.

⁵⁸ 699; cf. Hesiod, *Op.*, 313: *πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ*.

is ὕβρις. According to Solon, ὕβρις is generated by great wealth.⁵⁹ But to argue that, where ὕβρις is alleged by Aristotle to be the ἀρχή or occasion of στάσις,⁶⁰ it is correct to speak of its cause as being an economic one, is, I think, plainly mistaken. Here Aristotle's usage appears to have diverged from the earlier one.

But, with regard to the fundamental analysis of στάσις, comparison of Solon with Aristotle shows a remarkable similarity of approach. Solon combines the economic and the "ethical" interpretations of στάσις in the same way as Aristotle: the latter approach, moreover, clearly limits the scope of the former and does not just add to it a normative comment. Thus, according to Aristotle, Solon attached the entire responsibility for the στάσις which he was called upon to remedy, to the rich.⁶¹ But his economic analysis is limited by ethical considerations. He did not take the view that the conflict underlying the outbreak of στάσις was in any way inherent in the economic structure of Attic society: he held simply that the ἀγαθοί had abused their position.⁶² Solon's response to the demand for γῆς ἀναδασμός, again, is dictated by precisely the beliefs which animate Aristotle's criticisms of Plato and Phaleas.⁶³

If we look in the *Politics* for a particular example to illustrate the modification of the economic by the "ethical" analysis of στάσις, the most outstanding is found to be the idea, only twice referred to in Book V but developed at length in Book IV, 11, of the importance to cities of having a strong "middle" class. This idea is not, I believe, derived by Aristotle, as it might seem to be, from the economic analysis. That it belongs to the economic analysis is suggested by the statements that "where there is a strong middle class, there least of all are στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις,"⁶⁴ and that στάσις arises when the two classes, οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος, are equally balanced and there is no middle class.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ Cf. *Ath. Pol.*, 12, 2.

⁶⁰ E. g. V, 2, 4; V, 10, 13.

⁶¹ *Ath. Pol.*, 5, 3.

⁶² *Ibid.*, e. g. ἐν μετρίοις τίθεσθε μέγα νόον.

⁶³ It is possible that Aristotle in the *Ath. Pol.* projected on to Solon certain views which he felt he should have held. But the evidence of the extant fragments seems sufficient to refute this.

⁶⁴ IV, 11, 12.

⁶⁵ V, 4, 11.

Possibly attention to the economic structure of the πόλις might by itself have persuaded Aristotle that the remedy for στάσις lay in the balance which might be secured by the development of a middle class in Greek states, but it seems much more probable that considerations of this kind only reinforced what in fact was primarily the application to politics of the ethical doctrine of the desirability of achieving the Mean. The question is, moreover, decided by Aristotle's explicit reference to the doctrine of the Mean: "If what was said in the *Ethics*⁶⁶ is true, that the happy life is the life according to virtue without impediment, and that virtue is a mean, then the life which is in a mean must be the best."⁶⁷ And, he continues, since it is agreed that τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ μέσον is the best, it is clear that as regards the possession of goods also the mean is the best state: for in that state it is easiest to obey rational principle.⁶⁸ It must be obvious that Aristotle has here quite deserted his empirical method and that, to justify his assertion that the provision of a strong middle class is an important precaution against στάσις, he is resorting to a psychological argument, namely the argument derived from the analogy of state and soul which Plato employs in the *Republic*.⁶⁹ This conclusion is confirmed by Aristotle's assertion that a μέση πολιτεία is not only a provision against στάσις but is less likely than a state in which some possess much and others nothing to give rise to either extreme democracy, or pure oligarchy, or tyranny.⁷⁰ It is, finally, perhaps an argument in favour of the view that Aristotle is here more concerned with ethical doctrine than with economic analysis that he speaks indifferently of the Mean πολιτεία as being one in which the middle class is large⁷¹ and as one in which (all) the citizens have "a moderate and sufficient property,"⁷² although it is

⁶⁶ E. g. *Eth. N.*, I, 1098 a 16; VII, 1153 b 10; X, 1177 a 12.

⁶⁷ IV, 11, 3.

⁶⁸ IV, 11, 5.

⁶⁹ Plato, *Rep.*, VIII, 544 D 6.

⁷⁰ IV, 11, 11.

⁷¹ IV, 11, 1296 a 8.

⁷² IV, 11, 1295 b 40; cf. V, 8, 14 where Aristotle gives the obscure injunction ἡ συμμιγνύναι τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλεῖθος καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ τὸ μέσον αὔξειν. See Newman, IV, p. 276.

obvious that these two conceptions, if put into effect, would produce two very different types of society.⁷³

V. CONCLUSIONS.

The results of this examination of the notion of *στάσις* are as follows. First, as to Aristotle's treatment of the subject: it is important, for the understanding of *στάσις*, to distinguish it from the notion of *μεταβολή πολιτείας*. Aristotle treats both these subjects together in the *Politics*, not unnaturally, since they are intimately connected. It is possible, however, that he could have distinguished the two more clearly than he does in a number of contexts. A more serious charge with regard to his treatment of *στάσις* is that Aristotle does not make at all plain the distinction between the "occasion" of the phenomenon and what I have called the underlying conflict. The implication, that he does not in his own mind always distinguish the two correctly, seems a justifiable one. It must not, on the other hand, be forgotten that Aristotle has the merit of being the first thinker, as far as our knowledge goes, to undertake anything approaching a scientific analysis of this important and peculiar feature of Greek city-state politics.

Secondly, as to rendering of the word *στάσις*. I conclude that none of the habitual English translations such as "revolution," "sedition," "class-warfare," etc., conveys adequately the full meaning of the Greek word.⁷⁴ The reason for the difficulty is the obvious one that the class of situations which constitute the meaning of the word is one with which in our public life there is nothing strictly comparable.

Finally, as to the analysis of the phenomenon *στάσις*: I suggested that, superficially, *στάσις* is a situation occurring in the public life of the greater number of the Greek city-states at larger or smaller intervals of time, that it results from the col-

⁷³ *The Mean*; it is worth noticing that Solon was of "*οἱ μέσοι*" (*Ath. Pol.*, 5, 3). Cf. also the judgment of Thucydides on the "hoplite" constitution of 411 B. C. (VIII, 97).

⁷⁴ I think that "sedition," which is Barker's translation, comes nearest to doing so, as far as descriptive content is concerned, but that its emotive colouring in modern English bears little resemblance to that of *στάσις*. The Irish "troubles," in both form and matter, corresponds remarkably closely to *ἡ πολιτικὴ ταραχή*.

lision of temporarily organized groups of citizens, and that its characteristic feature is "illegality" of behaviour, which may range from minor infringements of the "constitution" to wholesale massacre of opponents. Its aims seem usually to be of a political nature, either office (*τιμή*) or profits from office (*κέρδος*) or undefined powers (*δύναμις*).⁷⁵ This use of *στάσις* as what I called a "method" in politics has, unfortunately, received comparatively scanty attention from Aristotle.

In discussing Aristotle's twofold analysis of *στάσις* in terms of the divisions of wealth and poverty on the one hand, and of *ἀρετή* and *μοχθηρία* on the other hand, I further suggested that it would be more convenient to attempt to relate the phenomenon to one or more underlying conflicts than to speak of seeking its "cause." That a fundamental conflict of economic interest was an important contributing factor in very many instances of *στάσις* seems to me absolutely certain: *στάσις* in the majority of cases is a conflict of "oligarchs" and "democrats" and Aristotle is emphatic that these groups are to be defined in terms of an economic class-division. But I think that to attempt to equate *στάσις* with the Marxian notion of the class-struggle is to make a grave misinterpretation, for three reasons: first, the terminology of the "class-struggle" hypothesis is incompatible with the fact, essential to *στάσις*, that the objective in the struggle is almost always purely political power. Second, the "class-struggle" doctrine is closely associated with the view that there may or must be achieved a society in which the distinction between economic and social classes, as at present understood, will become obsolete. No Greek of the classical period thought seriously of the possibility of such a society being achieved and not more than one or two ever regarded the existence of such a society as even in principle desirable. Finally, we have, I think, to distinguish carefully two views about the nature of *στάσις*, one that it always involves a struggle between "haves" and "have-nots," the other that it involves a struggle between "haves" and "have-nots" and that such a conflict is inherent in the economic structure of the society. I think that both these views have some claim to be described as "economic" interpretations of *στάσις*. Aristotle, however, like Solon assents only to the first

⁷⁵ Cf. *Ath. Pol.*, 13, 2; Herodotus, V, 66, 2.

or weak form of the economic interpretation. His dual analysis seems to me partly unsound, partly sound: unsound, inasmuch as it is meaningless to postulate an underlying moral conflict in the way in which it makes sense to postulate an underlying economic conflict: sound, in that not every phenomenon which may legitimately be described as *σάος* can be related to a conflict of economic interests.

MARCUS WHEELER.

ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

TITUS AND BERENICE.

The purpose of these remarks is to suggest that the romantic story of Titus and Berenice should be connected with the political history of the period A. D. 69-79, if a proper picture is to be drawn of the supporters of the régime and their mutual relations.¹

When the Flavian *putsch* was first mooted in 69, its support derived from two elements. On the one hand stood Mucianus, the "king-maker," an Eastern counterpart of Verginius Rufus. Between him and Vespasian there had been no love lost, but the reconciliation that made the rise of the Flavians possible was effected by Titus.² It should not be concluded from this that there existed any particular friendship or affinity between Mucianus and Titus, though the latter certainly turned on the conduit of his charm; it merely means that while Mucianus had small reason to back the Imperial candidature of an aging military colleague, the prospects of a personal ascendancy behind the scenes were much brighter if the old man had a robust son to perpetuate the dynasty for a good term of years.³ Titus was the corner-stone of the coalition, the promise of permanence and continuity; ⁴ indeed, perhaps the earliest scheme had been for him to ingratiate himself with, and secure his adoption by,

¹ I have gratefully to acknowledge the help and advice of Miss Jocelyn Toynbee, the Rev. M. P. Charlesworth, and Messrs. H. M. Last, H. B. Mattingly, and A. Momigliano. They are not responsible for my conclusions and conjectures.

² Tacitus, *Hist.*, II, 5.

³ Significant here is the attitude of Mucianus to another powerful member of the Flavian family, Vespasian's statesmanlike brother Flavius Sabinus. It was suspected that if the latter had survived the "Bellum Capitolinum" he and the "king-maker" would have been at loggerheads: *caedem eius laetam fuisse Muciano accepimus. ferebant plerique etiam paci consultum, dirempta aemulatione inter duos, quorum alter se fratrem imperatoris, alter consortem imperii cogitaret* (*ibid.*, III, 75).

⁴ Hence the remark put into Mucianus' mouth by Tacitus (*ibid.*, II, 77), that if he were Emperor himself he would make Titus his successor.

Galba,⁵ in which case Vespasian would have missed the purple altogether.

The second element in the Flavian party was what may be called an Oriental group, led by that powerful prefect of Egypt, the apostate Jew Ti. Julius Alexander. It owed its influence in no small measure to Julia Berenice, the sister of Agrippa II, who had for a short time been Alexander's sister-in-law.⁶ Once again, though Vespasian was interested in her money, it was Titus who provided the key to the situation. He had already been attracted by her wiles before he started on his mission to Galba;⁷ in fact her hold over him probably dates from 67, when he first led troops to Palestine to join his father,⁸ and when she and her brother embraced the Roman cause.⁹ There can be no doubt that Berenice wanted to be queen at Rome, and here were the makings of a difficult situation—would the advisers of the Emperor, and in particular Mucianus, endorse the ambitions of this "Cleopatra in little"?¹⁰

Everything depended on Titus, and he and Mucianus were destined themselves to be involved in a clash of ambitions. The effective position of Titus during his father's reign has not received enough emphasis. Not merely could he regard himself as the decisive factor in the rise of the dynasty to power,¹¹ but

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 1.

⁶ See *R.-E.*, s. v. Berenike, no. 15 (Wilcken).

⁷ Tacitus, *ibid.*, II, 2.

⁸ See *R.-E.*, s. v. Flavius, no. 207, col. 2698 (Weynand).

⁹ They turned their coats even sooner than Josephus; otherwise their position is similar to his and their connexion with him significant. It was to Titus (upon their recommendation?) that Josephus owed his reception on the Roman side (*B. J.*, IV, 628 ff.), and during his subsequent literary career at Rome under Titus' patronage he kept up a long correspondence with Agrippa (*Vita*, 364-7), who supplied him with historical information. *B. J.* is favourable to Titus, and emphasizes the Judaism of Agrippa and Berenice; but in *A. J.* Josephus turns on his protectors and hints at incest (XX, 145—a cardinal argument for the death of Agrippa by 93). See *R.-E.*, s. v. Julius, no. 54, col. 150 (Rosenberg) and Grace Macurdy in *A. J. P.*, LVI (1935), pp. 248-9, 250.

¹⁰ The phrase is Mommsen's: *Röm. Gesch.*, V², p. 540.

¹¹ He is not recorded as having made this claim explicitly, but one notes with amusement that both Mucianus and Domitian found it necessary at one time or another to put in counter-claims (Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 4; Martial, IX, 101, 15-16).

from 71 he was, in practice if not in theory, co-Emperor and more, for the addition of the sole prefecture of praetorians to his *imperium* and *tribunicia potestas* gave him a concatenation of powers without precedent or subsequent parallel: *neque ex eo destitit participem atque etiam tutorem imperii agere*.¹²

Mucianus can hardly have intended to leave his own ambitions so little elbow-room. Book IV of the *Histories* makes it abundantly clear that on arriving at Rome after its capture he behaved as *de facto* temporary head of the State, ordering executions, appointing generals, and so on.¹³ The aberrations of the Emperor's younger son were easy to curb, but against Titus he had to build his defences more subtly. One of his first achievements was to secure the escape from a menacing Senate of Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus, *amici* of Nero who had practised delation and were now assailed for it by Helvidius Priscus.¹⁴ These men had their qualities, hated though they might be. Marcellus was given an appointment calling for high administrative ability—the governorship of Asia during a period of reorganization—and Crispus a similar post in Africa,¹⁵ doubtless on the recommendation, if not actually by appointment, of Mucianus. And by 74, the dramatic date of the *Dialogus*, Crispus and Marcellus *nunc principes in Caesaris amicitia agunt feruntque cuncta*¹⁶—no small support for Mucianus, to whom they owed their place.

During 70 Vespasian returned to Rome, in a hurry, according to Zonaras.¹⁷ The Tacitean account suggests at first sight that it was Domitian's conduct about which he was worried; but the sentiments put into Titus' mouth by the historian are significant. He urges his father to be lenient with Domitian, *nam amicos tempore, fortuna, cupidinibus aliquando aut erroribus imminui, transferri, desinere: suum cuique sanguinem indiscretum*.¹⁸

¹² Suetonius, *Dip. Tit.*, 6, 1 (and see what follows).

¹³ Cf. Tacitus, *Agr.*, 7, 4: *initia principatus ac statum urbis Mucianus regebat* (a word with despotic implications). It was he who gave Agricola his legionary command in Britain.

¹⁴ Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 43-4.

¹⁵ See McElderry in *J. R. S.*, III (1913), pp. 116 ff.

¹⁶ Tacitus, *Dial.*, 8, 3.

¹⁷ Dio-Zonaras, LXVI, 9, 2a.

¹⁸ Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 51-2.

What was worrying Titus, at any rate, was not his brother but the great *amicus*. He might well be alarmed, for Vespasian, back in Rome, was surrounded by the full influence of Mucianus and his group. Whether it was they who spread the rumours about Titus' behaviour in the East one hesitates to say, for such stories were dangerous to the stability of the régime, and there is no sign that either of the parties on which the dynasty depended was disloyal to it. That rumours were current is, however, certain, not only from the account of Suetonius,¹⁹ but from the telltale frequency of the CONCORDIA-legend on the coinage from 71 to 73. And there is no doubt that Titus' actions and acquiescences gave colour to them. That he was in fact disloyal is unlikely and unproven;²⁰ but he was very certain of his position as corner-stone of the régime, and rather unwisely inclined to parade it.

Early in 71, Titus in his turn hurried home, sailing up from Rhegium to Puteoli in a commercial vessel and sacrificing his chance of a triumphal progress overland from Brundisium.²¹ He was dismayed at the possible effect of rumours on his father, and no doubt at the lordly position of Mucianus. His return to Rome restored the equilibrium; there followed the double triumph, the bestowal on him of the *tribunicia potestas*, his appointment to the praetorian prefecture and the joint censorship of 73-74. The prefecture is not adequately explained by regarding it simply as an additional safeguard for the régime; no one else ever thought such a step necessary, and there can hardly have been such an utter lack of loyal *equites* that not one was competent to hold the position. But seen as a *quid pro quo* demanded by Titus, his counter to the power of Mucianus, it becomes intelligible; and as such he was presently to employ it.

¹⁹ *Div. Tit.*, 5.

²⁰ The argument from coin-legends for a "Verfassungstreit" was refuted by Weyand, *loc. cit.* Nevertheless, Titus did allow the Asiatic mint to strike coins giving him the *praenomen imperatoris*, and he did wear the diadem in Egypt.

²¹ Josephus, *B.J.*, VII, 119 seems to imply that he did have his triumphal return. This is a case of simple contradiction between the authorities, and the account of Suetonius is to be preferred, in view of the well-known purpose of *B.J.* to parade the discipline and unity of Rome, and of the personal connexion of Josephus with Titus.

The balance, however, though restored, had not tipped in Titus' favour, for in 74 Mucianus' protégés still carry the day at Court, and their influence still prevents Titus from bringing his mistress to Rome.²² Berenice was left behind in the East in 71, an extraordinary circumstance. She must surely have expected an immediate summons to the capital, but for four years her hopes were suspended. That she came at last in 75 must reflect some significant change in the political background; it may be suggested that what opened the door to Berenice was the death of Mucianus.

The evidence for the date of this cardinal event in the reign of Vespasian is indirect. The "king-maker" was certainly alive in 74,²³ certainly dead in 77.²⁴ Mattingly, indeed, attempts to go closer; he proposes to interpret certain coin-types as showing that Mucianus was dead by 76.²⁵ Unfortunately, his case is not strong, both because some of the coins are not themselves dated with certainty, and because there is no parallel for the use of allegorical coin-types to refer to the death of an individual outside the Imperial house. The most that can be said is that there is nothing against putting Mucianus' death in 75, and that it would explain admirably how it was that in that year Berenice

²² Note that Mucianus received that highest of honours, a third consulship, in 72, and Eprius Marcellus a second in 74. On the other hand, Titus had wrested the praetorian prefecture from Arrecinus Clemens, another of Mucianus' men, Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 68; honours were clearly even. It would be interesting to know what became of Ti. Julius Alexander. He does not reappear after the Jewish war; he may of course have died, but if he did not, then in view of his prefecture of Egypt and his support of the dynasty he was due for higher honours. Was he perhaps baulked of them?

²³ Tacitus, *Dial.*, 37, 2 (sections of this work are quoted according to the Oxford text).

²⁴ Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXII, 62. The *Natural History* was published in 77.

²⁵ See the following references in Mattingly-Sydenham, *Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum*, II: (a) Eagle-on-column-base: p. lxvi; p. 101, no. 485; p. 102, nos. 487-8; pl. 17, nos. 16-18. Date 76, Asia Minor. (b) AETERNITAS with sun and moon: pp. xxxix-xl; p. 48; pl. 8, no. 9. Dated 76 by Mattingly, apparently only by analogy with (a). (c) Victory on the *cista mystica*: p. lii. Date 75. *Λ* and *Α*: p. 31, nos. 168-9; pl. 5, nos. 3-4; p. 33, nos. 173-4. *Α* (Victory on altar): p. 165; pl. 28, no. 13. In the case of (c) Mattingly is very tentative.

and her brother arrived in Rome, he to receive the *insignia praetoria*, she to live in the palace with Titus.

It is from 75 that the difficulties and confusions really begin, and the points involved will be best clarified by setting down the relevant passages.

Suetonius, *Div. Tit.*, 7 describes Titus' passion for Berenice, his unpopularity, and his eventual dismissal of her, *invitus invitam*—with the implication that she was sent away after his accession as sole Emperor. Suetonius is followed by *Ep. de Caes.*, 10, 7.

Dio-Xiphilinus, LXVI, 15, 3 ff. is a more complicated account. It dates the arrival of the princess in Rome securely to 75, and then goes on, with no further indication of date, to her period of cohabitation with Titus and her dismissal—and as a pendant to this the affair of Diogenes and Heras, the two Cynic preachers who inveighed in public against the immoral liaison, and of whom the one was consequently executed and the other scourged. καὶ ὃν χρόνον, continues Xiphilinus, καὶ ταῦτα ἐγένετο—and ταῦτα turns out to be the execution of the Celtic chieftain Julius Sabinus and his wife, who had lived in hiding for nine years after the crushing of the revolt of Civilis;²⁶ their execution must therefore be put in 79. This account is at once followed by the "conspiracy" of Marcellus and Caecina.

Ibid., 18, 1 returns to the subject of Berenice, after the accession of Titus: ὁ δὲ δὴ Τίτος . . . σόφρων, καίτοι καὶ τῆς Βερενίκης ἐς Πώμην αὐτῆς ἐλθούσης, ἐγένετο. Xiphilinus does not here say explicitly that Berenice was dismissed, but that is doubtless his implication.

The *Epitome* differs surprisingly from Aurelius Victor in its account of Titus, and is a good deal fuller. In fact it copies Suetonius, with the exception of one extraordinary remark in the middle: *Caecinam consularem adhibitum cenae, vixdum triclino egressum, ob suspicionem stupratae Berenice uxoris suae iugulari iussit.*²⁷ On the *milieu* of Caecina's death the authorities are unanimous, but the Epitomator's reason is entirely his own.

²⁶ Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 67.

²⁷ *Ep. de Caes.*, 10, 4. Appearing suddenly in the midst of a virtual paraphrase of Suetonius, this is as likely to be a guess or a catchpenny fiction as to derive from any authority, reputable or otherwise. It does,

The first thing that emerges from this evidence is that there is small justification for the usual assumption that Berenice was dismissed in the very year of her arrival. The implication of Dio-Xiphilinus is that her first dismissal was *round about* 79. It might indeed be maintained that Xiphilinus has omitted the events recorded by Dio for the years 76-78, and resumed his copying with a *καθ' ὃν χρόνον* that in the original referred to something altogether different; on the other hand the *a priori* arguments for keeping Berenice in Rome longer are strong; there was time enough for a tremendous popular scandal to develop, and Suetonius shows no awareness of any such immediate public-spiritedness on Titus' part. As for the testimony of the *Epitome*, even if it be no better than a guess, it at least shows that the Epitomator had in his mind a background in which Berenice and the Caecina-affair of 79 could be connected, and in a way that implies the presence of the princess in Rome when the "conspiracy" was uncovered.

Are we then to conclude that she was there continuously from 75 till after Vespasian's death, as Suetonius implies? This would be rather a cavalier way with Dio's *αἰθῆς*; a better solution is to suppose that she was dismissed after, and owing to, the Caecina-affair, to await the death of Vespasian as she had awaited that of Mucianus, and that she returned, and was again dismissed, upon Titus' accession, so shortly afterwards that Suetonius was either unaware of the double dismissal or saw no point in recording it. Reasons in support of this theory will be suggested in what follows, which is an attempt to reconstruct the background of 75-79 (and contains, it need hardly be said, a good deal of conjecture).

But first the alleged conspiracy of 79 must be examined. As told by Suetonius and Dio ²⁸ it is a notoriously suspicious tale. Caecina is invited to dinner and afterwards cut to pieces by Titus in his capacity as praetorian prefect and *tutor imperii*. There is then discovered about his person the manuscript of an address to the troops,²⁹ armed with which Titus is at once able to

however, indicate certain presuppositions on the part of the author; see below.

²⁸ Dio-Xiphilinus, LXVI, 16, 3 ff.; Suetonius, *Div. Tit.*, 6, 2. In what follows the two accounts, which seem to be complementary, are conflated.

²⁹ It was rash of Titus to parade his talent for forgery (Suetonius, *Div. Tit.*, 3, 2).

bring a case against Marcellus before the Senate and secure a condemnation. The traitor commits suicide; the menace to Rome has been averted by Titus' watchfulness. So runs the unlikely story, which becomes even more fantastic when one reflects upon the characters of the supposed ringleaders.³⁰ Treacherous they had indeed been in their time; but Marcellus' treachery had taken the form of delation against the opponents of the régime, and Caecina's talent was for deserting sinking ships, not those in full sail. These men were less than almost anyone the sort who make revolutionaries. There need be little hesitation in regarding the whole affair as engineered by Titus, and aimed (through Caecina, a figure of only secondary importance) at Eprius Marcellus, the inheritor of the mantle of Mucianus. Titus' prefecture had proved its value at last.³¹

The development of events, then, from 75, may be read somewhat as follows. The death of Mucianus was a radical blow to the influence of his followers, and Titus was able to summon Berenice to Rome. But the opposition, though weakened, was by no means crushed, and Berenice became a test-case, the centre of a struggle by Titus to retain her, by Marcellus and the rest to have her dismissed. That she wielded a political influence that was bound to be resented is suggested by the remark of Quintilian: *fuertunt etiam quidam suarum rerum iudices. nam et in libris observationum a Septimio editis adfuisse Ciceronem tali causae invenio, et ego pro regina Berenice apud ipsam eam dixi.*³² It is difficult to decide exactly what this passage means. The context concerns civil proceedings before a *iudex*, but it is hardly possible to suppose that a foreign princess could have been appointed as such, and *a fortiori* still more improbable that she ever presided over any sort of court at Rome. Perhaps she appeared on the scene, as Agrippina had done, on some occasion

³⁰ For their careers, see *P. I. R.*², C99; E84.

³¹ This is to reject the Epitomator's story that Caecina was killed because of his relations with Berenice; its weakness is that it provides no reason for the implication of Marcellus in Caecina's fate. One must suppose that the Epitomator was aware of some connexion between Berenice and the Caecina-affair, but that, the truth having been concealed from the beginning, he made a guess at its nature in accordance with the predilections of his age.

³² Quintilian, *Inst.*, IV, 1, 19.

when the Imperial *consilium* was dealing with a matter concerning her (the very question, even, of her retention or dismissal?), and it was known that, whether officially or not, she would have a finger in any pie she chose.³³ If this is indeed Quintilian's meaning, it is easy to see why her continued presence in Rome was so hard fought over, on political as well as moral grounds.³⁴

The opposition set about organizing public opinion against her presence in the palace; but they did not work with the same subtlety, or did not have as secure a seat in Vespasian's favour, as Mucianus, and the game soon became one of deadly danger. At this point, no doubt, the *mitis prudentia* of Vibius Crispus led him to dissociate himself from the policy of Marcellus, with whom he had till then been closely connected. The means adopted to organize overt discontent can be seen from the story of Diogenes and Heras. It can hardly have been without powerful backing that this pair managed to return from the expulsion to which all *philosophi* had been subjected and preach their sermons in the public theatre; and the shock caused to Titus by this revelation that the campaign against his mistress had reached such a pitch is evident from the care he took to prevent a recurrence: *suspectissimum quemque sibi summissis qui per theatra et castra quasi consensu ad poenam deposcerent, haud cunctanter oppressit*.³⁵

³³ P. Harris, *ined.*, published by C. H. Roberts in *J.R.S.*, XXXIX (1949), pp. 79-80, is a new fragment of the *Acts of the Pagan Martyrs*, which seems to describe proceedings before Titus and his *consilium*. Roberts suggests (p. 80, n. 3) that the Berenice-affair afforded material for this Alexandrian propaganda; it may be suspected that if more of the papyrus had survived there would appear accusations similar to those in the *Acts of Hermiscus* (*P. Oxy.*, 1242) where feminine influence backstairs and a *consilium* packed with ἀνόριοι Ἰουδαῖοι provide a lively theme. Berenice would combine both rôles admirably. Is it certain, as Roberts seems to assume, that the dramatic date of these *Acta* must be subsequent to the death of Vespasian?

³⁴ Compare the behaviour of Alice Ferrers, the mistress of Edward the Third. " 'Her dishonest malapertness increased so much' that when a cause in which she was financially interested was being heard Alice would appear in Westminster Hall and seat herself on the bench beside the judge" (Elizabeth Jenkins, *Six Criminal Women* [London, 1949], pp. 38-39).

³⁵ Suetonius, *Div. Tit.*, 6, 1. *Ep. de Caes.*, 10, 4 is even more explicit: *qui per theatra et castris invidiosa iactantes ad poenam poscerent*.

By the beginning of 79, with the Emperor perhaps showing signs of failing, the feud, linked now with the question of succession, became doubly bitter. Vespasian had always been determined that his sons should follow him, but there was clearly some pressure upon him to the contrary,³⁶ and the attempt to mobilize public resistance to the "Neronian" tendencies of Titus had not been unsuccessful. Nothing could better reveal the tenseness of the political atmosphere at Rome than Dio's account of the pitiless execution of Sabinus and his wife; courageous rebels were not usually so harshly treated at Rome.³⁷ Driven at last to extremities, Titus struck at Epruius Marcellus—and with success.

But the blow recoiled. This hasty liquidation of two eminent *amici principis*, even if there was no proof but only suspicion, had an effect on Titus' reputation like that which the "affair of the four consulars" was later to have on Hadrian's, *ut non temere quis tam adverso rumore magisque invitis omnibus transierit ad principatum*.³⁸ And so, even before his father's death, he was obliged to make a gesture of conciliation, concede the very point round which the battle had raged, and dismiss Berenice. But it may be guessed that she was intended neither to go far nor to wait long.

In June Vespasian died, and Titus' ultimate ambition was fulfilled; he was sole Emperor. But he found that absolute power was an illusion; now as always the security of a Roman Emperor depended, half indeed on personal *auctoritas*, but half on the support of a party of loyal and energetic *amici*. Titus succeeded to the purple with his *auctoritas* gravely impaired; and so, instead of being able to dispense with the services of those of his father's *amici* who had opposed him, he was dependent upon them. Suetonius says he chose *amici* who proved their worth and stayed to serve his successors; ³⁹ the evidence suggests that it would be truer to say that he had the statesmanship to retain those who had served Vespasian.⁴⁰ Thus the need to close

³⁶ Suetonius, *Div. Vesp.*, 25; Dio-Xiphilinus, LXVI, 12, 1. The discrepancy between plural and singular is not significant.

³⁷ Cf. the fate of Caratacus, Dio-Zonaras, LX, 33, 3c.

³⁸ Suetonius, *Div. Tit.*, 6, 2.

³⁹ *Div. Tit.*, 7, 2.

⁴⁰ Note especially the members of Domitian's *consilium* in Juvenal, IV, some of whom were already powerful in the Julio-Claudian period.

the ranks at the beginning of a reign, coupled with public hostility calling for appeasement, was the cause of that profusion of popular measures with which Titus' reign opened, and the amazingly rapid *volte-face* by which he won the public heart. It caused also the second rejection of Berenice, who had returned to Rome post-haste after Vespasian's death.

It is not unjustified to share the suspicions voiced by Dio,⁴¹ that Titus' beginnings were too good to be true, and that only his timely death saved Rome from disillusionment. Once more securely seated, he might well have reopened the campaign against his father's *amici*; and it can by no means be taken for granted that even Berenice's second dismissal was intended as final. Possibly only Titus' death dealt the last crushing blow to her ambitions. Of her own death nothing is recorded; she must have been a bitterly disappointed woman.

In his last hour Titus made the famous assertion that he had only once committed an act to regret; Suetonius adds that he kept his secret, and that, though there were theories, no one could easily guess the truth. Today, with so little evidence at our disposal, a guess is even more hazardous, but one could do worse than choose the judicial murder of Marcellus and Caecina, which Titus had good reason to regret, not only as a moral lapse but as a political mistake.

APPENDIX.

Against my interpretation of the Marcellus-affair one objection will at once be raised. The *Dialogus*, written, according to the view now widely accepted, in 81, during the last months of Titus' reign, has much to say about Marcellus. Would it not have been political suicide to mention him at all under Titus, if this had really been the Emperor's Heel of Achilles?

I entirely agree, and so am bound to state my view of the date of the *Dialogus*. I do not pretend to have anything new to say, or to have studied all the literature of the question; reference is always made nowadays to the full discussion in Gudeman's magnificent edition,⁴² and upon his remarks I shall base what follows.

⁴¹ Dio-Xiphilinus, LXVI, 18, 4-5.

⁴² *P. Cornelii Taciti Dialogus de Oratoribus* . . . ed. Gudeman (2nd

With stylistic criteria no time need be wasted. Leo long ago showed that in antiquity the style depended on the *genre*; Tacitus could have written the *Dialogus* at any stage. Gudeman cannot deny the truth of this, and rightly therefore dismisses the arguments from style as "völlig irrelevant."⁴³ For the rest, examination of all the pleas of Gudeman for 81 and against 96-8 leaves me with the feeling that they amount to very little. He succeeds in whittling down somewhat the solid mass of considerations that point to a post-Domitianic date, but their cumulative effect remains much more impressive than anything he can put in their place. Especially does he underestimate the arguments from the political situation—they are "rein in der Luft schwebende Vermutungen,"⁴⁴ and it is here that I must join issue with him.

Vibius Crispus is the crux of the whole matter. Gudeman's opponents argue that the *Dialogus*, containing bitter and derogatory remarks about Crispus, could not have been published till after his death—and that of the master whom he served. Crispus died about 93, Domitian in 96. Gudeman attempts to escape from this conclusion: he says first that we can never know whether Crispus read the *Dialogus*, which is beside the point, for what matters is whether an ambitious young author could have risked publishing a work that Crispus *might* read; and he adds that Crispus suffered a period of political decline under Titus and in the early years of Domitian, when it would have been possible to criticize him publicly.

For this latter assertion there is no evidence. Gudeman quotes Suetonius, *Div. Tit.*, 8, 5 and *Dom.*, 9, 3 for the general proposition that delators were *personae non gratae*, but both passages clearly refer to active delators, who attempted to lay informations before Titus and Domitian. Crispus' career in that profession was long past—he had become respectable.⁴⁵ As

ed., Berlin, 1914), *Prolegomena* ii (and additional refs. in the *Addenda*, p. 512).

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, p. 31. He dismisses them thus when used against him; he must not be allowed to use them to support him.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁴⁵ Note that he appears in a blaze of glory in Juvenal, IV, the dramatic date of which is certainly before 86, when Cornelius Fuscus

Gudeman truly remarks, we are reasonably well informed about his career; and what we are nowhere told is that he was ever under a cloud. The delators who did fall foul of Titus suffered flogging, banishment, and other hard fates; but Juvenal, who describes Crispus' Vicar-of-Bray career in his fourth Satire, is most emphatic that he never put a political foot wrong. What is certain is that for a number of years after 81 Crispus was very influential indeed; and Gudeman does not succeed, merely by suggesting that Crispus might not have known of the *Dialogus*, in avoiding the force of Helm's argument, that it is surprising that a man so hard done by in a work of Tacitus should not have taken his revenge by spoiling the young man's career in its critical stage.

I persist, therefore, in thinking that the evidence concerning Vibius Crispus is by itself decisive of a post-Domitianic date for the *publication*, at least, of the *Dialogus*. But there is another consideration. One of the threads running through the whole pamphlet is the thesis that oratory has been stifled by the principate; and in spite of an admission of Vespasian's generosity as a literary patron, the *Dialogus* makes it clear that patronage is not enough. The point is given trenchant expression, especially in 13, 4, *nec imperantibus umquam satis servi videntur nec nobis satis liberi*, a remark no less unflattering to the Emperor than to his *amici*.⁴⁶ The parallel that springs to the mind is the famous *pallor amicitiae* of Juvenal, IV, 75.⁴⁷ It was easy

was killed, and which should perhaps be connected with the Chatti war of 83; so Suetonius, *Dom.*, 9, 3 clearly does not apply to him.

⁴⁶ Equally forceful is 2, 1, which concerns the effects of parts of Maternus' *Oto* on the *potentes*; but Gudeman may be right in refusing to subsume Vespasian under them. He is indeed treated handsomely in the *Dialogus* (and elsewhere by Tacitus) and is presently called *patientissimus veri*, though this expression may refer, like Suetonius, *Div. Vesp.*, 13, to the Emperor's tolerance of freedom of speech from his *amici*. But I do not think any argument can prevent the *imperantes* from referring to Vespasian.

⁴⁷ Incidentally, *pallor* is actually mentioned (though the context is not quite the same) in 13, 5. Cf. the *pallor* of the Senators in *Agr.*, 45, 2, by contrast with the flushed face of Domitian. It might be suggested that Domitian's famous blush, which made everyone about him appear pale, may have made this *pallor*-idea a popular literary standby after his death. If so, we have a pointer to the period at which the *Dialogus* was not merely published, but written.

enough to say this kind of thing about Domitian, or any of the Flavians, when the dynasty had gone; but could it possibly have been said about Vespasian during the reign of Titus? I do not think so.

To have shown strong reasons for thinking that a post-Domitianic date is essential for the publication of the *Dialogus* is sufficient for the purpose of the present paper. There will be many who prefer to suppose that, whatever its date of publication, it was written earlier. No attempt to refute their point of view can be embarked on here—the problems of the *Dialogus* are not susceptible of easy or brief solution—but I add by way of conclusion one point which influences me, at any rate, in believing them wrong.

Assign the *Dialogus* to the Nervan-Trajanic “liberation,” when it became fashionable to speak one’s mind, at least on the subject of previous Emperors, and it can be seen as a counterpart to the *Agricola*, with a basically similar theme; good can still be worked in this age by men of good will, even Emperors, but only in spite of the principate. In this case the introduction of Marcellus as an example of successful oratory, which is something of a puzzle whatever the date of the pamphlet, since Tacitus’ readers could not fail to know that Marcellus came to a bad end, will explain itself as the clinching sarcasm of the whole thesis; after years of what Tacitus regarded as servitude as an *amicus principis*, the great statesman had at last been rash enough to pull against the current of Titus’ wishes, and had fallen in consequence. Crispus had escaped, but only because he

numquam direxit bracchia contra
torrentem.

JOHN A. CROOK.

THE UNIVERSITY, READING.

ONCE OR TWICE?

Plutarch, *Cimon*, 16, 4-17, 2, relating the revolt of the Helots against Sparta during the fourth year of Archidamus' reign, says that after a great earthquake ¹ the Helots hurriedly gathered together from all the country round about with intent to despatch the surviving Spartans. But, finding them arrayed in arms, after the signal given by Archidamus, they withdrew to the cities and waged open war persuading many of the Perioeci to do likewise, while the Messenians also joined in attacks upon the Spartans. The Lacedaemonians sent Pericleidas to Athens in quest of aid and then Cimon was sent by the Athenians with an army. Later the Lacedaemonians again invoked the Athenians against the Messenians and Helots at Ithome.

But, while Plutarch says that the Athenians twice sent aid to the Lacedaemonians, Thucydides (I, 102) together with Diodorus (XI, 64) and Pausanias (IV, 24) mentions aid by the Athenians only once, to Ithome, and thus arises the question whether the Athenians went to the aid of the Lacedaemonians once or twice.

This question was regarded by modern historians ² as definitely solved by accepting the view that the Athenians aided the Spartans only once, at Ithome, in contradiction to the information of Plutarch, which was rejected by Grote ³ for the following three arguments:

¹ Pausanias (IV, 24, 5) dates the earthquake and revolt to the 79th Olympiad when Xenophon of Corinth won the stadion (464-3 B.C.) while Diodorus (XI, 63) says that it happened in 469 B.C. For the year when Archidamus ascended the throne, Diodorus (XI, 48) gives 476 B.C.; but, in comparing this information, where it is said also that Archidamus reigned 42 years, with another one given by the same author (XII, 52) and with Thucydides (III, 1, 1; 89, 1), Diodorus' muddle is evident. See Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, III, 1, p. 201 n., Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, I, 2, pp. 184 ff., II, 2, pp. 195 ff.

² Busolt, III, 1, pp. 243 ff., 256 ff.; Beloch, II, 1, pp. 152 ff.; *O. A. H.*, V, pp. 70 f.

³ *History of Greece* (1856), V, pp. 316-17, note 1. Uxkull (Uxkull-Gyllenband, *Plutarch und die Griech. Biogr.* [1927], pp. 71 ff.) says that Plutarch, temporarily leaving his historian to insert the anecdote about Cimon and Lachartus, taken from another source, and then coming back

(a) that Plutarch has construed too much as historical reality the comic exaggeration of what Aristophanes says. This is all very telling and forcible, as a portion of an Aristophanic play, but there is no historical truth in it, except the fact of an application made and an expedition sent in consequence.

(b) that the earthquake took place when the siege of Thasos was yet going on (Thucydides, I, 101, 2) and Cimon, who commanded at the siege (Plutarch, *Cimon*, 14, 2), could not have gone as commander to Laconia at the time when the first expedition is alleged to have been undertaken.

(c) that Thucydides' account of the expedition of 461 B. C. (at Ithome) with its very important consequences is such as to exclude the supposition that he knew of any prior expedition, two or three years earlier.

To show whether these three arguments are forcible enough or not in combating Plutarch's information and supporting the view that the Athenians only once sent an army to aid the Lacedaemonians, it is necessary to examine at this point Plutarch's information with regard to Grote's arguments given above.

From the information given by Plutarch it appears that the revolt of the Helots took place immediately after the earthquake when they gathered around Sparta *ὡς ἀναρπασόμενοι τοὺς σεισσωμένους τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν*. Although, except for Diodorus,⁴ no other author mentions anything concerning this movement of the Helots at that time, there are no reasons for doubting that this movement took place, because widespread destruction of houses and the loss of many people⁵ provided an excellent opportunity for the success of the revolt directly after the earthquake. However, finding the Spartans arrayed in arms, the Helots withdrew and waged open war after persuading many of the Perioeci to do likewise, while at the same time they were joined by Messenians in attacks upon Spartans. Certainly, the Perioeci and Mes-

to his historian to write about Cimon's expedition to Ithome, wrote *αὐθις*. Weizsäcker (*Untersuchungen über Plutarchs biographische Technik* [1931], pp. 63 ff.) finds that in Plutarch there are two settings: one eidological, the other chronological with *αὐθις*.

⁴ XI, 64, 1: *οἱ δὲ Μεσσήνιοι μετὰ τῶν Εἰλώτων συνταχθέντες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤρμησαν ἐπὶ τὴν Σπάρτην*.

⁵ Plutarch, *Cimon*, 16, 4; Diodorus, XI, 63, 2; Pausanias, IV, 24, 6.

senians did not begin warring directly the movement of the Helots began, but sometime afterwards.

After this, Plutarch says that *πέμπουσιν οὖν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Περικλείδαν εἰς Ἀθήνας δέομενοι βοηθεῖν*. But what is the exact time when this event took place? Since nothing certainly compels us to accept that Pericleidas' mission took place when the Perioeci and the Messenians began to aid the Helots, I prefer to believe that this happened immediately after the earthquake, when the Spartans first learned of the movement of the Helots against them. My reasons are as follows:

(a) The phrase *δέομενοι βοηθεῖν*, which refers to Pericleidas' mission to Athens, compared with the other phrase used by Plutarch to say that the Spartans had later invoked again the Athenians (*τοὺς Ἀθηναίους αὖθις ἐκάλουν*) shows that the first request for aid was made during a time of great emergency, such as the period directly after the earthquake.

(b) In the Athenian assembly, according to Critias, as found in Plutarch, Ephialtes objected to helping the Spartans and advised the Athenians *μὴ βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἀνιστάναι πόλιν ἀντίπαλον ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἀλλ' εἰς κείσθαι καὶ πατηθῆναι τὸ φρόνημα τῆς Σπάρτης* (*Cimon*, 16, 8). As is evident, the significance of these words of Ephialtes is completely incompatible with the conditions under which the Spartans requested the aid of the Athenians against Ithome; yet, their meaning is fully compatible with the emergency condition created in Sparta by the earthquake and by the movement of the Helots against the city.

(c) In asking the Athenians to aid Sparta, Cimon exhorted them, according to Ion, *μήτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χολὴν μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἑτερόζυγα περιδεῖν γεγενημένην* (*Cimon*, 16, 8). Is it possible for us to believe that Cimon used so strong a dramatic speech when Sparta was waging, or preparing to wage, an aggressive war against Ithome? Certainly not. For that reason, then, Ion refers to the occasion of a call for help first mentioned by Plutarch.

(d) Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, 1138-44 says:

οὐκ ἴσθ' ὅτ' ἐλθὼν δεῦρο Περικλείδας ποτὲ
ὁ Λάκων Ἀθηναίων ἰκέτης ἐκαθέζετο
ἐπὶ τοῖσι βωμοῖς, ὥχρὸς ἐν φοινικίδι,

στρατιὰν προσαιῶν; ἡ δὲ Μεσσήνη τότε
 ὑμῖν ἐπέκειτο χῶ θεὸς σείων ἅμα.
 ἐλθὼν δὲ σὺν ὀπλίταισι τετρακισχίλοις
 Κίμων ὅλην ἔσωσε τὴν Λακεδαίμονα.

Since there is no doubt that poets make use of exaggeration, we can accept the opinion that Aristophanes in the verses quoted above speaks with exaggeration concerning the appearance of Pericleidas as a suppliant, the number of Athenians who were sent to Sparta, and the rescue of the whole of Lacedaemon by Cimon. But, I can see no exaggeration in all the poet says concerning the earthquake and the attacks of the Messenians.⁶

From all these it is clear, I think, that in speaking of the first request for aid and of the first aid sent to Sparta, if Plutarch did not follow any others too, he at least followed not only Aristophanes but Critias and Ion as well, since it is difficult to suppose in this instance that all the authors mentioned above fell into the same error one after another; on the other hand neither is there any occasion for explanations like those offered by Uxkull and Weizsäcker.⁷ However, in the first dispatch of aid, mention must be made also of Xenophon who says that the Athenians willingly aided the Lacedaemonians ὅτε αὐτοὶ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων.⁸

The silence of Thucydides on this point is advanced as an argument against this conclusion. However, this silence is not inexplicable, I think, for the following reasons:

Thucydides does in fact mention the earthquake, but, in doing so, his principal purpose is to explain through it the reason why the Lacedaemonians did not help the Thasians even though they had promised to aid them and intended to do so. After he had given this explanation, it occurred to him to add that during that time καὶ οἱ Εἰλωτες αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν περιόικων Θουριάται τε καὶ Αἰθαιῆς ἐς Ἰθώμην ἀπέστησαν . . . πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν Ἰθώμῃ πόλεμος καθειστήκει

⁶ See note 8.

⁷ See note 3.

⁸ *Hellen.*, IV, 5, 33: The Helots were called also Messenians. See Thucydides I, 101, 2: πλείστοι δὲ τῶν Εἰλώτων ἐγένοντο οἱ τῶν παλαιῶν Μεσσηνίων τότε δουλωθέντων ἀπόγονοι· ἢ καὶ Μεσσήνιοι ἐκλήθησαν οἱ πάντες; Pausanias, IV, 24, 5-6: Μεσσηνίων δὲ τοὺς ἐγκαταληφθέντας ἐν τῇ γῇ, συντελοῦντας κατὰ ἀνάγκην ἐς τοὺς εἰλωτας, ἐπέλαβεν ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ὕστερον ἀποστῆναι . . . καὶ τῶν εἰλώτων ὅσοι Μεσσήνιοι τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἦσαν, ἐς τὸ ὅρος τὴν Ἰθώμην ἀπέστησαν.

Λακεδαιμονίοις (I, 101, 2-3). Does this statement, however, include a full description of the revolt of the Helots? Is the first act of the Helots indicated by ἀπέστησαν? Of course, ἀπέστησαν is the result of previous acts which Plutarch mentions, i. e. the gathering of the Helots around Sparta, their withdrawal to the cities, and their successful attempt to arouse against Sparta many Perioeci whom Thucydides mentions by name. Consequently, because he casually mentioned the revolt of the Helots he omitted mentioning along with other incidents of the first period the aid that the Athenians sent to Sparta.

Since, however, this conclusion only partially refutes the third argument of Grote, we should note that the "very important consequences" are caused by and are due wholly to the conduct of the Lacedaemonians when the Athenians sent aid to Ithome and not to anything previous to that. Therefore, Thucydides omitted in his survey acts having no causal relation to the very important consequences.⁹ I believe also that an additional explanation for Thucydides' omission can be advanced, i. e. when the Athenians set out to aid the Spartans the first time, the Helots withdrew to the cities either because they saw that their surprise attack against the Spartans had failed, or because they had heard that the Athenians were hastening to the aid of the Spartans. Thus, when the Athenians arrived there, they did not engage the Helots in battle. Since, therefore, the first arrival of aid produced no practical result, a historian briefly surveying the facts could very well omit mentioning this aid.

The second argument advanced by Grote now remains for discussion. Thucydides says that the earthquake took place during the siege of Thasos by the Athenians (I, 101) and Plutarch says that Cimon Θασίους μὲν ἀποστάντας Ἀθηναίων καταναυμαχήσας τρεῖς καὶ τριάκοντα ναῦς ἔλαβε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐξεπολιόρκησε (Cimon, 14, 2). Grote by bringing these statements together and comparing them with Plutarch's information concerning the first arrival of the Athenians under Cimon to Sparta, concluded that Cimon "could not have gone as a commander to Laconia at the time when this first expedition is alleged to have been undertaken."

If we were to conclude with Grote that the two statements of Plutarch are contradictory, I cannot see how without any proof

⁹ For these consequences see Thucydides, I, 102.

or indication we can support the view that the truth lies with Plutarch's first statement (*Cimon*, 14, 2) and not with his second. But, do Plutarch's two statements actually contradict each other?

According to Thucydides, the siege of Thasos continued for three years when the Thasians ὁμολόγησαν Ἀθηναίοις τεῖχος τε καθελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες (I, 101, 3). Comparing this statement with Plutarch's previous one (*Cimon*, 14, 2) I distrust what is said there concerning the capture of the 33 ships after a sea-battle and I prefer to believe that these ships were surrendered by the Thasians at the end of the siege, as Thucydides states. Furthermore, if we must be on guard lest the meaning of Plutarch's statement be expanded more than Plutarch meant it to be when he was writing it, we must not overlook this—that according to Plutarch, though Cimon besieged Thasos during the last year, the third, yet this does not of necessity mean that Cimon was there during the whole time of the siege of Thasos. Consequently, we cannot accept the view that this first statement of Plutarch contradicts the second which refers to the first aid sent to Sparta under the command of Cimon.

Therefore, since the arguments advanced against Plutarch's information are not strong and since no other objections exist, we should trust Plutarch and his authorities, especially Critias and Ion, and admit that the Athenians twice sent aid under the command of Cimon, to Sparta the first time and the second time to Ithome.

GEORGE A. PAPANTONIOU.

GREEK THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE, BROOKLINE.

A POLITICAL SLOGAN IN ANCIENT ATHENS.

When, in the winter of 412/11, Pisander, as instructed by the oligarchs at Samos, tried to persuade the Athenians to a change of their constitution, he turned down all objections with the remark that Persian money would not be available under a democratic government—in his own words, not unless *μὴ περὶ πολιτείας τὸ πλεόν ἐν τῷ παρόντι βουλευόμεν ἢ περὶ σωτηρίας*.¹ The

¹ He soothingly adds: "Afterwards we can always change back if we like"—the age-old trick of introducing unpopular acts as emergency measures.

Athenian demos did not like the idea, but *σαφῶς διδασκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου μὴ εἶναι ἄλλην σωτηρίαν καὶ ἅμα ἐπελπίζων ὡς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται ἐνέδωκεν* (Thucydides, VIII, 53, 3-54, 1).

We do not know whether the catchy phrase *μὴ περὶ πολιτείας τὸ πλεόν βουλευόμεν ἢ περὶ σωτηρίας* was coined by Pisander on the spur of the moment or (as I am inclined to believe) was part of a well-planned political propaganda. It certainly became a regular slogan, the history of which can be traced over several decades of Athenian politics.

Since the Sicilian disaster the word *σωτηρία* had been in everybody's mouth, and the oligarchs were not slow to exploit this defeatism. The thirty *πρόβουλοι* (Suidas, s. v.; Aristotle, *Ath. Const.*, 29, 2) had instructions to submit proposals *περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας* and in the assembly at Colonus the prytaneis were requested to put every motion *περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας* to the vote (Aristotle, 29, 4). This meant *ἄδεια* for the oligarchs. At the Lenaea of 411 Aristophanes' Lysistrata—tamely as she had to—pitched her own way of *σωτηρία* against that of the Proboulos (vv. 497-501). When, later in the year, a delegation of the Four Hundred endeavoured to justify the régime before the navy at Samos (where, meanwhile, the democrats had gained control) they insisted *ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἡ μετάστασις γίγνεται ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ* (Thucydides, VIII, 86, 3).

It is against this background that the oligarchic slogan must be seen. The feeling that Athens was passing through a crisis was general, and so was the desperate striving for a way out—at all costs. This was the moment for the oligarchs to come forth with their doctrine that what stood in the way of Athens' recovery was her democratic constitution—and, of course, the empire that was its pendant.

Such ideas had been entertained in oligarchic circles for some time past. Not so long before, the Old Oligarch² had denounced Athenian democracy and everything for which it stood. He sees

² I feel strongly that Ps.-Xenophon must be dated as late as possible. A. W. Gomme (*Athenian Studies Presented to W. S. Ferguson, Harv. Stud. Class. Phil.*, Suppl. I, pp. 221-245) has recently argued a date 420-415. I wonder whether the phrase 3, 5: *ἐάν τε ὑβρίζωσι τινες ἀηδὲς ὕβρισμα* is not an allusion to the Hermocoridae. In that event the pamphlet might have been written in the early days of the Sicilian campaign when the crisis that hung over Athens would be anticipated at least by some.

clearly the connection between the Athenian democracy and the Athenian empire and rejects both. Not only does the latter imply the rule of those whom he, and his class, have been accustomed to term *πονηροί*; the imperial policy of the democrats has provoked Sparta and brought about a crisis which the democratic régime is unable to solve. The author, to be sure, does not speak of *σωτηρία* in this connection; but in the beginning of his pamphlet he says that those officers whose competency ensures *σωτηρία*, whereas their incompetency would bring about *κίνδυνος*, as for example the *strategi*, are chosen from the *χρηστοί* even in a democracy. The application is obvious: in a general emergency the *χρηστοί*, i. e. the oligarchs, must altogether take control.

The rule of the Four Hundred was shortlived. The experiment was renewed, however, with Spartan backing in 404. The essential identity of the two régimes shows, among other things, in a revival of the old slogan. This time it is Lysander who impresses on the Athenians the fact *ὅτι οὐ περὶ πολιτείας ὑμῖν ἔσται ἀλλὰ περὶ σωτηρίας εἰ μὴ ποιήσεθ' ἃ Θηραμένης κελεύει* (Lysias, XII, 74). Theramenes is the connecting link between the Four Hundred and the Thirty;³ it was probably from him that Lysander knew the slogan that had proved useful seven years ago.⁴

The Thirty went the way of their predecessors, but their policy still found supporters. The victorious democrats, on the other hand, had not failed to use their enemies' catchwords as trumps against them. If the oligarchs constantly talked about *σωτηρία*, the democrats, perhaps with better reason, maintained that they saved the city when their opponents gave it away to the enemy (cf. Andocides, *De myst.*, 81; Lysias, II, 64; XVIII, 5; XXVIII, 15), and that in 411/10 Athens had been saved

³ According to Lysias, XII, 73 Theramenes forced the Athenians into acceptance of the motion of Dracontides, who may have been nothing more than his agent.

⁴ Characteristically, Theramenes is credited with another bonmot that plays on the concept of *σωτηρία*: Plutarch, *Lys.*, 14, 8 *ὅτε καὶ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν νέων τινὸς δημαγωγῶν Κλεομένους ἐρωτώμενον, εἰ πολλὰ τὰναντία Θεμιστοκλεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν, παραδιδόνς τὰ τείχη τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἃ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀκόντων ἐκεῖνος ἀνέστησεν, εἰπεῖν· 'Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ὦ μειράκιον, ὑπεραντίον ἐγὼ πράττω Θεμιστοκλεῖ· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τείχη καὶ ἐκεῖνος ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνέστησε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ καταβαλοῦμεν.* Whether true or not, the anecdote, as many others in Plutarch, probably went round Athens at the time, and was recorded by local historians.

only by the democrats at Samos (Andocides, *De redivtu*, 12); if the régime of the Thirty was dressed up as a return to the *πάτριος πολιτεία* and the *πάτριον νόμοι* (Aristotle, 34, 3; 35, 2; Xenophon, *Hell.*, II, 3, 2), a defender of the newly restored democracy—the speaker of Lysias, *Orat.* XXXIV—addresses the Athenians *περὶ τοῦ μὴ καταλῦσαι τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν*—which, for him, is democracy. In his opinion the experiences of the past should be a warning even for future generations *μὴ ἐτέρας πολιτείας ἐπιθυμεῖν* (1); instead, the advocates of a restricted franchise still try to persuade those who have tasted both, and hope to play their old trick a third time.⁵ They still go around asking the question: *τίς ἔσται σωτηρία τῇ πόλει εἰ μὴ ποιήσομεν ἃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κελεύουσιν* (6). His answer, however, is *ταύτην μόνην σωτηρίαν εἶναι τῇ πόλει, ἅπασιν Ἀθηναίοις τῆς πολιτείας μετέιναι*.

Slogans die hard. Almost fifty years later, towards the end of the Social War, Isocrates writes (*De pace*, 51): *σπονδάζοντες δὲ περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν οὐχ ἤττον ἢ περὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν ὅλης τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν εἰδότες ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἡσυχίαις καὶ ταῖς ἀσφαλείαις αὐξανομένην καὶ διαμένουσαν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πολέμοις δις ἤδη καταλυθεῖσαν, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμοῦντας ὡς πρὸς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς ὄντας δυσκόλως ἔχομεν, τοὺς δὲ τὸν πόλεμον ποιοῦντας ὡς τῆς δημοκρατίας κηδομένους εὖνους εἶναι νομίζομεν*. The second confederacy had developed much like the first; again it is the propertied class that stands for peace and fair dealing against the imperial war policy of the radical democrats. It is, to be sure, a very different class from that of the landed gentry of the Old Oligarch; and, with all their leanings towards a more authoritarian régime, these circles are careful to avoid an open break with democratic forms. Their spokesman cleverly gives the old slogan a new turn: “we are concerned not less about our constitution than about our safety; but any unbiassed person must have learnt the lesson that this our cherished democracy has collapsed twice already (*δὺς ἤδη*, cf. Lysias, XXXIV, 1) in a military crisis, and that we could serve it in no better way than by seeking the peace in which alone it can thrive.” It is, of course, their own idea of democracy, the democracy of big business; but this the author conveniently omits to say.

LUDWIG BIELER.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

⁵ XXXIV, 1: *τοὺς κακῶς πεπονθότας καὶ ἀμφοτέρων πεπειραμένους ἐξαπατῆσαι ζητοῦσι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ψηφίσμασιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον δις ἤδη*.

REVIEWS.

JEAN CARRIÈRE. *Theognis de Mégare. Étude sur le recueil élégiaque attribué à ce poète.* Bordas, 1948. Pp. xii + 306.

JEAN CARRIÈRE. *Theognis, Poèmes élégiaques. Texte établi et traduit.* Paris, Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1948. Pp. 138. (*Collection des universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé.*)

The Theognidean corpus is peculiarly susceptible to dismemberment, and in the last half-century the "Theognidean Question"—which began in 1826 with Welcker's *Prolegomena*,¹ a generation after Wolff blazed the trail for Homeric criticism—has come to rival the older "Question" in interest. A wide variety of views may be enjoyed, ranging from Reitzenstein's theory of multiple authorship or the blustering skepticism of Kroll, through calmer attitudes like that of Hudson-Williams, to the missionary gallantry of Dornseiff or the astringent unitarianism of Allen. The attitude in which M. Carrière approaches Theognis may best be described in his own words: "C'est donc avec la plus grande prudence qu'il convient d'aborder cette étude" (p. 95); "Les nôtres [distinctions] tâcheront d'être à la fois plus précises et plus prudentes" (p. 143); "WINTER, en 1910, fut . . . plus modéré, et, par là, plus digne de créance" (p. 32); WELCKER . . . avait conservé dans l'audace plus de mesure" (p. 117), and therefore meets with Carrière's approval. We shall look for no extravagant fantasies from this writer.

Along his cautious path the author leads us in the first three chapters of his *Étude* through the morass of seductive hypotheses to reasonably solid ground. A survey of past Theognidean criticism, especially of internecine modern criticism, leads Carrière to conclude that he must start on a thoroughly objective basis by examining (a) the direct tradition of the text itself, (b) the indirect tradition of ancient citation and commentary, and (c) the contribution of metrical and linguistic studies. Investigation of the familiar repetitions in Theognis has persuaded him that in the text itself we have evidence of two separate collections of elegies; where the doublets first appear they serve as nuclei around which we may group sections of the first collection; the remainder of our text—except for a few small overlaps—formed part of the second collection. Careful study of the passages known to ancient writers confirms this distinction and shows that the text generally known up to the time of Lucian differed from that known to writers like Athenaeus and Stobaeus. Carrière is critical of the third class of evidence, pointing out that such statistics as those offered by Edmonds tend to measure the Theognidean corpus by itself instead of by external criteria; but such evidence as he accepts as reliable supports his view. The

¹ In his edition of 1550, however, Camerarius commented on the chaotic nature of the collection, its repetitions, and the presence of extraneous poems.

theory is sincerely and convincingly presented. There are dangers, of course, in the use of the evidence. Sifting of citations and comments can be done objectively, but the general assumption that the earlier form in which a doublet occurs is better than the second form and that it is therefore more likely to be original Theognis necessarily involves a subjective attitude.

This lack of objectivity is the defect of much modern criticism of Theognis when it leaves its legitimate field of literary appreciation to pronounce on an elegy's authenticity. And, as Carrière shrewdly points out, too often an appearance of unity is confused with evidence of authenticity, whereas such unity as can be detected is the mark of an editor's hand and is probably the product of some period like the ninth century with a flair for synthetic unification.

The history of our text, then, as reconstituted by the author is as follows: (a) Theognis' original *Ἰννομολογία πρὸς Κύρον*, written in the middle sixth century, was the basis of a fifth century Attic edition (*Ἐλεγεία*) which contained additional material by Theognis and other elegists; this lasted until at least the first century after Christ, becoming less and less generally known; (b) a second collection was formed to replace the vanishing collection I; it consisted of Theognidean poems, verses by Solon, Mimnermus, and others, and some frivolous poems; only Clement of Alexandria seems to have known both collections at this early stage, but the first collection reappears four centuries later in Hesychius of Miletus (source of Suidas' information); (c) the two collections were fused into one, not long before our earliest manuscript (A, tenth century), and, soon after this, offended moral sensibilities caused the sequestration of the erotic poems, our present Book II.

The second half of the study is disappointing. It opens with an *Étude littéraire* (chapter IV) to which one is tempted to apply the words which begin the *Étude philosophique* (chapter V): "Ce titre ne doit tromper personne." Thirty-six pages devoted to a catalogue of the various types of poems in the Theognidea include two interesting suggestions: (a) that the later part of Book I contains many poems which were inspired by or are replicas (sometimes fragmentary) of sepulchral epigrams; and (b) that some of the poems form the final moral lesson of versified anecdotes or fables; an example of this procedure in its full extent is to be seen in vv. 1135-1150. The variety of our text is due to the second collection.

For Theognis' personality we must look to the first collection. The picture Carrière offers is the traditional one of the intransigent aristocrat. A disturbing comparison is drawn in this connection: "Imagine-t-on le doux Virgile formulant un tel souhait (for bloody vengeance on his foes)?" How can one justly compare with Theognis a poet of different genius, temperament, and circumstances? Why not with Alcaeus, who can be just as violent in his lyrics as Theognis in his elegies?

The author is also concerned because Theognis is lacking in lyrical inspiration and fails to exploit mythological material, apparently not realizing that elegy may have peculiar, intrinsic merits of its own. Another disturbing suggestion is that Theognis' cry for vengeance (vv. 337-340) would have been better if it had been amplified as a Solon or Mimnermus might have developed it; the poignancy of its

brief anguish—so alien to those other poets—seems to escape him. The corpus is redeemed, however, by traces of “lyricism” in the false Theognis of collection II.

In the *Étude philosophique* the individual Theognis is absorbed into the collective personality presented by the work as a whole. The introductory sentence quoted above (p. 186) is unintentionally ambiguous. Not only does it preclude any supposition that we should look for any integrated philosophical system in Theognis, but it actually introduces a chapter that has little originality. What we have is a carefully documented repetition of the ethical concepts attributed to Theognis in most handbooks. Carrière does, however, point out that the Theognidean elegies do not embody the *morale* of an individual or even of a single group of people, but that they present, rather, *une pensée en marche*.

The sixth chapter (*Étude philologique*) is devoted to a study of Theognidean language, versification, and other aspects of the elegiac style. Basically Ionian, with Homeric, some Doric, and much Attic coloring, the language offers a duality of forms which can be used at will. (Are we to assume here that the author regards the corpus as the work of one writer? cf. p. 249: “Le poète cherche-t-il donc à déployer avec coquetterie les richesses de son langage?”) Questionable views that a touch of Homer can add nobility to a passage and that there is a distinction between language appropriate to poetry and that appropriate to verse are not helped by the choice of Plato as a prosaic writer. An elaborate discussion of metric produces the inoffensive if ineffective conclusion that the poets showed ingenuity in their search for variety within the formal limits of the distich; but no thorough attempt is made to investigate the possibility that the assonances or variations in rhythm noted by the author, enjambement, or word order may have a significant meaning. A study of Theognidean syntax adds little to the picture. We emerge with the unexciting verdict: “Ainsi le style de nos *Élégies*, si inégal qu’il puisse être, et, par certain côtés, si proche à la simple prose, ne manque pourtant pas toujours de pittoresque ni même d’un certain éclat” (p. 287).

Carrière’s book is the result of considerable statistical labor. It is also marked by an unhappy frequency of space-filling quotations which are the less useful since they are too often in translation, not in the original Greek. The bibliography is extensive and the writer is free from the national prejudices often seen in European scholarship. The printing is on the whole good with relatively few misprints, all easily corrected. All readers will be distressed, however, by the many faulty references to the text of Theognis.² The book

² Errors noted by the reviewer, of varying importance, are as follows: P. 46, line 26: for 1171-2 read 1071-2; p. 46, line 35: for 1072 read 1074; p. 48, line 4: for 858 read 878 (?); p. 76, n. 2: for 72 read 58, for 58 read 72; p. 81, line 28: for 435 read 434; p. 242, line 8: for 1171 read 1179; p. 243, n. 2: for 515, 516 read 514, 515; p. 245, line 4: for 291 read 299; p. 246, line 15: for 931 read 937 (cf. also 935); p. 246, n. 1: for 599 read 559; p. 247, line 3: 1153 contains no instance of *θελλών*; the reference must be to *μεριμνών* or *μεριμνέων*; p. 249, n. 2: for 137 (*κέρδεος*) read 133 (*κέρδεος*), 137 (*δοκέων*), for 291 read 290; p. 259, n. 7: for 1335 read 1336, for 252 read 282, add 242 for an

has its merits. But, in view of the labor involved, one is inclined to think, "Parturiunt montes . . ."

Far more satisfying is the Budé text and translation edited by Carrière. Since we have essentially only one family of manuscripts, the text cannot differ radically from that of any other edition; the numerous minor differences reflect Carrière's conservatism and his sensible preference to retain the manuscript reading wherever possible. The translation with its occasional footnotes is accurate, occasionally felicitous, and there is a useful introduction summarizing the editor's views on Theognis, the collection, and the manuscripts. Most welcome, however, are the forty-six pages of *Commentaire critique* at the end, an innovation in some of the more recent Budé editions.

There is, unfortunately, one serious defect—the unreliable nature of the apparatus criticus. Carrière has obviously devoted considerable time to the collation of the various manuscripts; but investigation of the apparatus suggests that the caution which the editor professed in his *Étude* has deserted him here. The errors vary in seriousness. Sometimes we find mere carelessness (219: *πολιτηάων* implied as the reading of O instead of *πολιτάων*); sometimes a scribe is given credit for what he may have intended or should have written (300: *γεγονη* for MS *γεγονη*; 1189: *πεμπη* for *πεμπη*); this insertion of an absent iota resembles Carrière's treatment of accents (877: *ηβανου* (*sic*) according to Hudson-Williams, *ἡβάνου* Carrière). Typical faults are the failure to mention that the text reading *γε* in 267 is Bekker's substitution for A's *τε*, that A omits *δε* in 311 and reads *ει ἀμείνω* (clearly a dittography from the next line) for *ἐτυχες* in 408. Occasionally we may assume an honest difference of opinion (721: *τα δεοντα* for *τα λεοντα*). But some variants seem inexcusable: for instance, in 299 Bergk's emendation of A's *δη* to *λῆ* is ascribed by Carrière to A, and Geel's emendation of A's *δοκει* to *δοκοῖ* is offered as a manuscript reading in v. 310. These errors are apparently not due to the printer; they must be Carrière's own. It is true that he gives us express warning (p. 24): "nous ne pouvions avoir l'ambition d'être complet. Sans parler des leçons où l'erreur est manifeste et qu'il n'y a nul intérêt à reproduire (à moins qu'elle ne semble pouvoir orienter utilement une recherche), à quoi bon consigner, par exemple, toutes les particularités d'accent, d'esprit, de ponctuation, d'iotacisme que nous avons observées dans les manuscrits? Nous n'avons retenu que les principales." But an apparatus-as pretentious as this should at least be reliable; better none at all.

instance of *καλός* with a long *α*; p. 260, line 1: for 334 read 344; p. 261, line 14: for 1095 read 1097; p. 261, n. 3: for 327 read 227; p. 268, n. 3: for 299-300 read 297-8 (?); p. 273, line 14: for 135 read 133; p. 275, line 25: for 743-4 read 743-6; p. 275, n. 1: for 381 read 367 (?), for 383 read 382; p. 280, line 5: for 871-2 read 869-72; p. 281, line 6: for 724-5 read 723-5; p. 285, line 3: for 1251 read 1252.

I may perhaps add that Carrière's statistics must be used with caution; for example, he is inclined to confuse "forms" with "instances" (p. 246, line 1: "11 formes de datif pluriel analogique en -εσσι," whereas we have only eight distinct forms), and he lists nine cases of apparent hiatus caused by the loss of the digamma, but seven of these involve forms of *εὖ ἔρδεν*.

A few notes provoked by the *Commentaire critique* may help to show how important that appendix is.

Vv. 19 ff. Like many editors Carrière regards the σφρηγίς of Theognis as the name Cynos, though, in his typical middle-of-the-road fashion, he does not assume that poems lacking the name are necessarily spurious. But I find it difficult to believe that in these verses σφρηγίς refers back to a vocative Κύρνε which has an independent syntax value. It seems better to regard the σφρηγίς as a particular quality of writing which Theognis thinks will be recognizable to all who read. This quality is, perhaps, partly defined in vv. 27-38: "Cynos, when I am acting as the poet-teacher (σοφίζομένῳ), my style should be unmistakeable. True, I can't please all my fellow citizens"—the aristocrats were presumably weakening and amalgamating with the *nouveaux riches*—"but you will recognize the value of the lessons I have to offer. They represent the traditional noble behavior passed on to me, which I now pass on to you. This will characterize my verse and its acceptance by you will make you acceptable in the best circles. Then you will understand how much you owe me" (note the emphatic final ἐμε in v. 38).

Vv. 39 ff. Contrary to Carrière's view, these verses must refer to a period when the nobles were still in control, not the upstart middle class. Corrective tyranny (εὐθυντήρα, μούναρχοι), Greek history suggests, arose out of dissatisfaction with aristocratic rule. The powerful nobles (ἡγεμόνες) no longer display that virtue (ἀγαθοί) which is appropriate to noble birth; they are becoming κακοί and will destroy the city. The words ἀγαθοί and κακοί must here bear more of the moral connotation than they are normally granted in Theognis. Incidentally, it is probably better to have a strong stop after κράτεος; this produces a neat chiasmic repetition: "when evil men choose to act outrageously, they ruin a city; and no city can remain peaceful when private gain is preferred to public good by evil men."

Vv. 73 f. Carrière has chosen Brunck's δμῶς here to the MS ὅλως, I believe, wrongly. At a time when no noble could be trusted, it was not wise to reveal one's plans entirely (ὅλως) or to all (emphatic final πᾶσι). Verse 74 is notable for its alliteration; Carrière, who translated the alliteration of v. 313 ("Avec ceux qui font les fous, je fais, ma foi, le fou . . ."), might well have noted this; after all, faithful friends are few and far between.

Vv. 109 ff. Carrière rightly retains the MS τὸ μέγιστον ἐπαυρίσκουσι παθόντες. One can never satisfy οἱ κακοί, and a single slip loses their friendship; but οἱ ἀγαθοί show fullest appreciation of any favor—παθόντες is explained by ἀγαθῶν in the next line—and never forget it.

Vv. 143 f. These verses might well have been chosen to show the effectiveness of Theognis' simple syntax: "Men vainly have opinions, because they know nothing; but gods by their very nature accomplish all things, because they know."

Vv. 201 f. (cf. 509 f.). Whatever reading one chooses, this is surely a comment on the mark of a gentleman, not on the quality of a wine.

Vv. 237-254. Again Carrière rightly follows the MS, retaining the MS verse order. Thus we find (a) an affirmation that in life Cynos will be remembered at symposia (note the strong overlap in v. 243,

ἄσσονται); (b) but even when he dies, he will enjoy life-giving κλέος, for he will still be remembered in song. And are the last two lines so out of place? For all we know Cynrus may have been a very unreceptive pupil.

Vv. 257 ff. Carrière shuns an erotic interpretation of these verses. This is in line with his attitude in the *Étude* (pp. 156 ff.), where his restraint causes him to "whitewash" most of the erotic material in the collection, like a Platonic Pausanias.

Vv. 309 ff. This must be advice on behavior at parties and in public. The break should come after γελοία in v. 311: "be a good fellow at a party, but in public be circumspect and remember that people differ in temperament."

Vv. 447 ff. Surely some comment ought to be made here on the clever use of color adjectives: λευκόν (whether used merely with ὕδωρ or by implication with κεφαλῆς), χρυσόν, ἐρυθρόν in contrast with the touchstone, whose color is not mentioned, and μέλας. And surely it is no accident that the poem's last word is καθαρόν.

Vv. 729 f. Is it not possible that we have here a reference to the instability of men's fortunes? The phrase φροντίδες πτερὰ ποικίλ' ἔχουσαι recalls Aeschylus, *Supp.* 328 f.: αἰδὼ' ἀνθρώπων κακά. | πόνου δ' ἰδοὺς ἂν οὐδαμοῦ ταῦτ' ὄν πτερόν.

Vv. 757 ff. This poem has perhaps been taken too seriously. The speakers are not careless; they merely hope that they may always be at peace and be able to enjoy their lives. Perhaps the pun in μηδὲν . . . Μήδων suggests that no particular threat is feared.

Vv. 773 ff. Both Persian invasions have been suggested as the inspiration for this poem. It must be the second: too few Greek states were involved in 490 B. C. to make any talk of Greek disunity (στάσιν Ἑλλήνων) intelligible.

Vv. 879 ff. Carrière makes the excellent suggestion that we have here something like an innkeeper's advertisement praising his wares.

Vv. 939 ff. Too much fuss has been raised about these verses. We have here a man who claims to be usually a good singer, but admits that his last night's festivities have silenced him (cf. Plato's *Symposium*), and he is too honest to assert that the accompanist is too poor.

These are only a few of the thoughts provoked by Carrière's valuable interpretations. There is much in the commentary of which one cannot but approve; there is much with which one may disagree—but what of it? M. Carrière challenges us to read the text with interest and with care; an editor can do no greater service.

CHRISTOPHER M. DAWSON.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

FELIX HEINIMANN. *Nomos und Physis. Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im Griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts.* Basel, Friedrich Reinhardt AG., 1945. Pp. 221. (*Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, Heft 1.*)

The antithesis is well known and recent books have kept hammering home the important rôle which it played in the disintegration of traditional ethics and in the great intellectual crisis which arose at the end of the fifth century B. C.; at times it is difficult to resist the impression that about the time of the Peloponnesian War the Athenians spent most of their leisure in discussing the relative merits of νόμος and φύσις. A glance at the footnotes and the bibliography in Heinimann's book is enough to convince us that in Germany and Switzerland the interest in the subject has been no less lively; yet Heinimann felt that there was a need for a monograph which should synthesize what is known—or may be found out—about the antithesis, interpret some of the more important documents and, in addition, trace the history of the two concepts before their antagonism became acute. This need did indeed exist and Heinimann has met it in a very satisfactory fashion.

The book is an expanded and revised Ph. D. dissertation; the dissertation itself had grown out of an interpretative study of Antiphon's Ἀλήθεια. Some results of these interpretative efforts are incorporated in Section III where they form part of a chapter entitled "Naturgesetzlichkeit und Nomos." Sections I and II deal with the prehistory, so to speak,—the *Vorgeschichte*—of the conflict between φύσις and νόμος. In Section I Heinimann shows very interestingly that in the Hippocratic treatise περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων both concepts occur in the explanation of ethnic characteristics but that the author of the treatise regards them as complementary rather than as antithetic; he certainly makes no attempt to exalt φύσις at the expense of νόμος. Heinimann suggests that in this author as well as in Herodotus (with whom he deals next) we get reflections of a discussion which attributed remarkable Greek achievements, especially the victory over the Persians, to the educational influence of the Greek νόμος or νόμοι. This is a democratic point of view. In opposition to it, aristocratic circles clung to the notion that a man's worth rests on his φύσις (or φυνά; cf. Pindar). It is in this situation that Heinimann if I understand him correctly finds the origin of the antithesis. In the preserved literature it appears for the first time in a passage of Sophocles, *Ajax* (vv. 548 f.) to which we shall return later.

In Section II Heinimann, still concerned with the *Vorgeschichte*, presents an account of certain other antitheses, like ἔπος and ἔργον, δόγμα and πράγμα, δόξα and ἀλήθεια. His reason for studying them lies in the fact that when the opposition between φύσις and νόμος was firmly established this pair of concepts became a sort of catch-all and absorbed some functions of the earlier and less ambitious antitheses. However, in Section II we stop short of the fully developed antithesis between φύσις and νόμος. Before attacking his central subject Heinimann finds it necessary to investigate the earlier history of both concepts. What was their meaning and what con-

notations had they acquired before they became locked in opposition to each other? The original meaning of νόμος is by no means "law" but rather "order," something definitely and unquestionably valid, either universally or at least in a particular social group or nation. Herodotus' descriptions of Persian, Scythian, and other νόμοι are not inspired by a relativistic outlook—in spite of the famous anecdote reported in III, 38. As for φύσις, while it certainly can be equivalent to γένεσις (e.g. in Parmenides and Empedocles and also, though with a different meaning, in Pindar and Sophocles) it yet denotes in the same period the true nature and the essential character of a thing, without regard to its origin or growth. In Heraclitus' first fragment κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων means the same as φράζων ὅπως ἔχει. φύσις stands for the normal and the normative; it is used of natural developments, yet also of the form which a thing will take if not interfered with. Instances of these meanings are found in the early Hippocratic treatises (for some time hope had been entertained that a scrutiny of these writings would throw light on the "naturalistic" thinking of the more radical sophists; this hope has now been fulfilled even if perhaps not to the full extent to which some of us had indulged in it).

On its way toward victory the φύσις concept drew much strength from its association with ἀνάγκη on the one hand and with τὸ συμφέρον on the other. In Section III Heinimann gives us the story of this victory, showing the elevation of φύσις to the position of a norm and of a supreme criterion or standard for what is right and valid. He is convinced that in this development Antiphon's Ἀλήθεια played a very important part. He may be correct, yet considering the fragmentary state of our knowledge caution is indicated. Who can assure us that the discovery of another papyrus would not again change our perspective as thoroughly as Heinimann suggests that it has been changed by the Ἀλήθεια? Nevertheless, his interpretation of some preserved passages of this work is valuable, and, while I cannot agree that Antiphon distinguishes between what is ξυμφέρον for man and what benefits the φύσις (col. 4, 9 ff. Antiphon seems to me to argue, that if the laws do not benefit φύσις they cannot in the true sense of the word be ξυμφέροντα), I accept his thesis that the influence of medical thinking can be seen in the proposition that whatever harms (λυπεῖ) the φύσις is bad—a proposition which Antiphon uses to discredit the νόμοι (pp. 137 ff., 139).

In the same chapter (III, 2) the views of Hippias are discussed and reference is made to some passages in Aristophanes' *Clouds* which are reflections of the νόμος—φύσις controversy. One may regret that Thucydides' use of these concepts is nowhere studied with as much care and attention to details as the Ἀλήθεια, and that Callieles' radical message although not ignored is never made the subject of a really penetrating interpretation. In the later chapters of this section (III) Heinimann deals with other phases in the victorious career of φύσις; we watch the concept invading the realms of epistemology and of philosophy of language and working its way if not into history proper yet into the speculative accounts of the origin and growth of civilization. Here, however, if the impression which Heinimann gives us in the chapter on *Kulturentstehungslehren* is correct, νόμος would seem strong enough to stage a

come-back. Unfortunately it is not altogether correct; Heinimann has overlooked evidence of considerable importance which might tip the scales in favor of φύσις. This evidence includes a fragment of Democritus (B 154) in which human activities are explained as imitations of animal behavior, and Plato, *Leg.*, X, 889C ff., a passage which has figured more than once in recent discussions (and which Heinimann himself examines in a different context, p. 119, n. 24); Plato here speaks of thinkers who constructed the growth and appraised the achievements of civilization in ways decidedly partial to φύσις. Heinimann might also have asked himself to what extent the Epicurean theory of civilization (preserved in Lucretius' Book V), according to which Nature guides man's course, reflects earlier speculations.

My report will have made clear that Heinimann's book although not equally reliable throughout has its definite and substantial merits. Not the least of these merits is that besides integrating carefully and intelligently what we do know about the history of the antithesis he also points out what we do not know. We do not know who was the first to express the opposition between truth and popular notions in terms of φύσις and νόμος (Heinimann does not believe that it was either Protagoras or Archelaus of Athens). We do not know the first man who proclaimed that it is right to indulge one's natural impulses and appetites and that the νόμοι if they interfere with the gratification of these appetites are to be condemned. After reading Heinimann's book one feels inclined to raise a few further questions. How much importance does he attach to the opposition which he mentions early in the book—but to which he does not come back—between the aristocrats' reliance on φύσις and the democratic exaltation of νόμος? Are we to assume that the democratic ideology was well on the way toward overcoming the aristocratic notions when the latter suddenly found new, and as it turned out extremely powerful, support in the form of a new φύσις concept which had taken shape in medical thought and was now broadcast by the sophists? This construction has much to recommend it, yet I should hesitate to regard it as certain. The actual developments may well have been more tangled and complex. The words in Sophocles, *Ajax* (vv. 548 ff.) by which Ajax refers to his son ἀλλ' αὐτίκ' ὥμοις αὐτὸν ἐν νόμοις πατρὸς / δαί πωλοδαμνείν κάξομιούσθαι φύσιν do not throw very much light on the situation in which the antithesis developed (another Sophoclean passage, *O. C.* 337 f., which Heinimann uses in the same context, was written thirty-five years later, i. e. belongs to a time when the antithesis may have been in almost everybody's mouth; nor is it as close to the *Ajax* passage as Heinimann believes, p. 38). Yet there is a good deal of Sophocles that might have been taken into account. Characters like Antigone, Electra, Deianeira set up for themselves standards of action which befit an ἀγαθή or εὐγενὴς φύσις (see e. g. *Trach.* 721 f.: ζῆν γὰρ κακῶς κλύουσιν οὐκ ἀνασχετὸν ἦτις προτιμᾷ μὴ κακῶς πεφυκέναι; cf. *Ajax* 470-80, *Ant.* 38, *El.* 989). Yet no play exhibits Sophocles' unshakable belief in the εὐ πεφυκότες as emphatically as the *Philoctetes* in which Neoptolemus after having been persuaded into an ignoble course of action which is contrary to his nature (vv. 79 f.; cf. vv. 902 f.: ἅπαντα δυσχέρεια τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν δταν λιπὼν τις δρᾷ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα) finds his way

back to his true φύσις. At this juncture he is praised by Philoctetes: τὴν φύσιν δ' ἔδειξας, ὦ τέκνον, ἐξ ἧς ἐβλαστες, οὐχὶ Σισύφου πατρός—as Odysseus—ἀλλ' ἐξ Ἀχιλλέως, κτλ. (vv. 1310 ff.). I cannot here go deeper into this subject and must content myself with reminding Heinimann that the noble yet self-willed φύσις of Antigone clashes with Creon's νόμος, to be sure not with *the* νόμος or *the* νόμοι but only with *a* νόμος, and it would surely be as rash to generalize on this basis as it would be to regard this opposition between φύσις and νόμος as pivotal for the understanding of the play. Yet the fact that this opposition is present in the *Antigone* is certainly relevant to Heinimann's subject. I should even say that there is something prophetic of later developments in Antigone's appeal to a higher and divine law which overrides Creon's ordinance (vv. 440 ff.); for as Heinimann knows (though since it falls outside his period he merely touches upon this point, p. 169) the antinomy between φύσις and νόμος was finally resolved in the Stoic conception of a divine νόμος, a *lex rationis* which is in harmony with φύσις.

On Euripides too much remains to be said. Heinimann has gone through his plays but with his eye rather too exclusively on *Ausprüche* like ἡ φύσις ἐβούλετ' ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει and others of the kind of which he does make good use. What about the characters? We are in the habit of speaking of Euripides as student or portrayer of "human nature"; do we have a right to translate this phrase into Greek? It is easy enough to see that Euripides is not like Sophocles concerned with εὐγενεῖς φύσεις, yet we should like to know more definitely the relation between his representation of human brutality which tramples all laws, written and unwritten, underfoot and the "modern" realistic conception of φύσις as selfish and savage, as spurning restraint and tolerating no interference—the conception of φύσις of which we get glimpses in Thucydides, III, 84 and in Callicles' revolutionary message (Plato, *Gorg.* 482 ff.). Does Medea's course of action correspond to the new notion of φύσις? Does Hecuba's (in *Hecabe*, not in *Troades*)? Does man's and even more woman's true "nature" show itself when he or she ἐξηγγίωται under the impact of sufferings or provocations which, as the war according to Thucydides, πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὁρὰς ὁμοιοῖ? I am merely asking questions. Heinimann's principle is to rely on passages in which the actual words νόμος and φύσις occur. This method is sound enough—for the initial stages of the investigation. It puts us on safe ground, but should one not after a time be able to rise above it? (It is after all certainly correct to think of Sophocles' Antigone and Neoptolemus as γενναῖαι φύσεις even though no character in the plays refers to them by these words.) If one knows as thoroughly as Heinimann does what the Greeks thought about φύσις one should, in Plato's words, be δυνατὸς διαισθάνομενος ἑαυτῷ ἐνδείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὗτός ἐστι καὶ αὕτη ἡ φύσις περὶ ἧς τότε ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, νῦν ἔργῳ παρούσα (*Phaedr.* 271E).

Heinimann was not able to use recent English, French, or American work in the preparation of his book. I do not wish to increase the length of this review by including a large supplementary bibliography; yet as I have already referred to the reconciliation of νόμος and φύσις in Stoic thought it should be mentioned that we have lately learned to regard Plato's reinterpretation of the φύσις concept,

his assimilation of φύσις to εἶδος, as a prior condition for the Stoic "law of nature." An important paper by Glenn Morrow which appeared later than Heinimann's book ("Plato and the Law of Nature," in *Essays in Political Theory Presented to George H. Sabine* [Ithaca, N. Y., 1948]) may appropriately be read as a sequel to it. It seems a pity that Heinimann appears never to have heard of Lovejoy's studies; I venture to think that even those relating to the concept of nature in the 18th century might have proved helpful in distinguishing nuances in the φύσις concept of the 5th and 4th B. C.

It would hardly be fair to conclude this review without saying a few words about the *Anhang* (pp. 170-209) in which Heinimann defends his views regarding the mutual relation between two Hippocratic writings, *περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων* and *περὶ ἱερῆς νόσου*. The opinion which prevails among students of the Hippocratic *Corpus* is that both works were written by the same man. Heinimann rejects this view on the strength of differences in medical theory and meteorological interests; to these points he adds stylistic observations (not altogether unlike those made by W. H. S. Jones in the Introduction to his edition and translation, Loeb Library, II, 131 f.) which suggest that *π.ἰ.ν.* is later than *π.ἁ.ὑ.τ.* His arguments are valid and well reasoned and, while it is perhaps not altogether impossible that the author of *π.ἁ.ὑ.τ.* wrote *π.ἰ.ν.* in a later period of his life, I incline to think that Heinimann's thesis is correct. The dissimilarities between the two works are certainly greater than has generally been admitted.

FRIEDRICH SOLMSSEN.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

VITTORE PISANI. *Testi arcaici e volgari con commento glottologico.* Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1950. Pp. xvi + 196.

This is the third volume of Professor Pisani's projected series of five volumes with the general title *Manuale storico della lingua latina*; the only other which has as yet appeared is the second volume, *Grammatica latina storica e comparativa* (1948; see my review in *Language*, XXV, pp. 198-203). The next to be issued will be the fourth, on the non-Latin languages of ancient Italy; then the first, containing an historical-methodological introduction and a history of the Latin language, and finally the fifth, comprising indexes to the other volumes, but planned so as to form an etymological handbook.

After a foreword in which there is a minimum bibliography explaining the abbreviations, the first part of the present volume (pp. 1-113) presents the archaic texts: older inscriptions; archaic documents that have reached us through the literature; selections from Livius Andronicus, Naevius, Ennius; selections from the grammatical writers, ending with considerable extracts from the grammatical chapters of Quintilian. The second part (pp. 115-79) contains the Vulgar Latin texts: wall inscriptions, mostly from Pompeii; other inscriptions, mostly epitaphs—pagan, Christian, Jewish; selections from Consentius, *De Barbarismis* and from the

Appendix Probi. The final part consists of indexes: the inscriptions according to their sources; the fragments of archaic authors mentioned in passages from other authors, and in the notes; the sections of the *Grammatica latina* cited in the notes.

To all the texts Pisani gives full notes, using his own *Grammatica latina* as a basis for reference by section number. To those who have the *Grammatica* this is a satisfactory arrangement; to those who lack it the notes are often very obscure. But we may assume that students using the *Testi* will normally possess also the *Grammatica*, for Pisani is a scholar of such originality and so frequently departs from what we may call the accepted conservative interpretation of the texts, that one needs every possible guide to his views. This is especially true on some of the oldest inscriptions, for which there is no generally accepted interpretation. I therefore discuss certain of these texts, using Pisani's numbering of the archaic texts by A plus a numeral (the vulgar texts by B plus a numeral); to this I may add the page of his book, as well as the *C. I. L.* numbering or other source identification.

Page 1, A 1 (*C. I. L.*, I², 2, 1), the Forum Stele: This is of course too mutilated for any sure restoration, nor does Pisani give any; but I fail to find among the list of attempts to complete it that of Minton Warren, in *T. A. P. A.*, XXXVII, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

Pages 2-5, A 2 (*C. I. L.*, I², 2, 2), from the Acts of the Arval Brothers: The conventional interpretation of this satisfies me quite well, but Pisani quotes with apparent approval, though without giving a complete approved version, a number of views that seem to me very aberrant. I mention just one point: he regards *sins* as not conceivably for *sinās*, since long vowels are not syncopated (does he overlook *lubs* = *lubēns* in *C. I. L.*, I², 2, 62 and 388?), and takes it as from **sem-* 'one' + adverbial -*s* as in *bis*, **tris* (> *ter*), meaning 'semper'; yet by this argument it should mean 'once,' and not 'always.' The loss of the long vowel in *sin(ā)s* is of course not by syncope, but purely a graphic abbreviation.

Pages 6-8, A 4 (*C. I. L.*, I², 2, 4), the Duenos Vase: Though the first line is pretty clear, the second line is a puzzle; I do not see how it can begin with *ast* 'but,' which Pisani accepts as certain, for with this start the line is not grammatically framed to give a coordinate adversative to the first line. Line 3 falls obviously into two parts grammatically, and *duenoi* must begin the second part as a match for *duenos* beginning the first part; the main division can hardly be after *duenoi*, as Pisani takes it. I refer to my own interpretation of this inscription, in *Lang.*, II, pp. 207-22, which, though published in 1926, still seems to me more reasonable in most of its features than subsequent attempts chronicled by Pisani (mine is not cited).

Page 11, A 7 (*C. I. L.*, I², 2, 7), one of the Scipio eulogies: In the last line Pisani takes *subigit* as an optional writing for perfect *subēgit*, but admits *abdoucit* as an historical present. It seems more reasonable to me to take both verbs as historical presents, however surprising the use may be in this passage. Page 19, A 27 (*C. I. L.*, I², 2, 379), a dedication from Pisaurum: The text is *Matre | Matuta | dono dedro | matrona |*⁵ *M'. Ouria | Pola Livia | deda*, in which, as Pisani says, lines 5-7 were added later. But he takes *deda* as

'nurse'; it is, however, quite clearly a present third plural of *dō*, with Umbrian reduplication (cf. Umb. *dirsans* 'dent'), as others have taken it, or the compound *dēdant*, denoting a different act, "the matrons gave as a gift to the Mater Matuta; Mania Curia (and) Pola Livia perform the dedication." Page 23, line 4 f. b.: *intuiteis* is a misprint for *inuiteis*.

Page 26, lines 3-4, in the *Sententia Minuciorum* 13 (C. I. L., I², 2, 584) we find *agri poplici quod Langenses posident, hisce finis videntur esse*. Pisani, noting the *quod*, thinks it strange that *ager* is treated as neuter, and suggests that the generalized value of *quod* had already begun, which we find in the Romance languages. The explanation is simpler: *agri poplici* is merely a partitive genitive depending on a neuter pronoun, as in the familiar *quid causae est?* and in Catullus' dedication *quicquid hoc libelli*. But *agri poplici* is placed outside the relative clause because it functions also as modifier of (nominative) *hisce finis* in the main clause.

Page 34, A 39: The passage of the *Carmen Saliorum* preserved in Varro, *De Lingua Latina*, VII, 26, is too corrupt textually to yield a generally accepted interpretation. I merely call attention to my own attempt in the translation of Varro in the Loeb Classical Library (not cited by Pisani in his bibliography), which seems to me to do less violence to the diplomatic text, and to make rather better sense, than Pisani's version.

Passing to the *Annals* of Ennius, pages 70-78, A 48, we find comments on metrical peculiarities. Verse 83 (numbering of Vahlen²) ends with *ēsset induperātor*, where according to the note the vowel quantity is still *essēt*. I doubt this, for the following bucolic caesura could cause the syllabic division to be after the *t* (cf. my article in *Mélanges Marouzeau*, pp. 303-8), instead of allowing the final consonant to pass over to the next word; the operation of this principle is used by Pisani to explain the long ultima of *populus* before *atque*, in verse 87. In verse 93, ending *quattuor corpora sancta*, the necessity of pronouncing *quattuor* as a dissyllable receives no comment; nor in 96 does the division of the initial cluster of *scamna* between the two words secure attention: *stabilīta scāmna solūmque*—divide the syllables *sta-bi-lī-tas-cām-na*, making a closed and therefore long syllable *-tas-*. I turn now to a misuse of the term "elision," occurring twice in the note to verse 494:

dum quidem unus homo Romanus toga superescit

on which Pisani comments: "*quidem* non elide l'm, §129; *Romanus* ha elisione del -s, §128." It happens that in §129 and §128 of his *Grammatica* Pisani has the correct interpretations of the phenomena concerned: normally a final *m* followed by an initial vowel became a mere nasality of the preceding vowel, which was then elided (in 494 there is hiatus); and in older Latin a final *s* after a short vowel was often so weak in pronunciation when followed by an initial consonant that it did not close and thereby lengthen the syllable. But it is a misnomer to speak of "elision" of either a final *m* or a final *s*; the term applies only to loss of vowel sounds.

Page 82, A 50: Here are certain of the grammatical formulations of Lucilius (verses numbered as in Marx's edition). Long ago I made a careful study of Lucilius' formulations on the use of *ei* and *i*,

and my results appeared in this JOURNAL, XXXII, pp. 272-93, which article is cited in a footnote by Pisani. But I cannot agree with his reading of 359: *militiam, tenues i: pilam in qua lusimus, pilum* . . . Herein he reads the name of the letter *i* as a short vowel, though elsewhere the names of vowel letters are always long, and takes *pilam* with short *i*, meaning 'ball.' But what could "ball, in which we have played" mean? And why the perfect *lusimus*? We should expect no preposition and the present *ludimus*, "ball with which we play," matching the *pila quae iacimus* "javelins which we throw," in 360-1. I therefore would change the second singular subjunctive *tenues* to the neuter adjective *tenue*, and *lusimus* to *pi(n)simus*, pairing off with the next word, *pilum quo pi(n)so*; then there are three pairs of words: *meille meillia*, *miles militiam*, *pila* 'mortar' and *pilum* 'pestle,' instead of two semantically unrelated words at the end. The line then is

militiam, tenue ī. pilam in qua pi(n)simus, pilum.

Page 88, A 54: I am glad to see some of the more interesting passages from the works of Varro, though those here presented are mostly fragments quoted by other authors. In Pisani's note at this point, I find that of the "erudito Varrone" we possess "per intero i libri V-X del *de Lingua Latina*." I wish that this were the case; but in reality as much as a tenth, perhaps even as much as one seventh, of these six books is lost; cf. the edition of Goetz and Schoell, p. xxii (Teubner, 1910).

My interest, I confess frankly, lies more in the earlier documents than in those of later Latin, and I therefore conclude my critique at this point. In any event, the later texts furnish much less of disputable nature than the earlier. Despite my strictures on certain points, the book furnishes a convenient collection of texts for the study of the history of Latin, provided the student—and his teacher, of course—compare Pisani's views with those of other scholars and come to a carefully considered conclusion. And as I am somewhat conservative and unimaginative, I may have been rather too old-fashioned in my views; but I would not have anyone think that I desire to repress honest free thought in scholarly problems.

ROLAND G. KENT.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

DAVID MAGIE. *Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ*. Two volumes, Princeton University Press, 1950. Pp. xxi + 1663 and map. \$20.

After almost twenty-five years of investigation David Magie, whose contributions to our knowledge of Roman history began with a now famous dissertation in 1905, has produced a monumental study of the growth of Roman rule in Asia Minor. As might be expected from such a scholar and from the length of preparation, the work is excellent, a judicious synthesis of the literary, numismatic, and especially the widely scattered epigraphical evidence, so that

comprehensive studies by Rostovtzeff, Broughton, and now Magie have made Asia Minor one of the best known sections of the Roman Empire.

The arrangement of the book is remarkably successful in that it serves in a model fashion the needs of two groups of readers. Volume I presents a connected narrative with no Greek words and a minimum of Latin. Footnotes with brief references to Livy, Strabo, etc., are given at the bottom of the page and reassure the general reader without distracting him. Unusually good chapters concerning the geography of the country precede each section where in the chronological progress of the narrative the extension of Roman rule to a new area will have to be treated. By virtue of its clarity and style the volume is well adapted for use by college students in Ancient History as collateral reading and for the use of any intelligent reader with an interest in Anatolia; for the general reader there are no waste words and the geographical chapters add immensely. For scholars, on the other hand, who are particularly interested in bibliography and controversial questions, volume II offers an extraordinary survey of the ancient evidence and of modern scholarship therein. The strength, the great strength of the book, lies in the thorough preparation, documentation, fairness, and caution of the author. The superior index of 42 pages and the convenient system of orientation over each of the 845 helpful pages of learned notes will save time and command the gratitude of all. There are lists of provincial dignitaries and Roman officials, one in some points anticipating a still unpublished Johns Hopkins dissertation by Robert K. Sherck, *The Legates of Galatia* (1950). The reviewer, who cannot summarize such a book, will rather arbitrarily mention two sections of more than ordinary interest.

The status of the free cities under Alexander and the Hellenistic kings: "The restoration of the liberty of the ancient Greek communities of Asia Minor was based on the theory that those cities which had originally been free but for a time had been subject to alien rule should again enjoy their primary status of independence." Magie makes a convincing distinction between the freedom of those cities (along the Aegean littoral), which had an inherent right to independence, and the revocable status of cities newly founded or newly constituted as poleis, whose freedom was acquired as an act of grace.

Aristoniceus and the testament of Attalus: Magie believes that Attalus III bequeathed his kingdom to the Romans because in the absence of a candidate of sufficient capacity and prestige to mount the throne he felt that the Romans alone were capable of preserving order. The will arrived in Rome before the death of Tiberius Gracchus. Aristoniceus got his first support from elements who were jealous or fearful of Rome, but when the Greek cities rejected him as the foe of commercial prosperity, he appealed to the outlaws and the slaves, to the impoverished and the discontented, and emerged also as the leader of the native peasants, the foe of Hellenism. The name he gave his followers came indeed from some Utopia of contemporary Stoicism but did not mean more than freedom from their present economic status to the Asianic peasants.

The reviewer cannot point to real weaknesses, but here and there

a statement or opinion may seem unacceptable. On page 641, for instance, Magie in the reviewer's opinion exaggerates the control exercised by the Roman government in reference to the decrees of Greek cities when he says, "The enactments had to be approved by the Roman governor." Th. Mommsen, *Jahreshefte*, III (1900), p. 3 came nearer the truth by saying that the ordinary measures of the community were not laid before the governor, but the extraordinary, however, did need his permission. The reviewer would say that just as the governor was expected to consult the emperor before initiating a radically new policy or promulgating an important decision, so the city was expected to consult the governor before initiating a radically new policy or promulgating an important decision. Evidence appears in Plutarch, *Political Precepts*, 19, which the reviewer will treat elsewhere.

Evidence on the regulations for streets, cisterns, and real estate in a Greek city of Asia comes from the *basilikos nomos*, best known as *O. G. I.*, 483, from Pergamum. W. Kolbe, the first editor, thought that an inscription from the reign of Trajan afforded the closest parallel at Pergamum for the lettering of this inscription, which, accordingly, must have been cut in the time of Trajan or Hadrian. But despite the lettering of this inscription erected by an *astynomus* during his year of office, Kolbe excluded a date in the second century after Christ on the grounds that a law emanating from the emperor could not be described as a *basilikos nomos* and that the use of a local month established as a *terminus ante quem* the year 9 B. C. when the Commonalty of Asia adopted the calendar of Macedonian months to be used in the cities of Asia as the proconsul had proposed. The second argument has no real validity, because we know that, for purely local matters at least, the local calendars did survive (Magie's note 40 on p. 1343 cites evidence from eight cities). In the reviewer's opinion the first objection has no validity either, because in the absence of identification the reference should be to the reigning *basileus*, not to some *basileus* who had been dead for at least 250 years. Anyone who believes that the emperor would not be called the *basileus* in the *sermo publicus* of a city of Asia need only look at *Hesperia*, 1951, p. 32, a decree of nearby Thyatira in which Hadrian is repeatedly called the *basileus*. Despite the authority of Kolbe, Dittenberger, Hitzig, Corradi, Swoboda, Broughton, Rostovtzeff, Hansen, and now Magie (pp. 40 f., 157, 971, 1007), the reviewer fails to see justification for dating to the Hellenistic Period this *Lex de astynomis Pergamenorum*, which according to Dittenberger has been cut by the engraver of a letter presumed to be from Hadrian. Mention of the *νομοφύλακες* does not prove that the document cannot be Hadrianic. For the title *basilikos nomos* in the heading there is a parallel at Athens in the heading of the oil law, *κε(φάλαιον) νο(μο)θε(σίας) 'Αδριανού* (*I. G.*, II², 1100 with corrections in *Hesperia*, Suppl. VIII, p. 221). Hadrian, under whom the praetorian and aedilician edicts at Rome were revised and stabilized, had an interest in city codes. At Athens he placed the services of his staff at the city's disposal and redrafted their laws professionally. He presumably did the same elsewhere, and at Pergamum.

The reviewer would offer as a small positive contribution to the subject evidence on the date of T. Flavius Philinus of Thespiae in Boeotia, who had a career as quaestor Asiae, tribunus (plebis), praetor, legatus Cypri, proconsul Lyciae Pamphyliae, and who is left undated by Magie on pp. 1590 and 1600. Groag (*P. I. R.*², F 331) overlooked an Athenian inscription concerning the well-known family of this man. The names Philinus and Mondo seem to have been borne by the head of the family

in alternate generations so that it is difficult to assign the inscriptions *I. G.*, VII, 1830, 1866-9, 2520-1, and *S. E. G.*, III, 329 to the right man in each case. The generations work out satisfactorily as follows: Plutarch's friend T. Flavius Philinus I, then T. Flavius Mondo I *ca.* 135 A. D., then Philinus II *ca.* 170 A. D., then Mondo II *ca.* 205 A. D., then Philinus III (who may have been the Philinus archon at Athens in 221 A. D.: cf. Syncell., *Chronogr.*, p. 400 Dindorf), then T. Flavius Mondo III Philini [f.], δ κπá (τάρτος), i. e. as often *vir clarissimus*, who according to *Hesperia*, 1942, p. 71, No. 37 was priest of [Athena] Polias (at Thespieae?), priest of Homonoia in the Hellenic cult at Plataea, Athenian citizen of the Phlyan deme, and archon at Athens for the second time in a year independently datable close to 275 A. D. Since, while three or four generations are represented in honorary inscriptions, the family does not appear as of senatorial rank until quite late, the reviewer would identify the proconsul with T. Flavius Philinus III and assign the career approximately to the reign of Severus Alexander.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

ALEXANDER SOUTER. *A Glossary of Later Latin to 600 A. D.* Oxford University Press, 1949. Pp. xxxii + 454. \$10.50.

Thirty years ago Professor Souter spoke with regret of the apparent "profound aversion on the part of British scholars to the labor *improbis* involved in such a task as that of compiling the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*." In protesting against the general indifference toward this very necessary work, he emphasized the severe handicap to classical scholarship which the lack of an adequate dictionary has occasioned. Since that time the work of Latin lexicography has progressed at a snail's pace. Students of late Latin particularly have been uncomfortably familiar with the inadequacies of the older lexicons, the great lacunae in certain fields, and the persistence of erroneous information, as well as with the inconvenience of having to consult special glossaries and indices to individual authors. Hence there will be a warm welcome for Souter's *A Glossary of Later Latin to 600 A. D.*, a singularly valuable volume which makes available the results of the investigations carried on during the long scholarly career of one of the most distinguished of classical lexicographers.

The purpose of the compiler has been to collect from literary, epigraphical, and palaeographical sources all the "common" words which do not occur before 180 A. D. and can be assigned to a date earlier than 600 A. D. Words which appear in sources older than the late second century but which have taken on new meanings or have become entirely specialized or limited to a particular phrase have been included. It is thus a supplementary volume to the projected *Oxford Latin Dictionary* which will include authors whose works fall before 180 A. D.

The general methods and terminology of the *Thesaurus* to which Souter was a major contributor have been employed, although a policy of stringent economy of space has forced the citation of sources to be reduced to a minimum. Only when there was reason

for believing that the word was fairly rare is a precise reference given. In spite of the limited space allotted to a single entry, any pertinent facts which would affect its understanding or interpretation are furnished. For words which were taken over from the Greek, the original is given.

Aside from the evident advantage of having one volume, and that a portable one, which contains all the words which comprise the new vocabulary of late Latin works, the glossary is of great usefulness in filling the gaps in the works of Forcellini and his followers. It has incorporated the results of the studies of Nettlehip, Mayor, Paucker, Ronsch, Goelzer, Arnaldi, and others. It has made use of the newest texts, some of which are still unpublished. A vast amount of material from manuscripts and from inscriptions has been included. An examination of the list of sources will indicate how very thoroughly the field has been canvassed.

In adding to the sum of our knowledge of early Mediaeval words, Souter has performed a most valuable service. By its very structure, his *Glossary* has achieved a secondary end, that of demonstrating graphically the factors which were effective in transforming the language of the Roman Empire into Mediaeval Latin. By far the largest and most significant addition to the vocabulary is the impressive mass of words taken over from the Greek. Although the bulk of these are theological as one might expect, yet a number of ordinary words such as *catalogus*, *categoria*, *hieroglyphicus*, and *geographus* were incorporated into the Latin tongue only at this time. New compounds account for a large increment to the vocabulary. Of these, some were reserved for very specialized concepts; so *inherbo* means to 'feed with grass,' *inaudientia* 'disobedience,' *inaptabilis* 'incomparable,' and *subquartus* (ὑποτέταρτος) 'standing to another in the ratio of four to five.' Another group of words which forms an appreciable part of the *Glossary* is that of familiar terms which have suffered a sharp change since classical times, either in taking on a new and often strictly specialized or technical meaning or in becoming restricted to a single aspect of a formerly general term. One might mention *instar* 'institution' or 'custom,' *aeternitas* 'the world soul,' *exterminabilis* 'misleading,' and *facies* (πρόσωπον) 'person.' Foreign words, with the exception of a number of Hebrew terms which were used extensively in ecclesiastical treatises, are surprisingly few. Still more rare are instances of words which one must consider newly coined. Of particular interest is the alteration in meaning of some of the small common words, prepositions, adverbs, and conjunctions. Even these few examples should serve to point out what the *Glossary* so vividly illustrates, namely that, contrary to persistent popular belief, the later Latin language is not an inaccurate, inexact instrument incapable of conveying precise meaning. If this point of view could be established more generally, we might hope for a better understanding of the thought and letters of this important era.

Souter has aided Mediaeval scholarship to an almost equal degree by clearing up the confusion which has existed regarding a number of words. For example, he emphasized the distinct identity of *conditio* and *condicio* which have frequently been regarded as the same word. Further, he has called attention to words whose exact

meaning is still uncertain, though they have been accepted in established texts and incorporated into lexicons. So he questions the word *tymbribus* which occurs in the text of Cassiodorus (*Variarum*, V, 1, 1: *P. L.*, LXIX, 644). Finally and most significantly, he has disenfranchised a group of imposters, phenomena to which only a lack of knowledge had given the status of words. In this category he has detected and exposed a number of "words" which represent interpolations, palaeographical errors, and poor conjectural readings. For example, *myrrhaginem* appears in the text of Maximus Taurinensis (*Homilia*, XLI: *P. L.*, LVII, 319) and is cited by Forcellini. Souter suggests that it may be an error for *voraginem*, a reading which occurs in one of the manuscripts. Barwick accepts in his text of Charisius (p. 477) *obrimo* which Souter conjectures may stand for *opprimo*. Apparently the compiler took real satisfaction in laying the ghost of *infallibiliter*, a simple misreading for *ineffabiliter* (Augustinus, *Praedest. Sanct.*, 15, 31: *P. L.*, XLIV, 982) to which Paucker (*Suppl. Lex. Lat.*, 388) unwittingly gave existence and a long and interesting career in the lexicons.

It seems almost an impertinence to mention a few shortcomings of this excellent and handsome book. Although it has been designed to serve the less specialized reader as well as the expert, certain features may prove a little puzzling to the average person who has occasion to consult it. Since, for instance, only the new and unusual meanings for older words are given, one might be misled, in looking up an unfamiliar word, into accepting as the ordinary definition one which was quite uncommon and restricted to a very specific usage. The nonspecialist may be occasioned some delay in finding references to the more obscure works, since the abbreviations of the authors' names frequently are not expanded in the references to the editions or sources used. Of course the specialist will regret the fact that *all* references for a given word are not cited; he will also be irritated at the policy of economy which has left almost no margin for him to add his own references. Of more trivial import, the system of superscript numbers appearing with certain items is not wholly consistent in its application. I notice an incorrect definition of *Zodiacteus* (Mart. Cap., ed. Dick 6, 9) as one of the Pleiades, and I question the rendering of *emergens* (Mart. Cap., 153, 20) as dancing. The reference to *antichthon* should be Chalc., *Comm.*, 121; Mullach (*Frag. Philos. Graec.*, II, 209) gives it in its Greek form.

The *Glossary* will be the indispensable tool for all students of Mediaeval texts. It is entirely likely that it will also have the extended usefulness which Souter wished for it. Modestly he expressed the hope that it would prove of interest to scholars working in the fields of early English and Romanic philology and that it might stimulate the study of Mediaeval medical texts.

CORA E. LUTZ.

WILSON COLLEGE.

JOHANNES TH. KAKRIDIS. *Homeric Researches*. Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, 1949. Pp. 168. Kr. 15. (*Acta Reg. Soc. Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis*, XLV.)

This is a truly international book. First published in 1944 in modern Greek, it now appears, with additions and revisions, in an English translation from Sweden, while in its aims, methods, and results it is closely akin to the products of the contemporary German school of Homeric scholarship. Like Pestalozzi (*Die Achilleis als Quelle der Ilias* [Erlenbach-Zürich, 1945]) and Howald (*Der Dichter der Ilias* [Erlenbach-Zürich, 1946]), Professor Kakridis believes that the *Iliad* as we have it is an integral work of art and that the criteria of the older separatists have no value (p. 2). Schadewaldt's *Iliasstudien* (Leipzig, 1938) is proving here to have had the influence that it deserved to have. Within this integral work of art, however, there are many motifs, scenes, situations, which are not organically motivated,—poetic contradictions which are sharply distinguished from meaningless logical contradictions (pp. 8 f.). These poetic contradictions are regarded as the unassimilated skeletal remains of the earlier epics on which the *Iliad* was based. The neo-analyst, as Kakridis describes himself, uses these contradictions in an effort to reconstruct the earlier epics and so place the *Iliad* in an epic tradition. The ultimate aim is to enable us to distinguish between Homer's inheritance and his original work.

In his first chapter Kakridis endeavors to establish the existence of a pre-Homeric *Meleagris* and to reconstruct the main features of this epic. We are told, among much else, that "It is on the model of Cleopatra and Marpessa that Homer created his own women who loved and were loved profoundly, Andromache and Penelope" (p. 40). In the second chapter this *Meleagris* is seen as underlying much of the material in Z. Meleager serves as the model for both Hector and Paris in this book, Cleopatra for Helen and Andromache. It is rather surprising to read, "As to the problem of the connection of Meleager's wrath with Achilles' wrath, I do not even now dare to express a view" (p. 60, n. 22). Howald has no such hesitations. According to him Meleager is the prototype not only for Achilles' wrath but also for the hero's early death (*op. cit.*, pp. 118-143).

The entire case for the existence of a *Meleagris* rests on the interpretation of I, 527-599. There Phoenix tells the story of Meleager in a form radically different from that known to us from later poets. The crucial question is, "Does the treatment of the story by Homer force us to assume an earlier well-known epic version which he is following, or do we have here merely another case of the free adaptation of folk-tale to serve as a poetic example?" Kakridis says that we must assume an epic. His argument runs as follows. Meleager refuses for good reasons to join in the battle to save Calydon. He is unmoved by delegations of elders, of his parents, and, finally, of his friends. Only when his city is actually burning does he yield to his wife's entreaties and go forth to rout the enemy. But he yielded too late. Though he saved the city he died before he could receive the promised gifts. The story is thus narrated by Phoenix to Achilles as a dissuasive. According to Kakridis the rough edge

which betrays the influence of the earlier epic is the presence of the wife Cleopatra. It would have been much more "natural" for Homer to have made his Meleager yield to the penultimate embassy of his friends (*ἑταῖροι*, equated, reasonably enough, by Kakridis to the embassy in I) and so set a good example to Achilles. But Cleopatra was a fixture in the epic version and could not be overlooked.

At this point we must consider the poetic function of the Meleager story in I. Apart from its local dramatic function as an example to be avoided by Achilles, it has the more general poetic function of prefiguring what both the poet and the audience know is going to happen. Achilles, too, will yield too late. Kakridis' proposed more "natural" version eliminates this characteristically Homeric ironic aspect of the story. Right here we have the central difficulty of the neo-analytic method. A motif which to one man seems to be an unassimilated residuum of an earlier tale will seem to another to be perfectly "organic." To me, at least, every detail of Phoenix's speech seems to be elaborately integrated into the total structure of the *Iliad*. While it is of course impossible to prove that no such epic about Meleager as Kakridis reconstructs ever existed, as far as the evidence goes, and there is none in our own tradition outside Phoenix' speech, the *Meleagris* looks very much like the ghost of a phantom that never was.

In the case of the *Achilleis* which Kakridis thinks underlies much of the second half of the *Iliad* (ch. 3), the situation is quite different. Apart from the neo-analytic evidence we have, in Proclus' summary of the *Aethiopis*, and in references in the *Iliad* itself, strong evidence for a pre-Homeric epic or epic tradition concerned with the death and burial of Achilles. Whether this epic was in part identical with the later *Aethiopis*, as Pestalozzi believes (*op. cit.*, pp. 7f.) or whether the *Aethiopis* follows closely the earlier epic, is a question which Kakridis wisely leaves open. When he states that many motifs which in the earlier epic belonged to Achilles alone, are, in the *Iliad*, divided between Achilles and Patroclus, we can follow him; but when he implies that these motifs find their place in the *Iliad* only because Homer is blindly following his source, that they are no longer organic, we must object. The bifurcation of the hero into an Achilles-Patroclus is a fact of the *Iliad*, not dependent on any hypothesis of sources. When Homer makes Patroclus don Achilles' armor he is doing more than describing a military stratagem. Patroclus is Achilles' *alter ego* in a deeply significant sense. When he goes out to die he is killed in a way suitable for Achilles, by a hero with Apollo's help. When he dies he is honored with games, etc. Similarly, after the death of his *alter ego*, Achilles is surrounded by the imagery of death, Thetis mourns as if he were dead and when she visits him takes his head in her hands (E 71),—a formulaic gesture appropriate to the chief female mourner at a funeral (Kakridis, p. 68). The mother's son is dead with Patroclus. Only a daemonic, other-worldly self survives. To make Achilles survive what is, in a sense, his own death, and so reap to the full the results of his actions, was a masterpiece of poetic strategy to which much of the tragic power of the *Iliad* can be traced. To reduce the symbols by which this poetic strategy is implemented to unassimilated residua of earlier epics is destructive criticism at its worst.

To this reviewer the whole neo-analytic movement in Homeric scholarship is suspect,—theoretically, because the effort to distinguish “das Homerische in Homer” surely implies an inadequate theory of the nature of originality in literary composition; practically, because, as the method demands inconsistencies, inconsistencies will be found, whether real or imaginary. Homer’s more figurative and metaphorical touches seem particularly subject to abuse. For all this the effort to define Homer’s sources is well worth while, though I do not think that the time for it has come yet. Paradoxical as it may sound, the literary study of Homer’s poetry is in its infancy. We must work out Homer’s poetic techniques patiently and, above all, with that humility which is appropriate in dealing with the greatest and most sophisticated poet of them all. Only then, when we understand something of his principles of organization, can we profitably approach the problem of the sources of what he organizes.

Though I cannot agree with the methods or results of this book I learned much from it, as, I am sure, would anyone. It is a genuinely scholarly piece of work and it contains much shrewd comment on passages from the *Iliad* as well as much incisive criticism of other scholars’ theories. A special feature is the frequent introduction of parallels from modern Greek folk-lore. In his preface Professor Kakridis states that it was through the agency of Professor Martin P. Nilsson that this book is now published in a language more widely known than modern Greek. We should all be grateful to Professor Nilsson for making available to us this impressive example of modern Greek scholarship.

H. N. PORTER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

T. J. HAARHOFF. *The Stranger at the Gate. Aspects of Exclusiveness and Co-operation in Ancient Greece and Rome, with some Reference to Modern Times.* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1948. Pp. xii + 354. \$3.75.

The first edition of *The Stranger at the Gate* was published in 1938 (Longmans, Green, and Co.) and was almost entirely destroyed in the blitz on London. This second edition is a photostatic copy produced with permission of the original publishers. The author, Head of the Department of Classics of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, has written on classical and non-classical subjects both in English and in Afrikaans. He brings to his theme a considerable experience in a bilingual country at present grappling with racial problems.

Dedicated “To the Spirit of Racial Co-operation,” the book emphasizes the Graeco-Roman relationship, which, it is contended, has particular significance for South Africa. The first part, in nine chapters, traces the attitude of Greeks to aliens, both Hellenic and barbarian; the second, in three sub-divisions, discusses the meeting of Romans and Greeks and the eventual harmony of the Mediterranean world; the third moves to modern times and finds most of its illustrations in South Africa. The front matter includes a Preface

to the Second Edition, Corrections and Modifications, and a short essay entitled Introductory. The last few pages are occupied by the Index.

The idea of the book is a good one and it would be pleasant to report that the execution is courageous and satisfactory. This I cannot do. In stating the principles of racial co-operation Haarhoff is lofty enough; in specific terms, however, he resents interference, in South Africa at least, by well-meaning foreigners. The South Africans will solve their own problems in their own time without advice. This kind of approach requires no courage; nor does it make progress.

The core of the volume concerns the ancient world, to which Haarhoff is generous with his advice and criticisms. These chapters embody a series of observations, some original and some borrowed, some based on evidence and some irresponsible, fitted together in a rapidly moving chronological account. The total impression is of platitudinous superficiality.

Not least of the flaws in the book is Haarhoff's persistent defense of the Romans, who are revealed in a much more favourable light than are the Greeks. The Romans did respect the "principle of growth" and they did (in time) produce the *pax Romana*, which is likened to General Smuts' doctrine of "Holism." But the Romans were also responsible for much misery, especially among the provincials, and for many acts of brutality. The true admirer of Rome recognizes this and Rome stands upon her record without partisan apology.

In our day we are afflicted with much careless thinking about Empire and Citizenship, Democracy and Imperialism. On pp. 114-115 Haarhoff self-righteously lists "the tests of a successful political unification." Criterion (2), in my opinion an impertinence, reads as follows: "The members of the larger unit must not be excluded from the citizenship of the leading power, if there is a leading power." Clearly, Haarhoff has the Athenian Empire in mind. He fails to see that citizenship was never an issue between Athens and her allies, and that such an extension was entirely foreign to the Hellenic view of international life in the fifth century. "——in so far as international relations are eased and helped by concrete organisation, it is to the Romans that we must look. As always, the Greek thinks out the theory, but the Romans have the practical ability to bridge the difficult gap between abstraction and practice." But the Confederacy of Delos was a practical union conceived of experience and given life by an agreement realistically stated in 478/7; a quarter of a century later the Athenians proved their talents by their detailed organisation of an Empire. Nor was the Peloponnesian League a mere theory. The conservative Romans, who were far less inclined to experiment, required very nearly two centuries before efficiency was introduced. I do not mean to defend the Greeks or to slight the Romans; their times and their problems differed, and it is futile to glorify one by depreciating the other. Yet I deplore the ease and the frequency with which such remarks are glibly perpetrated without regard for the evidence. In newspaper columns we expect them, not in works of scholarship.

Apart from the general uncritical tone there are blunders and

distortions of which I shall not inflict even a sample upon the reader; he will find them for himself without trouble. He will also be impressed by the extent to which the author depends upon secondary materials which are not always spliced neatly. The Canadian will be surprised to learn that "territorial segregation" exists in his country (p. v), and Haarhoff will be equally surprised, I believe, to learn that Canada is officially bilingual. Outsiders must leave South Africa alone; but ignorance does not deter Haarhoff from pronouncements about others.

Mechanically this book is a glaring example of slovenly workmanship; the initially sympathetic reader might well be antagonized. I checked seven quotations (pp. 196, 197, 200, 216-17, 223, 320); not a single one is given accurately, and indeed Haarhoff apparently feels free to adjust the writings of others within quotation marks. In the two cases on p. 196 the references are wrong. Nor is it good practice to cite merely *C. A. H.*, which lacks meaning without an author's name. Such expressions as *tên dunamin tês phônēs* (p. 6) are common; less often Greek font is employed and one can only assume that these grotesque transliterations are the author's preference. In his references Haarhoff is unconscious of any regular conventions; italics are scattered quite at random as are Roman and Arabic numerals. Some references are placed in the margins, some at the ends of the chapters; system is disregarded. The chronology is fantastic.

The reading of the proof has been of a like character and a page of Corrections and Modifications (p. ix), which itself exhibits two errors, does little except draw attention to the monstrous nature of earlier blunders. The new Preface increases a list already too long for citation here.

In style the book is infuriating, chiefly (but not wholly), I think, because of the author's pernicious habit of interrupting his reader by placing a comma before the verb when the subject is compound or of more than two or three words. The style alone would overwhelm whatever good passages there may be in the work.

That this book should originate in South Africa is a pity; that it should bear the imprint of Basil Blackwell is a shock.

MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI.

CONSTANTINE G. YAVIS. *Greek Altars, Origins and Typology*. St. Louis, Saint Louis Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. xxiii + 266; 54 figs. in text, 39 in 21 plates. \$6.00. (*St. Louis University Studies, Monograph Series: Humanities*, No. I.)

The supplement to the title, *Origins and Typology*, and the subtitle, *An Archaeological Study in the History of Religion*, express the character and purpose of the book. The preface states that the book provides "a summary and classification of Helladic (including Minoan-Mycenaean) apparatus pertaining to non-liquid offerings," and "a survey and classification of extant Hellenic altars." All

these claims, with certain reservations, are amply and ably fulfilled in a book full of concentrated information conscientiously collected and presented.

Before considering the reservations, the reader may wish to have some notion of the content of the work. The material is presented essentially in the form of a classified catalogue of surviving published altars, with some representations on vases, divided into four chapters: I. The Pre-hellenic Period; II. The Geometric and Archaic Period: (a) altar types of autochthonous origin; III. The Geometric and Archaic Period: (b) altar types of non-autochthonous origin; and IV. The Classical and Post-classical Periods.

In the first chapter are examples of prehistoric offering benches, tripod hearths, trays, stands, and other minor types, in the neolithic and bronze-age Aegean world, including Cyprus. In the second chapter are survivals of these forms in Cyprus; sacrificial apparatus at places like Dreros, Prinias, Neandria (here is inserted a discussion of classical masoned-well altars in relation to Mycenaean walled pits), and Cyprian altars illustrating the adaptation of Minoan-Mycenaean furniture to early classical ritual.

Chapter III introduces the classical types of altar in their earliest form. The earliest type of all, a cubical structure with (usually) a step or *prothesis* on the east, is called a ceremonial altar. Other types are: low monumental, stepped monumental, monolithoid, hollow ceremonial, ground altars, sacrificial pits, rectangular monolithic, cylindrical monolithic, and *arulae*. In the fourth chapter the classical and hellenistic development of these and still other types is taken up, but in a different order.

Throughout the book, numerous examples of each type are given in connection with the general description, in the form of illustrations and verbal descriptions taken from the original publication of the altar. These descriptions contain much interesting information in addition to the details concerning the specific examples.

At several points the author forges a distinction between Olympian and chthonic altars, concluding that the latter are always low and have some sort of hollow, not necessarily deep, in the sacrificing surface.

Among other conclusions regarding religion itself, the most important as stressed by the author, is (quoting from his preface) that "burnt flesh sacrifices were not a normal part of Minoan-Mycenaean religion and special structures for sacrificial purposes did not exist in the Minoan-Mycenaean religious apparatus"; and "the chief types of hellenic altars are not derived from Minoan-Mycenaean . . . ; the altars of the Hellenes were imported by the Dorian tribes which must, therefore, also have been responsible for the . . . concept and practice of burnt flesh sacrifices." Of these, the former conclusion seems fairly convincing, on the evidence assembled. The latter seems a little startling if we take the obvious implication that the last arriving Greek tribe, having borrowed somewhere a religion foreign to its earlier arriving cousins, imposed the new religion on the whole Greek people. The author, however suggests briefly a more plausible hypothesis, that the earlier arriving Greek tribes suppressed their own religion in the face of the more powerful Minoan culture, but did not lose their own entirely, so that the

stimulation of fresh reminders of the original tradition, when the Dorians came, easily restored the ancient beliefs and practices.

The above is a summary of the content of the book, apart from detailed descriptions of types and examples of altars. If it does not seem perfectly clear or well ordered, the fault is partly in the book itself. The work is, in the first place, difficult to follow in reading because of the arrangement of topical paragraphs intermingled with descriptions in catalogue form. The author's train of thought would therefore be difficult to keep in mind, even if there were a more consistent thread of continuity in themes. A more fundamental basis for the lack of coherence in the presentation may be in the logic—or imperfect logic—of the system of classification. Certain types are differentiated by size alone (indeed, the pre-occupation with statistics of average dimension seems relatively fruitless), and types which to this reviewer seem closely related are widely dispersed. For example, from the point of view of physical form a logical system based on three groups might emerge: one, consisting of monolithic (square, cylindrical, hexagonal), monolithoid, low monumental, ceremonial (with hollow ceremonial), ceremonial *in antis*, stepped monumental, stepped pyramidal, colossal. Another would include the masoned-well altars and perhaps pits; a third, the primitive, hearth, ash, pyre, mounds, and some others. A wholly different system might be based on the difference between chthonic and Olympian altars, or some other aspect of purpose and use. As it is, however, the theoretical basis for the arrangement and relation of types is not clearly defined, with the result that the reader is often confused and lost.

This is the most serious defect of the book. Other matters which some readers might hope to find covered have been omitted by the author conscious of the impossibility of including everything and of the need to adhere to his chosen idea. It is to be hoped, however, that he or someone else will proceed to a study of altars as elements of a sanctuary complex, so that we may get the whole picture of a religious scene, and relate it more fully to cult practice and religious thought. For such a venture the present book will be a most valuable beginning.

To conclude: the book contains a vast amount of useful and important information; it is carefully equipped with indexes and classified tables of examples of altars; and it will be a valuable guide to and even a source for much information for many different researches.

ROBERT SCRANTON.

EMORY UNIVERSITY.

PENTTI AALTO. Untersuchungen über das lateinischen Gerundium und Gerundivum. Helsinki, Suomalainen Tiedekatemia, 1949. Pp. 193. (*Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae*, Ser. B, Tom. 62, 3.)

The investigations of the Latin gerund and gerundive by various scholars during the two decades since the appearance of the *Lateinische Grammatik* of Leumann and Hofmann are quite sufficient to

justify a monograph summarizing and evaluating the results of these studies. Aalto's work gives a brief history of ancient and modern theories regarding these verbal formations, followed by a classification and listing of examples selected from a remarkably wide range of texts. In view of the great number of solutions already proposed for the problem of the gerund and gerundive, it is not to be expected that Aalto's approach will present much that is totally new. In many points his doctrine agrees with that of Miss Adelaide Hahn (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXIV [1943], pp. 269-306), whose articles, along with other recent American work, he has used to good advantage, but sometimes he supports older theories with original arguments. The book throughout is characterized by great soundness of judgment, and it is only fair to say that no scholar seriously pursuing further study in this department of Latin grammar can afford to ignore it.

The two chief obstacles to a complete understanding of the gerund and gerundive are the question of the origin and Indo-European connections of the formative suffix *-ndo-* and the question of priority between the two formations. For the first problem Aalto adopts the safe course of withholding final judgment, since the Balto-Slavic nouns in *-nda*, which constitute the only group of probable cognate forms outside of Italic, provide no basis for semantic comparison with the Latin forms. He has a brief discussion of Sturtevant's derivation of Lat. dat. sing. *-ndō* from **-tnōi* (*Lang.*, XX [1944], pp. 206-11), but regards the change *-tn- > -nd-* as lacking in adequate support. Yet connection of the gerund with the Hittite verbal nouns based on stems in *-ter / -tno-* would be semantically very attractive were it not for the fact that it calls for a dative as the original case, while Aalto's view calls for a nominative-accusative.

In taking his stand with those scholars who regard the gerund as the older formation, I believe he is right, since the syntactical difficulties of deriving it from the gerundive are considerable, as he ably demonstrates. The non-occurrence of gerunds in the Oscan and Umbrian remains, which is the chief argument for the opposing view, loses force in view of the scantiness of the material, but it seems rash to explain away the gerundives in the later Iguvine Tables as Latinisms. In addition to the fact that grammatical loans are far less common than lexical loans, the borrowings in the present case would seem to me to involve some difficulties of sound-chronology. On the syntactical side, his explanation of the genesis of the various Latin usages is one of the best treatments of this subject known to me, but only the barest summary can be given here: the gerund in the nominative and accusative (which he does not restrict to *oratio obliqua* and prepositional phrases) developed into an expression of obligation or necessity in association with the copula and possessive dative, a process illustrated by parallels from numerous other languages as well as from certain uses of Latin *habere*; the oblique cases maintained their usual functions (instrumental, final, etc.) without the notion of obligation; the relation of the gerundive to the types *-undus*, *-bundus*, *-cundus* is less close than is generally supposed, and the lack of comparative and superlative forms as well as of adverbial derivatives helps to prove that gerundives did not originate as adjectives, but gerunds in both predicative and adnominal relations developed passive adjectival

functions, with assistance from those ambiguous constructions of the type *lucis tuendi copia* where the gerundive appears to agree in number and gender with the noun; in the third century of our era the gerundive developed the value of a future passive participle, but Romance preserved only the ablative case of the gerund, with the value of a present active participle.

The book contains a table of contents, a very full bibliography, and indices of subject-matter, of authorities cited, and of passages involving textual problems. The main body of the work is followed by a statistical table covering thirty-five Latin texts, among which, strangely enough, most of the prose-writers of the Silver Age are conspicuous by their absence, although some citations from them, especially from Tacitus, are scattered through the body of the text. A few slight criticisms may be made on certain minor details. On p. 32, where Sturtevant's view is mentioned, the reconstruction **-tnōi* as ancestor of a Hittite form should be cited as Indo-Hittite, although this particular reconstruction happens to be IE as well. On p. 113 read 599 for 593 in the citation from Stolz-Hofmann. On p. 133 it is hard to believe that the infinitive in Varro, I, 63: *id enim cum promptum est in sole ponere oportet* has passive value instead of governing *id* as direct object, though I am willing to admit it where the Old Church Slavic infinitive translates a Greek passive.

JAMES W. POULTNEY.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

VICTOR GOLDSCHMIDT. *La Religion de Platon*. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1949. Pp. xi + 158. 200 fr. (*Mythes et Religions*, 25.)

Mr. Goldschmidt has the great merit of insisting that the religion of Plato cannot be isolated from the rest of his philosophy, indeed is that philosophy, so that his book is in fact a popular statement of Platonism, dealing with the world, with man, and with the state. He makes no attempt to trace any development of thought from the early dialogues to the *Laws*. This leads to some disconcerting juxtapositions, but the method is justifiable in a popular book which deals with essentials, for in these there was indeed little change.

The author identifies the Forms with the divine and the Good with God. This is not unreasonable, provided one is careful to define one's terms and not to allow the associations of the modern words to becloud the meaning of the Greek. Goldschmidt makes very commendable efforts to avoid this; he clearly states, for example, that this divinity is in no sense a person, though there remains a certain confusion between the Supreme Being and the Supreme Intelligence. Nor is it easy to avoid a personalized vocabulary, and such expressions as "la volonté de Dieu," "la bonté de Dieu," and the rest, must be confusing to the general reader, for they hardly fit the Good. There is also a tendency in the later parts of the book to take mythical descriptions as literal statements of faith, and to miss the imaginative irony of Plato's references to the Olympic gods and the

oracle of Delphi. Occasionally, too, as in describing the increasing "individualisation" of the vicious souls, metaphors are used which seem more Plotinian than Platonic (e.g. on p. 95, see also p. 33). Goldschmidt lays an interesting emphasis on self-love as the main "error" and for this he produces good authority in Plato, but he refuses to carry the need to lose one's self into the rejection of personal immortality which would seem to be the Platonic conclusion. He reconciles the worship which the Platonic citizens are expected to pay the traditional gods (and this he seems to exaggerate) with the Good as God by finding, in Plato, two levels of religion, one for the philosophers and one for the ordinary citizen. Thus the traditional gods acquire meaning even for the philosopher as he descends into the cave, as the traditional religion will do for the ordinary man what only dialectic can do for the philosopher. This leaves the "astral" gods in a somewhat ambiguous position, and the whole question might have been clearer if more attention had been given to chronological development.

It is impossible, in a popular book of this kind, to be other than dogmatic, and the author can well be congratulated in that he has avoided this as far as possible. Inevitably, there are a number of points to which any reviewer could take exception, but they are for the most part matters of opinion. As a general statement of the Platonic attitude to life this little book is sound and very readable. Copious references allow the reader to check the statements for himself. There are many statements that are suggestive for the student, and the general reader, provided he pays due attention to the author's own warnings as to the meaning of words, will find here an excellent guide to what can be called, in the broadest terms, the religion of Plato.

G. M. A. GRUBE.

TRINITY COLLEGE,
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

WERNER SCHMALENBACH. *Griechische Vasenbilder*. Basel, Verlag Birkhäuser, 1948. Pp. 42; 158 plates. (*Sammlung Birkhäuser*, Band 14.)

KARL SCHEFOLD. *Griechische Plastik, I: Die grossen Bildhauer des archaischen Athen*. Basel, Verlag Birkhäuser, 1949. Pp. 76; 90 plates. (*Sammlung Birkhäuser*, Band 16.)

The appeal of art is more universal and more immediate than that of literature because works of art require no translation and only little explanation and interpretation. Yet the inadequacies of the literary tradition are often matched by the deficiencies of the artistic reproduction. The two small books under review with their excellent illustrations are therefore welcome as additions to our growing list of picture books of ancient art.

Schmalenbach's *Vasenbilder* is little more than a picture book, but as such it is very good. The illustrations are almost exclusively taken from other publications, but they are discreetly chosen and well printed. They contain a few splendid examples of Cretan,

Mycenaean, Geometric, Corinthian, and non-Attic archaic vase paintings and a representative selection of Attic masterworks of the sixth and fifth centuries B. C.; a small number of significant specimens from the early Hellenistic period completes the selection. The introduction provides the historical background of early Greek art down to the sixth century, and a brief account of the stylistic development of Attic vase painting during the archaic and classical periods.

Schefold's *Griechische Plastik* is a much more ambitious book. Although the illustrations are excellent, this publication is not merely a picture book but an important contribution by a serious scholar. It deals exclusively with archaic sculpture, and the subtitle indicates that the book is primarily concerned with works of the great Attic sculptors and their pupils. It is not intended as a scholarly publication, and it is therefore unfair to question certain dates and attributions, to complain about the omission of certain works and the inclusion of others, or to comment on the scarcity of bibliographical references and on the principle of their selection. Schefold's text is a popular and general, extremely well-written introduction to the extant Attic sculpture of the archaic period, presented in a novel and thoroughly attractive fashion. At the same time it is a highly stimulating series of essays full of original and critical observations on special points of interest and current problems of archaeological scholarship. The general reader will appreciate not being lectured at, and the specialist will notice, sometimes perhaps with a smile, those comments which were made especially for his benefit.

A. E. RAUBITSCHKE.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

KARL SCHEFOLD. *Orient, Hellas und Rom in der archäologischen Forschung seit 1939*. Bern, A. Francke Ag. Verlag, 1949. Pp. 248; 8 pls. Swiss francs 18.80. (*Wissenschaftliche Forschungsberichte*, Geisteswissenschaftliche Reihe, Bd. 15.)

The harassed classical scholar who laments the long break in his reading caused by World War II will welcome this review of what was written in the field of classical archaeology during the decade 1939-1949. The book is one of a series edited by Professor Karl Hönn and designed, like so many "Bailey Bridges," to span the wartime gaps in scholars' first-hand knowledge of progress in the various sciences. The author, a German scholar well known for his earlier work on the Kertsch vases, on the site of Larisa, and on ancient portraiture, spent the war years on the side lines in his university post at Basel, Switzerland, where he was able to maintain an extraordinarily thorough watch on the appearance of all the relevant publications both in Europe and America.

The book begins with a review of the development in the aims and methods of archaeology since the time of Winckelmann. There follows a section on recent studies of the influence upon early Greece of the cultures of neighboring lands: Egypt, Mesopotamia, India,

Syria, Asia Minor, the "Mountain Lands," and Central Europe. Cyprus, Crete, and Mycenae come in for brief treatment.

The main body of the work is divided between Greece and Rome in the proportion of two to one. Within each of these major divisions excavation, architecture, sculpture, painting, and mythology are dealt with in turn. Finally, the peripheral peoples of historical times are noticed: the Persians and Scythians, the Etruscans and Celts, the Spaniards and Carthaginians, again from the point of view of their relations with the classical world.

The review thus covers a vast area, yet some readers will regret the omission of epigraphy and numismatics. Inscriptions receive no attention, perhaps because they are to be dealt with in other volumes of the series devoted to Greek and Latin language and literature. Numismatic publications are referred to only incidentally and usually only in so far as they have a direct bearing on sculpture. The omission is the more striking inasmuch as the publications in this branch, e.g., numerous fascicules of the *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum* and successive volumes of the great catalogue of coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum, must rank among the most solid achievements of the decade in the archaeological field. The necessary space might have been found in the volume by the omission or drastic curtailment of the introduction.

The editor's instructions called for an objective review of progress within the discipline with a minimum of criticism on the part of the author. A mind as energetic and eager as Schefold's, however, could scarcely be bridled by an editor; the result is that almost every page bristles with argument and *ex cathedra* pronouncements. This personal approach has also led to a marked unevenness in treatment. Some books of monumental importance, e.g., Dunbabin's *The Western Greeks*, receive a sober paragraph or two, whereas studies that touch on themes close to the author's own special interests, e.g., portraiture or symbolism in Roman art, have inspired lengthy disquisitions. It must be admitted, however, that the intrusion of the author's personality gives a certain unity to the compilation and makes of it a readable book as distinct from a purely mechanical bibliography.

The make-up of the book is not attractive. The nature of the material no doubt required that widely disparate odds and ends should often be thrown together even in a single paragraph. The irregular alteration in size of type detracts from the appearance of the pages. The proof readers have overlooked an extravagant number of small typographical errors. The index is helpful but by no means complete. The 32 illustrations gathered together on 8 plates have been copied from earlier publications and fall far short in quality of the illustrations used in other works by the same author. The book, however, is light and handy, and its straightforward organization makes for easy use.

Apart from its usefulness as a compendium of bibliographical information, Schefold's work has great value as indicating trends within the discipline, e.g., toward a deeper and more fruitful understanding of the relations between early Greece and the East, a more precise determination of the essential quality of Roman art and the time of its beginning, a more finely shaded delineation of the

development of ancient portraiture, an interest in the impact of Greek and Roman civilization on the Iberian peninsula, the study of which has been so greatly facilitated by the recent publications of Spanish scholars. For the sake of the stimulus of this nature that may come from such a review the exercise might be worth repeating at ten-year intervals, war or no war.

Both at the beginning and at the close of his book the author insists on the value of the classics as a common heritage and so a potentially unifying force among peoples. This view received little encouragement from the results of the first-hand human contacts between the classical scholars of the Occupying Powers and the people of Greece during World War II; still it embodies a pious hope and one worth cherishing.

HOMER A. THOMPSON.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY, PRINCETON.

J. DELZ. Lukians Kenntnis der athenischen Antiquitäten. Freiburg in der Schweiz, Paulusdruckerei, 1950. Pp. viii + 194.

In a careful study presented as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Basel, J. Delz, a student of P. Von der Mühl, publishes an investigation into the reflection of Athenian political, military, and legal institutions in the works of Lucian and Alciphron. He examines the spurious or dubious as well as the genuine works of Lucian, and indeed he contributes a new argument for the genuineness of the *Charon* and against that of the *Amores* and the *Demos-thenis Encomium*. He is particularly interested in distinguishing between references drawn from the Athens of the second century after Christ and references drawn from classical Athens or the Athens of the New Comedy, also whether the classical color was correct or revealed a misunderstanding. He points out that Lucian achieves his Attic grace not only by his vocabulary but by constant use of Athenian background, and that Lucian, unobtrusive in his learning and unafraid of inconsistency, treated the background with considerable independence.

Delz has made good use of the inscriptions and of the works of Graindor and of Bruno Keil on Roman Athens. The reviewer still believes that one can hardly use Lucian to clarify the institutions of Roman Athens, but Delz has done valuable work in clarifying Lucian's constant references to Athenian political, military, and legal institutions from the standpoint of the information which has accumulated particularly in recent years. He arranges the material in chapters as follows: I, Demes and Tribes; II, Phratries and Genē; III, Civil and Family Law; IV, Honors and Privileges; V, Duties of the Citizen; VI, Military and Naval Institutions; VII, Slaves and Metics; VIII, Boulē and Ecclesia; IX, Areopagus and the Courts. The subject index is adequate and the index of passages discussed can be praised. The *προεδρία* (cf. Delz, p. 45) as a privilege still occasionally granted in Roman Athens is now attested by the decrees in honor of Ulpius Eubiotus, which contribute also in other ways

to our knowledge of privileges, distributions, and the procedure of passing a proposal through the public corporations, and might help to explain the usage of the word νόμος which bothered Delz on p. 149 (see the reviewer's article in *Hesperia*, 1951, No. 3).

In regard to the vocabulary and arrangement of the Athenian decrees, it might be said in general that the decrees of the Roman Period show a constant striving for variation within the pattern. No group of decrees was so stereotyped as the prytany decrees, and yet every new discovery brings some new version of an old formula or a slight shift in the arrangement of traditional elements. The new text published by Dow, *Prytaneis*, No. 116, has the formula of purpose at the end, whereas the many previously discovered decrees have it just before the formula of sanction. If we had a richer assortment of Athenian decrees from the second century after Christ, we should probably find many more points of contact with Lucian's mock decrees. Even in the present dearth Lucian's ἀπαξ ἐκκριθέντων (*Concilium Deorum*, 15), for example, has a model in the [ἐγ]κριθέντων ἀπαξ of *I. G.*, II², 1092, lines 10 f.

The author's chief weakness lies in some unfamiliarity with the Greek terminology for Roman institutions or with the Roman institutions themselves. The reviewer who does not wish to obscure the contributions of this well-organized dissertation will remind the reader that the following cases are few indeed in comparison with the total number discussed, but the reviewer must disagree with the author in his treatment of the following cases.

First the proceedings in the *Bis Accusatus*. The reviewer suspects that the explanation in the text is wrong and that the right explanation is intimated on p. 156 in note 19, which begins, "In some way or other the entire invention is influenced also by the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus. Dike here represents Athena." In the reviewer's opinion Lucian started with the idea of his own trial before the Areopagus and this recalled inevitably the trial of Orestes in the *Eumenides*, or he started with the idea of a series of such trials. In either case the opening scene between Zeus and Hermes away from Athens, the divine motivation for the trials, can contain very un-Aeschylean allusions. It is possible that, as Delz argues in the text, Lucian makes Zeus talk like a Roman emperor when he asks προτίθμεν αὐτοῖς ἀγορὰν δικῶν. One might emphasize not only the phrase ἀγορὰ δικῶν but also the verb προτίθμι which occurs in a closely related sense three times in the first edict of Augustus at Cyrene (*S. E. G.*, IX, 8). However, the word προτίθμι does not have to be so interpreted, and the Athenian inscription, *S. I. G.*³, 1109, lines 86 and 97, attests this very usage of ἀγορά in thoroughly Greek surroundings of the second century after Christ. Zeus would not unnaturally suggest the Roman emperor, but it is too much to claim identity (so Delz, p. 156) between the goddess of Justice and the proconsul of Achaia. These trials on the Areopagus, moreover, follow Greek procedure.

Elsewhere Lucian does borrow elements from the *cognitio* procedure, trial extraordinary by a Roman magistrate, and that brings us to the interpretation of two other passages, *Piscator*, 10-16 and *Vera Historia*, II, 6-10. When it is said of Philosophy (*Piscator*, 10) ἡμεῖς ἀγαπήσομεν οἷς ἂν ἐκέλνῃ διαγνῶ, the language and situation

reflect the *διάγνως* or *cognitio* of a Roman magistrate, whose impartiality Greeks often preferred in cases where their own local tribunals were quite competent (cf. Plutarch, *Reip. ger. praec.*, 19); and again when Philosophy fills up her *συνέδριον* with Arete, Sophrosyne, Dikaiosyne, Paideia, and Aletheia (*Piscator*, 16), contemporaries would have visualized the *consilium* of a Roman magistrate, which was called *οἱ συνεδρεύοντες* even at Athens (*A. J. P.*, 1948, p. 439). Yet the same dialogue contains also elements drawn from Attic literature or Athenian practice such as the black ballots mentioned in section 21. Lucian selects at random. Again in the *Vera Historia*, II, 6-10, the proceedings, for which Delz (p. 167) could of course find no analogy in Athenian practice, reflect trials extraordinary in the court of a Roman governor: the case of the travelers who find themselves on the Island of the Blest comes up fourth, and after a hearing the governor, who is the Cretan Rhadamanthys, consults his *consilium* before rendering a decision: *ἐπὶ πολλὸν χρόνον ἐσκέπτετο καὶ τοῖς συνέδροις ἐκοινοῦτο περὶ ἡμῶν*. Decisions by the prefect of Egypt were often reported with the introduction "So and so, *ἐπισκεψάμενος μετὰ τῶν συνεδρευόντων*," κτλ.

A fourth passage occurs in the *Amores*, 30, composed by an imitator of Lucian: *εἰ γυναιξὶν ἐκκλησία καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἦν μετουσία, στρατηγὸς ἂν ἢ προστάτης ἐκεχειροτόνησο*. On pp. 68 f. Delz has trouble with the precise meaning of the word *προστάτης*, which in the reviewer's opinion reflects the Roman institution of the *patronus ordinis et populi*.

A fifth passage, *Bacchus*, 2-3, where the expedition of Dionysus against the Indians forms the subject, causes trouble on p. 73. Lucian describes Dionysus as a *στρατηλάτης*. It is indeed not the late Roman term (*magister militum*) but neither is it derived from a model in iambic verse. In the Greek of the second century after Christ the word meant *dux exercitus* and indicated the commanding general of an expeditionary force (cf. *Sitzb. München*, 1934, Heft 3, pp. 15 f.).

Two passages, which have not at all been misinterpreted by Delz, invite further comment from the reviewer. In the *Concilium Deorum*, 19, after Momus has read the proposal, Zeus, who is the president of the Assembly, speaks as follows: *Δικαιοτάτον, ὦ Μῶμε· καὶ ὅτῳ δοκεῖ, ἀπατεινάτω τὴν χεῖρα· μᾶλλον δέ, οὕτω γιγνέσθω, πλείους γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι ἔσονται οἱ μὴ χειροτονήσοντες*. The ancient reader expected the president of an Assembly to put a vote by saying first, "Ὅτῳ δοκεῖ κύρια εἶναι τὰ ἀνεγνωσμένα, ἀράτω τὴν χεῖρα, and then, καὶ ὅτῳ μὴ δοκεῖ, ἀράτω τὴν χεῖρα. Zeus, when he declares the bill passed before the negative vote is taken and before the affirmative vote is counted, comments, "For I can tell that those who will vote *No* will be more numerous." In the *Necyomanteia*, 20, the decree is read, and then Lucian says, *Τούτου ἀναγνωσθέντος τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἐπεψήφισαν μὲν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπεχειροτόνησε δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἐβριμήσατο ἡ Βριμὴ καὶ ἰλάκτισεν ὁ Κέρβερος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐντελὴ γίγνεται καὶ κύρια τὰ ἐγνωσμένα* (or rather we should emend the last word to read *<ἀν>εγνωσμένα*). The Assemblies of the Roman Period provided no opportunity for discussion; the people had the chance to accept or reject, and they usually accepted with shouts of approval. Papyri and inscriptions

of the second and third centuries show that the acclamations were recorded or indicated in the minutes of the meeting like the number of votes for and against the proposal (cf. *Hesperia*, Supplement VI, pp. 140 f., and A. Wilhelm, *Beiträge zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde* [Vienna, 1909], pp. 179 f.). It was now common to engrave, not just the decree, but the entire minutes, as in *S. I. G.*³, 1109 and 898, and Lucian satirizes the custom, especially by the absurd acclamations of Brimo and Cerberus. The other passage too with its picture of the arbitrary behavior of the president (Zeus) contains more satire than burlesque, for with the power concentrated in the hands of the magistrates the Assemblies of Lucian's time must have often seemed parodies of the ancient.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under Books Received. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Adams (Henry Hatch) and Hathaway (Baxter), ed. *Dramatic Essays of the Neoclassic Age*. New York, *Columbia Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. xix + 412. \$5.50.

Amandry (Pierre). *La mantique Apollinienne à Delphes. Essai sur le fonctionnement de l'oracle*. Paris, *E. de Boccard*, 1950. Pp. 290. (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, 170.)

André (J.). *Étude sur les termes de couleur dans la langue latine*. Paris, *Librairie C. Klincksieck*, 1949. Pp. 427. (*Études et Commentaires*, VII.)

Angel (J. Lawrence). *Troy, The Human Remains*. Supplementary Monograph I. *Princeton Univ. Press*, for the Univ. of Cincinnati, 1951. Pp. 40; 9 tables; 14 pls.

Aubretion (Robert). *Démétrius Triclinius et les recensions médiévales de Sophocle*. Paris, *Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres"*, 1949. Pp. 291. (*Collection d'Études Anciennes publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé*.)

Austin (R. G.), ed. *Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Liber XII*. Oxford, *Clarendon Press*, 1948. Pp. xlvii + 246. \$3.75.

Barlow (Claude W.), ed. *Martini Episcopi Bracarenensis Opera Omnia*. New Haven, *Yale Univ. Press*, for the American Academy in Rome; London, *Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. xii + 328. \$3.50. (*Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome*, XII.)

Barrington-Ward (J. G.), Bell (J.), Bowra (C. M.), Bryan-Brown (A. N.), Denniston (J. D.), Higham (T. F.), Platnauer (M.). *Some Oxford Compositions*. Oxford, *Clarendon Press*, 1949. Pp. 324.

Battisti (Carlo). *Avviamento allo studio del latino volgare*. Bari, "*Leonardo da Vinci*" Editrice, 1949. (*Collana di Grammatiche Storiche Neolatine*, I.)

Beardsley (Monroe C.). *Practical Logic*. New York, *Prentice-Hall, Inc.*, 1950. Pp. xxviii + 580. \$3.75.

Beare (W.). *The Roman Stage. A Short History of Latin Drama*

in the Time of the Republic. London, *Methuen and Co., Ltd.*, 1951. Pp. xii + 292. 25 s.

Beeler (M. S.). The Venetic Language. Berkeley, *Univ. of California Press*, 1949. Pp. 60. \$1.25. (*Univ. of California Publ. in Linguistics*, IV, No. 1.)

Bell (H. Idris) and Roberts (C. H.), ed. A Descriptive Catalogue of the Greek Papyri in the Collection of Wilfred Merton, Vol. I. London, *Emery Walker, Ltd.*, 1948. Pp. xiv + 183; 51 pls.

Beyenka (Sister Mary Melchior, O.P.). Consolation in Saint Augustine. Washington, D. C., *The Catholic Univ. of America Press*, 1950. Pp. xxiii + 115. \$1.50 (Diss.) (*Patristic Studies*, LXXXIII.)

Blegen (Carl W.), Caskey (John L.), Rawson (Marion), Sperling (Jerome). Troy. General Introduction. The First and Second Settlements. *Princeton Univ. Press*, for the Univ. of Cincinnati, 1950. Vol. I, Part I: Text. Pp. xxiv + 396. Vol. I, Part II: Plates. Pp. xxvii; 473 pls. \$36.00.

Bonner (Campbell). Studies in Magical Amulets, chiefly Graeco-Egyptian. Ann Arbor, *Univ. of Michigan Press*; London, *Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. xxiv + 334; 25 pls. \$12.50. (*Univ. of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series*, XLIX.)

Braga (Domenico). Catullo e i poeti greci. Messina-Firenze, *Casa Editrice G. D'Anna*, 1950. Pp. 274. (*Biblioteca di Cultura Contemporanea*, XXX.)

Brelich (Angelo). Die geheime Schutzgottheit von Rom. Zürich, *Rhein-Verlag*, 1949. Pp. 64. (*Albae Vigiliae*, N. F., VI.)

Brelich (Angelo). Vesta. Zürich, *Rhein-Verlag*, 1949. Pp. 120. (*Albae Vigiliae*, N. F., VII.)

Brouzas (C. G.). Byron's Maid of Athens: Her Family and Surroundings. Pp. 65. (*West Virginia Univ. Bulletin*, Series 49, No. 12-VI [June 1949].)

Brown (W. Hannaford). On the Nature of Things by Lucretius. New Brunswick, N. J., *Rutgers Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. xxi + 262. \$5.00.

Buschor (Ernst). Das hellenistische Bildnis. München, *Biederstein Verlag*, 1949. Pp. 71; 62 figs.

Caes (Lucien). Le statut juridique de la sponsalicia largitas échue à la mère veuve sui juris selon la Nov. 6 de Majorien et la Nov. 1 de Sévère. Contribution à l'étude du régime juridique de la donation pour cause de mariage, échue à la mère veuve sui juris, depuis la loi Feminae (a. 382) de Théodose I jusqu'à la Nouvelle I (a. 463) de Sévère. Courtrai, *Imprimerie Groeninghe*, 1949. Pp. 112.

Caes (L.) and Henrion (R.). Collectio Bibliographica operum ad ius romanum pertinentium, Series II, Theses. Vol. I: Theses Galliae. Bruxelles, *Office International de Librairie*, 1950. Pp. 445.

Callaway (Joseph Sevier). Sybaris. Baltimore, *Johns Hopkins Press*, 1950. Pp. 131. \$3.00. (*The Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Archaeology*, 37.)

Campbell (A. Y.), ed. Euripides, *Helena*, with Commentary and General Remarks. Liverpool, *University Press*, 1950. Pp. xvii + 172. 12 s. 6 d.

Cantarella (R.), ed. Aristofane. Le Commedie. Vol. I: Prolegomeni. De Graecorum comedia commentaria et testimonia vetera. Milano, *Istituto Editoriale Italiano*, 1949. Pp. 198.

Casson (Lionel) and Hettich (Ernest L.), ed. Excavations at Nes-sana, Vol. II: Literary Papyri. *Princeton Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. xiv + 175; 8 pls. \$7.50. (*Colt Archaeological Institute*.)

Castorina (Emanuele). Appunti di metrica classica, I: La prosodia di Comodiano nella storia della metrica latina; II: Sulla scansione "sdruciolà" nei metri giambici ed eolici. Catania, *Niccolò Giannotta*, 1950. Pp. 18; 27.

Castorina (Emanuele). Apuleio Poeta. Catania, *Niccolò Giannotta*, 1950. Pp. 42.

Castorina (Emanuele). Licinio Calvo. Catania, G. Crisafulli, 1946. Pp. 134. 300 lire. (*Saggi e Ricerche*, XII.)

Castorina (Emanuele). Vox Rivuli, Carmina. Catania, *Niccolò Giannotta*, 1950. Pp. 62.

Charlesworth (M. P.). The Lost Province or The Worth of Britain. Cardiff, *Univ. of Wales Press*, 1949. Pp. vii + 89. (*Gregynog Lectures*, 1948.)

Constans (L.-A.) and Bayet (Jean). Cicéron, Correspondance, Tome IV. Texte établi et traduit. Paris, *Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres"*, 1950. Pp. 261. (*Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé*.)

Copley (Frank O.), transl. The Menaechmi of Plautus. New York, *The Liberal Arts Press*, 1949. Pp. 65. 35c. (*The Little Library of Liberal Arts*, 17.)

Copley (Frank O.), transl. The Woman of Andros by Terence. New York, *The Liberal Arts Press*, 1949. Pp. 57. 35c. (*The Little Library of Liberal Arts*, 18.)

Cuervo (Rufino Jose). Disquisiciones sobre filología Castellana. Edición, prologo y notas de Rafael Torres Quintero. Bogota, 1950. Pp. xvi + 666. (*Publicaciones del Instituto Caro y Cuervo*, IV.)

Dahlmann (Hellfried), ed. L. Annaeus Seneca, De Brevitate vitae: über die Kürze des Lebens, mit Einleitung, Übersetzung und Erläuterungen. München, *Max Hueber Verlag*, 1949. Pp. 88.

Danielsson (Bror). Studies on the Accentuation of Polysyllabic Latin, Greek, and Romance Loan-Words in English with special reference to those ending in -able, -ate, -ator, -ible, -ic, -ical, and -ize. Stockholm, *Almqvist and Wiksell*, 1948. Pp. xvi + 644 + 6.

de Félice (Th.). Éléments de grammaire morphologique. Paris, *Études d'aujourd'hui*, *Marcel Didier*, 1950. Pp. 58.

del Grande (Carlo). Hybris. Colpa e castigo nell'espressione poetica e letteraria degli scrittori della Grecia Antica da Omero a Cleante. Napoli, *Riccardo Ricciardi*, 1947. Pp. 560.

de Lorenzi (Attilio). Quaderni filologici, III: Filestetica (La critica estetica dal punto di vista filologico). Napoli, *Stabilimento Tipografico G. Genovese*, 1949. Pp. 59.

Delz (Josef). Lukians Kenntnis der athenischen Antiquitäten. Freiburg in der Schweiz, *Paulusdruckerei*, 1950. Pp. viii + 194.

DeWitt (Norman W.) and DeWitt (Norman J.). Demosthenes, VII: Funeral Speech, Erotic Essay LX, LXI, Exordia and Letters. With an English Translation. Cambridge, Mass., *Harvard Univ. Press*; London, *William Heinemann Ltd.*, 1949. Pp. xi + 388. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Diehl (Ernst). Anthologia Lyrica Graeca I: Poetae elegiaci. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1950. Pp. 144. \$2.40. (*Bibliotheca Teubneriana*.)

Diller (Hans). Göttliches und menschliches Wissen bei Sophokles. Kiel, *Kommissionsverlag Lipsius & Tischer*, 1950. Pp. 32. (*Kieler Universitätsreden*, I.)

Disandro (Carlos A.). La Poesía de Lucrecio. La Plata, *Ministerio de Educación, Universidad Nacional de La Plata*, 1950. Pp. 152. (*Instituto de Lenguas Clásicas, Textos y Estudios*, I.)

Downer (Alan S.). *English Institute Essays*, 1949. New York, *Columbia Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. x + 186. \$2.75.

Drabkin (I. E.), ed. and transl. *Caelius Aurelianus, On Acute Diseases and On Chronic Diseases*. *Univ. of Chicago Press*, 1950. Pp. xxvi + vii + 1019. \$15.00.

Dulceit (Gerhard). *Philosophie der Rechtsgeschichte: Die Grundgestalten des Rechtsbegriffs in seiner historischen Entwicklung*. Heidelberg, *Quelle & Meyer*, 1950. Pp. 148. DM. 7.20.

Durr (Jacques A.). *Deux traités grammaticaux Tibétains*. Heidelberg, *Carl Winter*, 1950. Pp. 95.

Durry (Marcel). *Éloge funèbre d'une matrone romaine (éloge dit de Turia)*. Paris, *Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres,"* 1950. Pp. 82. (*Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé*.)

Eis (Gerhard). *Historische Laut- und Formenlehre des Mittelhochdeutschen*. Heidelberg, *Carl Winter*, 1950. Pp. 160.

Ellspermann (Gerard L.). *The Attitude of the Early Christian Latin Writers toward Pagan Literature and Learning*. Washington, D.C., *The Catholic Univ. of America Press*, 1949. Pp. xxviii + 267. (*Patristic Studies*, LXXXII.)

Ernout (A.). *Les adjectifs latins en -ösus et en -ulentus*. Paris, *Librairie C. Klincksieck*, 1949. Pp. 119. (*Collection linguistique publiée par la Société de Linguistique de Paris*, LIV.)

Ernout (A.) and Meillet (A.). *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine. Histoire des mots. Troisième édition, revue, corrigée, et augmentée d'un index. Tome I (A-L)*. Paris, *Librairie C. Klincksieck*, 1951. Pp. xv + 667.

Ferrero (Leonardo). *M. Tullio Cicerone. De Re Publica (Lo Stato), Codice Vaticano, Somnium Scipionis, Frammenti. Introduzione, testo ed commento*. Firenze, "*La Nuova Italia*" Editrice, 1950. Pp. xxii + 235. (*I Classici della Nuova Italia*, 30.)

Ferrero (Leonardo). *Poetica nuova in Lucrezio*. Firenze, "*La Nuova Italia*" Editrice, 1949. Pp. viii + 193. (*Biblioteca di Cultura*, 31.)

Fridh (Åke J:son). *Études critiques et syntaxiques sur les Variae de Cassiodore*. Göteborg, *Blanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag*, 1950. Pp. 99. (*Göteborgs Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets- Samhälles Handlingar*, Sjätte Följden, Ser. A, Band 4, N:o 2.)

Fromm (Hans). *Bibliographie Deutscher Übersetzungen aus dem Französischen 1700-1948*. Erster Band, Verzeichnis A: A-B; Zweiter Band, Verzeichnis A: C-E. Baden-Baden, *Verlag für Kunst und Wissenschaft*, 1950. Pp. xxxi + 367; 433.

Gagé (Jean). *Huit Recherches sur les origines italiques et romaines*. Paris, *E. de Boccard*, 1950. Pp. 252. 750 fr.

Garzetti (Albino). *Nerva*. Rome, *Angelo Signorelli*, 1950. Pp. 208. (*Studi pubblicati dall'Istituto Italiano per la Storia Antica*, VII.)

Gerhard (Melitta). *Schiller*. Bern, *A. Francke Ag. Verlag*, 1950. Pp. 455. 15.80 Swiss fr.

Goldman (Hetty). *Excavations at Gözlü Kule, Tarsus, The Hellenistic and Roman Periods*. Vol. I: Text; Vol. I: Plates. *Princeton Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. 420; 276 pls. \$36.00 the set.

Gombosi (Otto Johannes). *Tonarten und Stimmungen der antiken Musik*. Kopenhagen, *Ejnar Munksgaard*, 1939. Pp. xv + 148.

Gonda (J.). *Notes on Brahman*. Utrecht, *J. L. Beyers*, 1950. Pp. 89. 5 guilders.

Gow (A. S. F.). *Theocritus, Vol. I: Introduction, Text, Translation*;

Vol. II: Commentary. Cambridge, *University Press*, 1950. Pp. lxxxiv + 256; 634; 15 pls. \$12.50.

Grant (Michael). Aspects of the Principate of Tiberius. New York, *The American Numismatic Society*, 1950. Pp. 199; 8 pls. \$5.00. (*Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, 116.)

Grant (Michael). Roman Anniversary Issues. An Exploratory Study of the Numismatic and Medallie Commemoration of Anniversary Years 49 B. C.-A. D. 375. Cambridge, *University Press*, 1950. Pp. xxiv + 204.

Granville (Wilfred). Sea Slang of the Twentieth Century. With an Introduction and Etymologies by Eric Partridge. New York, *The Philosophical Library*, 1950. Pp. 271. \$3.75.

Greenberg (Sidney). The Infinite in Giordano Bruno. With a Translation of his Dialogue concerning the Cause, Principle, and One. New York, *Columbia Univ., King's Crown Press*, 1950. Pp. 203. \$3.00.

Grégoire (Henri) and Méridier (Louis), with the collaboration of Fernand Chapouthier. Euripide, Tome V: Hélène—Les Phéniciennes. Texte établi et traduit. Paris, *Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres"*, 1950. Pp. 226. (*Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé*.)

Grene (David). Man in his Pride. A Study in the Political Philosophy of Thucydides and Plato. *Univ. of Chicago Press*, 1950. Pp. xiii + 231.

~~Hadas~~-(Moses)-ed.-and-transl.-Aristeas-to-Philocrates-(Letters-of-Aristeas). New York, *Harper and Brothers*, for The Dropsie College for Hebrew and Cognate Learning, 1951. Pp. vii + 233. \$4.00. (*Dropsie College Edition Jewish Apocryphal Literature*.)

Hatcher (Anna Granville). Modern English Word-Formation and Neo-Latin, A Study of the Origins of English (French, Italian, German) Copulative Compounds. Baltimore, *The Johns Hopkins Press*, 1951. Pp. ix + 226.

Henry (Paul) and Schwyzer (Hans-Rudolf). Plotini Opera, Tomus I: Porphyrii Vita Plotini, Enneades I-III. Paris, *Desclée de Brouwer et Cie*; Bruxelles, *L'Édition Universelle, S. A.*, 1951. Pp. lviii + 420. (*Museum Lessianum*, Series Philosophica, XXXIII.)

Herrick (Marvin T.). Comic Theory in the Sixteenth Century. Urbana, *Univ. of Illinois Press*, 1950. Pp. viii + 248. (*Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, XXXIV, Nos. 1-2.)

Hoffmann (Ernst). Platon. Zürich, *Artemis-Verlag*, 1950. Pp. 223.

Holmberg (Allan R.). Nomads of the Long Bow. The Siriono of Eastern Bolivia. Washington, D. C., *U. S. Gov't. Printing Office*, 1950. Pp. 104; 7 pls. (*Smithsonian Institution, Institute of Social Anthropology*, Publ. No. 10.)

Honigmann (Ernst). The Lost End of Menander's Epitrepontes. Bruxelles, *Palais des Académies*, 1950. Pp. 44. (*Académie Royale de Belgique*, Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques, *Mémoires*, XLVI, Fasc. 2.)

Housman (A. E.), ed. M. Annaei Lucani Belli Civilis Libri Decem. Cambridge, Mass., *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. xxxvi + 342.

Hubbell (H. M.). Cicero, De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica. With an English Translation. Cambridge, Mass., *Harvard Univ. Press*; London, *William Heinemann Ltd.*, 1949. Pp. xviii + 466. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Jacoby (Felix). Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (F Gr Hist), Dritter Teil: Geschichte von Staedten und Voelkern (Horographie und Ethnographie), B: Autoren ueber einzelne Staedte (Laender), Nr. 297-607. Leiden, *E. J. Brill*, 1950. Pp. 8* + 779.

Jashemski (Wilhelmina Feemster). *The Origins and History of the Proconsular and the Proprætorian Imperium to 27 B.C.* Univ. of Chicago Press, 1950. Pp. vii + 174. \$5.00.

Johnson (William H. E.). *Russia's Educational Heritage.* Pittsburgh, Carnegie Press, Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1950. Pp. xvi + 351. \$5.00.

Josephson (Åke). *Casae Litterarum. Studien zum Corpus Agri-mensorum Romanorum.* Uppsala, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1950. Pp. xx + 316. (Inaugural Diss.)

Jouguet (P.), Vandier (J.), Contenau (G.), Dhorme (E.), Aymard (A.), Chapouthier (F.), Grousset (R.). *Les premières civilisations. Nouvelle rédaction du volume paru sous le même titre en 1926.* Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1950. Pp. xii + 768; 4 maps. (*Peuples et Civilisations, Histoire Générale, I.*)

Katz (Joseph). *Plotinus' Search for the Good.* New York, Columbia Univ., King's Crown Press, 1950. Pp. ix + 106.

Légrand (Ph.-E.). *Hérodote, Histoires, Livre VII, Polymnie. Texte établi et traduit.* Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1951. Pp. 240. (*Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé.*)

Melden (A. I.), ed. *Ethical Theories. A Book of Readings.* New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950. Pp. viii + 386. \$4.00.

Menéndez Pidal (R.). *Orígenes del Español. Estado lingüístico de la Península Ibérica hasta el siglo XI. Tercera Edición muy corregida y adicionada.* Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, S. A., 1950. Pp. xv + 592. (*Obras Completas, VIII.*)

Mondolfo (Rodolfo). *Ensayos sobre el renacimiento italiano.* Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, Instituto de Filosofía, 1950. Pp. 64. (*Cuadernos de Filosofía, VI.*)

Monk (Samuel Holt). *John Dryden. A List of Critical Studies Published from 1895 to 1948.* Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1950. Pp. v + 52. \$1.00.

Moricca (Humbertus). *Marci Tulli Ciceronis Epistularum ad Familiares Libri Sedecim. Pars prior: libri I-VIII; pars altera: libri IX-XVI.* Turin, G. B. Paravia & Co., 1950. Pp. lxxii + 717. (*Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum.*)

Müller-Blattau (Joseph). *Gestaltung-Umgestaltung. Studien zur Geschichte der musikalischen Variation.* Stuttgart, J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1950. Pp. 70.

Nagel (Earnest). *John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Method. Edited with an Introduction.* New York, Hafner Publishing Company, 1950. Pp. xiv + 461. \$2.50 (paper); \$4.50 (cloth).

Nilsson (Martin P.). *Geschichte der griechischen Religion. Zweiter Band: Die hellenistische und römische Zeit.* München, C. H. Beck, 1951. Pp. xxiii + 714; 16 Taf.

Nilsson (Martin P.). *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion.* Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, 1950. Pp. xxiv + 656; 208 figs. 50 kr. (*Skrifter Utgivna an Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund, IX.*)

Nougaret (Louis). *Traité de métrique latine classique.* Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1948. Pp. xii + 134.

Oliver (James H.). *The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law.* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1950. Pp. 179. \$5.00.

Olsson (Bror). *Swedish Erudite Name-Forms.* Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, 1949. Pp. 14. (*Bulletin de la Société Royale des Lettres de Lund, 1948-49, I.*)

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXXII, 3

WHOLE No. 287

THE PROBLEM OF CRATYLUS.

Cratylus of Athens, son of Smicrion,¹ has come down into history as a Heraclitean²—a believer in the flux of all things, a noteworthy influence on the youthful Plato, and an extremist who thought it impossible to step into the same river even once ~~and who finally abandoned speech and resorted to pointing.~~

That he was a Heraclitean is shown, one is told, by Plato's dialogue *Cratylus*; that he was an extreme Heraclitean is shown by two mentions of him in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.³ There is no other evidence for Cratylus than this: later references, in Diogenes Laertius, III, 6, in the commentators on Aristotle, and in Proclus' commentary on the *Cratylus*, are all patently dependent upon either Plato or Aristotle.

The main purpose of this paper is to show that contrary to the general assumption Plato does *not* depict Cratylus as a convinced Heraclitean. To this demonstration is appended a consideration of some of the difficulties inherent in the combination of the Platonic with the Aristotelian account of Cratylus.

Cratylus appears in Plato only in the dialogue which bears his name—a dialogue of which the date and purpose have been the

¹ This can be inferred from Plato, *Cratylus*, 429E and 348B.

² This term is used purely for convenience; I do not propose to discuss here either the accuracy of Plato's picture of Heraclitus as a believer in flux, or the hypothetical existence of an actual sect of "Heracliteans."

³ Aristotle mentions him once apart from this, at *Rhet.*, I 16, 1417 b 1. There he merely quotes a remark of the Socratic Aeschines that Cratylus used to wave his hands and hiss while talking. This information seems to refer to a physical idiosyncrasy and to have no relation to Cratylus' ideas: see p. 244 below.

subject of constant discussion. As for the first, I believe that the old view that the *Cratylus* is an exploratory dialogue belonging to the first decade of Plato's literary activity has been satisfactorily discredited by M. Warburg,⁴ who on stylistic and other grounds attributes the *Cratylus* to the period of the *Theaetetus*. However, it is the purpose of the dialogue which is of more immediate relevance here. Beginning with a discussion of the natural or artificial origin of names, it proceeds to a long etymological excursus by Socrates which is mainly jocular in intention. At the end of the dialogue Socrates declares that knowledge does not depend upon names, nor can its objects be the transient contents of the phenomenal world, but that knowledge is of "the beautiful itself, the good itself, and all such things" (439C). This last is the positive conclusion of the work, yet it is the discussion of the origin of names which is the main theme; and into this discussion the Heraclitean view of the world as flux is introduced. Cratylus, who supports the natural validity of names against Hermogenes' belief in their artificial origin, accepts from Socrates a Heraclitean argument for this natural validity, and is commonly written down by modern critics as a Heraclitean who also had ideas on speech and words.⁵

Yet if the dialogue is examined closely, and without preconceptions derived from Aristotle's treatment of Cratylus as a Heraclitean and nothing else, it will be seen that Cratylus is first and foremost a protagonist of the natural validity, ὁρθότης, of names; thus at 427E he describes this problem as ὁ δὲ δοκεῖ ἐν

⁴ "Zwei Fragen zum Kratylos," *N. Philol. Unters.*, V (1929). Warburg's thesis was violently criticized by von Arnim, "Die sprachliche Forschung," *Wien. Sitzb.*, CCX (1929), and is by no means universally accepted, e. g. not by Goldschmidt, *Essai sur le Cratyle* (Paris, 1940), p. 33, n. 7.

⁵ So e. g. O. Apelt, *Kratylos* (1922), p. 2: "um so sicherer ist, was wir aus unserem Dialog erfahren, das weiterhin seine Schule (sc. Heraclitus'), zu der Kratylos gehörte, eine Sprachtheorie vertrat, die sich ganz auf des Heraklits Bewegungslehre gründete." V. Goldschmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 32 ff., deals at some length with the question of the historical Cratylus without solving the real difficulties or breaking any new ground, but has useful remarks on the linguistic views of Democritus and Antisthenes (pp. 16-20). Other recent writers on the dialogue have confined themselves chiefly to the elucidation of Plato's theory of language, and have been content to accept the conventional view of Cratylus: see Goldschmidt's bibliography.

τοῖς μέγιστον εἶναι. It is *Socrates* who introduces the Heraclitean idea of flux, and this before *Cratylus* has properly entered the conversation; the latter accepts the idea only because he has been misled by *Socrates* into thinking that it supports his own theory about names. When *Socrates* goes back on his tracks and removes this apparent support *Cratylus* is left confusedly and futilely clinging to the Heraclitean view, which *Socrates* had apparently justified by so many persuasive etymologies. Thus the dialogue does not reveal *Cratylus* as a convinced Heraclitean, but as a convinced believer in the natural validity of names who is led to accede, mistakenly and perhaps temporarily, to the theory of universal flux. This contention is supported by the detailed analysis of the *Cratylus* which follows—an analysis which is necessarily selective and therefore to some extent subjective. Not all the convolutions of the argument are followed up, and many transient concessions by *Cratylus* are passed by; it is hoped that the total picture is a fair one, but the reader can only satisfy himself about this by referring to the dialogue itself. He should be warned that two passages (440C-D, and *Cratylus*' remark at 440D-E, ἀλλά μοι σκοπομένῳ κτλ.) are given a new interpretation on which the present thesis largely stands or falls, and should therefore be examined especially critically.

At the opening of the dialogue *Hermogenes* and *Cratylus* have decided to refer an argument to *Socrates*. *Hermogenes* says (383A): "Cratylus here, *Socrates*, says that there is a naturally existing correctness of name for each of the things that are (ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων φύσει πεφυκυῖαν); and that this is not a name, whatsoever people call a thing by mutual agreement, uttering for it a piece of their own voice, but that there exists some correctness of names, both for Greeks and for barbarians, the same for all. So I ask him if *Cratylus* is in truth his name, and he agrees . . . (384). And when I ask and am eager to know whatever he means, he makes nothing clear and dissembles toward me, claiming to have some private idea of his own as though he knew all about it—which, if he wished to speak it out, would make me too agree and share his views. . . ." ⁶ *Socrates* undertakes to examine the problem, and *Hermo-*

⁶ This "private idea" of *Cratylus* is not revealed in the dialogue, and it must be assumed that it is pure humbug. It is not the theory of

genes, who is the respondent for the first and greater part of the dialogue, states his own position (384C-D): "For my part indeed, Socrates, I have frequently talked both with Cratylus here and with many others, yet am unable to be persuaded that there is any other correctness of names than compact and agreement." Hermogenes is led by Socrates to profess a subjectivist view (385D): $\Sigma\Omega$. $\delta\ \alpha\upsilon\ \alpha\pi\alpha\ \epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \phi\eta\ \tau\omega\ \delta\upsilon\omicron\mu\alpha\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$, $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu\ \epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omega\ \delta\upsilon\omicron\mu\alpha$; 'EPM. *Nal.* Yet he denies that he really agrees with Protagoras. Socrates now leads him to admit to some sort of natural validity of names: naming is an action which has some sort of reality (387D), names were devised by some lawgiver or namemaker who had the ability "to put the name which exists by nature for each thing into his sounds and syllables," just as the shuttle-maker looks to the task which the shuttle has to perform, and to the essential nature of Shuttle, to determine what shape to give it. Socrates hints that this concession to Cratylus' view is dialectical (indeed it appears to involve a gross *petitio principii*), yet he admits, apparently seriously, that (391A) "so much already is apparent beyond our previous assumptions, both that the name does have *some* correctness by nature and that not every man has the ability to apply it correctly to any object." The next task is to determine the character of this "correctness." After considering the difference between divine and human names in Homer, Socrates examines and finds appropriate some of the proper names of mythology, professing that he is "inspired" by Euthyphro; the names of deities are treated next, then words like *δαίμονες* (derived by Socrates from *δαήμονες*). At 401C *οὐσία* is described as having the dialect variants *ἑσσία* and *ὥσία*: the second of these is connected with *ὠθεῖν*, and Heraclitus is mentioned for the first time (401 D): $\delta\sigma\omicron\iota\ \delta'\ \alpha\upsilon\ \acute{\omega}\sigma\iota\alpha\nu$ [*sc.* *λέγουσιν*] $\sigma\chi\epsilon\delta\acute{o}\nu\ \tau\iota\ \alpha\upsilon\ \omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\ \kappa\alpha\theta'$ $\text{'Η}\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\lambda\epsilon\iota\tau\omicron\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\ \eta\gamma\omicron\iota\acute{\nu}\tau\omicron\ \tau\grave{\alpha}\ \delta\upsilon\tau\alpha\ \acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota\ \tau\epsilon\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ (Hermogenes is still respondent; Cratylus has no part in this conversation). This derivation allows Socrates to see a "swarm of wisdom" (*σμήνος σοφίας*, an extravagant phrase which warns us, but not Cratylus, not to take what follows too seriously): "I seem to spy Heraclitus saying certain ancient words of wisdom,

flux, for Cratylus simply accepts this from Socrates and does not profess to have held such a view himself.

simply things from the time of Cronus and Rhea, which Homer too said. *Herm.* What do you mean by this? *Soc.* Heraclitus says somewhere that all things move and nothing remains still, and likening the things that are to the flux of a stream he says that you would not step twice into the same river (402A: λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπαικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὥς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης).

. . . Do you think that he who gave the names 'Cronus' and 'Rhea' to the ancestors of the other gods had anything different in mind from Heraclitus? . . . Observe then that these names agree with each other and all tend toward the words of Heraclitus." Socrates does not pursue this intuition further until 411C, where he remarks that the old name-givers were like "the majority of the wise men of today, who are always becoming dizzy through frequently revolving in their search for the nature of existing things, and then it appears to them that the objects are revolving and in motion," not themselves. For, Socrates enquires of Hermogenes, "perhaps you did not notice that in the case of what we were just talking about the names were applied to the objects altogether as though these were in motion and flowing and becoming?" This contention is illustrated from moral terms, and it is discovered that "good" words contain the idea of motion, "bad" words that of rest and hindrance. At 422C Socrates becomes serious again and attempts to fulfill his promise of 391A, to determine the character of whatever correctness adheres to names: they are found to *imitate* the things for which they stand, through the natural associations of letters and sounds—thus iota and rho suggest movement, delta and tau, rest. Here Cratylus is brought into the discussion to replace the confused Hermogenes, who withdraws with a reiterated complaint about Cratylus' obscurity in his defence of the correctness of names. The latter admits (428B) to having "both investigated such things in person and learned from others," and to Socrates' injunction: "If you have anything better to say, enrol me also as one of your pupils in the correctness of names," he replies: "Perhaps I *will* make you a pupil." Neither remark should be taken too seriously, yet Cratylus had clearly devoted a more than amateur attention to this study, and it is not at all impossible that, even at the period represented in the dia-

logue, he was embarking upon the career of a professional philologist.

Cratylus declares that he has nothing to add to Socrates' treatment of names, which had after all reached the (to Cratylus) satisfactory conclusion that they have a kind of natural *ὁρθότης*.⁷ Socrates however returns to the attack, and to his question (429B): "Are then all names correctly assigned?" Cratylus replies: "As many as *are* names" (*ὅσα γε ὀνόματά ἐστιν*). This involves the view that false utterance is impossible because it means saying that which is not, and that which is not cannot exist—a view emphasized in a slightly different form by Parmenides⁸ and the Eleatics, but one which was not exclusively their prerogative and was commonly held by sophists and others until Plato's final unmasking of the predication problem in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. Cratylus develops this argument by asking in true Parmenidean style: "How could anyone, saying that which he says, not say that which *is*" (*τὸ ὄν*, which also has the connotation "that which is true")? Against this argument Socrates brings up his theory that names are imitations of things; false names are simply bad imitations—to which Cratylus is eventually (431A) forced to agree. He also agrees with the earlier argument that names resemble things because their elements, i. e. letters, have their own separate associations. Under pressure his assertions become more extreme, and at 435D he says: "Whosoever knows the names knows the objects too." To meet Socrates' objection that the original name-giver may just have misjudged the nature of the objects he adduces a fresh, non-Eleatic argument, which represents his first positive championship of the theory of flux originally mentioned by Socrates: (436B-C) ". . . but it is necessary that he who gave the names did so in full knowledge; otherwise, as I keep on saying, they would not be names at all. And let this be your greatest proof that the name-giver was not balked of the truth: in this case his names would not all have been so consistent—or did you not

⁷ Contrast what A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, p. 84, has to say about this attitude: "Cratylus now replaces him (*sc.* Hermogenes) as interlocutor. He is delighted with all that Socrates has said—no doubt because Socrates has professed to find Heracliteanism embodied in the very structure of language—and thinks it could hardly be bettered."

⁸ Cf. Parmenides, fr. 5 (Diels-Kranz); fr. 8, 8; fr. 8, 34.

notice that you yourself said that all names were formed in the same way and to the same end" (*κατὰ ταῦτόν καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτόν*)? The reference is, of course, to the "flowing" etymology of good words, the "static" etymology of bad words; but it is the *fact* of a consistency in names, rather than their consistent content, which interests Cratylus here. Socrates replies very much to the point, that consistency in conclusions is no proof of the correctness of their premises; if the initial assessment of objects by the name-giver was wrong, then the consistency of the names assigned to them is not particularly significant; all it tells us is that the name-giver had an orderly mind. Before Cratylus has time to comment on this argument—and he would surely have maintained that the whole system of names cannot be wrong, otherwise there would be no names at all and no significant speech—Socrates continues that in any case he doubts whether names really are consistent (436E): "Let us review our previous discussion. Names, we say, indicate reality to us, with the implication that everything is moving and flowing. Do you think that this is what they show? *Crat.* Very much so, and they certainly indicate it correctly" (*πάνυ σφόδρα, καὶ ὁρθῶς γε σημαίνει*). Cratylus' vehemence here is surely due to his determination to cling to an argument of which he is rather proud, and which he still thinks can save his belief in the natural correctness of names in spite of Socrates' warning of the fallaciousness of the argument from consistency. Perhaps sensing obstinacy, Socrates proceeds to destroy the consistency which he himself had so laboriously demonstrated; examples are given of etymologies which suggest not universal flux but universal rest, and Socrates concludes: "I think one would find many other names too, if one took the trouble, which would lead one to the opposite opinion, that the name-giver indicated objects not as in motion but as stationary." He is of course merely toying with the unfortunate Cratylus, who objects that nevertheless *most* names (of those which had been examined) indicate motion, to which Socrates answers that absolute *ὁρθότης* does not rest with a majority: if the argument from consistency has to be used, then at any rate all names must tell the same story. Eventually (438C) Cratylus remembers to assert that one or other of the opposed classes are not names at all, in other words that all true names do consistently give the same picture of reality; but he

does not here seem certain which class should be chosen. At this point Socrates becomes serious again and suggests that knowledge is to be acquired not from names, as Cratylus thought, but from things themselves, of which names are more or less bad imitations. Cratylus concedes this with a hesitant *Φαίvera* (439B), and Socrates proceeds to the following important question: "Consider, my excellent Cratylus, what I often dream of. Are we to say that the beautiful itself and the good itself and each of such things are anything, or not?—I think so, Socrates.—Then let us consider *that*, and not whether a certain face is beautiful, or any such thing, and whether all these things seem to be in flux; but shall we say that the beautiful itself is not always of the kind which it is?" Cratylus is not willing to say this, in fact at this point he agrees with everything that Socrates says; probably the reason is that Plato is subordinating the dramatic purpose of the dialogue to the clear and vital statement by Socrates of the theory of Forms⁹—perhaps the first statement in the dialogues, in point of time, in which the epistemological argument is explicitly defined. This occurs a few lines later at 440A: "But in addition neither would it (*sc.* that which changes) be known by anyone; for at the instant when the potential knower approached, it would become something else and different in character, so that its nature and state could no longer be known . . . but it is not even reasonable to say that knowledge exists, Cratylus, if all things are changing and nothing stays still." On the other hand, Socrates continues, if there is such a thing as knowledge and the stable realities which can be its objects, then one is obliged to deny the Heraclitean thesis that *all* things are changing. The two alternatives being thus outlined Socrates emphasizes the necessity for a choice between them. The correct interpretation of the passage which follows is not so simple as it appears. Socrates mentions (i) the belief that all things flow, and (ii) the belief that names are correct (from which Cratylus' agreement with Socrates' postulation of Forms *appears* to proceed); but it is not immediately clear how he relates these two ideas. The Greek is as follows (440C-D):
ταῦτ' οὖν πότερόν ποτε οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἐκείνως ὥς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε λέγουσι καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, μὴ οὐ ῥᾶδιον ἢ ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πάνυ νοῦν

⁹ So Goldschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 176, n. 2.

ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν
 θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτά, δυσχυρίζεσθαι
 ὥς τι εἰδότα (καὶ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγινώσκειν) ὥς οὐδὲν
 ὑγιὲς οὐδενὸς ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ῥεῖ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ
 κατάρρῳ νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως οἶεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι,
 ὑπὸ ῥεύματός τε καὶ κατάρρου πάντα [τὰ] χρήματα ἔχεσθαι. ἴσως μὲν
 οὖν δῆ, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ οὐ. (The Oxford text
 of Burnet has commas after οὐδενός and εἰδότα, and no paren-
 thesis; otherwise it is as above). I propose the following as the
 correct translation:

Whether these things are thus, or in the way that Hera-
 clitus' entourage and many others say, is perhaps not easy to
 determine; nor perhaps is it the characteristic of a sensible
 man that,¹⁰ once having entrusted to names himself and the
 care of his soul, having confidence in¹¹ them and their
 assignors, he should assert as though in full knowledge (and
 thus condemn both himself and reality) that there is no
 sound part of anything but that all things flow like leaky
 pots, and just like men suffering from running noses that
 he should think that things too are so disposed—that all
 things are gripped by flux and catarrh. Now perhaps,
 Cratylus, these things are so; but perhaps again they are not.

The construction is *δυσχυρίζεσθαι ὥς τι εἰδότα . . . ὥς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς
 οὐδενός <ἐστι> . δυσχυρίζεσθαι, καταγινώσκειν, οἶεσθαι*, are the three
 infinitives of the accusative and infinitive subject-clause; *κατα-
 γινώσκειν*, although grammatically parallel with the others, is
 explanatory and subordinate in sense; I have therefore set its
 clause in parentheses.

According to this translation the thing which "condemns both
 himself and reality" is not simply that a man should believe that
 "there is no sound part of anything, but that all things flow":
 it is the fact that he holds this belief simultaneously with the
 other irreconcilable belief in the natural validity of names. It is

¹⁰ Accusative and infinitive as subject-clause: cf. e.g. Plato, *Apology*,
 29A: τὸ γὰρ θάνατον δεδιέναι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα.

¹¹ *πιστεύειν* in Plato always means "have confidence in" (with the
 dative). The sense "entrust something to something" does not occur in
 Plato; otherwise it might be possible to translate: ". . . having turned
 himself over to names, and having entrusted his soul to them and their
 assignors to care for . . ." which would do away with the somewhat
 unusual asyndeton between *ἐπιτρέψαντα* and *πεπιστευκότα*.

the combination of two such beliefs which, according to Socrates, would be the mark of a fool. If things are always changing then the *φύσει* . . . *ὁρθότης* which names are said to have is destroyed; if names do have such an *ὁρθότης* then the objects which they represent cannot always be changing.

This is not the conventional interpretation of the passage. According to other translators (and e.g. the paraphrase by Shorey, *What Plato Said*, p. 267), Socrates is simply telling Cratylus to stop attaching any importance to the apparent presence of the flux-idea in etymologies; it is the belief in mere names which by itself is the characteristic of a fool, for it leads to a view of the world—that all is flux—which is quite impossible. Three well-known translations are given below, all of which lead to this interpretation, and I know of no other translation which avoids this fault.

Jowett	Apelt (<i>Krat.</i> 131)	H. N. Fowler (Loeb ed.)
<p>. . . and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers of names as to be confident of any knowledge which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot . . .</p>	<p>. . . und es steht einem vernünftigen Menschen schlecht an die Sorge für das Heil seiner selbst und seiner Seele von den Worten abhängig zu machen. Das führt nur dazu, im Vertrauen auf sie und auf die Namengeber sich dreist als ein Weisen anzugeben und so über sich zugleich wie über die Dinge abzuurteilen, als gebe es nichts Gesundes an irgend einem Ding, sondern alles fliesse wie in reissender Strömung¹² . . .</p>	<p>. . . but surely no man of sense can put himself and his soul under the control of names, and trust in names and their makers to the point of affirming that he knows anything; nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots . . .</p>

These translators all get into difficulties with *δυσχερῖζεσθαι ὥς τι εἶδόντα* . . . *καταγινώσκειν*, and their attempts seem to fall short of total accuracy; indeed it is an interesting speculation what Jowett and Fowler at any rate thought the construction actually was.

Now whether or not the Greek can be made to mean anything like any of these translations, such an interpretation is intrinsically improbable. Having carefully outlined the choice between the views that all things flow, and that beauty itself, etc. exist, and having asserted that this choice is not easy, Socrates is

¹² Reading, most improbably, *χειμάρροα* for *κεράμια*.

extremely unlikely to have destroyed his show of objectivity by prejudging the issue and saying that the flux-view necessarily involves condemning oneself and reality, in short that it is quite wrong. It is clear of course that this is Socrates' own opinion, and that he deliberately ridicules the idea of universal flux with his catarrh-simile; but he would hardly *formally* reject one alternative within the limits of the very sentence in which the alternatives are formally stated, and immediately before a formal recapitulation of the possibility of choice between the alternatives ("perhaps these things are so; but perhaps again they are not.") This type of phrase in Plato is usually intended to carry the emphasis on the second member; nevertheless, formally it expresses the possibility that either of two alternatives may be true).

To recapitulate my argument on 440C-D: Socrates here outlines two alternatives: either (a) things such as knowledge, the knower, the known, the beautiful, the good, exist and are unchanging; or (b) the Heraclitean view that all things are constantly changing is true. He then adds a rider addressed particularly to Cratylus, that a sensible man could not believe both (a) and (b) at the same time—which is just what Cratylus is inclining to do: for a belief in the natural correctness of names involves (as Plato really sees, and as he argues elsewhere) a belief in certain abiding common qualities to which some class-name can be attached. These qualities come under (a) and are irreconcilable with (b). Socrates makes it clear that Cratylus has been led to accept (b) in defence of his theory of names, whereas in fact this theory should logically lead him to accept (a). The whole passage is an *argumentum ad hominem* and does not suggest that Socrates himself agrees finally with the belief in names.

Cratylus however fails to see the point of Socrates' warning, and to his injunction to "consider well and manfully, and not accept lightly—for you are still young and in your prime; and if, on consideration, you make a discovery, give me also a share in it," he replies as follows (440D-E): "Yes, I will do so. Yet be well assured, Socrates, that not even now am I unreflecting, but to me as I deliberate and exert myself it appears to be much more in the way that Heraclitus said" ('Αλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. εὔ μέντοι ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ νυνὶ ἀσκέπτως ἔχω, ἀλλὰ

μοι σκοπομένῳ καὶ πράγματα ἔχοντι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκείνως φαίνεται ἔχειν ὡς Ἡράκλειτος λέγει). So, after one more trivial exchange, the dialogue ends. Now Cratylus' profession of adhesion to Heraclitus is almost invariably¹³ taken as referring to the time before the dialogue takes place: Cratylus was a Heraclitean and here he says so. Yet this appears totally to disregard the *present* principles in the passage just quoted, σκοπομένῳ and ἔχοντι, which, taken with the present tense of the main verb φαίνεται, must mean that these activities are contemporary. If Cratylus really meant that he had *in the past* (i. e. before the time of the dialogue) devoted, and was continuing to devote, careful attention to the Heraclitean view, we should have not present but perfect participles. The phrase ἀσκέπτως ἔχω is neutral and can either mean σκοποῦμαι or ἔσκεμμαι, but the former must be the case in view of the present forms which follow. Cratylus is therefore referring to the active consideration which he has been devoting to the problem during the dialogue itself, and especially during the formulation by Socrates of the alternatives. The present tenses, admittedly, logically do not preclude previous consideration continuing into the present, but in the absence of positive evidence and in view of the general probabilities of the case his adoption of the Heraclitean view seems to be a recent and perhaps a transient affair; at least an opinion reached in so shallow and unthinking a manner could be abandoned just as quickly.

The foregoing examination of the dialogue has reached the conclusion that Cratylus is not portrayed there as a convinced and established Heraclitean, but as a young man whose primary interest is the origin and validity of names, who grasps eagerly at the hypothesis proposed by Socrates, that the correctness of names may be shown by the fact that they all seem to point to a single cosmic theory (that all things flow), and who clings to this hypothesis, which he had welcomed so warmly, even when it has been discredited by Socrates and the irreconcilability of the Heraclitean view with Cratylus' belief in the natural correctness of names has been clearly shown. At first sight it is surprising that the dialogue should end with one of the main participants clinging to a quite untenable position, even though Socrates has

¹³ M. Leky, *Plato als Sprachphilosoph*, p. 82, translates correctly: " . . . aber indem ich darüber ernsthaft nachdenke, scheint es mir. . . ."

hinted at further discussion of the question with Cratylus. Dramatically, however, the ending is not without point. Cratylus has appeared in the earlier part of the work as an obstinate dogmatist who refused to expand or support his contentions at the request of Hermogenes. In the conversation with Socrates he is perhaps no more obstinate than other respondents in other dialogues, until the very end; but in gullibility he comes well up to the standard of most of Socrates' victims. It is by no means contrary to human nature that a young man of this type should reach a state of confusion in which he refuses to think clearly and merely reiterates with increasing vigour his belief in what at first appeared to be a positive proof of his primary contention.

At this point it is worth considering the attempts of orthodox interpreters of the *Cratylus* to solve the dilemma which confronts them: how could an extreme Heraclitean, like Cratylus as he appears in Aristotle, have also believed in the natural validity of names? These attempts have taken five separate directions; in every case they show considerable weaknesses, which I briefly describe.

(1) Plato's picture is not intended to be historical, and Cratylus did not really believe in the validity of names, although this was a problem which interested many of his contemporaries.—This is the underlying motive of E. Weerts' treatment of Plato's "historical dialectic," in his "Plato und der Héraklitismus," *Philologus*, Supplb. XXIII, 1 (1931). Weerts is also attracted to some extent by (3) below, which, like (2), presupposes a similar view of Plato's historical methods and intentions. Now admittedly Plato did not set out to be a historian in any sense, any more than Aristotle did; the dangers of taking the dialogues too literally as historical documents are well known. On the other hand they are not entirely fictitious, and the characters named in them lived not so very long before, so that Plato could not take too great liberties with them. One can hardly doubt that the historical figures whom Plato chose to be Socrates' respondents (many of whom may well have played this part in real life) had some connexion at least with the views which they are made to support, in the first place at all events, in the dialogues—and often an obvious connexion, otherwise the dialogues would lose much of their dramatic interest for those who read them. Thus Euthydemus was in fact an eristic and a dealer

in fallacies in predication, Laches was a simple soldier, Protagoras to some extent a subjectivist. As the dialogues advance such figures are made by Socrates to agree to opinions which they might never have held in real life; but it is often not hard to detect these extravagances. Even at their first appearance in the dialogue they may be, and undoubtedly often are, caricatured; yet the essence of caricature is that it puts all the emphasis on a man's most prominent feature, not that it totally misrepresents him. Even with due allowance for Plato's lack of historical intentions, and for such added hazards as Socrates' "irony," there is still perceptible in the Platonic dialogues a hard core of truth. It may not be too imprudent to assert that Cratylus' keen interest in names (and perhaps particularly in etymology, though it is Socrates who does the etymologizing) belongs to this core of historical fact.

(2) Cratylus was a Heraclitean, but Plato grafted on to him the personality of Antisthenes, whom we know to have been interested in the correctness of names, but not in Heracliteanism; in other dialogues too Plato attacked Antisthenes, whom, however, he never actually named from motives of delicacy. This composite personality accounts for any inconsistency in the ideas ascribed to Cratylus.—The discovery of Antisthenes in the dialogues, ruthlessly pursued by e.g. Hermann, T. Gomperz, Dümmmler, and Natorp, has been effectively opposed by e.g. Zeller, Kirchner, and, most decisively, by Wilamowitz in *Platon*, I, pp. 294 f., whose work was elaborated by Dahlmann. In fact the Antisthenes-theory is almost dead; but Kiöck (*De Cratylī Platonici indole ac fine*, pp. 44 f.) has maintained more plausibly that Plato in his picture of Cratylus was representing "sophistae grammatici ideam," of which the historical Antisthenes may have been an important element. Yet it is just as hard to reconcile Antisthenes or any such etymologist with the doctrine of flux as it is Cratylus.

(3) Cratylus was a Heraclitean and a relativist but he held no theory of names; Plato was led to ascribe such a belief to him by his close acquaintance with Heraclides Ponticus, a prominent member of the Academy and a man who was probably interested in both Heraclitus and the theory of names. Cratylus to some extent represents the views of Heraclides, who could not be named in person in a dialogue set many years in the past.—This

is the theory of Warburg, "Zwei Fragen zum Kratylus," *N. Philol. Unters.*, V (1929), pp. 8 ff. and 23-31. It is an ingenious theory which, however, again demands a very liberal view of Plato's use of the dialogues; in addition it does not remove the difficulty of a single man (this time Heraclides) holding inconsistent ideas. Actually our knowledge of Heraclides' interests is extremely indefinite, and while we know that he wrote four books of *ἐξηγήσεις* on Heraclitus (Diogenes Laertius, V, 88), we do not know that he accepted the Heraclitean theories as correct.

(4) Cratylus was a Heraclitean who "claimed to obtain through names that knowledge of things which he despaired of obtaining through the senses": so Henry Jackson, *Cambridge Praelections*, 1906, p. 11. This explanation fails to account for the particular situation of the dialogue, where Cratylus appears to welcome the Heraclitean theory of flux because he thinks it supports his primary belief in the natural correctness of names; which is the reverse of resorting to names because the belief in flux has induced scepticism about any other means of obtaining knowledge. Of course Jackson and other scholars who have tried to reconcile a belief in flux with one in the natural correctness of names did not perceive that the Cratylus of the Platonic dialogue is not so simple in his relationship to Heracliteanism as the Cratylus of Aristotle; but simply as a reconciliation of two logically inconsistent theories this type of solution has considerable merits. A more or less irrational belief in a natural connexion between names and things recurs again and again in Greek thought. Such a belief is perhaps magical in origin: knowledge of the exact name of a person, which is an essential part of him, confers power over him. The ritualistic implications of names are analogous: a deity has to be addressed by his full titles, otherwise the invocation is not only ineffective, but actually offensive. Thus Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, 681, 689, 1081, relates the names of gods to their functions; cf. Heraclitus, fr. 32 (Diels). Heraclitus indeed appears to have thought that words had a significance other than artificial, and when he said (fr. 48) that "the name of the bow is life (*βίος* life, *βίος* bow), but its function is death," he probably thought that he was adverting another valid example of the coincidence of opposites. So too word-plays like *μόρον—μοίρας* (fr. 25) and *ξὺν νόμῳ—ξυνῶ* (fr. 114) may be more than mere tricks of style. Indeed Warburg,

op. cit., p. 11, is probably right in thinking that no special, conscious theory of language should be attributed to Heraclitus; nevertheless words have real significance for him, as Snell, *Hermes*, LXIII (1926), pp. 386 ff., and Calogero, *Giornale Critica di Filosofia Italiana* (1936), pp. 204-9, have shown: cf. also Goldschmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 f. An irrational belief of this kind, perhaps developed into but still underlying a conscious theory of language, might explain how names as a source of knowledge could be accepted even when the things which names "naturally" represent have been rejected. Such a belief would be illogical by our standards and by Aristotle's, and by Plato's too; its illogicality is just what is pointed out in *Cratylus*, 440C-D, as has been demonstrated; but this does not mean that it could not have been held by a sophist at the end of the fifth century.¹⁴

(5) Cratylus was a Heraclitean and a Protagorean subjectivist, combining these two positions much as Plato does at *Theaetetus*, 152D-E; he was led by his belief in flux to think that all names were correct for the namer.—So, with reservations, Calogero, *Enciclopedia Italiana*, XI, p. 805, s. v. "Cratilo." Karl Reinhardt, one may infer, subscribed at one time to a variation of this view: the Heracliteans, he maintained in *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, pp. 241 ff., were, like Protagoras, reactionaries against extreme Eleaticism who chose the escape offered by relativism, itself suggested by the Parmenidean *πρὸς δόξαν* and Melissus. These relativists later adopted the physical idea of flux from Heraclitus because they thought it supported their theory of knowledge, and so became "Heracliteans." The Cratylus of the dialogue is an example of such a Heraclitean.—This explanation of the Cratylus of the dialogue ignores the fact that it is Hermogenes, not

¹⁴ The argument might be advanced that *because* Cratylus was a Heraclitean he was led to combine the idea of flux with a belief in the natural correctness of names—both of which ideas are present in Heraclitus. But the latter idea was probably not developed by Heraclitus, and I believe that the *πάντα ῥεῖ* hypothesis, in the form in which it is presented by Plato, was not held by Heraclitus, whose views on change would not of themselves lead to the kind of scepticism envisaged for Cratylus by Aristotle. In any case Cratylus clearly went far beyond Heraclitus, and an inconsistency in his position is not fully justified by pointing to the hypothetical roots of such an inconsistency in Heraclitus.

Cratylus, who is tempted to adopt the subjectivist position; for further discussion see below.

The article on Cratylus by Julius Stenzel, in Pauly-Wissowa, *R.-E.*, XXII, cols. 1660 ff., shows with great clarity the difficulty of satisfactorily reconciling the divergent theories accepted by orthodox interpreters of the dialogue. By accepting Aristotle's evidence that Cratylus was an extreme Heraclitean he is led to believe that Cratylus' doctrine was a "continuation of Heracliteanism to the point of radical scepticism," and to admit the real inconsistency with this of the objective correctness of names proclaimed by Cratylus in the dialogue; he attempts to meet this difficulty by supporting Kiöck [cf. (2) above, *ad fin.*]. A strange part of Stenzel's treatment [cf. also Calogero in (5) above] is that he professes to find in the dialogue a belief by Cratylus in a subjective, as well as an objective, correctness of names. The latter is certainly present and is explicitly asserted throughout; indeed when questioned about the origin of names Cratylus had advanced the theory that they have an objective, divine origin (438C): "I think that the truest saying about them is, Socrates, that some greater than human power attached the first names to things, so that it is necessary that they are correct." The idea that Cratylus showed a belief in a merely subjective value of names seems to depend chiefly on two passages: (i) Hermogenes said at the beginning of the dialogue (383A) that Cratylus assumed "a certain correctness of names *both for Greeks and for barbarians, the same for all.*" Now it might be argued that if the Greek and, say, the Persian name for a common object, for example a bed, were totally different and could not even be connected by one of Socrates' linguistic devices, then the correctness that inheres in each of these different names must be relative to the two different races: for an object cannot have more than one "naturally correct" name. Thus Cratylus was really accepting a relativist view. But this interpretation is the opposite of the truth: the words "the same for all" (*τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασι*) surely imply a universal correctness which is unaffected by racial conventions and differences. Cratylus would doubtless have argued against this objection that a Persian bed, by the very fact of being Persian, was different from a Greek bed and therefore deserved a different name. If a Persian came to Greece and used the Persian name for a Greek bed, doubtless this

would be incorrect and the Persian name would on this occasion be non-significant and therefore not really a name at all. (ii) At 429B, as we saw, Cratylus professed to an Eleatic belief in the impossibility of false names and false assertions. Thus Calogero, *loc. cit.*, writes apropos of this profession: "S'intende che tale 'esattezza' (*ἀρθότης*) intrinseca del linguaggio . . . se corrispondeva in sostanza alla 'verità' soggettiva e assoluta di Protagora" But when Cratylus asked: "How could anyone, saying that which he says, not say¹⁵ that which is?", he does not mean that any sound uttered by a man for any object is correct. An object only has one correct name and anyone who tries to call it anything else is not naming it at all but only uttering "a piece of voice," *φωνῆς μῶριον* (383A). Thus these two passages, when rightly interpreted, support Cratylus' belief not in the subjective, but in the objective validity of names.

The upshot of the foregoing examination of various attempts to account for Cratylus' professed belief in the natural correctness of names, in the Platonic dialogue, is that only by supposing with Jackson that a prior Heracliteanism led to a resort to names as the only means of knowledge can we reconcile the two different elements in Cratylus;¹⁶ and this does not fit the conclusion elicited from the dialogue, that Cratylus adopted the Heraclitean view (whether temporarily or permanently) *as a result* of his ideas about names.

At this stage it is advisable to turn to Aristotle's evidence for Cratylus, according to which he was an extreme Heraclitean. The first of the two relevant passages is the famous one describing the origins of Plato's philosophy, in *Metaphysics* A, of which a paraphrase, composed somewhat later, occurs in M:

<i>Met.</i> , A 6, 987a29	<i>Met.</i> , M 4, 1078b9	Translation of <i>Met.</i> A
(Plato to some extent followed the Italian philosophy, but was subject to other influences too)	(For translation see p. 251 below.) (The theory of Forms resulted, for those who held it)	

¹⁵ λέγειν in Greek has the connotation "significant utterance."

¹⁶ The possibility that Plato shows Cratylus at the exact moment of change from a belief in names to a belief in flux can be dismissed. Why should Plato suddenly become so historical about an event which seems to have taken place before he was born? And if Aristotle is right, it was not as a believer in names that Cratylus interested Plato.

Met., A 6, 987a29

ἐκ νέου τε γὰρ συνήθης
γενόμενος πρῶτον Κρα-
τύλῳ καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλει-
τείοις δόξαις ὡς ἀπάντων
τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ ρέοντων
καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν
οὐκ οὐσης, ταῦτα μὲν καὶ
ὑστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν.
(Socrates with his ethical
definitions, reached induc-
tively, was another in-
fluence).

Met., M 4, 1078b9

διὰ τὸ πεισθῆναι περὶ
τῆς ἀληθείας τοῖς Ἡρα-
κλειτέοις λόγοις ὡς πάν-
των τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ
ρέοντων, ὥστε εἴπερ
ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἔσται καὶ
φρόνησις, ἑτέρας δεῖν
τινὰς φύσεις εἶναι παρὰ
τὰς αἰσθητάς, μενούσας·
οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τῶν ρέον-
των ἐπιστήμην.

Translation of Met. A

For having become famil-
iar from youth up with
Cratylus and the Hera-
clitean opinions that all
existing things are always
flowing and that knowl-
edge about them is im-
possible, these things he
supposed to be so later on
in life too.

Here Aristotle attributes to Cratylus not only the Heraclitean view that all things are in flux, but also the epistemological deduction from this that knowledge of such things is impossible *because* they are in flux and constantly changing. That this deduction is attributed to Cratylus, and is not just made by Aristotle himself, is shown more clearly in the version of M, where the indirect discourse of οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τῶν ρέοντων ἐπιστήμην shows quite clearly that this conclusion belongs to Cratylus. Thus this statement by Aristotle supports the theory that it was a scepticism arising out of the Heraclitean position that all things are in flux which might have driven Cratylus to his trust in names; although Aristotle himself seems to ignore this last part of Cratylus' beliefs.

The second Aristotelian passage is *Metaphysics*, Γ 5, 1010a7:

... ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην
κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ
μεταβάλλοντος οὐθὲν ἀληθεύμενον,
περὶ γε τὸ πάντη πάντως μεταβάλ-
λον οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν. ἐκ
γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξήνθη-
σεν ἡ ἀκροτάτη δόξα τῶν εἰρημένων,
ἡ τῶν φασκόντων Ἡρακλείτῳ
καὶ οἷαν Κράτυλος εἶχεν, ὃς τὸ
τελευταῖον οὐθὲν ᾔετο δεῖν λέγειν
ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον,
καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπειμα εἰπόντι ὅτι
δὲς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν
ἐμβῆναι· αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾔετο οὐδ'
ἅπαξ.

Further (sc. they believed that
knowledge is impossible) through
seeing that all this natural world
is in movement, and that nothing
is truly asserted about that which
is changing—at least, that about
that which is changing all over in
every way it is impossible to make
a true assertion. From this belief
blossomed the most extreme opin-
ion of those under discussion, that
of those who profess to follow
Heraclitus—an opinion such as
Cratylus held, who finally thought
it improper to say anything but
only moved his finger, and blamed
Heraclitus for saying that it is im-
possible to step twice into the same
river, for he thought, once and
once.

Here Aristotle asserts more positively that Cratylus was led by the epistemological consequences of the theory of flux to an extreme scepticism. The indication of things with the finger rather than by words might appear to have some connexion with the quotation from the Socratic Aeschines at *Rhetoric*, I 16, 1417b1, cited in n. 3 on p. 1. However, although the phrase *τοῖν χερσὶν διασείων* occurs there, we are told that Cratylus did this while talking, and not therefore as a substitute for speech. Aristotle quotes this as an instance of rhetorical peculiarity, and it must be assumed that the context in Aeschines¹⁷ did not preclude this interpretation. Yet if we can trace no source for the pointing-anecdote, we seem to be able to do this for the other anecdote, about the river. Aristotle summarizes Heraclitus' belief, as criticized by Cratylus, as follows: *δὲς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι*. These words closely resemble the language of Plato at *Cratylus*, 402A: [*Ἡράκλειτος*] *λέγει ὡς δὲς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης*. The two slight differences in construction do not negative the implication of the very similar word-order and choice of words: that Aristotle is here dependent upon Plato for his summary of Heraclitus. It is possible, of course, that Aristotle and Plato were both quoting or closely paraphrasing some familiar words of Heraclitus, and that their similarity is due to the use of a common source. Most authorities, however, now follow Reinhardt (*Parmenides*, pp. 165 and 207, n. 1; *Hermes*, LXXVII [1942], pp. 18 f. and especially, for what follows, n. 2 on p. 18) in thinking that the original of Plato's version was Heraclitus, fr. 12 (Diels), of which the certainly genuine part is as follows: *ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ*.^{17a} That this is so is confirmed by the following consideration. Most of the post-Aristotelian notices of the river-statement adhere either to Plato's version or to Aristotle's very similar one. But Plutarch is particularly interesting, for he gives three different versions:

¹⁷ H. Dittmar, "Aeschines von Sphettos," *Philol. Unters.*, XXI, pp. 293 f., rejects the idea of Hermann that the context of this remark is the dialogue *Telauges*. Admittedly it is known that Hermogenes (one of the respondents in the Platonic *Cratylus*) takes part in that dialogue; but he seems to play a totally different rôle from the one he plays in the *Cratylus*, and there is no reason why he should be associated here with Cratylus; see *op. cit.*, pp. 226 ff.

^{17a} See also fr. 91. Fr. 49^a is of course spurious.

(1) *De E*, p. 392a(2) *De sera num.*,
p. 559c(3) *Qu. Nat.*,
p. 912a

ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν	. . . ποταμὸν . . . εἰς	ποταμοῖς γὰρ δις τοῖς
ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ	ὅν οὐ φησι δις ἐμβῆναι	αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης·
.	ἕτερα γὰρ ἐπιρρεῖ
		ὕδατα.

It will be noticed that (1) reproduces the Aristotelian version, of which the distinguishing marks are οὐκ ἔστιν with the infinitive and the dative after ἐμβῆναι; while (2) probably follows Plato with his optative construction and εἰς after ἐμβαίης (although in the oratio obliqua ἂν has been dropped); (3) however contains vestiges of both the Platonic and the Aristotelian version, which were presumably equally well-known to Plutarch; but, in addition, unmistakable elements of the original fragment of Heraclitus are present—the words ἕτερα . . . ἐπιρρεῖ ὕδατα, and the plural form ποταμοῖς which neither Plato nor Aristotle has. Plutarch preserves a good number of the extant fragments of Heraclitus, and there can be little doubt that he had access to a good handbook if not to Heraclitus' work itself; he was also, of course, familiar with both Plato and Aristotle. In these circumstances his combination of the two versions of the river-statement with the original cannot be accidental, and indicates that he knew them to bear this relationship—i. e. the relationship of copies or paraphrases to an original source. Now the two versions of Plato and Aristotle are so close to each other, and yet so verbally different from the original, that they cannot be separate and disconnected paraphrases of a common source; in other words they are interdependent, and Aristotle simply took over Plato's paraphrase, with slight modifications. Plutarch's synthesis also discredits another possibility: that Cratylus himself was the author of the version of the river-statement preserved by Plato and Aristotle, and that the οὐδ' ἄπαξ anecdote attributed to him in the passage from *Met.*, Γ 5 quoted above is a literal account of Cratylus' words. Of course it is possible that Plutarch had no separate information about Cratylus, and was mistaken in his connexion of the Platonic-Aristotelian version directly with Heraclitus; but in any case it is extremely unlikely that if Plato knew Cratylus to be the author of the summary of the river-statement he should not have mentioned him, and especially his

extreme criticism, in contexts like the *Theaetetus* as well as the *Cratylus*.

It seems probable therefore that Aristotle, in his account of Cratylus' criticism of Heraclitus, used a summary of Heraclitus' river-statement which he had learned from Plato, and perhaps in particular from the dialogue *Cratylus*—for it is doubtful whether, in referring verbally to Heraclitus, Plato would consistently have used exactly the formula which he wrote in the dialogue and which is so closely followed by Aristotle. At this point an interesting possibility presents itself. Could Aristotle have developed this anecdote about Cratylus simply from what he read in the dialogue, and from his own deductions about the extreme form to which a theory of flux could be taken? Further, could *all* his information about Cratylus (i. e. the pointing-anecdote and the statement that Cratylus influenced the young Plato, in addition to the above) be due simply to his own inferences from the dialogues, the *Cratylus* in particular? Doubtless this appears to be a very remote possibility when one considers that Aristotle spent no less than twenty years as a member of the Academy and therefore had presumably no need to depend solely on a reading of the dialogues for information about Plato's older contemporaries. However, Cherniss in his book *The Riddle of the Early Academy* has argued that the oral instruction given by Plato during the last decades of his life was mainly mathematical, and that in many cases Aristotle appears not to have asked Plato about uncertainties in the dialogues; and on p. 72 the conclusion is reached that "Plato did not expound any physics or natural philosophy beyond that which he wrote in the *Timaeus*, and he did not give his students or associates any further exegesis of the doctrines which he set down in his dialogues." Cherniss supports this contention by showing that Aristotle failed to elucidate, by direct enquiry from Plato, points which puzzled him (and which in fact he misunderstood) in the *Timaeus*. In addition one may wonder how soon Aristotle became interested in the earlier history of philosophy in Greece. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Eng. transl., 1st ed.), p. 173, assigns the composition of *Metaphysics* A, which is the first extant systematic presentation of the history of earlier philosophy (for *Physics* A is far from comprehensive), to the time when Aristotle retired to Assos, after Plato's death (but see also Cherniss, *Aristotle's*

Criticism of Plato and the Academy, I, pp. 488 ff.). The *De Philosophia* may have belonged to the early Assos period too; Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 128, puts it not earlier than *Metaphysics A*; but again Cherniss maintains with some plausibility that it, like the *De Ideis*, was written before Aristotle left the Academy. The *De Philosophia* certainly contained a thorough review of earlier philosophies, including eastern philosophies. Certainty here is difficult to achieve, but one may perhaps hazard the conclusion that Aristotle may not have concerned himself with a detailed study of earlier philosophy (of course a consideration of the major movements must have been part of the regular teaching in the Academy) until shortly before Plato's death; and that he may have had to rely to some extent on the dialogues for information about the lesser-known contemporaries and predecessors of Socrates—among whom Cratylus must be numbered. If the *De Philosophia* and *Metaphysics A* were written at Assos then Aristotle may have had very few books to refer to; but copies of his master's dialogues he would certainly have with him.

In view of these last considerations the possibility outlined above seems to deserve detailed examination, although it must be emphasized that in the present state of the evidence it can never be more than a possibility, and perhaps a remote one. The advantage of such a hypothesis is, of course, that it resolves the difficulty of reconciling the picture of Cratylus in Plato as primarily a believer in names, with the picture of him in Aristotle as simply an extreme Heraclitean. It does so by assuming that Aristotle was misled by the *Cratylus*, as many modern readers have been, into thinking that Cratylus is there shown as a *convinced* Heraclitean. In the following pages, therefore, I shall briefly consider Aristotle's three main statements about Cratylus with a view to determining whether they could have been determined wholly or in part by the dialogues, and particularly the *Cratylus*, alone.

It has already been shown that the language used by Aristotle in recounting the οὐδ' ἀπαξ anecdote is in part derived from the *Cratylus*. There is no doubt, however, that the kind of extension of Heraclitus' fr. 12 which occurs in this anecdote certainly could have been made in the latter part of the fifth century and by anyone who reflected seriously on the proposition "You cannot step twice into the same river." In fact, though, this propo-

sition is first stated in extant literature by Plato, and goes far beyond the words of fr. 12. If it was not Plato but Cratylus or some other pre-Platonic Heraclitean who put this interpretation on the fragment, and added perhaps the modification implied in οὐδ' ἄραξ, then it is surprising that Plato did not seize upon this apparent absurdity implicit in the Heraclitean position and use it in the *Theaetetus*, where Socrates and Theodorus are made to pour scorn upon the ideas of the ῥέοντες (179D-180D). It is still more surprising when one remembers that Plato applies an analogous criticism in the fields of knowledge and perception. There is a close parallelism between the ontological observation that universal change destroys the possibility of any fixed relationship between man and the outside world (in terms of the river-image, between the wader and the river), and the epistemological discovery that universal change destroys the possibility of a fixed relationship, i. e. knowledge, between the potentially knowing and the potentially known. This last theory, as we saw, was explicitly stated for the first time by Plato in the *Cratylus*, where the fact that knowledge itself *and the knower* (corresponding to the wader in the river) must be changing as well as the object to be known is stated with the air of a new discovery (440A): "But it is not even reasonable to say that knowledge exists, Cratylus, if all things change and nothing stays still. For if this very thing, the knowledge, does not change from being knowledge, then the knowledge would always remain and be knowledge; but if the very form of knowledge changes, at the same time it would change into another form of knowledge and not really be knowledge; and if this change is constant there would never be any knowledge, and from this argument there would never be either knowing agent or known object." This duality of knower and known as equally important elements in an act of knowledge is transferred, in the *Theaetetus*, to the theory of sense-perception: perception involves two "motions," one from the perceived object and one from the perceiving organ.¹⁸ Now if this subject-object dichotomy was applied by Plato in the fields of both knowledge and perception it is perhaps significant that it was not applied by him in the field of physical

¹⁸ Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, I, p. 242, recognised the connexion when he wrote (without real grounds): "... the doctrine is that of Cratylus, while the elaboration of it is Plato's."

change (of the *objects* of knowledge and perception), in particular relation to Heracliteanism. The fact that it was not specifically so applied, when it would have been so excellent an argument against Heracliteanism and for the existence of stable realities, may suggest that it was *not* developed before Plato (as Aristotle suggests that Cratylus developed it), and that Plato did not realize its full significance. On the other hand, it may be that Plato took it so much for granted that he did not bother to state it explicitly. Be this as it may, to Aristotle's analytical mind the application of the rule of change to man as well as to the outside world would be a necessary consequence of the Heraclitean position and a necessary development of the Platonic version of the river-statement; taking Cratylus as he did to be an extreme Heraclitean he might well have attributed to him what he assumed to be an obvious implication of the river-statement as quoted by Plato, even without direct evidence that Cratylus actually held such a view.

Aristotle's other statement about Cratylus in *Metaphysics* Γ is that because of his extreme Heraclitean views he finally avoided speech and resorted to pointing as a method of signification. We may infer that some sort of strong belief about words, as well as about the flux of all things, is involved in this radical position. A Heraclitean *tout simple* would have no motive for avoiding words as long as they served the needs of practical life, even if they did not bear any fixed theoretical relationship to objects in constant change. However, a Heraclitean who in addition believed that the use of a proper name somehow implied a real fixity in the thing to which the name was applied might, if he were eccentric as well as conscientious, find it necessary to avoid proper names altogether. This kind of resultant belief is well exemplified in two passages in Plato. First, *Theaetetus*, 183A-B: (Socrates) "... Now it seems that what has in fact come to light is that, if all things are in change, any answer that can be given to any question is equally right: you may say it is so and it is not so—or 'becomes,' if you prefer to avoid any term that would bring these people to a standstill." (Theodorus) "You are right." (Soc.) "Except, Theodorus, that I used the words 'so' and 'not so,' whereas we have no right to use this word 'so'—what is 'so' would cease to be in change—nor yet 'not so': there is no change in that either. Some new dialect

will have to be instituted for the exponents of this theory . . .” (translated by F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 100). The second passage is *Timaeus*, 49B-E: (fire, water, etc., are constantly changing into each other in a cyclical process) “Then, since none of them thus wears a constant aspect, of which of them can one say with confident assertion that it is *this* same thing and no other, without blushing for himself? Of none of them all; far the safest rule in speaking of them is the following. Whenever we see a thing changing, fire, for example, we must, in every case, call fire not *this* but *this-like* (μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον), nor yet may we use the word *this* of any of the things we fancy we are indicating when we point them out by the use of the words *this* and *that*, as though any of them had a permanent being . . .” (translated by A. E. Taylor). Now it again seems strange, if Cratylus used to do the very thing which Plato is talking about in these passages, that he is not cited by Plato as an excellent illustration of the point in question; he could have been introduced particularly effectively in the *Theaetetus* passage, where the tone is not too serious. If Cratylus did *not* do any such thing, then it is not inconceivable that these Platonic passages in themselves should have suggested to Aristotle the kind of behaviour that might be expected of an extreme Heraclitean who believed in the natural correctness of names—which is the picture which he might have derived of Cratylus from the dialogue. But supposing Cratylus did in fact resort at some stage to pointing, but not because he was a Heraclitean? In this case he could not be appropriately introduced by Plato into either of the passages quoted above. And indeed there is another perfectly good reason (good to an eccentric, that is) for the avoidance of names: it is that the man who avoids them is a believer in the real and natural connexion between names and things, but that he is sceptical of his ability, or the ability of men in general, to determine on every occasion what the correct name for an object is. This is approximately the attitude of Cratylus in the Platonic dialogue, after he has been led to admit by Socrates’ discovery of both flux and rest in words that some names are not correctly named. I remarked in the analysis of this part of the dialogue that his logical reply to Socrates would have been that one or other of the conflicting classes of names were not names at all; and there is no particular

vice except waste of breath in simply uttering "a piece of voice." However, Cratylus in real life might not have taken this easy way out, and might have saved himself from error by the adoption of pointing as a means of signification which served its purpose without committing its user. I do not say that this is the truth of the matter, but merely that Cratylus *could* have avoided speech, if he really did so, for other reasons than those given by Aristotle; and that in any case Aristotle would have attributed such behaviour to Cratylus' connexion with Heracliteanism.

There remains *Metaphysics*, A6, 987a29, quoted on p. 248 above; Aristotle's meaning is perhaps put more plainly in the paraphrase of this passage, composed later, at M4, 1078b9: "The theory of Forms resulted, for those who profess it, through believing, on the subject of Truth, the Heraclitean arguments that all perceptibles are in continual flux, so that if there is to be knowledge and understanding of anything there must be other, enduring, natures besides the perceived ones." Cratylus is not specifically named here but we know from the version of A that Aristotle considered him to have taught Plato about Heracliteanism. Now it has generally been thought that the overwhelming probability is that Plato *told* Aristotle, while the latter was his pupil, about the early influences on himself and the manner in which he arrived at a theory of Forms; in other words that Aristotle's account in the passages above must rest on the ultimate authority of Plato himself. This probability cannot be minimized. On the other hand it is by no means impossible that Plato, who during the period of Aristotle's membership of the Academy had gone beyond the theory of Forms as such, remained silent about the details of his youthful development. In this case Aristotle might have fallen back on the dialogues themselves, after their author's death, as the source of a plausible inference about Plato's historical position. Weerts, "Plato und der Heraklitismus," *Philologus*, Supplb. XXIII, 1 (1931), pp. 1 f., observed that Aristotle's judgement about the Heraclitean-Cratylean influence on Plato might be inferred from the last two pages of the *Cratylus* alone: there Cratylus is made to admit the existence of *some* real entities by the argument that knowledge (which is assumed without question to be real) must have stable objects. One may compare in particular this state-

ment at *Cratylus*, 440A: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γινώσκω εἶναι φάναι εἶκος, ὃ Κρατύλει, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει with the belief ascribed by Aristotle to Cratylus (and the Heracliteans) at *Metaphysics*, A6, 987a32: . . . ὡς ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης. Now it is conceivable that students of Heraclitus did make this explicit deduction from the assumption of flux; but Plato's *Cratylus* is the first extant source in which this deduction appears. W. D. Ross may be correct when he writes (*Aristotle, Metaphysics*, I, p. xlvii): "The recognition of the flux of all sensible things and the consequent impossibility of knowledge of them is present throughout the dialogues as the underlying assumption which does not need to be often emphasized because it is unquestioningly taken for granted." Yet even if Plato realized from the first "the consequent impossibility of knowledge" of constantly changing objects, this does not necessarily mean that this consequence was fully understood by any of his predecessors or that Plato derived it from them; and Aristotle's assertion that it was so understood *could* be mere inference from the Heraclitean premises. His whole description of the influences on Plato *could* be mere inference: that is all one can say.¹⁹

¹⁹ Weerts, *loc. cit.*, eventually rejects the possibility that Aristotle's account of Cratylus' influence on Plato is derived from the dialogues. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, I, p. 242, n. 1, maintains that "It is probable indeed that this (*sc.* Plato's familiarity with Cratylus) is only Aristotle's inference from the *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus*, but it is a fair inference." Ross, *loc. cit.*, is more conservative. "What we should not have known from the dialogues is Plato's early acquaintance with Cratylus. This cannot, I think, be merely Aristotle's inference from the *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus*; there is nothing in these dialogues to suggest it. It seems to be a genuine piece of information derived in all probability from Plato; . . . His other piece of information about Cratylus may well come from the same source." Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, I, p. 218, n. 129, effectively sums up the case for prudence: ". . . even though his (*sc.* Plato's) elaboration of the doctrine of flux may have altered the form which it had for those from whom he adopted it, this does not impeach Aristotle's account of the importance of the doctrine in the history of the theory of ideas. It is true too that the dialogues offer no positive corroboration of Aristotle's statement that it was Cratylus from whom Plato adopted the theory of flux; but neither do they offer any ground for disbelief, and we have no other basis on which to challenge the account. . . ."

The examination of Aristotle's statements about Cratylus has shown that it is at least possible that Aristotle was dependent solely upon the Platonic dialogues, and particularly the *Cratylus*, for his information; and that his picture of Cratylus as an extreme Heraclitean could conceivably be the result of his misinterpreting Cratylus' shifts of position and final obstinacy in the dialogue, and a result also of his own preconception of what an extreme Heraclitean should logically have believed. If this were the case, then the dilemma would be solved of whether the historical Cratylus was primarily a Heraclitean, primarily a believer in the natural validity of names, or both at once; and if the last, of how he reconciled the two ideas. The assumption could be made that Cratylus was really a believer in names whom Plato represented in the dialogue as incidentally persuaded by Socrates to adopt, temporarily, the Heraclitean thesis, because he had been misled into thinking that this supported the natural connexion between names and their objects. But it must be emphasized that the possibility of Aristotle's error is still not a strong one, and that the *a priori* probability that he *was* in a position to know the truth about Cratylus stands firmly set against it, whatever we may think in general about Aristotle's reliability as a historian of ideas. Perhaps the strongest argument against Aristotle is that, if Cratylus really was the eccentric (and presumably notorious) extremist that Aristotle shows him to be, it is surprising that Plato painted him in such soft colours and failed to name him as a type of the extreme Heraclitean in the *Theaetetus*; but this may be simply a pupil's deference.

Thus we are left with the Cratylus of Plato on the one hand, the Cratylus of Aristotle on the other. That the two are not identical—that the Cratylus of the *Cratylus* is not, contrary to the general opinion, a convinced Heraclitean—must remain the sole positive conclusion of the present inquiry.²⁰

GEOFFREY S. KIRK.

TRINITY HALL, CAMBRIDGE.

²⁰ I must record my gratitude to Professor Harold Cherniss of the Institute for Advanced Study, and to Professors Jaeger, Nock, and Havelock, and Mr. Z. Stewart, of Harvard University, for many valuable criticisms and suggestions.

ON THE CHRONOLOGY OF CAESAR'S FIRST CONSULSHIP.

The major chronological problems of Caesar's consulship in 59 B. C. are the dates of Caesar's first *lex agraria* and of the *lex Vatinia de imperio Caesaris*. On the relative dates of these two laws there was a long controversy between Frank Burr Marsh and Matthias Gelzer.¹ Marsh held that Caesar, having proposed the agrarian law, gave up trying to put it through the assembly and had Vatinius pass the law that gave Caesar an army and the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum; after that law was passed, on February 28, in Marsh's view, Caesar, with soldiers under his command, obtained a favorable vote on the agrarian law in early April. Gelzer is in approximate agreement on the date of the agrarian law, but places the *lex Vatinia* in May or June, shortly after Caesar's second agrarian law, the *lex Campana*. I propose to argue in this paper that Gelzer is right on the order of the laws and on the date of the *lex Vatinia*, but that the first agrarian law is earlier than Gelzer believes. On the basis of my dating I shall attempt to establish the date of other laws and other events in the first six months of 59.

On chronological questions the sources on the consulship, although abundant, are far from conclusive. Cicero nowhere gives us a narrative of events, although in orations of 57-56 he mentions many details. The only letters of the first half of 59—a group of fourteen written from his villas to Atticus in April and early May—are baffling in their brief comments on matters that Atticus, who was in Rome, knew better than Cicero did. But Cicero tells us enough in these letters and in the letters of

¹ Marsh, *The Founding of the Roman Empire* (Austin, Texas, 1922), pp. 94 ff., 271 ff.; "The Chronology of Caesar's Consulship," *C. J.*, XXII (1927), pp. 504-24; *A History of the Roman World from 146 to 36 B. C.* (London, 1935), pp. 180 ff., 387-94; Gelzer, *Caesar*, 1st ed. (Berlin, 1921), p. 69; 3rd ed. (Munich, 1941), pp. 100 f.; *Gnomon*, I (1925), p. 272. For a full statement of Gelzer's views see "Die Lex Vatinia de imperio Caesaris," *Hermes*, LXIII (1928), pp. 113-37. My obligations to this paper will be clear in this investigation. The date of the *lex Vatinia* is also discussed in many of the articles on the terminal date of Caesar's Gallic command. For recent bibliography see G. R. Elton, *J. R. S.*, XXXVI (1946), pp. 18-42.

July to enable us to evaluate later writers. He shows that Velleius omits important events, that Plutarch is confused in various details, that Appian makes shocking errors, and that, although chronology is not the only determining factor in the arrangement of material, Suetonius and Dio are in general reliable.²

From Cicero's letters it is clear that the first agrarian law³ had been passed by the middle of April. This law assigned for distribution to Pompey's veterans and to the urban plebs the public land in Italy—exclusive of the *ager Campanus*—and additional land to be purchased from the revenues of Pompey's conquests. By mid-April also the commissioners who were to administer the distribution had been elected⁴ and three other measures sponsored by Caesar had also been passed—the law restoring Ptolemy Auletes to the throne of Egypt, the law revising the contracts of the publicans,⁵ and the curiate law (passed

² See Vell., II, 44-45; Plut., *Caes.*, 14; *Pomp.*, 47-48; *Cato Min.*, 31-33; *Luc.*, 42; App., *B. C.*, II, 9-14; Suet., *Iul.*, 20-22; Dio, XXXVIII, 1-12. In the early chapters of the *Divus Iulius* Suetonius pays more attention to chronology than he usually does, but in ch. 20 he violates the order of time in mentioning the *lex Campana* before the *lex de publicanis*. Dio has the same order. In general Dio classifies the legislation according to sponsors, treating Caesar's laws first, then the judicial law of the praetor Fufius Calenus, and then the tribunitial law on Caesar's command. The adoption of Clodius is mentioned after the laws.

³ On the agrarian laws see M. Cary, *Journal of Philology*, XXXIV (1920), pp. 174-90; Eduard Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius*² (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919), pp. 62-72; T. Rice Holmes, *The Roman Republic*, I (Oxford, 1923), pp. 312-17, 476-79. Full citation of the sources dealing with the laws will be found in these discussions.

⁴ Cic., *Ad Att.*, II, 6, 2; 7, 3-4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 16, 2 (written about May 1): *Nam adhuc Pompeius haec ἐσοφίzero, se leges Caesaris probare, actiones ipsum praestare debere; agrariam legem sibi placuisse, potuerit intercedi necne nihil ad se pertinere; de lege Alexandrino placuisse sibi aliquando confici; Bibulus de caelo tum servasset necne sibi quaerendum non fuisse; de publicanis voluisse illi ordini commodare; quid futurum fuerit si Bibulus tum in forum descendisset se divinare non potuisse.* Cicero is here summarizing a conversation with Pompey which had probably taken place before Cicero left Rome early in April. He may have seen Pompey at Antium about the 18th, though I agree with Sjögren in accepting C. L. Smith's emendation of *Anti* to *Atti* in *Ad Att.*, II, 12, 1. Even if *Anti* is right,

by Caesar as *pontifex maximus*) transferring Clodius to the plebs.⁶

The second agrarian law (*lex Campana*), providing for the distribution of the *ager Campanus* and the neighboring *campus Stellas* to veterans and members of the plebs who had three or more children, was proposed about May first. Cicero, who was at his Formian villa, heard of the bill in a letter from Atticus that arrived on April 29.⁷ Atticus did not at the time know the full conditions of the new proposal, and was evidently writing before it had been posted. The bill seems to have been promulgated about May 1, and, if Caesar was following constitutional procedure, could have been voted on after the legal interval of twenty-four days (a *trinum nundinum*) had elapsed.⁸ I think it was probably passed in one of the *dies comitiales* at the end of May. News of the marriage of Caesar's daughter to Pompey reached Cicero about the fifth of May;⁹ it apparently took place after the posting of the *lex Campana*. At about the same time, if we can trust authorities who mention the two marriages together, Caesar married the daughter of L. Calpurnius Piso.

Now Plutarch, who in his life of Cato shows familiarity with both agrarian laws, mentions only one in his lives of Caesar and Pompey, and places the two marriages between the proposal and the voting.¹⁰ Plutarch has evidently telescoped the two laws, as does Appian, who often used a common source with Plutarch,¹¹ and has transferred the circumstances of the first law to the period of the second, the time of the marriages. As we know

the remarks refer to legislation passed not later than early April since there were no comitial days between the 4th and the 18th.

⁶ *Ad Att.*, II, 7, 2; 9, 1; 12, 1.

⁷ *Ad Att.*, II, 16. Cicero speaks here of an earlier letter which had aroused his anxiety.

⁸ See Kroll, *s. v.* "Nundinae," *R.-E.* Caesar violated this law (the *lex Caecilia Didia*) in the curiate law transferring Clodius to the plebs (*Cic.*, *Dom.*, 41), but there is no evidence that any of his other laws were passed in violation of it. This was one of the many laws that Vatinius disregarded.

⁹ *Cic.*, *Ad Att.*, II, 17, 1: *Quid enim ista repentina adfinitatis coniunctio, quid ager Campanus, quid effusio pecuniae significant?*

¹⁰ *Plut.*, *Cato Min.*, 31-33; *Pomp.*, 47-48; *Caes.*, 14.

¹¹ *App.*, *B. C.*, II, 10. On the common source of Appian and Plutarch see Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 608.

from Suetonius (*Iul.*, 20), and Dio (XXXVIII, 6), it was after the passage of the first agrarian law that Bibulus shut himself up in his house to remain there the rest of the year. Plutarch, assuming that there was only one agrarian law, and that the marriages took place after that law was proposed, says that Bibulus remained in his house for eight months.¹²

Plutarch's eight months have had undue influence on the dating of the first agrarian law. Although some scholars have conceded that the statement may be inexact and have dated the passage of the first law in March, the more usual view is that the law was not passed until early April.¹³ But an examination of the Roman calendar shows that this date is impossible. Before April 24 there was only one *dies comitialis* in the month that could have been used for voting on laws.¹⁴ That one day would not have sufficed for the passage of the agrarian law, the subsequent election of the commissioners, and the passage of Caesar's two later laws, the *lex de rege Alexandrino* and the *lex de publicanis*. Obviously the agrarian law, which preceded the election of the commissioners and the passage of the two other laws, was voted on before April.

In attempts to date the first agrarian law there has been another erroneous assumption. Several scholars have held that Bibulus, as the older consul, had the *fasces* in January and the odd-numbered months of the year, and that accordingly Caesar could not have brought up his agrarian law until his turn with the *fasces* came in February.¹⁵ But Caesar's name comes first

¹² Plut., *Pomp.*, 48, 4: Πραττομένων δὲ τούτων Βύβλος μὲν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν κατακλεισάμενος ὀκτὼ μηνῶν οὐ προῆλθεν ὑπατεύων, ἀλλ' ἐξέπεμπε διαγράμματα βλασφημίας ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντα καὶ κατηγορίας. Velleius, II, 44, who mentions the *lex Campana* but not the first agrarian law, seems, like Plutarch and Appian, to have combined the two agrarian laws into one. The statement about Bibulus which follows (*maiore parte anni domi se tenuit*) accords with a retirement of eight months.

¹³ Carcopino, *César* (Paris, 1936), p. 683, dates the law in March. Gelzer, *Caesar*³, p. 87, places it in March or the beginning of April. Marsh, *C. J.*, XXII, p. 521, Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 71, and Täubler, *Bellum Helveticum* (Zurich, 1924), p. 57, date the vote at the beginning of April.

¹⁴ The only comitial days in April before the 24th were the 3rd and the 4th, but the latter day was not available for an assembly since it was the first day of the Megalesian games.

¹⁵ See Lange, *Römische Altertümer*, III^a (Berlin, 1876), p. 279;

in all the consular lists and datings preserved from this year, and, as Professor Broughton and I have shown,¹⁶ that means that Caesar had priority in holding the *fascēs*. Caesar would therefore have had the opportunity to propose the law in January. Both Dio and Suetonius indicate that the agrarian law was proposed at the beginning of the year.

This is certainly what Cicero expected when he wrote to Atticus (*Ad Att.*, II, 3) at the end of December of 60. Cicero was considering what stand he would take on the agrarian law: *venio nunc ad mensem Ianuarium et ad ὑπόστασιν nostram ἀπολιτεῖαν . . . nam aut fortiter resistendum est legi agrariae . . . aut quiescendum . . . aut etiam adiuvandum*. To make sure that Cicero would decide to be helpful, Caesar's emissary Cornelius Balbus had just come to see Cicero. Balbus' visit was an immediate preparation for the agrarian law designed to provide the land bonus for which Pompey's soldiers were pressing. There is no reason to doubt that this urgent measure came up in January, and probably at the very beginning of the month.¹⁷

A consideration of the circumstances attending the passage of the first agrarian law will, I believe, enable us to date it more exactly. Dio's full account (XXXVIII, 1-7), confirmed in various details by Cicero, seems in general to be reliable. Caesar presented his bill first to the senate, seeking the authority of that body before he took it to the people. The majority of the senate, led by Cato, adopted obstructionist tactics, which, ex-

Täubler, *op. cit.*, pp. 55 ff.; Marsh, *C. J.*, XXII, p. 506, n. 5; P. Stein, *Die Senatsitzungen der ciceronischen Zeit* (Münster, 1930), pp. 25 ff. Carcopino, *loc. cit.*, and Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 71, n. 3, attribute the *fascēs* to Caesar in the odd-numbered months, but date the passage of the law respectively in March and April.

¹⁶ See our paper, "The Order of the Two Consuls' Names in the Yearly Lists," *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, XIX (1949), pp. 3-14.

¹⁷ By arranging at the beginning of his magistracy for the publication of the *acta senatus* (Suet., *Iul.*, 20), Caesar made sure that the people would know of any obstructions offered to the land bill in the senate. Suetonius goes on to say that Caesar restored the old custom under which the consul who did not have the *fascēs* was preceded by an *accensus* and followed by the lictors. This revival of old custom has been, mistakenly, I believe, interpreted by Lange, *loc. cit.*, to mean that Caesar was doing honor to Bibulus.

tending probably through several sessions,¹⁸ prevented the measure from being brought to a vote. Unable to secure senatorial action, Caesar called a *contio* and, before the people, appealed to his colleague Bibulus to support the bill. When Bibulus proved obdurate, Caesar obtained the public endorsement of Crassus and Pompey and the assurance of Pompey that he would, if need arose, use force to put the bill through. When the time for voting came, Bibulus offered religious obstructions and also, with the aid of three tribunes, tried to have the bill vetoed.¹⁹ There were postponements of the vote until Caesar set a day for the passage of the bill. When the day came the Forum was occupied in advance by armed men, and Bibulus and the tribunes were driven from the Forum. Having thus forcibly prevented a veto,²⁰ Caesar secured the passage of the law. He had added a *sanctio* requiring the senators within a stated period to take oath to observe the law. Bibulus protested to no avail in the senate next day,²¹ and in the end all the senators, including the recalcitrants, Metellus Celer, Cato, and Favonius, took the oath and were thus bound to support a law that they held to be unconstitutional.

Now let us consider the schedule of events in January. Caesar, who had made his plans in advance, must have posted his bill

¹⁸ Dio does not say whether there was more than one meeting. But a good deal of time would have been occupied in calling on all the senators (Dio, XXXVIII, 2, 1), and Cato also made one of his time-consuming addresses. See Capito *apud* Gell., IV, 10, 8.

¹⁹ According to Dio, XXXVIII, 6, Bibulus, to prevent the bill from being voted on, declared a *leponnyria* for all the remaining comitial days of the year. That is obviously an inaccurate statement made through confusion with Bibulus' course after he shut himself up in his house. Suetonius' account (*Iul.*, 20) is more reliable here: *obnuntiantem collegam armis foro expulit*. Bibulus was trying all means of postponing a vote, and one of them was to announce an adverse omen which would dissolve the assembly. See my *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949), pp. 82 ff.

²⁰ As Dio makes clear, Bibulus also tried a veto. Cicero indicates that the first agrarian law was invalid because a veto had been prevented. See *Ad Att.*, II, 16, 2 (quoted in note 5). See also Suet., *Iul.*, 30, 3, on Caesar's fear that he would be called to account for the acts of his first consulship which violated *auspicia legesque et intercessiones*. The later legislation, passed while Bibulus was watching the heavens, violated *auspicia* and *leges* (presumably the *leges Aelia et Fufia*); the first law violated the right of veto.

²¹ Suet., *Iul.*, 20; Dio, XXXVIII, 6, 4.

promptly, perhaps on the first day of January. At this period certainly Caesar was trying to act constitutionally, and he could not have called for a vote until after twenty-four days. There was a series of comitial days from January 25 to 28 when the vote might take place. Senatorial meetings were, under the *lex Pupia*,²² limited to non-comitial days, of which there were ten before January 16 and only one after that date, the last day of the month, the 29th. There were presumably several senatorial meetings in the first days of January and then one or more *contiones*. The first efforts to put the law through the assembly, which could have been made on January 25-27, were unsuccessful. Dio's account has been interpreted to mean that there was a long postponement before Caesar set the day when the bill was to be voted, but Plutarch's statement that Bibulus remained shut up in his house eight months explains this interpretation. I believe that the day Caesar fixed upon was January 28, the last of the comitial days in January. My reason is that the senate met next day, that the meeting could have been held on the 29th, a *dies fastus*, and that, in my view, Suetonius' account implies that the meeting was held under the presidency of Caesar.

At that meeting, according to Suetonius, Bibulus failed to find anyone who would either put the question or formulate a motion on the subject—*referre aut censere*.²³ Suetonius' words have usually been taken to mean that Bibulus was himself conducting the meeting,²⁴ and that it therefore took place in a month when he had the *fasces*. But in that case he had the right to put a question (*referre*). It seems clear that the meeting was held under the presidency of Caesar in January and that Bibulus was looking for a tribune who, under his constitutional right, would reconvene the meeting and put the question *de re publica*.²⁵ But the three tribunes who had supported Bibulus

²² On the *lex Pupia* see Cic., *Ad Fam.*, I, 4, 1; cf. *Ad Q. fr.*, II, 2, 3. On the date of the law see Niccolini, *I Fasti dei Tribuni della Plebe* (Milan, 1934), p. 257.

²³ Suet., *Iul.*, 20: *postero die in senatu conquestum nec quoquam reperto qui super tali consternatione referre aut censere aliquid auderet, qualia multa saepe in levioribus turbis decreta erant, in eam coegit desperationem ut, quoad potestate abiret, domo abditus nihil aliud quam per edicta obnuntiaret.*

²⁴ See for instance Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

²⁵ See Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, II³, pp. 313-17.

evidently were intimidated by the events of the previous day, and Caesar doubtless saw to it that the questioning of senators did not last long enough to reach Cato, who would have had the courage to defy Caesar.²⁶

A law governing senatorial procedure made it impossible for Bibulus to postpone the question to February when he would have the presidency of the senate, for under this law no other business could be transacted in the senate until after the foreign embassies had been heard.²⁷ Bibulus could not count on waiting until these hearings were over, for the time limit, five to ten days in other laws on which we have information,²⁸ within which the senators would have to take the oath, would have expired, and the optimates would be bound to support Caesar's law.

I therefore date the passage of the first *lex agraria* on January 28, and the meeting of the senate on the 29th; I would assume that Bibulus refrained from holding the senate in February and remained in his house, watching the heavens on all comitial days, from the beginning of February to the end of the year. His self-imprisonment thus lasted eleven months instead of the eight reported by Plutarch.

According to this view the senate was never convened under the presidency of Bibulus. There was some truth in the jesting description of the year 59 as the consulship of Julius and

²⁶ Cato was still a *tribunicus* and the meeting, like the one reported in *Ad Att.*, I, 17, 9, probably did not last long enough to give Cato a chance to speak.

²⁷ The *lex Gabinia de legationibus* has sometimes been dated in the consulship of Aulus Gabinius in 58, but there are strong arguments against that dating. See Niccolini, *op. cit.*, pp. 256 and 518, who places the law in Gabinius' tribunate in 67. It should more probably be assigned to the tribune of 139. See Carcopino, *Mélanges Gustave Glotz* (Paris, 1932), I, pp. 120 ff. On the effect of these laws see Cic., *Ad Fam.*, I, 4, 1 and *Ad Q. fr.*, II, 2, 3, both of January 56. The embassies were actually postponed in that year (Cic., *Ad Q. fr.*, II, 3, 1), but postponements would have been more difficult in 59 when the ambassadors waiting to be heard were probably under Pompey's protection.

²⁸ Under Saturninus' agrarian law of 100 the senators were given five days to take the oath. Cf. Appian, *B. C.*, I, 29, 3. In the *lex Bantina* the interval allowed is ten days for senators and five days for magistrates. Cf. *C. I. L.*, I, 2^a, p. 582.

Caesar.²⁹ Whether the embassies were heard we have no sure means of knowing, but I shall suggest that certain laws of Vatinius, which are to be considered later, were a substitute for the customary senatorial action on the embassies. Caesar could, of course, in the absence or "indisposition" of his colleague, have called the senate, and he probably did so in later months when Bibulus had the *fascēs*. Certainly Caesar continued to hold meetings of the senate during the year, and, though Cato and his associates stayed away,³⁰ Caesar got a quorum, and had a number of decrees passed. As far as his subsequent laws were concerned, Caesar presented them henceforth directly to the people without any request for senatorial authority in advance. He seems to have continued to assure senatorial compliance by requiring the members of the body to take oaths to support the laws.³¹

In succeeding months Bibulus and the three tribunes were watching the heavens on all comitial days, thereby providing the basis for the claim that all the laws of Caesar and his tribune Vatinius were unconstitutional. Caesar's laws passed by April included the two already mentioned, the *lex de rege Alexandrino* and the *lex de publicanis*, which I am disposed to assign to

²⁹ See Suet., *Iul.*, 20, who quotes the verses that circulated at Rome:

Non Bibulo quiddam nuper sed Caesare factum est;
Nam Bibulo fieri consule nil memini.

Bibulus' policy, which Cicero later praised, is condemned in *Ad Att.*, II, 15, 2, written in April. See also Sallust's comment on Bibulus as consul, *R. P.*, II, 9, 1: *Quid ille audeat, quod consulatus, maximum imperium, maximo dedecori fuit?* There is reason to believe that Bibulus considered a more active course later in the year. In an edict issued in July (Cicero, *Ad Att.*, II, 20, 6) Bibulus postponed the consular *comitia* from July to October 18, that is, according to my view, from a month when Caesar held the *fascēs* to a month when Bibulus, as the holder of the *fascēs*, would have conducted the election. In the end Bibulus was apparently intimidated and the election was conducted by Caesar, who may have postponed it to his month, November.

³⁰ Cic., *Sest.*, 63; *Brut.*, 219; Plut., *Caes.*, 14, 8.

³¹ Cicero, *Sest.*, 61, seems to show that Cato had taken oath to observe more than one of Caesar's laws: *Quasi vero ille non in alias quoque leges, quas iniuste rogatas putaret, iam ante iuravit.* See also Schol. Bob., p. 133, Stangl. For the *sanctio* of the *lex Campana*, which demanded a special oath from candidates for office, see Cic., *Ad Att.*, II, 18, 2.

March, the second month when Caesar had the *fascēs*. It is generally agreed that the curiate law transferring Clodius to the plebs should be dated in March or perhaps early April. This law was proposed and passed by Caesar as *pontifex maximus* on the day when Cicero spoke his mind too freely in defense of C. Antonius.³²

In the same period Vatinius was very active in legislation. At the beginning of his tribunate he had proposed a law on challenging jurors; it contained a clause excluding from the benefit of the law men who were accused before it was passed, and Vatinius waited to have it voted on until after C. Antonius had been accused.³³ Before that, Cicero tells us (*Vatin.*, 27), Vatinius had passed many other laws. These are apparently the laws referred to by Cicero when he asks Vatinius: *fecerisne foedera tribunus plebis cum civitatibus, cum regibus, cum tetrarchis; erogarisne pecunias ex aerario tuis legibus?*³⁴ Such legislation invaded the prerogatives of the senate, which Vatinius is elsewhere accused by Cicero (*Sest.*, 114) of disregarding. I am disposed to date these laws in February and March, and to suggest that they took the place of senatorial action on the embassies. According to Cicero, Vatinius showed complete disregard of the constitution. He had announced at the beginning of his office (*Vatin.*, 14) that he would not be deterred in his tribunate by the college of augurs. In the laws he had passed by April Vatinius had disregarded the auspices and the *lex Aelia* and *Fufia*, which regulated the validity of the auspices in the assembly; he had also violated the *lex Caecilia Didia*, requiring a *trinum nundinum* between proposal and vote on a law, and the *lex Iunia Licinia* which provided that copies of laws should be deposited in the treasury in the presence of witnesses. By that time too he had, by failure to put on festal attire, refused to recognize the *supplicatio* voted for Pomptinus, the victor over the

³² Cic., *Dom.*, 41; see note 6 above.

³³ *Vatin.*, 27; *Schol. Bob.*, p. 149 St. The bill seems to have been passed before Antonius' accusation resulted in a conviction.

³⁴ *Vatin.*, 29; cf. *Ad Att.*, II, 9, 1: *improbitate istorum qui auspicia, qui Aeliam legem, qui Iuniam et Liciniam, qui Caeciliam et Didiam neglexerunt, qui omnia remedia rei publicae effuderunt, qui regna, qui praedia tetrarchis, qui immanis pecunias paucis dederunt.* See Gelzer, *Hermes*, LXIII, p. 121.

Allobroges.³⁵ That refusal is usually explained by Vatinius' interest in Caesar's designs on Gaul, but there is, in my opinion, a more probable explanation. A *supplicatio* regularly stopped comitial activity, and Vatinius wanted his laws to be voted on without delay. Like the tribunes C. Cato in 56 and Curio in 50, Vatinius was, I think, resisting the removal of comitial days.³⁶

Caesar's law ratifying Pompey's acts is, I believe, later than these laws of Caesar and Vatinius. From Cicero, *Ad Att.*, II, 16 of May 1 or 2, I am disposed to believe that it was proposed and voted on at approximately the same time as the *lex Campana*, in May. Cicero has just mentioned Pompey's attitude on the *lex agraria*, the *lex de rege Alexandrino*, and the *lex de publicanis*. He goes on: *Nunc vero, Samsicerane, quid dices? vectigal te nobis in Antilibano constituisse, agri Campani abstulisse? Quid? hoc quem ad modum obtinebis? "Oppressos vos" inquit "tenebo exercitu Caesaris."* This passage seems to me to suggest that the *lex Campana*, which removed important revenues of the state, was under consideration at the same time as the ratification of Pompey's acts, which established new revenues.

Vatinius' law giving Caesar a five-year command in Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, three legions and the right to name his own legates had certainly been passed by July when Cicero had been offered a post as Caesar's legate.³⁷ There is no word of such an offer in the letters of April and May when Cicero was considering avoiding his difficulties by securing either a *libera legatio* or an appointment as legate to Egypt.

The words that Cicero puts into Pompey's mouth (*Ad Att.*, II, 16, 2)—*oppressos vos tenebo exercitu Caesaris*—are cited by Marsh to prove that by early May Caesar had an army under his command. Marsh concludes that the *lex de imperio* was one of the laws passed by Vatinius in the early part of the year. But,

³⁵ *Ad Att.*, II, 7, 3 proves that this incident had taken place before mid-April. For further details see *Vatin.*, 30-32; *Schol. Bob.*, pp. 149 f. St.

³⁶ *Ad Q. fr.*, II, 4, 6; *Ad Fam.*, VIII, 11, 1. See my *Party Politics*, pp. 79 f.

³⁷ *Ad Att.*, II, 18, 3 and 19, 5, written in the early part of July. On the chronology of these letters see my discussion, *Historia*, I (1950), pp. 45-51.

as Gelzer has shown, *exercitus* is here used to describe a band of adherents.³⁸ We use "army" in the same sense.

Cicero was afraid at this time that Caesar's benefactions, including lavish gifts of money, were increasing his followers beyond bounds. If this was the end, it would be bad enough, he says in the next letter (II, 17), but this cannot be the end. *Numquam huc venissent nisi ad alias res pestiferas aditus sibi compararent.* I agree with Gelzer that Cicero was expecting news of a move on Caesar's part to secure a valuable command. We hear nothing more on the subject, for Atticus and Cicero seem to have been together in the weeks following this letter of early May.

Plutarch, Appian, and Dio all mention the *lex de imperio* after the other legislation. The first two are too inaccurate to merit attention. Dio classifies his material here according to the sponsorship of the laws and is therefore not decisive on chronology, but it is significant that he indicates that Caesar did not have Vatinius propose the law until great popular favor (that is an "army" of supporters) had been obtained by Caesar's lavish favors. There is a similar statement in Plutarch's life of Cato which, for the events of this year, rests on better authority than the lives of Caesar and Pompey. It is significant that Velleius mentions the *lex de imperio* after the *lex Campana* (of May). Still more important is Suetonius, who places it after the marriages and, in the phrase *socero igitur generoque suffragantibus*, attributes to Caesar the assistance of his new father-in-law and son-in-law in securing his command. If Suetonius is correct, the law was proposed after the beginning of May.

The negative evidence of Cicero's letters thus accords with the other sources and particularly with Suetonius in support of the view that the *lex de imperio* was not proposed until after the first of May. For an early date two other arguments have been advanced. First, there was in the *lex de imperio* a mention of the Kalends of March,³⁹ and that has led to the assignment of the law to the end of February, and second, the bill has been

³⁸ *Hermes*, LXIII, p. 116. Especially significant are the parallels from Cicero, *Leg. agr.*, II, 99 and III, 16, where colonists are described as *militēs* and *exercitus*. The sources make it clear that Pompey's soldiers were used to put the first agrarian law through.

³⁹ *Cic., Prov. cons.*, 36-37.

dated in the period before the death of Metellus Celer which took place not later than the middle of April.

The meaning of the Kalends of March in the *lex de imperio* has been explained by Gelzer.⁴⁰ There was a provision in the law that the senate was not to assign Cisalpine Gaul to another governor before the first of March of 54; a similar provision was also included in the law of Pompey and Crassus of 55, extending Caesar's command another five years, a provision that prevented discussion of the assignment of the two provinces before March 1 of 50. The Kalends of March was a date of some importance in senatorial procedure.⁴¹ It had no connection with the time when the *lex de imperio* was passed.

So far in my discussion of the *lex de imperio* I have done little more than restate the arguments of Gelzer for a date in May or more probably early June, but on Metellus Celer there is a new point of view that needs to be considered. The general opinion is that at the beginning of 59 B. C. Metellus Celer was governor of Transalpine Gaul, but had not yet gone out to his province, and that his death, not later than the beginning of April, opened up a new field of operations. It has been argued that the *lex de imperio*, which did not put that province in Caesar's command, must have been passed before Celer died. But Professor Broughton, interested in establishing a list of provincial appointments, has argued that Metellus Celer was prevented by tribunitian action in 60 from assuming the governorship of the province, and that in the early months of 59 Pomptinus was still governor.⁴² His arguments and his conclusion that the death of Celer has no bearing on the date of the *lex de imperio* provide strong support for Gelzer's dating of the law.⁴³

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 123 ff. This discussion, in my opinion, provides the best solution that has been offered for the terminal date of Caesar's command.

⁴¹ See also Hirschfeld, *Kleine Schriften* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 319 ff.

⁴² "Metellus Celer's Gallie Province," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIX (1948), pp. 73-76.

⁴³ It is tempting to try to fix the date of Pompey's motion in the senate (Cic., *Ad Att.*, VIII, 3, 3) to assign Transalpine Gaul to Caesar. Suetonius (*Iul.*, 22) and Dio (XXXVIII, 8, 5), who do not share the error of Plutarch and Appian in crediting the *lex de imperio* with the assignment of both Gauls, mention the decree immediately after the *lex*, and Suetonius says it was passed soon afterwards. But the word

In this paper I have provided evidence to support Gelzer's view that the *lex de imperio* followed the two agrarian laws and that Caesar depended for its success on the "army" of clients won by his donations. I have tried to establish a new date for the first agrarian law. If my date is correct, Bibulus withdrew at the beginning of the first month in which he held the fasces, and never functioned as consul. My proposals for the chronology of the laws that were passed and of the major events that occurred from January to June of 59 are as follows:—⁴⁴

- January 1 or 2. Caesar, presiding in the senate, proposed the first *lex agraria*. The law was apparently discussed at subsequent senatorial meetings which could have been held on January 5-6, 9-11, and 13-15. Before the law was voted on, certainly one and perhaps several *contiones* were called to present the bill to the people.
- January 25-27. Comitial days following a *trinum nundinum* when the law could be voted on. Bibulus reported an omen and, with the aid of three tribunes, attempted a veto.
- January 28. A veto was prevented by force, and the law was passed.
- January 29. Bibulus protested in the senate and then went home to shut himself up in his house until the last day of the year.
- February, beginning. The senators took oath to support the land law.
- February to March. Commissioners were elected to administer the land law. Vatinius passed a series of laws on kingdoms and principalities. After these had been voted on, he passed a law on challenging jurors, which had been promulgated at the beginning of his term.

he employs, *mox*, is elastic in his usage. The decree should not be placed at the end of June or in July, a period for which Cicero (*Ad Att.*, II, 18-24) gives detailed information. If the decree was passed in June, it must date before June 16, for the senate could not meet on the comitial days that lasted from the 16th to the 28th. The first half of June may be the correct date, but a date after the beginning of August is also possible.

⁴⁴There is no evidence for the exact dates of two other laws of this year, Caesar's extortion law and Fufius Calenus' law on jury votes.

- March 1 to April 3. Caesar proposed and passed the *lex de rege Alexandrino* and the *lex de publicanis*. As *pontifex maximus*, Caesar passed the curiate law transferring Clodius to the plebs.
- May 1. Caesar proposed the *lex Campana*; it was probably voted on by the end of the month. About the same time he proposed and passed the law ratifying Pompey's *acta*.
- About May 2-3. The marriage of Pompey and Julia. The marriage of Caesar and Calpurnia took place about the same time.
- May, after the beginning. Vatinius proposed the *lex de imperio Caesaris*. It was probably not voted on until early June.

LILY ROSS TAYLOR.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

THE MEGARIAN DECREE.

It has become the accepted view that the decree by which Megarians were excluded from the Attic market and the harbours of the Athenian empire was passed in 433 or 432 and that it had a significant place among the chain of events leading to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Precisely what significance is not indeed a matter of agreement. Those who explain the outbreak of that war by trade rivalries between Athens and the leading commercial cities of the Peloponnese naturally regard it as a stroke of commercial imperialism on the part of Athens which helped to drive her competitors to the breaking point.¹ Beloch,² who holds that Pericles forced on the war to preserve his own power at Athens and that the decree was one of the measures by which he succeeded in doing this, thinks that the indignation it aroused was the decisive factor that led the Peloponnesian allies to reject Archidamus' advice and resolve on immediate war. Busolt³ apparently treats it as a third incident which along with the Corcyraean and Potidaean occasioned the outbreak. For Adcock it "was not . . . a cause of war, it was an operation of war, the first blow at the courage and will of Athens' adversaries";⁴ the judgement expressed by Glotz⁵ is substantially the same.⁶

From this *communis opinio* of eminent historians of the Peloponnesian war the only dissentient is Thucydides himself. Not only does he not regard the Megarian decree as a cause of

¹ Cf. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (1907), pp. 25-38.

² *Griechische Geschichte*, II², 1, p. 292.

³ *Griechische Geschichte*, III, 2, pp. 810-17.

⁴ *Cambridge Ancient History*, V, p. 186.

⁵ *Histoire Grecque*, II, pp. 618-19.

⁶ Busolt, *op. cit.*, p. 811, n. 1 cites the older literature on the date of the decree; of the writers he names only Steup (see the fifth edition of Classen's *Thucydides*, p. 422) placed the *Handelsperre* before 433, partly on the correct ground that the decree must precede the period of the *αἰῶλαι* and *διαφοραί* which Thucydides undertakes to record, but partly like Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk d. Thukydides*, p. 123, n. 1, on the basis of a mistaken inference from Thucydides, I, 42, 2; see note 9 below. The views of Bodin, *Autour du Decret Mégarien* (*Mél. littéraires Fac. L. Clermont-Ferrand*, 1910), are unknown to me.

the war—that was of course in his view Athenian imperialism and the apprehension that it aroused at Sparta; he does not even record the decree in the train of events that led up to its outbreak. He mentions the decree in only two connections. (a) It was one of the grievances against Athens voiced by Sparta's allies at the first Peloponnesian congress in 432 (I, 67). (b) In the negotiations of the winter 432-1 the Spartans, besides demanding that the siege of Potidaea should be raised and that the autonomy of Aegina should be restored, declared in the strongest and plainest terms that there would be no war if the Megarian decree were repealed (I, 139, 1; 140, 3-4). But Thucydides gives no inkling that it was a newly passed Megarian decree that turned the scales against Archidamus at the congress; and as for the negotiations he treats them as diplomatic fencing. He writes as if the war would not only have come, but as if it would also have come just when and how it did, even if the Megarian decree had never been passed. In his view it was not even (like the Corcyraean or Potidaean incidents) an occasion (*airia*) of the war. And equally clearly he did not think it an operation of the war; it was his task to record the operations of the war in some detail, and he only alludes to the decree. The refusal of the Athenians to repeal it was an episode in the diplomatic struggle for self-justification and is recorded; the decree itself was no part of his story.

This dissent of Thucydides from the *communis opinio* ought to give us pause. The fact that he held the war to be inevitable did not lead him to treat its preliminaries as trivialities that did not warrant detailed narration. If the Megarian decree was among those preliminaries, why did he fail to inform us when and for what reason it was passed? He represents the revolt of Potidaea as growing out of the hostility between Athens and Corinth engendered by Athenian intervention on behalf of Corcyra and as itself determining the Spartan decision to fight at once; if in the true sequence of events either the Corcyraean or the Potidaean incidents induced the Athenians to pass the Megarian decree, and if this decree was one of the recent circumstances that influenced the Spartan decision, it is incomprehensible that Thucydides should have carelessly omitted or deliberately concealed so important a fact. Certainly he would not have concealed it in order to make the conduct of Athens more

conciliatory than it really was. It was never any part of Thucydides' object to whitewash Athens; he knew that the fact that it was the Spartans who declared war did not make them morally the aggressors; Athenian imperialism *compelled* them to it (I, 23, 6). Thucydides depicts Pericles not as pacific but as unyielding; it would have completed his picture to have stated, if it had been true, that in the delicate diplomatic situation of the autumn of 433 or the summer of 432, Pericles carried the Megarian decree. If Athens had chosen such a moment for a gesture of defiance, calculated "to produce throughout Greece a deep and enduring impression, by showing in a terrible example that she was not to be defied with impunity, that the empire of the sea permitted her to starve out any city(!) that incurred her resentment,"⁷ Thucydides could not have ignored it, and nothing indeed could have provided the Corinthian speakers at the first congress at Sparta with a better illustration of the dangers to be apprehended from the aggressive Athenian character.

The inference to be drawn is that the decree was not passed in 433 or 432, but some time earlier, that it was not classed by Thucydides even among the *airtai* of the war simply because it was long antecedent to the war and because the long acquiescence of Sparta and her allies in its existence proved that it did not even occasion the war. Of course this inference must be set aside, if strong grounds can be seen for dating the decree to 433 or 432, but such grounds appear to be absolutely lacking.

There is no explicit ancient testimony for the date of the decree.⁸ The earliest dateable reference to its existence is its mention by Thucydides among the complaints made against Athens at the first Peloponnesian conference at Sparta in the summer of 432.⁹ But his language conveys no suggestion that

⁷ Glotz, *loc. cit.*

⁸ Philochorus, quoted by Schol. on Aristoph., *Peace*, 605, dates the Megarian complaints at Sparta, not the decree itself, to 432/1.

⁹ I cannot see any reference to the decree in the words ascribed to the Corinthian envoys at Athens in 433 (I, 42, 2) τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης πρότερον διὰ Μεγαρέας ὑποψίας. The word *πρότερον* suggests that, whatever the suspicion was, the occasion for it had passed away; yet if it had been evoked by the decree, it could only have been allayed by its repeal. It is more natural to take the words as alluding to the assistance given by Athens to Megara against Corinth about 460; cf. 103, 4.

it was a recent grievance. Both there and in the negotiations at Athens in the ensuing winter it is mentioned in the same context as the grievance of Aegina. This was a grievance of long standing. It must be assumed that Aegina lost her autonomy at her capitulation in 457 and that whatever vague provisions were inserted to safeguard her rights in the Thirty Years Peace,¹⁰ she did not in fact then recover it, only to lose it again in the interval between 446 and 432. Sparta had thus long given *de facto* recognition to Athens' control of the government of Aegina but that did not prevent her in 432 from demanding the restoration of Aegina's autonomy. Equally she would not have felt precluded from taking up a long standing grievance of Megara. In neither case indeed can we be sure that she had never made any previous representations to Athens; Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 538, quoted below, may show that she had; but in 432 for the first time these representations took the form of an ultimatum.¹¹

But could the tradition that treated the Megarian decree as the cause or immediate occasion of the war ever have arisen if the decree had been passed long before the war? Undoubtedly, yes. The Spartans gave out that in order to avoid war the Athenians had only to repeal the decree (Thuc., I, 139, 2); despite the arguments of Pericles (I, 140, 4), that greater issues were involved than this triviality, some Athenians besides Aristophanes were doubtless convinced, and their numbers would grow with the sufferings of the war. It was therefore easy to say, as Andocides (III, 8) said nearly forty years later, that the Athenians went to war on account of the Megarians, and as memories became dim, it was also easy to confuse the passing of the decree with the refusal to repeal it. This evolution of oral tradition, combined with the evidence apparently provided by Aristophanes, suffices to explain the fact that Diodorus, or rather Ephorus, conveys the impression, though not very explicitly, that the decree was passed shortly before the outbreak of war.¹²

Of course the fact that the words do not refer to the decree does not show that the decree was not then in force; on my view it was.

¹⁰ The Aeginetans said that they were not autonomous *κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς* (I, 67, 2).

¹¹ I, 140, 2: (Λακεδαιμόνιοι) ἐπιτάσσοντες ἤδη καὶ οὐκέτι αἰτιώμενοι πάρεσιν.

¹² Strictly Diod., XII, 39, 4 dates the appeal of Megara to Sparta after

But Aristophanes remains to be considered. In his famous comic account in the *Acharnians* of the origins of the Archidamian war (509 ff.) he describes how "worthless fellows" laid informations against the importation of Megarian wares, how some young Athenians carried off the fair Simaetha from Megara and Megarians retaliated by stealing "two of Aspasia's hussies," and how (530 ff.):

ἐντεῦθεν ὀργῇ Περικλέης οὐλύμπιος
ἤστραπτ' ἐβρόντα, ξυνεκύκα τὴν Ἑλλάδα,
ἐτίθει νόμους ὥσπερ σκόλια γεγραμμένους,
ὡς χρὴ Μεγαρέας μήτε γῇ μήτ' ἐν ἀγορᾷ
μήτ' ἐν θαλάττῃ μήτ' ἐν ἡπείρῳ μένειν.
ἐντεῦθεν οἱ Μεγαρήs, ὅτε δὴ πείνων βάδην,
Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδέοντο τὸ ψήφισμ' ὅπως
μεταστραφείη τὸ διὰ τὰς λαικαστρίας·
οὐκ ἠθέλομεν δ' ἡμεῖς δεομένων πολλάκις.
κἀντεῦθεν ἤδη πάταγος ἦν τῶν ἀσπίδων.

It is doubtful how far sober history can ever be reconstructed from the jests of comedy. Even if this passage unambiguously implied that the Megarian decree was passed shortly before the outbreak of war, we should not be justified in accepting this as a fact in the face of strong reasons to the contrary. It was at least true that the repeal of the decree had been demanded by the Spartans as a condition of the preservation of peace; this would be remembered by Aristophanes' audience and would afford sufficient basis for them to enjoy his joke, even if he appeared to be putting in 432 a decree passed say in 440. No spectator was going to rise in his seat and say, "This is really not funny; the chronology is quite wrong." But if we must take Aristophanes seriously on such a question, we ought not to be debarred from pressing his words closely. He gives no definite date; the decree *follows* (ἐντεῦθεν, v. 530) the seizure of Aspasia's girls; *thereafter* (ἐντεῦθεν, v. 536) the Megarians apply to Sparta; war begins *after* Spartan representations are rejected. We must indeed note that he says that the Megarians were starving *slowly* when they sought the good offices of Sparta and that the representations of Sparta were rejected *many* times at Athens. These

the Potidaean incident (in 431!), but leaves the decree itself undated in a genitive absolute clause ὅντος δὲ ψηφίσματος κτλ. Chronological evidence cannot be expected, and is not found, in Plutarch, *Pericles*, 29-30.

phrases are more compatible with an interval of years between the passing of the decree and the outbreak of war than with one of months. The implications of the language of the *Acharnians* and of the silence of Thucydides are identical; in both cases the evidence points to a date earlier than 433 or 432.

Aristophanes again alluded to the Megarian decree in the *Peace*, 605 ff.:

πρῶτα μὲν γ' αὐτῆς ὑπῆρξε Φειδίας πράξας κακῶς.
 εἶτα Περικλέης φοβηθεὶς μὴ μετὰσχοι τῆς τύχης,
 τὰς φύσεις ὕμῶν δεδοικῶς καὶ τὸν αὐτοδᾶξ τρόπον,
 πρὶν παθεῖν τι δεινὸν αὐτός, ἐξέφλεξε τὴν πόλιν,
 ἐμβαλὼν σπινθῆρα μικρὸν Μεγαρικοῦ ψηφίσματος
 ἐξεφύσησεν τοσοῦτον πόλεμον κτλ.

This passage certainly does afford chronological evidence, though not evidence that the decree was the immediate occasion for the outbreak of war;¹³ if the decree was the spark that kindled the war, it was none the less so, even if it preceded it by some years. What these lines do *appear* to show is that the decree was subsequent to the condemnation of Phidias. Unfortunately there is no agreement about the date of Phidias' trial.¹⁴ If the general view (in which I concur) is right, and it should be dated to 438-7, then the lines quoted above, which suggest that the decree was passed soon after that trial, lend further support to the proposal to date it some years before 432. But no weight could be attached to this evidence. The *Peace* was produced in 421. It is evident from vv. 615-17¹⁵ that no one had previously connected Phidias' trial with the Megarian decree or the origin of the war. Memories of the sequence of apparently unrelated events would be sufficiently dim to ensure that a sense of his chronological inexactitude would not spoil the audience's appreciation of the poet's comic explanation of the cause of the war. Even if the rival dating of Phidias' condemnation to 432-1 had to be accepted, it would still be permissible to hold that for comic effect Aristophanes had confused the true order of events. There would be nothing surprising in this. The humour of his

¹³ As Busolt, *op. cit.*, p. 816, n. thinks.

¹⁴ See *Cambridge Ancient History*, V, pp. 478-80.

¹⁵ Τρ. ταῦτα τοίνυν μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω 'γὼ 'πετύσμην οὐδενός,
 οὐδ' ὅπως αὐτῇ προσήκοι Φειδίας ἡκηκόη.

Χο. οὐδ' ἔγωγε, πλὴν γε νυνί.

story rests entirely in its utter improbability, that Pericles who was χρημάτων διαφανῶς ἄδωρότατος (Thuc., II, 65, 8) should have plunged Athens into war to escape a charge of embezzlement, and one historical blunder more or less would not diminish the comic effect of this suggestion.

Granted that the decree was passed well before 433, why and when was it passed? The Athenians justified it, according to Thuc., I, 139, 2, on the grounds that the Megarians had cultivated consecrated soil as well as a strip of No Man's Land on the frontier and had harboured runaway slaves; Aristophanes' tale of the seizure of Aspasia's hussies is doubtless a comic version of the second charge. Disputes of this kind might arise at any time and provide us with no clue to the date. The complaints alleged by Athens against Megara *may* have been no more than a pretence. No doubt the Athenians had hated Megara since her revolt in 446. It may also be that the Athenians suspected that the Megarians had had a hand in the revolt of the Megarian colony of Byzantium in 440, or that they were informed that the Megarians were among those allies of Sparta who had urged intervention in favour of Samos (I, 40, 5); they may have sought the readiest pretext, which could be justified in diplomacy, for punishing Megara for this conduct. All this is guesswork; in plain fact we do not know the date of the decree.

The passage quoted from the *Acharnians* suggests that there were two stages in the action taken against Megara; in the first there was what German scholars have called an *Einfuhrverbot*, i. e. Megarian imports into Attica were liable to sequestration, the execution of the law being left as usual to private informers; in the second—and here we have the decree to which Thucydides refers—not only was this prohibition of Megarian imports into Attica re-affirmed but there was a general *Handelsperre* by which Megara was debarred from sending her goods or even perhaps her ships to all ports in the Athenian empire. The Megarians contended (I, 67, 4) and the Athenians denied (I, 144, 2) that this was contrary to the terms of the treaty, a point which in our ignorance of its text it is idle for us to try to settle.¹⁶

¹⁶ Nesselhauf, "Die diplomatische Verhandlungen vor die Peloponnesischen Kriege" (*Hermes*, LXIX, pp. 286-99), offers a plausible conjecture, which would explain the rival Athenian and Peloponnesian interpretations of the treaty on this point.

The Athenians certainly hoped to inflict loss on the Megarians by their action, and no doubt they succeeded. It has, however, often been thought that their intention was more far-reaching, to coerce Megara to rejoin the Athenian alliance. This was certainly a very natural objective of Athenian strategy; a friendly Megara with an Athenian garrison in Pegae and in Long Walls from Megara to Nisaea secured Attica from invasion by the Peloponnesian army and might permit Athens to resume her attempt to dominate Central Greece. But it is very doubtful if such an objective could have been attained by the decree.

We do not know the extent to which Megara was dependent on trade with the subjects of Athens. Further we may doubt how far the decree could have been enforced. There is no ground for supposing that the Athenians kept a ship in every port to seize blockade runners. The allied cities would have no motive for applying the decree strictly; their interest was to buy the goods that Megara could best supply, and their self-esteem must have been offended by the attempt of Athens to control their trade. Aristophanes' statement that the Megarians were slowly starving may be taken as comic exaggeration. That they suffered inconvenience may be assumed; but if there had been serious danger of their being reduced to submission to Athens by economic pressure dating perhaps from 440 or 439, it would not have needed the Corcyraean and Potidaean incidents to precipitate war between Athens and the Peloponnesian League.¹⁷ It is true that during the Archidamian war Megara was reduced to serious straits, but although the blockade carried out by Athens in war was then presumably far more effective than the operation of the decree had been in peace,¹⁸ Thucydides attributes her plight to the twice-yearly invasions of the Megarid by the Athenian army and the depredations of oligarchical exiles in possession of the port of Pegae (IV, 66), and not to the cutting off of her trade with the Aegean and Black Sea. It looks indeed as if trade was much less important in Megara's economy than

¹⁷ The murder of the herald, Anthemocritus, by the Megarians (Plut., *Per.*, 30) no doubt shows that the decree caused great bitterness at Megara.

¹⁸ Cf. Thuc., II, 93, 4 for the Athenian fort established on Salamis: τοῦ μὴ ἐσπλεῖν Μεγαρεῦσι μηδὲ ἐκπλεῖν μηδέν. Nicias' capture of Minoa in 427 (III, 51) made the blockade more stringent.

we generally suppose, less important at least than freedom to work her own territory. With the cessation of Athenian invasions after 424 (cf. II, 31, 3), and of the depredations by the exiles, who were then admitted to power (IV, 74), Megara had so far recovered that in 421 she was ready to fight on rather than accept a disadvantageous peace (V, 17, 2).

In 432 then the decree had been in force, perhaps nominally rather than effectively, for many years, without exercising any marked influence on the relations of the Great Powers; why then was a demand for its repeal made as an ultimatum by the Spartans in the winter of 432? It should be recalled that this demand was linked with two others, both of which were from the outset plainly unacceptable. The Spartans could not have expected that the Athenians would even consider raising the siege of a revolted subject city or restoring autonomy to Aegina, the "eyesore of the Piræus." If these demands had stood alone, it would be obvious that they were no more than attempts to justify a declaration of war on which Sparta was already resolved. But on the face of it the demand for the repeal of the Megarian decree was more reasonable, and it has suggested to modern scholars the notion that the peace-party at Sparta had regained the ascendant and was seeking a genuine accommodation. In fact the contrary seems more probable.¹⁹ For whatever motives the decree had been proposed by Pericles, it had been justified in part on the ground that the Megarians were guilty of sacrilege. This was a plea calculated to impose on the credulous masses at Athens at least as much as on the outside world. It was the time perhaps of the prosecution of Anaxagoras and of Diopieithes'

¹⁹ The best analysis of the final negotiations is that given by Nesselhauf, *op. cit.* He shows that the Spartans put forward their last demand that the Athenians should respect the autonomy of the allies, which plainly stood no chance of being accepted at Athens and was only intended to impress the Greek world at large, at the same time that they did not expressly withdraw their previous declaration that the repeal of the Megarian decree would in itself be sufficient to preserve peace. This procedure strengthened the hands of the peace party at Athens, and would yet have left Sparta free to make further demands if that party had secured the repeal of the decree. My only criticism of Nesselhauf's views is that he has not recognized the strength of the objections that must have been felt at Athens even to repealing the decree.

decree. Politicians imbued with the spirit of the *Aufklärung* might evoke for their own ends a religious fanaticism which they could not allay when they pleased. The *Acharnians* suggests that the Megarian decree was couched in terms of unusual solemnity, and according to Plutarch, *Pericles*, 30, there was a law that forbade its repeal. Of course the law itself might have been repealed, but apart from the fact that this would have involved time and difficulty, its mere existence shows that feelings at Athens were strongly roused against Megara, probably because of the alleged sacrilege. If Pericles, as Thucydides relates, offered to abandon the decree if the Spartans would abandon the *xenelasia*, he made a good debating point; he was not simply suggesting that restrictions on freedom of intercourse should be removed on both sides, but hinting that it was no more reasonable to expect the Athenians to sacrifice their religious feelings than to ask the Spartans to surrender one of their most time-honoured institutions, which, like all those attributed to Lycurgus, was supposed to have the divine sanction of the Delphic oracle.²⁰ We know indeed from Plutarch (*Per.*, 30) that the Athenians were not content to make this rejoinder, as specious as the Spartan demand, and to offer to submit the dispute to arbitration, but that they sent a memorandum to Sparta, justifying their conduct and indicting that of the Megarians; they were confident that justice was on their side.²¹ If Thucydides tells us little or

²⁰ I owe this last point to Professor H. J. Rose, who has also suggested to me that the Athenians probably consulted the oracle themselves on the sacrilege committed by the Megarians and acted with its approval.

²¹ The bearer of this memorandum, Anthemocritus, was murdered by the Megarians; in retaliation the Athenians passed Charinus' decree for which see Plut., *Per.*, 30, [Dem.], XII, 4. Anthemocritus was a herald, and apparently on this ground Busolt, *op. cit.*, p. 815, n. placed his mission and murder between the surprise of Plataea and the setting out of the Peloponnesian army; he cites Thuc., I, 146, which states that between the last Spartan embassy to Athens and the commencement of open warfare *ἐπεμείγνυντο δὲ ὅμως ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων ἀκηρύκτως μὲν, ἀνυπόκτως δὲ οὐ*; cf. II, 1; during the war *οὔτε ἐπεμείγνυντο ἔτι ἀκηρυκτεῖ παρ' ἀλλήλους*. This argument is not decisive. Heralds were employed not only between states at war or not enjoying diplomatic relations with each other, but for quite other purposes; e.g. heralds inform the subjects of Athens of the decree imposing the use of Athenian currency, etc. (Tod, *G. H. I.*, I², no. 67) and of their obligation

nothing of all this, it is not surprising; he rarely gave full weight to the strength and practical effect of religious or sentimental considerations, doubtless because he himself was immune from their influence. Nor was it necessary for his purpose that he should say more of the Megarian decree. He had already stated that the war was caused by Spartan fear of Athens, he had made it plain that the Spartans had already taken their decision and obtained, as they thought, Delphic sanction for it, he had said explicitly that the Spartans were only concerned in the negotiations to secure the best possible pretext for war, if the Athenians did not comply with their demands (126, 1). The demand for the repeal of the decree was coupled with others patently unacceptable, and was soon superseded by the sweeping claim that Athens should leave all her allies autonomous. Thucydides must have thought—and with reason—that no reader could for a moment have supposed that the Spartans meant peace. This was the essential point; no need for him to go into all the intricate details of the diplomatic fencing. And on this point, if the present analysis of the Megarian decree is correct, Thucydides was right; the Spartans were asking what they knew the Athenians were least likely to concede, until with the return of campaigning weather they could continue their diplomacy by other means.

P. A. BRUNT.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

to send first fruits to Eleusis (*ibid.*, 74); a herald is sent to Plataea, to advise against the immediate execution of the Theban prisoners (Thuc., II, 6, 2); in Herodotus the word often means no more than messenger, cf. Powell, *Lexicon to Hdt.*, s. v. κήρυξ, though not all his instances of this sense are right. Probably the Athenians sent a herald rather than an ambassador, whenever they wished to convey information or orders or, in the present instance, a protest to another city, and not to enter into negotiations. Thuc., I, 146 does not of course mean that no heralds conveyed messages between Athens and Sparta during the period in question, but that as yet intercourse was not confined to the sending of heralds. Charinus' decree presupposes that military operations had begun or were imminent, and is perhaps later than the attack on Plataea, but Anthemocritus' mission more likely belongs to the winter; after Plataea both sides were preparing for war (II, 7, 1), not sending notes to each other.

Addendum.

In the third volume of *The Athenian Tribute Lists* (Princeton, 1950), published since the preceding paper was written, Meritt, Wade-Gery and McGregor date the Megarian decree to 432; besides the ancient evidence already discussed they cite (p. 321, n. 87) [Lysias], VI, 10 and 54, passages which would not establish its date, even if they were known to refer to the decree at all. They have, however, made a suggestion which, if sound, would refute part of my case for proposing a much earlier date.

I have contended that the Megarian grievance should be associated in time with the Aeginetan and that the Aeginetan grievance was of long standing. The authors of *A. T. L.* hold, on the contrary, that in 432 "it was probably recent" (p. 303, n. 10). They suggest that the clause in the Thirty Years Peace which stipulated that Aegina should be autonomous was phrased like part of a clause in the Peace of Nicias (Thuc., V, 18, 5), providing that certain cities should be autonomous, on condition that they paid the tribute of Aristides' time. By analogy the Thirty Years Peace might have provided that Aegina should be autonomous, so long as she continued to pay the tribute of 30 talents fixed at the time of her capitulation. They note (p. 320) that in the spring of 432 Aegina paid only 9 or 14 talents, and infer that "this partial payment exposed her perhaps to the action which Athens now took. We are not told exactly what this action was, only that later in the year Aegina complained privately at Sparta that her autonomy was being violated. Possibly Athens installed a garrison; strategic control of Aegina was vital in case of war."

This language does not make it as clear as could be wished that the proposed reconstruction of events is merely conjectural. Not only are we not told by any ancient authority "exactly what action" Athens took against Aegina in 432; we are not told that Athens took any action at all. It remains my conviction that Thucydides would not have passed it over in silence, if shortly before the outbreak of the war Athens had taken action against either Aegina or Megara, and if that action had been one of the events directly occasioning the outbreak or even a military precaution, an act of war prior to the beginning of formal hostilities.

What then of Aegina's failure to pay 30 talents in 432?

In the first place we do not even know that Aegina was still liable to pay this sum in the sixth assessment period; her name is not extant on any quota list between that of 440/39 (in the fourth period) and 432 (see *A. T. L.*, I, p. 218). Perhaps Athens had reduced her tribute, on the ground of temporary impoverishment. There is of course no evidence to point to this, but that is not a serious difficulty; we know little of the detailed history of Aegina, or indeed of the economic history of any Greek cities at this time.

Secondly, even if this possibility is discounted, even if we admit that Aegina's low payment in 432 *necessarily* implies that she was in default (perhaps in expectation of a general war), it does not follow that Athens then took action to deprive her of such autonomy as she still possessed. No doubt she pressed her for payment of arrears; but it can hardly be true that she installed a garrison, or else Thucydides' statement of the Aeginetan grievance must surely have been more specific. It is no less clear that Athens did not set up a puppet government. Thucydides says indeed (I, 67, 2) that the Aeginetans voiced their grievance at Sparta in secret, but that does not suggest that the complainants were merely private citizens and not the government of Aegina.

What then did the Aeginetans mean by the assertion that they had been deprived of autonomy? Partly perhaps that like the other allies they had been deprived of full rights of jurisdiction.¹ But it may also be that they regarded the tribute itself as a breach of autonomy.² "Autonomy" is not a precise term; frequently it means simply "independence" (e. g. V, 27, 2;

¹ In the treaty of alliance between Sparta and Argos in 418 juridical equality is closely associated with autonomy, Thuc., V, 79, 1: *ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλεις . . . κοιναγέοντω τᾶν σπονδᾶν καὶ τὰς ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλεις, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες κατὰ πάτρια δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας.*

² In several passages Thucydides seems to take payment of tribute as a criterion of subjection; VII, 57, 4: *τῶν μὲν ὑπηκόων καὶ φόρου ὑποτελών . . . Χίοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ὄντες φόρου, ναῦς δὲ παρέχοντες αὐτόνομοι*; VI, 85, 2: *Χίους μὲν καὶ Μηθυμναίους νεῶν παροκωχῆ αὐτονόμους*; VI, 84, 3: *καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς . . . ξύμφορος ἡμῖν ἀπαράσκευος ὦν καὶ χρήματα μόνον φέρων, τὰ δὲ ἐνθάδε καὶ Λεοντῖνοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φίλοι ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτονομούμενοι.* Of course this identification would not have been possible when the Delian league was founded, and the autonomous members paid *φόρος*, not at Athens' behest, but for common purposes and by common consent.

VIII, 91, 3), and a city might feel her independence lost, not only if a constitution or garrison were imposed on her from outside, but also if she were forced to pay tribute to another state at a rate and for purposes which that state determined at her own discretion. The authors of *A. T. L.* assume indeed that the Thirty Years Peace explicitly provided both that Aegina should be autonomous and that she should pay tribute at a fixed rate. If that had been so, Aegina could not have complained that the imposition of tribute infringed the autonomy promised her by the treaty. But the assumption is not necessary to account for the known facts. It may also be that the treaty listed Aegina among the allies of Athens³ and provided that she should be autonomous without defining the nature of this autonomy. In that case the Athenians could have interpreted the treaty to mean that they were within their rights in imposing tribute on Aegina as on other cities listed as allies, though not as in other cases in interfering in her internal government. The Aeginetans, on the other hand, while continuing to pay under *force majeure*, may never have ceased to protest against what they considered an infringement of their independence. If this be so, the clause in the Peace of Nicias, cited in *A. T. L.*, is not a parallel to the provision affecting Aegina in the Thirty Years Peace, but represents perhaps an attempt to remove an ambiguity in the meaning of the term "autonomy" which experience of the working of that provision had revealed.

All this is certainly conjectural, but suffices to show that the epigraphical evidence for the theory in *A. T. L.* can be interpreted in a way more compatible with the silence of Thucydides about the origin of the Aeginetan grievance. That silence surely implies that it did not arise from any new action taken by Athens just before the meeting of the Peloponnesian congress, and the quota-lists do not require us to believe that it did.

One last word. Thucydides makes the Corinthians complain that the Spartans had wilfully closed their eyes to the insidious aggressions of Athens; "we know the path they take and their manner of proceeding against their neighbours *by gradual steps*" (*κατ' ὀλίγον*—I, 69, 3). The point of this would have been lost if it had been true that all the aggressive acts of Athens, of which her enemies were then complaining, had been crowded into the few preceding months.

³ Cf. *A. T. L.*, III, p. 304, n. 15, based on Thuc., I, 35, 1; 40, 2.

ROMAN NAMES AND THE CONSULS OF A. D. 13.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the name of C. Silius, one of the ordinary consuls of A. D. 13,* and to touch upon the matter of suffectus in the same year. L. Munatius Plancus, the other ordinary, does not enter the problem. The name of Silius appears in standard works¹ as "C. Silius A. Caecina Largus" or "C. Silius (P. f. or P. f. P. n.) Caecina Largus," and we have been unable to find any questioning of these forms; but we should like to suggest the possibility that Silius should be known simply as "C. Silius" and that A. Caecina Largus was quite another person, a suffect of the same year.

An examination of all the names in the first edition of the *Prosopographia* and in the volumes of the second edition that have appeared to date shows no example (if one discounts Silius) of a name composed of two complete names in juxtaposition (each with praenomen and nomen, with or without a second nomen, and with or without cognomen) earlier than the Flavian period, over fifty years later.² We are aware that custom and law with respect to the formation of names had been undergoing changes: in the Augustan period it became fashionable to use cognomina as praenomina,³ perhaps through the influence of

* All dates here are of the Christian era unless "B. C." is added.

¹ E. g., *C. I. L.*, I¹ (1863), pp. 475 (XIV, year 766), 629 (*s. v.* Silii); *C. I. L.*, I², 1 (1893), pp. 166 (year 766-13), 353 (*s. v.* Silii); P. von Rohden-H. Dessau, *P. I. R.*¹, S 507 (1898); Nagl, *R.-E.*, Silius, no. 12 (1927); E. Groag-A. Stein, *P. I. R.*² after C 100 (1936); A. Degraffi, *I. I.*, XIII, 1 (1947), p. 532, year 13-766; *Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius* collected by Victor Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (Oxford, 1949), p. 40, year 13.

² The earliest examples are C. Marius Marcellus Octavius Publius Cluvius Rufus, suffect in 80 (*P. I. R.*¹, M 231, *R.-E.*, Marius, no. 46); L. Pompeius Vopiscus C. Arruntius Catellius Celer, suffect *ca.* 72 (*P. I. R.*¹, P 501); C. Octavius Tadius Tossianus L. Iavolenus Priscus, suffect after 83 and distinguished jurist—Pliny the Younger's absent-minded Iavolenus Priscus (*P. I. R.*¹, O 40, *R.-E.*, Octavius, no. 59); M. Larcus Magnus Pompeius Silo, suffect in 82 (*P. I. R.*¹, L 58, *R.-E.*, Larcus, no. 16); C. Antius A. Iulius Quadratus, consul in 94 (suffect) and 105 (ordinary) (*R.-E.*, Antius, no. 10, *P. I. R.*¹, Iulius 338, *Epigraphica*, III, p. 24 and note 11).

³ E. g., Paullus Fabius Maximus and his brother, Africanus Fabius

Augustus' use of "Caesar" as praenomen, and the first examples of nomina used as cognomina, without change of form, are found then.⁴ It has been supposed that such names represent cases of adoption—the second nomen being the adoptee's original one—, but the evidence is not sufficient for certainty. In any event the traditional way of forming the name after adoption seems to have been as follows: the adoptee took over his adoptive father's three names, to which he added as a fourth his original nomen expanded into a form ending in *-anus*; e. g., C. Octavius *Kaivias* (?) Thurinus, adopted by C. Iulius Caesar, became C. Iulius Caesar Octavianus (though apparently he himself avoided "Octavianus" as too plebeian); if the adoptive father had no cognomen, the adoptee retained his own, if he had one (e. g., T. Pomponius Atticus, adopted by his uncle Q. Caecilius, became Q. Caecilius Q. f. Pomponianus Atticus).⁵ If either adoptive father or adoptee, or both, had more than one cognomen (i. e. before the adoption), how many of these the adoptee ended up with, and their order in his final name, are questions not yet clearly answered and not a part of the present study.

Though this traditional system lasted at least into the reign of Tiberius (Sejanus is an example), the case of Brutus—M. Iunius Brutus, adopted by his uncle Q. Servilius Caepio, became Q. Caepio Brutus—indicates that changes had begun before the end of the Republic, and by Tiberius' reign we find frequent examples of a new method of making names after adoption, particularly adoption by will (which Roby⁶ says "appear to be really appointment of heir with direction to bear testator's name"). The adoptee writes his new father's praenomen and nomen, then his own original nomen unchanged, and finally either his new father's cognomen or his own original one. Thus

Maximus, consuls in 11 and 10 B. C.; Iullus Antonius, cos. 10 B. C.; Cossus Cornelius Lentulus, cos. 1 B. C.; Sisenna Statilius Taurus, cos. in 16; Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus, suffect under Tiberius. See Klebs, *P. I. R.*¹, C 1124, and Groag, *P. I. R.*², C 1380.

⁴ E. g., P. Sulpicius Quirinius (cos. 12 B. C.). Cf. Mommsen, *Ges. Schr.*, IV (Berlin, 1906), p. 405; Groag, *P. I. R.*², F 121, note.

⁵ See Ernst Fraenkel, *R.-H.*, XVI, 2 (1935), col. 1662, 6 ff., s. v. *Namenwesen*.

⁶ Henry John Roby, *Roman Private Law in the Times of Cicero and of the Antonines* (Cambridge, 1902), I, p. 59, note 1.

we find M. Acilius Memmius Glabrio, *C. I. L.*, VI, 31543 (probably Tiberian, before A. D. 24: *P. I. R.*², A 75), and C. Sallustius Passienus Crispus, cos. suff. in 27, cos. in 44, adoptive son of the historian's adoptive son,⁷ whose cognomina Glabrio and Crispus (Passienus is a nomen) appear to come from the adoptive fathers; and Sex. Tedi- (or Teidius) Valerius Catullus, suffect in 31 (Groag, *R.-E.*, Teidius, no. 3), and C. Petronius Pontius Nigrinus, cos. in 37 (*P. I. R.*¹, P 218), whose cognomina seem to be their original ones. Cf. also T. Rustius Nummius Gallus, suffect in 34 (Degrassi, *I. I.*, XIII, 1, p. 218, note on 34, 46 f.).

Polynomials became quite frequent and fairly complicated in the latter part of the first century and in the second century, but it seems clear that a person commonly used only part of his name for general purposes. It has been held⁸ that he might employ any combination he pleased of nomina and cognomina from among those to which he was entitled, being bound only to use the praenomen which went with the nomen he choose to use ("la loi de l'adhérence du *praenomen* au *gentilicium*"). In these cases of polynomials through adoption, apparently the name acquired from the adopter came first, but scholars seem to doubt that this was an absolute rule.⁹

It is true that the emperor Galba, who was consul first in 33 and was adopted by his step-mother in her will, used two praenomina, but there is no case in which both his praenomina appear in the same reference, and Galba is the first person (again discounting Silius) for whom there is any evidence for the use of two praenomina (i. e. sometimes one, sometimes the other).¹⁰ Neither Clément Pallu de Lessert nor Degrassi mentions anyone earlier, and we have been unable to find any earlier examples

⁷ *P. I. R.*¹, P 109; Otto Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten*² (Berlin, 1905), p. 26, note 1; Stein, *R.-E.*, Sallustius, no. 11, col. 1955, 65 ff.; *P. I. R.*², C 1387; *I. I.*, XIII, 1, no. 24, p. 299, A. D. 27, with Degrassi's note, p. 300.

⁸ A. Clément Pallu de Lessert, *Soc. Nat. des Ant. de France, Cent. 1804-1904, Recueil de Mémoires* (Paris [1904]), pp. 369-375, esp. pp. 371 f., 373.

⁹ For treatment of names in the empire see also Mommsen on the younger Pliny, *op. cit.* (note 4), pp. 394-412 (from *Hermes*, III [1869], pp. 59-77); Fraenkel, *loc. cit.*, cols. 1648-1670 (especially good for origins of names); A. Degrassi, *Epigraphica*, III (1941), pp. 23-27.

¹⁰ On Galba see Degrassi, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 f.

elsewhere. C. Appius Iunius Silanus, consul of 28, seems to be an entirely different kind of case and unique in his period: Mommsen and others have conjectured that the "Appius" came from his mother's family, the Claudii (*R.-E.*, Iunius, no. 155).

Silius, who apparently was the son of P. Silius Nerva, consul of 20 B. C., the brother of P. Silius, consul suffect of 3, and of A. Licinius Nerva Silianus, consul of 7, and the father of C. Silius, consul designate of 47/48 and unfortunately connected with Messallina,¹¹ is a man on whom we have a fair amount of information from historians and inscriptions (see note 1), and in all this evidence except the index to Book LVI of Dio and the inscribed fasti he is *always* referred to simply as "C. Silius" or, once in the text of Dio, "the Silius" (without cognomen of any kind).¹² If his full name really was "C. Silius A. Caecina Largus," we do not know how he came by the name; if by testamentary adoption, we note that his name by birthright comes first, certainly not the common practice.

Let us examine the four inscribed consular lists in which the year 18 has come down to us in whole or in part. They are the Fasti Consulares Capitolini (hereafter designated as Fast. Cap.), the Fasti Fratrum Arvalium, the Fasti Scribarum Quaestoriorum, and the Fasti Antiates Minores. It is with the last that we shall begin, since it is from this list that the full name (including the praenomen "Aulus") "C. Silius A. Caecina Largus" has been derived.

The "Lesser Fasti from Antium" (*C. I. L.*, I², p. 72, no. XVI; X, 6639; *I. I.*, XIII, 1, pp. 303 f., no. 26), extant for the years 9-18, are on a marble tablet or slab (see Plate; cf. *I. I.*, XIII, 1, Tab. XC) 40.5 cm. high and 27 cm. wide,¹³ broken off at the bottom and at the upper left-hand corner. Found in June 1846,

¹¹ For these relatives, in order of mention, see *P. I. R.*¹, S 512, 506, L 153, S 505; and *R.-E.*, s. vv. Silius, nos. 21, 9, Licinius, no. 137, Silius, no. 4.

¹² The Chronographer of 354, the Fasti Hydatiani, and the Chronicon Paschale all have "Silanus" or "Filanus" by mistake for "Silius" (*C. I. L.*, I², 1, p. 166; *I. I.*, XIII, 1, p. 532).

¹³ These measurements are taken from Degraffi (*I. I.*, XIII, 1, p. 303). Our squeeze measures somewhat less because of the inevitable slight shrinkage. Measurements given below regarding letter size are from the squeeze and accurate with relation to one another, but doubtless a little short of the actual measurements.

it is now in the lapidary gallery of the Vatican Museum (panel xxxvii, no. 32). As the photograph shows, the general arrangement is that for each year the two ordinary consuls are inscribed on a single line and the suffect or suffects under them on a separate indented line (or lines, if needed, as for the last year). Except for the year 18 (the last 4 lines) the month and day on which the suffects entered office are not given. The lines containing the ordinary consuls begin at very nearly the same distance from the left edge of the stone (about 1.1 cm. on our squeeze), and those for the suffects are all nearly precisely equidistant from the left edge (3 cm. from it on our squeeze). For the years 12, 15, 16, and 17, the letters SVF precede the names of the suffects, and it has been supposed that this was true also of the years 9, 10, and 18, whose beginnings are lost. For the year 9, this is just spatially possible with a little crowding (line 2), and we believe that the first part of the line as preserved shows evidence of such crowding; and the year 18 probably read SVF·K·FEB·, etc. (spatially suitable). But if SVF had preceded the suffects of 10 (line 4), where the name SER·LENTVLVS begins at precisely the indentation used for all the other lines containing suffects and where there is not the slightest crowding, the line would have had to begin even nearer the margin than the lines below it containing the ordinary consuls. The margin for the lines containing the ordinary consuls decreases a little for the last two years, but for the previous years 1.1 cm. is the narrowest margin there is. The smallest space occupied by SVF·, measured up to the left edge of the following letter, is 2.0 cm. on our squeeze. This would bring the beginning of line 4 to 0.9 cm. from the left margin.

We should perhaps add that line 3 (A. D. 10), as completed "[P. Corn]elius Dolabell," fits perfectly the arrangement which we have noted. Line 1, in order to begin 1.1 cm. from the edge of the stone and to be completed "[Q. Sulpicius·C]" from other fasti, must show very generous spacing between letters, but note the generous spacing in the rest of the line. Allow:

Margin 1.1 to 1.2 cm.

Q. 1.1 (0.1 cm. more than the only Q we have, line 4,
measuring to left side of next letter)

SV	1.3	(as in SVF, in line 7, measuring to right side of V)
(V)L	0.9	(as in PROCVL, line 16, measuring from right side of V and allowing no space between L and following P)
PI	1.2	(as in PAPIVS, line 2, from left side of second P to right side, but not right finial, of I)
(I)C	1.0	(as in GERMANICVS, line 6, from right side of I to right side of C)
(CI)	0.25	(as in CAECINA, line 9, from right side of second C to left side of I)
IVS	2.10	(as in SILIVS, line 8, from left side of I to right side of S)
(S).C	1.2	(as in PLANCVS·C, line 8, from right side of S to right side of the C)
<hr/>		
10.15		to 10.25 cm.

We measure 10.3 cm. to the right lower edge of the C (which is just visible on our squeeze) of "Camerinus" (line 1).

There are, to be sure, errors in this list. The suffect of A. D. 11, whom we know from the Fast. Cap., is omitted; "Libo," the cognomen of Scribonius, cos. of 16, is wrongly given to Vibius in the next line (the Fasti Ostienses are fragmentary here but give "Rufinus"—nomen not extant—as the cognomen of the first suffect of 16); "Craecina" (*sic*) is written in the same year for "Graecinus." Nomina and cognomina are also omitted now and then, cognomina are in some cases abbreviated, and in 5 of the 10 years the order of the consuls is reversed from that of the Fast. Cap. (3 times, A. D. 9-13) and the Fasti Ostienses (2 times, A. D. 14-18). But we believe that the indentation of the suffects persisted throughout the tablet and that the scribe's error in line 4 was not a change in his plan of spacing but the omission of SVF before SER·LENTVLVS·Q·IVNIVS·BLAESVS (whom we know from other fasti to be suffects). It seems to us therefore that the natural interpretation of line 9 also is that A. Caecina Largus was a suffect and that the stone-cutter here, as in line 4, simply neglected to cut SVF first. Had "A. Caecina" been part of Silius' name, the scribe, we think, would have crowded the ordinary consuls'

line, as he did in other lines where needed, instead of spreading it and would have abbreviated their cognomina to get the two complete names all in one line, in harmony with the rest of the arrangement.

Only one fragment of the *Fasti Scribarum Quaestoriorum* is still extant in stone (it is of a later period than ours), but on the left side of the first fragment preserved in MS form we have the right end of the lines which contained the year 13 (the beginning of the next column with parts of the years 18 and 19 occupies the right side of the fragment), and we can read —CO COS, for ...Plan]CO COS (the consuls are in the ablative throughout this list). Silius apparently preceded Plancus here, and *C. I. L.* (VI, 32270; I², p. 74, no. XVII) and *I. I.* (XIII, 1, p. 306, no. 27) supply [C. Silio Largo, L. Munatio Plan]CO COS. We should like to point out that, even if it could be determined that spatially something more than "C. Silio" is needed, his filiation could have taken the place of the cognomen (see the filiation for Silanus, cos. of 19, in the same list). So this list offers no evidence for the name of Silius.

The *Fasti* of the Arval Brethren (*C. I. L.*, I², pp. 70 f.; *I. I.*, XIII, 1, pp. 296-301, no. 24) have the fragments of only two words from A. D. 13 (a. u. c. 766): ...]COS in one line and ...]CVS or GVS in the line below (*C. I. L.* reads CVS, but both *C. I. L.* and *I. I.* take them to refer to the cognomen of some suffect. Unfortunately we ourselves do not have squeezes of the pertinent fragments, but judging from the drawings and photograph in *I. I.* and relying on Degraffi's opinion of the reading, we would suggest [SVF·A·CAECINA·LAR]GVS as a spatially satisfactory and the most logical restoration of the line. On the order of the names of the ordinary consuls here we have no opinion. But we feel this list to be a small bit of evidence which favors the belief that "A. Caecina Largus" is a suffect's name and not part of Silius'; although not impossible, it would appear too much of a coincidence to find in the same year both "C. Silius A. Caecina Largus" and an otherwise unknown suffect whose cognomen also ended in GVS.

The *Fast. Cap.* end with the year A. D. 13 (*C. I. L.*, I², p. 29, a. u. c. 766; *I. I.*, XIII, 1, pp. 62 f.). They read for that year:

IMP·CAESAR·DIVI·F·AVGVSTVS·PONT·MAX·TR·POT·XXXV
 TI·CAESAR·AVGVSTI·F·DIVI·N·TR·POT·XIII
 C·SILIVS·P·F· P N ·L·MVNATIVS·L·F·L·N
 (erasure) | PLANCVS

LVDI, etc.

C. I. L. gives the letters C and E of the name "Caecina" in the erasure, but Degrassi reports that he could see no certain trace of these letters. Degrassi (*I. I.*, XIII, 1, pp. 63 and 141, year 13) concurs with Henzen (who first suggested it) in thinking that the erasure contained the words "Caecina Largus" (probably without the "A." for "Aulus"), and he states (pp. 142, col. 1, and 296 *fin.*) that the scribe omitted the suffect for the year because of lack of room, since (p. 20, col. 1 *fin.*) the *ludi* notice for 17 B. C. was already in place when the consuls of A. D. 13 were cut. In proposing that the erasure had contained CAECINA LARGVS, Henzen implied (*C. I. L.*, I¹, p. 450 *fin.*; I², p. 39 *fin.*) that the name had been deleted because of Silius' *damnatio* in A. D. 24, but Mommsen pointed out that this explanation was not satisfactory since the better-known name "Silius" was not erased. Mommsen's explanation (he accepted CAECINA LARGVS as the words erased) was that Silius either had no right to bear the name "Caecina Largus" or later lost the right: this could be due to the *damnatio memoriae* of the person from whom he came by the name, or more probably because Silius, for whatever reason he had combined the name "A. Caecina Largus" with his own, found that the combination was untenable under current law, and so it was removed by official order from the *Fast. Cap.*, where it had come from some popular list (*C. I. L.*, I, both edd., *ad loc.*; *Ges. Schr.*, IV, pp. 405 f.). Although no objection to the explanation can be made if one accepts the premise that only *Caecina Largus* was written here (and erased), it is pure conjecture and not deduction from evidence.

Again we have no squeeze, and the photographs available (e. g. Tab. XLII, no. xlviii, of *I. I.*, XIII, 1) are not completely helpful, but several things may be noted. First, the erasure covers a space much larger than that needed for "Caecina Largus" and begins immediately under the "C." of "C. Silius,"

suggesting an arrangement different from that of any of the preceding years. Then, Silius' name and filiation show unusual and unnecessary spreading: why so, if there was still more of the name to be added and space was cramped already by the *ludi* notice below? Finally, the line to the left of PLANCVS, which can be there only to separate what has gone before, is unique in this list and suggests to us that what preceded was not simply Silius' cognomen but something quite different from the arrangement for the previous years. The very fact that the notice of the *ludi* was already in place would make it necessary to abandon the arrangement for recording suffectus used for the preceding (Christian) years, and it seems possible to us that an attempt may have been made to squeeze the name of the suffect (or suffectus?) into the only space remaining, i. e. under Silius' name. Whether the erasure came because this proved inadequate for the purpose or because the suffect suffered *damnatio memoriae*, or whether something quite different (such as a date or heading for the *ludi* entry) was written and had to be erased, there is no way of knowing. If it is true that there are no sure traces of particular letters in the erasure, it seems fruitless to speculate further on what was there and why it was erased. Our purpose is merely to show on what meager grounds it is stated that the Fast. Cap. give Silius' name as "C. Silius P. f. P. n. / [Caecina Largus]." In our opinion the list offers no evidence that there was more here than "C. Silius P. f. P. n."

We now come to Dio Cassius. Although only Γάιος Σίλιος or δ Σίλιος appears in the text of Books LVI and LXI (the latter in epitomized form), the "index"¹⁴ to the former has Γ. Σίλιος Γ. υἱ. Καικίνα Λάριος, i. e. "C. Silius C. f. Caecina Larius." The errors in filiation and in the spelling of the cognomen find parallels in other examples from Dio's indices, though they have comparatively few major errors. One or two cognomina found only in Dio have not been universally accepted or thoroughly explained: for example, Φούριος for L. Calpurnius Piso, cos. 15 B. C., and Ἀρβατος for M. Valerius Messalla Appianus, cos. 12 B. C. (cf. Degrassi, *I. I.*, XIII, 1, pp. 276, 139, for 15 and 12 B. C.). For A. D. 4 the Dio index reads Σέξτρος Αἰμίλιος Κ. υἱ.

¹⁴ The listing of the years' consuls at the beginning of each book, preserved in at least one of the MSS.

Κάτος for Sex. Aelius Catus; for 7, K. Καίλιος Μέτελλος Κρητικός for Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Silanus; and for 17, Γ. Καίλιος Γ. υἱ. Νέπωσ ἢ Πούφος for C. Caelius Rufus. This last has been variously explained: perhaps a Caecilius was adopted by a Caelius, or an original error ("Caecilius" for "Caelius") may have led to the addition of a cognomen ("Nepos") prominent among the Caecilii Metelli (see *P. I. R.*², C 141).

The Dio index then is the only positive evidence that Silius bore also the names "Caecina Largus," and we cannot regard our case for two men, a consul and a suffect, as proved or provable since it must postulate an error in Dio's index. Errors, however, do exist there, and it is fair to say that to Dio in the early third century a name like "C. Silius (A.) Caecina Largus" would have seemed perfectly normal; if he used a list like the "Lesser Fasti from Antium" which neglected the SVF, he could easily have made the supposed mistake through too hasty an examination. For us it is easier to accept an error on Dio's part than to accept "C. Silius A. Caecina Largus" as a correct name in A. D. 13. All the evidence except Dio's seems to weigh against it.

Degrassi¹⁵ has suggested Favonius (Dessau, 9483; *P. I. R.*², F 121) and M. Lollius (*R.-E.*, Lollius, no. 12) as suffects for A. D. 13. Both these men were consulars and belong to the Augusto-Tiberian period, but we have no evidence for the date of their suffectures. Degrassi believes that 13 is the most likely year (the Arval Brethren Fasti show that one or more suffects held office that year; see above, p. 289, and *I. I.*, XIII, 1, p. 297, no. 24). So to his two possible suffects for the year we add A. Caecina Largus. Although there is no known A. Caecina Largus with whom our man can be identified, "Aulus" is found commonly as a praenomen for the Caecinae (cf. the consul of 1 B. C.), and other Caecinae Largi are known from the Empire (*R.-E.*, Caecina, nos. 16-20; *P. I. R.*², C 100-102).

ARTHUR E. AND JOYCE S. GORDON.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

¹⁵ *Epigraphica*, VIII (1946, publ. 1948), pp. 34-36.

THE PARADOX OF THE *OEDIPUS*.

Swellfoot the Tyrant, as Shelley entitled his version of this great play, is deservedly the most famous, though it is not the most overpraised, of Greek tragedies. Written during the maturity of Sophocles' powers, it remains, after twenty-five centuries of attrition and admiration, the most self-contained, the most complete, and the most adept of ancient plays. For many reasons none of these superlatives is misapplied; but there is a further reason for praise which appears to have escaped the attention of most critics.¹

The internal, or psychological, structure of the *Oedipus*, it is to be maintained here, is built upon a paradox, which one may suppose represents, at least partially, Sophocles' view of life during the disillusioning and harassing first years of the Peloponnesian War. For the poet, if he is indeed to see life steadily and see it whole, cannot hope to do so without an adjustment of vision. In this play the blind see; and when a man really sees with his eyes, he must summon the will to blind himself in his physical part, for the vision he would otherwise behold is too terrible for sight. Not only this: physical sight is equated with knowledge and light and truth, darkness with their opposites. The paradox is abruptly emphasized when light gives place to night: the protagonist puts out his eyes when he has finally been forced to see.²

¹ Though not that of E. H. Olmsted (*A. J. P.*, LXIX, p. 57), to whose criticism this study owes a great deal. She must not, however, be held responsible for its conclusions.

Most of the modern literature on Sophocles is highly controversial (an exception is the admirably straightforward work of F. Allègre, *Sophocle [Annales de l'université de Lyon]*, 1905), and some of it unrewarding as well (the nadir appears to have been reached in T. von Wilamowitz' *Die dramatische Technik d. Soph.* [1917]; and things have greatly improved since then).

² If it be objected that this makes the play too subtle to follow upon the stage, one may reply that this seems to have been its actual fate at the first presentation; for Philocles ὁ ἀσχροῦς (see *Ar., Vesp.*, 462, *Thesm.*, 168) won the first prize. Perhaps also the vigor of the first scene (if the plague was contemporaneously raging) and the horror of the last (when even the sympathetic chorus cannot bear to look at the

This paradox of disillusionment is constantly brought to our attention throughout the play, as will be seen from even a brief analysis of it.³

Aristotle (*Poet.*, 1453 b) justly remarks: δὲ γὰρ καὶ ἀνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον ὥστε τὸν ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρέττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων· ἥπερ ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίπου μῦθον. τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὁψews τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν. The reference to the *Oedipus* is inevitable; and we may note that Aristotle offers no apology for the dramatist's introduction of the blinded hero upon the stage, even though the Chorus in the play cannot bear to look at their former king (1303). For it is the fearful fact, and not the mere ocular testimony, which produces the tragic effect. It is not unlikely that this seemed so obvious to Aristotle that, as often, he allowed his readers to make their own inferences and did not trouble to explain.

But did Sophocles hold such an opinion? He was a playwright and thus occupied with visual matters: he is credited, indeed, with the introduction of scene-painting.⁴ He knew that tragic ideas are intensified by tragic sights, as when he exhibited the dead body of Eurydice in the *Antigone*. In the *Oedipus*, it will

protagonist) may have contributed to a lack of acceptance. Jebb (ed. *O. T.*, p. xxxi) supposes that Philocles' play was very good: even this may not be so, though to accept Aristophanes as a literary critic of infallible discretion is not bargained for here. (G. H. Macurdy, *O. P.*, XXXVII [1942], pp. 307-310, finds the reason for Sophocles' defeat in a political interpretation of 873 ff.)

³ There is omitted, for the moment, a consideration of Sophocles' attitude toward conventional religion. In the opinion of the present writer he was, during the period in which he composed this play, passing through an antireligious phase. Observe that in the *O. T.* there is a complete suppression of the *reason* why Laius, and consequently his son, was doomed. The facts, to be sure, were familiar to an Athenian audience from such plays as Aeschylus' *Laios*, which contained the curse of Pelops (cf. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy*, p. 162). Kierkegaard's famous remark (*Either/Or*, I, p. 112 of the English trans.) is to the point: "... in Greece the wrath of the gods had no ethical character, but only esthetic ambiguity."

⁴ T. B. L. Webster (*Introduction to Sophocles*, p. 9) might perhaps have strengthened his argument about the friendship of Sophocles and Polygnotus by indicating that our poet may well have made this great innovation in stage technique under the influence of such an artistic relationship.

be found, he uses every device in his power, the cumulative effect of which is nothing less than overwhelming.

In the Prologue Oedipus (80-81) prays to Apollo that Creon's news may be bright (*λαμπρός*) as his countenance. The Chorus, upon entering, implores Athena, Artemis, and Apollo to shine forth (*προφάνητε* 163; cf. 474). *Παιὼν λάμπει* (186) and *ἄλκᾶ* (189) has a bright face. (198-200 are not considered, for their meaning is doubtful.) 203-215 are full of light, culminating in lines which may be restored with Arndt: *φλέγοντ' ἀγλαῶπι <δαία> πέυκη*.

When the first episode is well under way, we are introduced to Teiresias, who is blind (302, 348, 371, 374 f., 389), but can see the truth (324; cf. 299 ff., 284 ff. where Teiresias is said to "see" just as Apollo does, 369, 436, 461, 563: this theme is later to be masterfully developed at 747). But through the ignorance of his interlocutor he is taunted with falsehood and dissembling⁵ (390 ff., 403). Even the Chorus is deceived on this point (499 ff.) and so is Creon (526). Oedipus, on the other hand, has, to all appearance, eyes; but they are metaphorically blind (337-8, 413)⁶ and will become physically so (419, 454). He speaks ironically of himself as ignorant (397); and that is what he really is (415 f.; cf. 545, 550). Blindness is night (374, 419). Apollo's truth has flashed forth (473-5). The Chorus is ignorant and blind (486-8). Only the gods know, man is ignorant (498 ff.); one man, to be sure, may be wiser than another, yet there is no guarantee for the wisdom of a professional seer. Yet, strangely enough, Oedipus, in the chorus' opinion, is the exception to this limitation: he has been found wise by the pragmatic test (509-10) and Teiresias is compared unfavorably with him. Such are the scrupulous devices of the fierce Sophoclean irony ("il met une conscience rare à préparer les dessous de son sujet," as Allègre remarks).

In the second episode eyes and mind are equated (528). Creon is false and ignorant (548, 552); but yet maintains a certain wisdom in his ignorance (569). Oedipus' lack of knowledge is

⁵ And Oedipus (388-9) declares that Teiresias can only see when it is to his financial advantage to do so.

⁶ Ancient criticism (see Jebb's note) already recognized the ambiguity of 337-8, but not that of the first part of 928.

again emphasized (677; cf. 745) at Creon's exit. Jocasta's speech to promote intellectual enlightenment ends with the words

ὦν γὰρ ἄν θεός
χρεῖαν ἐρευνᾷ ῥαδίως αὐτὸς φανεί.

The light thrown on the situation quickly brings about the first crisis, awakening in Oedipus

ψυχῆς πλάνημα κάνακίνησις φρενῶν (727).

Light has indeed been thrown on darkness (754); and it is clear that the blind can see (747). The slave who alone saw the truth no longer wishes to see it (759, 762; cf. 118 f.). It was Apollo who revealed the truth (790); but Oedipus is no longer in his right mind (915 f.), the confusion of which is well illustrated by his conjecture (969-70) as to the way in which he may have been responsible for Polybus' death.

And now we come to the great *εἰκῇ κράτιστον* ζῆν speech, in which it is not impossible that Sophocles may have embodied some measure of his own feeling about contemporary life, making the words fall with perfect naturalness from the lips of this pitiful woman, destined for a speedy and a fearful doom.⁷ For our purposes, after noting that *πρόνοια* is never *σαφής* (978, which by now has become a favorite word), we must briefly reflect upon 981-3:

πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη κὰν οὐκ εἶρασαν βροτῶν
μητρὶ ξυνευνάσθησαν· ἀλλὰ ταῦθ' ὄτῳ
παρ' οὐδέν ἐστι ῥᾶστα τὸν βίον φέρει.

In plain, prefreudian terms, incest is a dream in darkness (cf. Plato, *Rep.*, 571 C-D): in the light of day, he who would be happy must ignore such dreadful manifestations. Ignorance and blindness, it may be inferred, are better, at least to Jocasta's way of feeling.

We must note that it is from this frank, but misguided, discussion of intimate topics before a total stranger that the second

⁷ It is impossible to overpraise Sophocles' care and skill in the treatment of Jocasta. She is the second of his great portraits of unfortunate women, of which Tecmessa was the first and Deianeira the last and greatest. Oedipus is, to be sure, the very opposite of Jocasta: he could not endure to live "at random"; in the words of Plato, *Gorg.*, 503 C: οὐκ εἰκῇ . . . ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι.

revelation (989 ff.) springs. We discover, through the Corinthian's agency, that Oedipus is ignorant of the true purport of his actions (1008). It is his sincere desire to throw light on unknown matters (1059, 1065; cf. 1085); but Jocasta by this time knows only too well that continued ignorance is the only way to preserve her son and husband's well-being (1068) and rushes off to her death.

The wretched herdsman, who next reluctantly appears, also implies that knowledge is a dangerous instrument (1151); and Light, when it comes, shines but once on the protagonist, only to be extinguished (1183), for Oedipus has indeed been revealed (1184) as he is. He looks at the Light for the first and last time, knowing that it will blind him.⁸

In the astonishing stasimon that follows, man is defined in Pindaric terms which suggest a shadow:⁹ that is, something between light and darkness. The Chorus wishes it had never seen Oedipus (1217; cf. 1303) since Time, the all-seeing, has found him out (1213). The lyric terminates with a highly poetical, but somewhat cryptic phrase (cf. 870 and Jocasta's use of *ὀφθαλμός* in 987):

ἀνέπνευσά τ' ἐκ σέθεν
καὶ κατεκοίμῃσα τοῦμόν ὄμμα.

The Messenger remarks that what is being brought to light, as well as that which is yet concealed, is evil (1227). Sight of evil is the most painful thing (1238; cf. 1265, 1271 ff., 1295, 1297). Those who have had wrong knowledge (in this case partly sexual: cf. the ambiguity of 337-8) must live in darkness.

At Oedipus' appearance the Chorus, though it is unable to look, yet wishes to learn and inspect (1303-5). Darkness is horror (1313 ff.). Oedipus finally calls himself blind (1323). Though in darkness he now has knowledge (1325-6). Why should a man see when there is nothing pleasant to see (1334-5)? Oedipus' intellect is pitied (1347), for it is as much the cause of

⁸ Cf. the interesting remarks in L. W. Lyde's *Contexts in Pindar*, p. 14.

⁹ The metaphor may be thought to be more Jebb's than Sophocles'; and perhaps one is wrong to allow *μηδὲν ζώσας* to suggest the 8th Pythian and *Ajax*, 125 f.; but if one compares *Ajax* 1275 and 1257 with this passage, one may comprehend the reason for Jebb's translation and the present interpretation.

his wretchedness as is his evil fate (that is, he wanted to know too much¹⁰). The chorus wishes it had never known him (cf. 1217, 1303 above). Death, it thinks (1368), is preferable to blindness.

But sight is worse, Oedipus declares (1371 ff.): how can a man bear to look upon the unendurable: father, mother, wretched children, innocent fellow-citizens, all cruelly wronged? How can a man, with knowledge of his pollution upon him, endure to see (1385)? Yes, ignorance is indeed bliss (1389-90). The best thing is to conceal the polluted man where he will never again be seen (1411-12). The Sun, Creon remarks, must not look upon such a sight, nor should the light of day (1425 ff.). We must acquire knowledge rightly and not act with unseemly precipitation (1443, 1445; cf. 1518).

At the exodus the insistence of the Chorus on visual terms is perhaps not important, for many, like van Herwerden, Bruhn, Ritter, and Pearson, believe 1524-30 to be an interpolation.

This, then, one may believe, is the paradox of the *Oedipus*: the blind see, yet those gifted with physical sight are, as it were, metaphysically blind. Its chief theme seems to be: the conditions of life being what they are, who knows whether to see is not in reality to be blind?

If such is the case, it is not surprising that the play was beyond the comprehension of the Athens of the poet's day, or of any audience of any day. Sophocles, the craftsman of intricate and subtle language, has written very carefully indeed, as an examination of the vocabulary shows.¹¹ The stages of revelation are

¹⁰ The scholiast does not agree: *δείλαιε τῆς συνέσεως ἔνεκα . . . χαλεπὸν γὰρ συνετῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα συνενεχθῆναι*. But this does not seem to fit the context here, nor does it agree with 1367. Plutarch, *Mor.*, 522 B-C, somewhat naively ascribes all of Oedipus' troubles to his curiosity, showing, at least, that this was an ancient interpretation.

¹¹ A study of the vocabulary of revelation yields some interesting results; *φαίνειν* and its compounds are used some 36 times; that is, in one out of every 40 lines. Other words of the same or related meaning, such as *δεικνύειν*, *δηλοῦν*, *μηνύειν*, *σημαίνειν*, and the like, swell the total to 58: one out of every 25 lines in the play. Similar collections, perhaps even larger, might be made for words of knowledge and ignorance; seeing, light, and darkness; truth and falsehood. The vocabulary of the play is compact and relatively small: every line tells, and every other line contains an important word. The obvious fact that similar collections could be made from the *Philoctetes* is not unimportant and

dexterously balanced, as has often been noted. The protagonist is at first revealed as an admirable man, happy, rich, powerful, a good king, devoted to his subjects and his family. His tragic flaw, if such a phrase be applicable, is symbolized, if the word is not too weak, by the precipitous haste with which he jumps to conclusions about the motivation of other people (656-7): Teiresias, Creon, Jocasta, all the named characters in the play, are one after another rejected without adequate cause. The rash speed with which he curses himself at the beginning of the play is paralleled by his hasty self-blinding at the end.¹² His quickness to suspect and to condemn others is contrasted with a painful slowness to grasp the appalling facts about his own situation.

"Oedipe," says Allègre, "est un être impulsif qui fait tout avec passion, mais qui ne sait jamais ce qu'il fait."¹³ In an ominous moment, he dubs himself the child of Fortune: it is a belated recognition of his talents, though not of his limitations, as a scion of Chance, of which neither bad nor good may be rationally predicated. His emotional nature is by no means commensurate with the vigor of his intellect or the headstrong ruthlessness of his self-assurance. Finally, having discarded all external cooperation, he stands alone, but in total darkness. In a literally blinding flash the truth is revealed. As Sophocles seems to have believed, it was the beginning of his career as a hero,¹⁴

indicates, one may believe, that the problem there was somewhat similar to the one confronting the dramatist here.

¹² This (*pace* Allègre, p. 329) is one of the reasons why Sophocles did not adopt Euripides' expedient of having Laius' old servants put out Oedipus' eyes.

¹³ P. 362; cf. pp. 379 f.: "Si maintenant l'on recherche par quel moyens de détail Sophocle a réussi à suspendre si longtemps la révélation fatale, on verra qu'il n'en a pas employé d'autre que celui dont la fatalité elle-même se sert pour aveugler ses victimes et les perdre."

¹⁴ See *O. C.*, 74. A hero is technically a man above merely human actions: his motivation and aspirations are directed by a supranormal impulse, as illustrated by the *O. C.* throughout. But here, as Allègre admirably puts it (p. 367): "Tout y arrive de ce que les dieux ont résolu et rien n'y arrive de ce que les hommes veulent; tous sont au même degré frappés d'aveuglement, comme si l'air fatal au milieu duquel ils se meuvent les pénétrait de son poison." (We shall have to except Creon: see the next note.)

but the end of his happiness on earth. He joins Teiresias in endless night; and like the seer, he has begun to see.¹⁵

W. C. HELMBOLD.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

Περικέκκασα—ARISTOPHANES, *KNIGHTS*, 697.

About the middle of the *Knights* of Aristophanes, in a quick exchange of abuse between Cleon and the Sausage-Seller, the latter jeers (696-7):

ἦσθην ἀπειλαῖς, ἐγέλασα ψολοκομπῖαις
ἀπεπυδάρισα μύθωνα, περικέκκασα.

The last word here represents Dindorf's emendation—substantiated by Photius (s. v.) and universally adopted by editors—for the περικέκκασα or περικέκκυσσα of the manuscripts.

The verb περικέκκασα is a *hapax legomenon*. It is not glossed in Hesychius, Suidas, or the *Etymologicum Magnum*—nor, indeed, is its hypothetical original, *κοκκάζω. The compilers of modern lexicons, in common with practically all editors, while keeping the reading περικέκκασα, translate as if the root word were κοκκίζω, “utter the sound ‘cuckoo’,” or “crow,” as a cock. The new Liddell-Scott-Jones dictionary, for instance, renders περικοκκάζω as “cry cuckoo all around.” Samples of the translations of the passage by various editors are as follows:

¹⁵ Many new facets of Sophocles' subtle mind are revealed by each fresh perusal of the play from the point of view outlined here, such as the significance in the parodos of the apostrophe, ἄμβροτε Φάμα (158). Cf. Bultmann, *Philol.*, XCVII, p. 12: “Der Gegensatz von Licht und Finsternis ist . . . im Griechentum kein ethischer Dualismus . . . Der Gegensatz von Licht und Dunkel ist . . . vielmehr der von Heil und Unheil.”

One of the most interesting of the phenomena brought to light (as against Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, XXXIV [1899], pp. 61 ff.) is the relevance of the character of Creon, the neutral figure standing apart from the plot, neither seeing nor blind, neither active nor passive, not good nor yet evil. Creon alone is given no development within the play, and Creon alone has not been blinded by knowledge when the play is over. But the Sophocles who had already written the *Antigone* had a worse fate in store for him.

"I like your threats; I'm wonderfully tickled To hear you fume; I skip and cuckoo around you" (Rogers, Loeb); "Oh! How he diverts me with his threats! His bluster makes me laugh! And I dance the *mothon* for joy, and sing at the top of my voice, cuckoo" (Black and Gold; also Oates and O'Neill); "Your threats and bounce I laugh at, dance on you The double-shuffle—cock-a-doodle-doo!" (Way); "Je danse un *mothon*! Je crie tout à l'entour 'cocorico'!" (Van Daele); "It makes me laugh, it amuses one to see him Bluster and storm! I whistle and snap my fingers" (Frere); "I dance a horn-pipe, and cry cock-a-doodle-do over him" (Merry); "Suave mihi est audire tuas minas; rideo fumos tuae jactantiae, saltito *mothonem*, alta voce canto" (Dindorf); "Mich vergnügt dein Drohn, dein Holtergepolter macht mir Spass, Wie ein Böcklein muss ich springen, kräh'n wie ein Hahn dazu!" (Droysen); "I like your threats, laugh at your empty bluster, dance a fling, and cry cuckoo all round" (Hickie); "Dolce m'è il suon di tue minaccie, e rido De tuoi gran vanti al fumo, or salta, ch'io Quasi cuculo canto" (di Bagnolo); "The threats I like; the smoky brags I laugh at; The scamp I kick away, and cuckoo at him!" (Walsh); "Recht hübsch gefucht, dein Drohen macht mir Spass, Ich tanz' und spring' und schnalze vor Vergnügen!" (Seeger); "J'aime tes menaces, je ris de ta jactance, je te fais la nique, et je me moque de toi" (Artaud), with note: "Littéralement, 'Je danse le *mothon* (danse obscène), et j'imité le chant du coq'"; "I admire These threats, and ridicule thy vamping; I leap, and sing aloud with cuckoo's note" (Wheelwright); "Mir behagt die Drohung, lachend hör' ich den Prahlerwind, Ab traml' ich den Plumptanz, and umher kukuk ich eins!" (Voss).¹

¹ The editions cited in this paragraph are: *Aristophanes, with the English Translation of Benjamin Bickley Rogers*, Loeb ed. (London, Heinemann; New York, Putnam, 1927), I, p. 191; Anon., *Aristophanes, The Eleven Comedies*, Black and Gold ed. (New York, Liveright, 1930), I, p. 42; Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O'Neill, Jr., *The Complete Greek Drama* (New York, Random House, 1938), II, p. 505; Arthur S. Way, *Aristophanes in English Verse* (London, Macmillan, 1927), I, p. 84; *Aristophane—Les Acharniens, Les Cavaliers, Les Nuées*, traduit par Hilaire Van Daele (Paris, Belles Lettres, 1923), p. 110; *The Acharnians and Three Other Plays of Aristophanes*, translated by J. Hookham Frere (London, Dent; New York, Dutton, 1911), p. 104; W. W. Merry, *Aris-*

In the interpretation of the word in question, it seems to me that too little attention has been given to the testimony of the early commentators on the passage—Photius and the scholiast. The former's gloss on περιέοκκασα is: "περιεγέλασα. καὶ κατορχησάμην <sic>· Ἀριστοφάνης." The latter's comment is: "περιέοκκασα <sic>· περιεκορδάκισα. ἔστι δὲ εἶδος ὀρχήσεως." The rest of his statement is to the effect that the word here implies derision.

If these comments, deriving in all probability from ancient sources, are to be trusted (and I see no reason for doubting their credibility, especially in view of the fact that Dindorf based his emendation on the authority of Photius), then περιέοκκασα would seem to mean here, as Rogers and Voss perceived, "I have cuckooed around you"—i. e., "I have derided you by dancing the cuckoo around you." "Dancing the cuckoo," although metaphorical in this passage, would refer to an imitation of both the movements and the cry of the bird. Whether a distinction in meaning between *κοκκάζω and κοκκύζω is to be inferred, the latter referring to the cry alone, we do not know; but the text of the scholion would argue against this supposition.

The remainder of the line contains mention of another dance—the *mothōn*. This was a lewd dance, performed often by sailors or by intoxicated persons.² It was characterized by writhing or wriggling, and apparently also by a striking of the buttocks with the soles of the feet or with the flat hand (Schol. Aristoph. *Knights*, 697 and 796). It seems thus to have been similar to

trophanes, *The Knights*² (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1902), Part II, p. 45; Wm. Dindorf, *Aristophanis Comoediae* (Paris, Didot, 1899), p. 53; J. G. Droysen, *Des Aristophanes Werke*² (Leipzig, Von Veit, 1869), I, p. 129; Wm. J. Hickie, *The Comedies of Aristophanes* (London, Bohn, 1853), I, p. 83; Coriolano di Bagnolo, *Comédie di Aristofane* (Torino, Marzorati, 1850), I, p. 146 and notes, p. 199; Benjamin D. Walsh, *Aristophanes—The Acharnians, Knights, and Clouds* (London, Bohn, 1848), p. 198; Ludwig Seeger, *Aristophanes* (Frankfurt a. M., Rütten, 1845), I, p. 305; M. Artaud, *Comédies d'Aristophane*² (Paris, Lefèvre, 1841), p. 77; C. A. Wheelwright, *The Comedies of Aristophanes* (Oxford and London, Talboys, 1837), I, pp. 323-4; J. H. Voss, *Aristofanes* (Braunschweig, Vieweg, 1821), I, p. 142.

² Photius, *s. v. mothōn*; Suidas, *s. v. mothōn*; Hesychius, *s. v. mothōn*; Pollux, IV, 101; Schol. Aristoph. *Plut.*, 279; Townley Schol. on *Iliad*, XXII, 391; *Bt. Mag.*, 589, 57; cf. Lillian B. Lawler, "The Dance of the Ancient Mariners," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXV (1944), pp. 31-33.

the figure called *ῥαθαπνυγίζειν*.³ Such striking of the buttocks was a motif common in the *kordax*, the distinctive dance of Old Comedy.⁴ The verb *ἀποπνυδαρίζειν*, used with *mothon* in our line, is interpreted by the lexicographers (*Et. Mag.*, 696, 3; Schol. Aristoph. *Knights*, 697) as denoting "leap, spring"; and its later form, *πνυγαρίζειν*, is taken as indicating an association with *πνυγή* (*Et. Mag.*, 696, 3). Antyllus (*ap. Oribas.*, VI, 31, 1) says that the kicking of the buttocks was done sometimes with both feet together, sometimes with the feet alternating. Photius (*s. v. mothon*) definitely says the *mothon* is *κορδακώδης*—characteristic of the *kordax*.

In the line in question, both the *mothon* and the suggested cuckoo dance are referred to metaphorically. Nevertheless, since the *mothon* is authenticated as a real dance of classical antiquity, associated with the *kordax*, and since the scholiast on the line glosses *περικόκκισα* as *περικορδάκισα*, it would certainly be logical to infer that a cuckoo dance or figure existed, and that it was to be found in connection with the *kordax*. It is well established that bird figures and motifs were common in the Greek dance, and were of high antiquity;⁵ and the very existence of such comedies as the *Birds* of Magnes and of Aristophanes is *a priori* evidence that such figures and motifs were actually used in the choral evolutions of Old Comedy.⁶ In Aristophanes' play, the cuckoo is mentioned only casually (504-7), as "king of Egypt and of all Phoenicia." However, it is entirely possible that one member of the chorus in the play was actually costumed as a cuckoo.

The nature of a mimetic cuckoo dance would not be hard to determine. The European cuckoo, *Cuculus canorus*, is a fairly large bird, with distinctive habits, and the Greeks had observed it with interest since their primitive days. To them, as to the inhabitants of mediaeval England, it was the herald of spring.

³ Hesychius, *s. v.*; Schol. Aristoph. *Knights*, 796; cf. also Hesychius, *s. v. ἀλέσθαι πρὸς πνυγήν*.

⁴ Heinz Schnabel, *Kordax* (Munich, Beck, 1910), pp. 16-19; Kurt Latte, "De Saltationibus Graecorum Capita Quinque," *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, XIII, 3 (1913), p. 21.

⁵ Lillian B. Lawler, "The Dance of the Holy Birds," *C. J.*, XXXVII (1942), pp. 351-61.

⁶ Lillian B. Lawler, "Four Dancers in the *Birds* of Aristophanes," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIII (1942), pp. 58-63.

In early times it was evidently held in high regard. Zeus, we recall, was believed to have wooed Hera in the guise of a cuckoo, on or near Mount Kokkygion, in Argolis (Pausanias, II, 17, 4; II, 36, 1-2; Schol. Theocr., XV, 64); and a cuckoo was perched upon Hera's scepter in the famous chryselephantine statue of the goddess made by Polyclitus for the Argive Heraeum. Cook discusses the implications of the legend.⁷ He sees in it evidence for a prehistoric concept of Zeus as a cuckoo; and he expresses the opinion (III, pp. 63-4) that there is in the story a "relic of the old Minoan belief that gods appeared in the shape of birds." He regards the name of the birds' city in Aristophanes' play, "Cloud-cuckooborough," as ritualistically significant. He also points out (III, pp. 64-5) that the bird has always held the attention of the peoples of Europe. He notes that all over Europe to this day there is a very old tradition that the cuckoo is a bird of good or evil omen, and that it is a sort of daemon which can give or withhold a "long and prosperous life." Pollard,⁸ on the other hand, has, successfully, I believe, upheld the thesis that the idea of a Zeus-cuckoo is a late one, and that the myth is aetiological; but that the connection of the cuckoo with Hera is unquestionably authenticated, and may be a legacy from Minoan-Mycenaean times, when the great mother goddess was habitually associated with birds of many different kinds.

The use of animal mummery and dances in religious rituals was widespread around the Mediterranean, in both prehistoric and historic times.⁹ In it, sacred animals were imitated by costumed worshippers. Such mummery naturally included bird dances of many kinds.¹⁰ Where protected by the secrecy of mystery cults, these dances remained solemn and serious; otherwise, they often degenerated into buffoonery and "horseplay." In Athens, of course, the animal *komos* played a large part in the

⁷ A. B. Cook, *Zeus* (Cambridge, University Press, 1914-40), I, pp. 134-5; 518; 532; II, p. 893 and note 2; p. 1144, note 2; III, pp. 63-8.

⁸ J. R. T. Pollard, "The *Birds* of Aristophanes—A Source Book for Old Beliefs," *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), pp. 353-76.

⁹ Lillian B. Lawler, "Pindar and Some Animal Dances," *O. P.*, XLI (1946), pp. 155-9; "Two Notes on the Greek Dance—I, The Fox," *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), pp. 87-90; "A Lion among Ladies," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVIII (1947), pp. 88-98.

¹⁰ Lawler, "Holy Birds" (see note 5).

development of Old Comedy.¹¹ Typical of the kind of deterioration in dignity which must inevitably have accompanied portrayal in the rough-and-tumble animal *komos* is the fact that soon "cuckoo" became a synonym for a cowardly, stupid, coarse, or half-crazy person (Aristophanes, *Acharn.*, 598 and schol. *ad loc.*; *Et. Mag.*, 524, 50)—as, indeed, it is to this day, in many languages.

In a dance or figure imitative of the cuckoo we should expect to find movements characteristic of the bird. *Cuculus canorus*, with its slim body, long wings, and long, rounded tail, has a swift, graceful, swooping flight.¹² It is very active, and is in motion from early morning until far into the night.¹³ It seems, however, to make every effort to avoid observation; for it is subject to pursuit and attack even by birds much smaller than itself, because of its resemblance to the hawk (cf. Aristotle, *Hist. An.*, VI, 563 b; XI, 618 a), and because of its parasitism in laying its eggs in other birds' nests.¹⁴ Light and graceful as it is in the air, it is singularly clumsy on the ground. There its one form of locomotion is an awkward, flopping hop,¹⁵ because of the fact that the arrangement of its four toes (two pointing forward and two pointing backward) precludes easy walking or running. The shrill mating-call of the male bird is familiar in all parts of Europe. As it perches on a bough, screeching "Cuckoo!" at the top of its voice, it sometimes turns in a circle about its own axis.¹⁶ Rival males fight bitterly, striking one another with beak and wings.¹⁷ All of these characteristic actions would lend themselves well to imitation in a mimetic dance.¹⁸

¹¹ Roy C. Flickinger, *The Greek Theatre and Its Drama*⁴ (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936), p. 38.

¹² Alfred E. Brehm, *Die Vögel*³ (Leipzig and Vienna, Bibliographisches Institut, 1900), II, p. 79; Walther Kahle, *Der Kleine Brehm* (Berlin, Voegel, 1924), p. 362. I am indebted to Dr. Emory E. Cochran, of New York City, who first called my attention to Brehm's work.

¹³ Brehm, *op. cit.*, II, p. 82.

¹⁴ Alfred Newton and Hans Gadow, *A Dictionary of Birds* (London, Black, 1893-6), p. 119.

¹⁵ Brehm, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 82-3; Kahle, *op. cit.*, pp. 364-5.

¹⁶ Brehm, *op. cit.*, II, p. 83.

¹⁷ Brehm, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-5.

¹⁸ For further information on the European cuckoo, and references to the bird in Greek literature, see D'Arcy W. Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds*² (London, Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 151-3; Otto Keller, *Die Antike Tierwelt* (Leipzig, Engelmann, 1913), II, pp. 63-7.

In many countries of Europe today there are old folk dances named for the cuckoo. Typical of these are the cuckoo dances of Germany, Bohemia, Moravia, and Russia.

The "Kuckuckstanz" of Pomerania, in Northern Germany,¹⁹ is characterized by turnings in place as the dancers cry "Cuckoo!" The "Kukacka" of Bohemia²⁰ features quick running steps (perhaps suggestive of flight), turns about the dancer's own axis, and stamping steps as the dancers cry "Ku, ku, ku!" The "Kukachka" of Moravia²¹ makes use of hops, smooth running steps, and turns in place. The Russian "Kukushka"²² is much more active, mimetic, and brilliant. In it, the dancers jump on both feet, in the manner of "a bird hopping from place to place," and at the same time flap their arms as if they were wings; they also turn in place, with little jumps, and cry "Cuckoo!"

In a moving picture "short subject" issued recently, featuring winter sports in Aspen, Colorado, a cuckoo dance on skis was introduced as a *tour de force*. The performer, dressed in Tyrolean garb, hopped, flapped his arms, and turned about his own axis, clockwise. The dance was evidently inspired by the cuckoo folk dance of Germany and Austria.

These dances may, of course, bear little or no relation to one another, and may have arisen spontaneously. However, when old folk dances of both Eastern and Western Europe, especially those of great popular appeal, agree so closely in pattern and detail, there is always the possibility that they may have a common origin in a Greek or Graeco-Roman prototype.

In this connection, the words chosen by two translators of Aristophanes are interesting. We have referred above to Voss' rendition of the line we have been discussing: "Ab tramp! ich den Plumptanz, und umher kukuk ich eins." Although "Plumptanz" is evidently meant to refer here to the *mothron*, yet it could actually be an accurate descriptive term for some of the cuckoo

¹⁹ Oswald Fladerer, *Deutsche Volkstänze* (Kassel, Bärenreiterverlag, 1927), I, pp. 10-11.

²⁰ Anna Spacek and Neva L. Boyd, *Folk Dances of Bohemia and Moravia* (Chicago, Saul Bros., 1917), p. 16.

²¹ Marjorie C. Geary, *Folk Dances of Czechoslovakia* (New York, Barnes, 1922), pp. 22-3.

²² Louis H. Chalif, *Folk Dances of Different Nations* (published by the author, 163-5 W. 57th St., New York, N. Y., 1926), III, pp. 59-62.

dances of modern Europe. Perhaps Voss had seen such dances, and was unconsciously influenced by them in translating the line. In an entirely different play, the *Lysistrata*, Droysen²³ translated the vexed διποδιάξω of line 1243, in dialect, "Mer wollen den Kukuk hopsa." I have argued elsewhere²⁴ that the διποδία here referred to was a dignified, graceful Spartan "dance to the dimeter" of Laconian choral songs; but that several writers, both ancient and modern (obviously including Droysen), have confused it with the ποδισμός or the διαποδισμός, which was a hop, with both feet held closely together as if tied, and with the body bent far forward. A figure of this sort, with lewd movements of the hips and thighs, was a characteristic feature of the *kordax*.²⁵ It would combine well with the *mothōn*. Scaliger²⁶ says that the figure is one in which "iunctis pedibus, labore plurimo et conatu, picos imitabantur." I have no idea from what source Scaliger drew this bit of information; but it offers a hint, at least, that the ultimate origin of this particular feature of the *kordax* was a dance or figure imitative of an awkwardly hopping bird.

In summary, then, I should like to offer the suggestion that line 697 of the *Knights* of Aristophanes is a passing reference, in the form of a metaphor, to a real dance or figure imitative of a cuckoo; that this dance or figure was a part of the old animal *komos* which, with its roots perhaps in Minoan-Mycenaean religious practices, was later a factor in the development of Greek comedy; that it became a *schema* of the *kordax*; and that characteristic features of it were awkward hops on both feet, a flapping of the arms, turns about the dancer's own axis, quick running steps to suggest flight, some hostile or derisive lunges with "beak" and "wings," and an obligato of cries of "Cuckoo!" or the Greek equivalent thereof.

LILLIAN B. LAWLER.

HUNTER COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

²³ *Op. cit.* (note 1), II, p. 183.

²⁴ "Diple, Dipodia, Dipodismos in the Greek Dance," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVI, pp. 59-73.

²⁵ Schol. Aristoph. *Clouds*, 540; Schnabel, *op. cit.* (note 4), pp. 5-6; Louis Sèchan, *La danse grecque antique* (Paris, de Boccard, 1930), p. 196.

²⁶ Julius Caesar Scaliger, "De Comoedia et Tragoedia," in Vol. VIII of Jacobus Gronovius' *Thesaurus Graecarum Antiquitatum* (Venice, 1732-7), cols. 1533 F-1534 A.

REVIEWS.

CAMPBELL BONNER. *Studies in Magical Amulets, chiefly Graeco-Egyptian.* Ann Arbor, The Univ. of Michigan Press; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. xxiv + 334; 25 pl. (*Univ. of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series, XLIX.*)

One rarely has the "honor of introducing" a piece of really basic scholarship to one's colleagues. Those who reviewed Preisendanz's edition of the Greek Magical Papyri, or Furtwängler on Greek Vases must have felt as I do in trying to write adequately of this study by Bonner on the amulets of late antiquity. These amulets had been studied with not always well-directed enthusiasm during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Such interest quickly expired, however, after the first quarter of the nineteenth century, when scholars unfortunately began to idealize and segregate the high moments of antiquity, and by forcing all eyes upon Greece from Homer to Demosthenes, upon Rome during the late republican and early imperial centuries, actually took the classical world out of the stream of history (and incidentally out of most modern interest). Furtwängler refused to consider the late syncretistic amulets with his classical gems, and induced the Berlin Museum to move them bodily into the section of Egyptology, where their welcome was stony disregard. Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries specimens found there were occasionally discussed by such unreliaables as King, Osborn, and the editors of the Southesk collection, but the stones were in general ignored. Still widely called Gnostic, though Beller-mann had dispelled that illusion in 1817, the stones were for the most part unknown and, as printed in rare folios, inaccessible.

The discovery of the magical papyri, and their publication, made scholars who worked with them freshly aware of the amulets, which obviously were cognates of the charms. Charms and amulets had a great deal of light to throw upon each other, but the matter could not be studied because there was no critical study of the amulets to balance the collection of charms by Preisendanz. This need has at last been filled by Bonner in the work we are considering. Here are splendid photographic reproductions of nearly four hundred of the amulets, largely of specimens which Bonner collected himself, or induced the University of Michigan to purchase, though there are a great number of others from public and private collections in Europe and the United States. The result is, as Bonner regretfully says, by no means "a complete survey of all existing amulets" (p. 135): that, or even an approximation to that, would indeed be a major work; but it is a magnificently representative offering, one which gives an excellent impression of the amulets as a whole and what is upon them.

Those less acquainted with the difficulties may regard Bonner's meticulous textual work as his greatest contribution. Gibberish appears everywhere on ancient charms and amulets, gibberish which

may reflect any one of a large number of languages in total degeneration, like the famous medieval case of *hocus pocus* from *hoc est corpus meum*. In reconstructing the meanings of these Bonner not only goes far, but knows when to stop, a very rare combination, and on pp. 186-207 gives the best discussion I know of the phenomenon.

Bonner may well feel his deepest satisfaction in his solution of the problem of arrangement. For one of the most difficult problems in presenting the amulets is that of organization. The device on one side of an amulet can hardly be considered without reference to what is on the other: but on the stones almost every combination appears, so that no important symbol escapes involvement with most of the others. Bonner has solved this problem by first treating amulets marked to serve a given purpose, as for general health, love, or some specific type of physical disorder, and then by taking symbols of major importance which were used for various purposes. The result is a surprisingly small residuum of miscellanea.

The problem of reproduction is almost as difficult. When one sees the photographs of such objects so often published, one is apt to think regretfully of the old line drawings. Bonner's plates are really excellent. Weak eyes will often need a glass to study them, but the reproductions are so clear that a glass usually does make clear what is there.

The book begins with a masterful summary of method, quotations about amulets from ancient authors, warnings against misconceptions and prejudices. I shall in a moment disagree in some details with the methodology here outlined, but still recommend it as incomparably the best treatment I know of the subject. There follows a discussion of the influences discernible on the amulets from Egyptians, Jews, Persians, and Greeks. The author is then ready to discuss the amulets themselves.

First Bonner discusses the amulets of a generally protective character, and here the interest is in petitions inscribed on the amulets, since petitions for general protection appear with a variety of figures (though Harpocrates is more common than any other one). More specific seem to be the specimens next considered, the medical amulets. There are representations in which a large bird, an ibis, stork, or ostrich, is attached to objects behind him, and usually with a variant of *πέπτε* or *πέσσε* "digest," somewhere on the stone. These amulets seem to have functioned for what must have been the endemic threat of dysentery, cholera, food poisoning, diseases of avitaminosis, and the like (to a very minor extent to correct the results of "man's proneness to overeating," as Bonner says, with the excesses of the upper classes in mind). The bird is usually attacking a snake, and Bonner thinks that the power of such birds to digest snakes made them a symbol of digestive triumphs for man: I should be more inclined to think that the agonies of intestinal difficulty were most aptly visualized as the writhing of a snake-demon within one, so that one called upon a snake-devourer for deliverance. That the ibis was also Thoth, a saving god from time universal, must also have entered into the symbolism, with no particular realistic association at all. In discussing such matters, in fact, one of Bonner's few defects is that he is apt to look for an explanation of a symbol, which then tends to become *the* explanation. This is the most com-

mon fallacy in dealing with symbols, since it ignores the fact that symbols have an extraordinary way of getting the widest variety of associations and values, and of presenting them simultaneously with not the least sense of responsibility for consistency. Symbolism is a field which has been repellent to the scholarly mind, because in it understanding requires the acceptance of confusion, rather than the creation of clarity.

Bonner goes on to an excellent discussion of Chnoubis, another digestive symbol. Here the protective figure is itself a snake, usually made solar by its radiant lion's head, but still basically a snake. It too is so often marked with inscriptions pleading for good digestion that its usual reference is unmistakable. The presence of the snake on both these amulets, the one deified with its solar head, the other being devoured by a divine being, suggests some very deep connection of the snake with digestive problems (of course with many other problems as well) which investigators should keep in mind. Here is at once an instance of the logical inconsistency of symbols.

After a section on the crane (or phoenix), which again is with a snake, Bonner discusses a series of amulets for colic on which Heracles may be represented strangling a lion, or Ares appears, or Aeolus with his bag of winds. It is obvious that in Heracles and Ares we have the divine power which attacks, fights, strangles, so that the basic element of the bird attacking a snake, the struggle between divine or demonic forces, is again presented. Bonner lists amulets with a large number of other symbolic types as having inscriptions which indicate that they were worn for digestion. And probably most wearers of the specifically digestive amulets expected general protection from them as well. Amulets to protect the eye usually had a lizard, for sciatica a reaper, for the gout Perseus, and Bonner lists others dedicated to various physical ailments.

A long and especially interesting section describes amulets whose inscriptions clearly indicate that they were worn for successful childbirth, and to prevent prolapsis and kindred difficulties. The typical symbol operative in such matters was a very complicated representation centering in what looks like a big-bellied pot, usually inverted, with what at first appears to be the crank of a winch attached to it, and a sort of grating below the lowered mouth. At the top are a pair of streamers or snakes upon which stand various gods, usually three or four of them. Bonner follows Delatte's interpretation of this symbol, and gives excellent evidence for his statement (he rarely becomes so positive) that it is "definitely proved" that this figure represents the uterus.

In the chapter "Unseen Perils" Bonner lists several types, the most interesting of which is the figure usually called "the evil eye," but which is more accurately called by its ancient term "the much-suffering eye," that is the figure of an open eye attacked from all sides by a spear, nails, trident, dog, lion, scorpion, snake, ibis, almost anything destructive. On the other side of amulets with the eye is often presented a cavalier, but to this figure Bonner returns later.

A valuable discussion follows of the types used in "aggressive magic," that is of amulets to avert wrath, of various sorts of love charms, and of black magic. In this section (pp. 108 f.) Bonner

discusses as evidence of black magic an amulet of which I should say a word, since it is one of the very few for which I have an alternative suggestion. The amulet bears on each side a mummy, with three projections from the head which are probably descendants of the three lotus flowers often used on crowns in Egypt. Under the feet of the mummy on both sides is a peculiar symbol which I take to be a magical "character," and on the margin of the obverse is written "Memnon child of Day sleeps (i. e. lies dead)" as Bonner translates it, accompanied by a long string of magical syllables. On the margin of the reverse are the words "Antipater child of Philippa sleeps," with the same magical syllables, and ἐγὼ ὁ ὤν beside the mummy. In discussing this Bonner recognizes that the mummy is probably Osiris, but does not recall that Osiris as a mummy, whether just drawn as such or as being transported to the other world on the Sun-ship, or lion, or whatever, is the chief single Egyptian symbol of immortality. He recalls that Memnon was killed, and supposes that the parallel statements on the charm expressed the hope that Antipater would also come to a bad end. Bonner has forgotten, however, that Memnon was one of those human beings who were given immortality after death (see "Memnon" in Roscher's *Lex. Myth.*). The amulet was probably made by Philippa to bury with the corpse of her son Antipater to help him into immortality, because to be "dead like Osiris" was the great hope of immortality, as, in Christian terms, is identification with the crucified Christ. "I am the One who is" Bonner recognizes properly as the announcement of God to Moses from the bush, the Septuagint of the Authorized "I am that I am." Here the phrase is properly associated with the mummy Osiris, in the sense that he represents the living one who gives life to others. I should guess, then, that Philippa was a devout Jewess, hellenized of course, who in the hope that rises out of utter grief put this amulet upon her son in his tomb. Whether she was a Jewess or not, the amulet seems definitely to look to immortality for her son Antipater, look for it in terms both of Osiris and of "I am that I am."

The discussions in the chapters that follow, "The Snake-Legged God," "The Young Sun," "Helios and Solar Types," and "Panthestic and Monstrous Forms" follow a second type of organization, for while heretofore Bonner has classified the amulets according to their purpose, now he follows the type of symbol, which may be upon amulets designed for a wide variety of purposes. The second method opens more important questions, on the whole, but is far more difficult, for what an amulet means is much more obvious when it has πέντε on it than when it has simply divine figures and names, with or without magical syllables. In these chapters Bonner seems to me to fall short of his goal, in spite of the tremendously useful body of material he gathers under each heading. In discussing the snake-legged god he has finally, I hope, laid the ghost of Gnosticism in these matters, and it appears at last that the anguipede is not properly named "Abraxas"; that the term "Abraxas" is not exclusively Gnostic; and that "there is no reason to believe that the conception [of the anguipede] originated in Gnostic circles." I think Bonner's suggestion that the cock's head on the anguipede shows Persian influence is not especially convincing, in view of the very common association of Hermes and the cock; I doubt that the

figure is armed "simply" (we must always be careful with "simply") as "another instance of the tendency . . . to clothe divine beings . . . in the costume of a Roman emperor" (p. 124) since, as he goes on to say, the shield is that of an ordinary Roman soldier, and I can see nothing exclusively imperial about the rest; and the snake legs upon a being otherwise solar suggest not the "chthonic," though the snake is often chthonic, but solar rays, as the common solar snake usually does, for example the uraeus and Chnoubis. This peculiar monster, Bonner reasonably suggests (p. 126), was the deliberate creation of "some teacher, the leader of a sect, rather than a natural blending of religious symbolism," and he later adds that it might have been produced by a "compact school of theosophists," but of such a person or school, he says, nothing is known (p. 135). The person, if there was one, is certainly unknown, but I am not sure that the group was made up of "Hellenized magi or pagan 'gnostics'." Since the term Iao is so common on the figure even where the figure is used in the most pagan environment it seems to me a natural guess that the term Iao was an original part of the symbol; which in turn would suggest that the figure was invented by some hellenized Jews, and that it so satisfied their needs that it spread widely and rapidly in general use: but of such a Jewish possibility in a moment.

Harpocrates as "the Young Sun" is again most admirably presented for its variety of appearances and identifications, and the same can be said of the chapters on Helios and the Pantheistic and Monstrous Forms which follow. The treatment of the inscriptions is a model, and the discussion of types from Palestine, Syria, and Christianity, and of "Unusual and Obscure Types" at the end of the book round it out solidly.

It is clear that Bonner has at last given us a sure foundation on which to stand in using this material. If accurate publication, description, and classification were the end of all study in the field, Bonner would have come as near reaching the "end" of the study of ancient amulets as a single work could hope to do. Better than having produced a "definitive work," however, Bonner has at last magnificently cleared the way for asking the next questions. These questions were not an integral part of Bonner's work, and, frankly, he himself often begs them. He would himself, however, feel that to use his work as a means of going on was the best compliment which could be paid it, and so I should like briefly to suggest what seem to be the next steps.

The first is a general consideration of the function of such objects. Bonner, for all his devoted care in presenting them, obviously has little sympathy with such symbols or with those who used them. He refers throughout to "magic" as something of a totally different kind from religion, without stopping to define in what this difference consists. "Religion," as on p. 123, often refers to a formal religion, that is to a system and recognized group of whose theological structure we have some knowledge from literary sources. So when he denies that an amulet or figure belongs to religion in those contexts he means that it was not the expression of a formal and recognizable cult group. He says: "It is necessary to inquire whether any of the prayers and invocations that are inscribed on some amulets

express a genuine religious feeling, and if so, to determine its relation to known religious groups such as the Jews, the orthodox Christians, and the Gnostics" (p. 21), a list in which paganism, Greek or Egyptian, is conspicuously absent. Later he includes the pagans, however, when he says: "Christians and pagans alike often wore upon their bodies objects made in similar forms and of the same materials, though adorned with different images and symbols. Among the spiritual-minded of both camps there was no thought of magic" (p. 208, n.). When Bonner gets on this ground he becomes an apologist who says things which are highly disputable. Helios, for example, was used by pagans, Christians, and Jews, as were many other images, and they were used by the "spiritual-minded of both camps." The difference between magic and religion, he goes on here to suggest, is that the spiritual-minded in wearing such objects "would keep their minds clear of the feeling that power proceeded from the thing itself, regardless of the wearer's religious attitude." This "notion that supernatural power may be inherent in some person, animal, or material object, or that it may at least reside there temporarily" is a "primitive concept" which is at the base of "belief in the efficacy of amulets" (p. 2). But to call "primitive" all belief that supernatural power can reside even temporarily in a material object is to condemn as "primitive" all use of consecrated ground, consecrated churches, holy water, medals and rosaries blessed by ecclesiastics, the cross as an effective medium to help in diseases, not to say the consecrated elements of the Christian eucharist, or the holy scrolls of Torah in a synagogue. That is, in ruling amulets, because they are "magical," peremptorily out of the history of religion, as Bonner repeatedly does (see especially p. 123) he means that amulets, as objects of potency because of divine power inherent in them, were used by the less spiritually minded followers of many religions, but were no part of the proper offerings of any religion, and were never used for their inherent potency by the spiritually minded. It seems to me clear that the importance of amulets in human history cannot be established without correcting almost every one of those basic assumptions, though it is beyond the scope of this review to bring in the flood of evidence that Jews, Christians, and pagans of the most sensitive type have clung in life and death to the material tokens of their faith, not merely as tokens, but as bringing what Jews call the "Shekinah" to their lives.

Less fundamental for general history, but of great importance for the origin of many of these amulets, and for Jewish history, is the question of their relation to Judaism. The problem can be briefly stated. On the amulets (and on the charms from papyri) Jewish names are among the commonest found. "Iao" is the most frequent single one of these, but "Adonai," "Sabaoth," appear very often, while it is not surprising on amulets of almost any type to find "Gabriel," "Michael," "Raphael," or even, though less commonly, "Abraham," "Isaac," "Jacob," or "Solomon." The problem is: when an amulet has "Solomon," so labeled, on one side, and Hecate on the other, or when "Iao" is written with a figure of Helios, does this testify to direct Jewish production, or only to "Jewish influence" upon pagans who borrowed such names and figures to strengthen their still pagan magic? And if Jews did make and wear

such amulets, has this any bearing upon the history of Judaism? Bonner clearly makes room for the possibility that Jews who were not "strict followers of the Law" could have made and worn amulets on which "Iao," the forbidden name, was written, and he says that Jews may have taken "anything that is of the heathen, whether an image, or name, or a formula," but they would have "Judaized" these only "for magical purposes." Still "the strange mental attitude of those who are attracted by magic" makes it clear that these amulets have only "magical, not religious significance" (p. 30). But when Bonner talks about Jews he obviously does not want ordinarily to be taken to refer to Jews of so questionable a type, though he admits that "there were probably a good many Jews who wore images of heathen gods as amulets" (p. 28). Bonner's general position is stated more clearly when he says: "On our amulets Jewish influence is mainly confined to the inscriptions, because monotheism and the prohibition of images restrained the Jews from developing figure designs comparable to the divine and demonic types carved on Graeco-Egyptian gems" (*ibid.*).

When he treats Palestinian amulets (Chapter XV) he admits that he is dealing with "some designs that were developed under Jewish inspiration, but represents a Judaism touched by Hellenistic influences and ready to use a magic which was not free from pagan elements" (p. 208). Under this category Bonner considers the amulets with Solomon as a cavalier, on the reverse of which a number of pagan figures are presented. He is aware that the paintings in the Dura synagogue and the mosaics in Beth Alpha seem to show that the commandment against the making of images "was not strictly observed by all Jewish communities" (p. 28), but he does not seem to know of the two "much suffering eyes" in the Dura Synagogue, one of them labeled "Iao," of the figures so much like magical ones in the cemetery of Sheikh Ibreiq in Palestine, or in fact of the great mass of Jewish images of which we know from Rome, through North Africa, amazingly common in Palestine, and on out to Dura itself. For example Ares, Tyche, Psyche, the three Graces, and, many times, Nike, are painted on the walls of the synagoge in Dura. These figures were presented by Jews in their places of public worship, so that we have no right to think that they could have been Judaized for magical purposes only. Just how Jews could have regarded such figures is indeed a difficult question, but we cannot begin by ignoring that material, or by summary judgments. Once we recognize that Jews of the day could and did, in their public places of religion, do a great many things which the rabbis did not approve (though a paragraph in the Talmud describes some astonishing figures which various rabbis used on their seals; cf. Albert Wolf, *Jewish Encyclopedia*, XI, p. 136) then we can no longer approach the charms and amulets with a double standard. For a double standard it is to say freely, when the name Ares appears on an amulet "the divine name marks [the amulet] as Greek" (p. 42), but over and again to refuse to see a similar implication for Jewish origin in the Jewish names. For example Bonner discusses (pp. 100 f.) an amulet which has the names "Damnamanaios and Adonaio and Iao and Sabaoth," where, even though Bonner makes one of his rare slips and omits "Iao," he admits that

the composer of the formula on the amulet "had a good knowledge of Jewish legend and Hebrew turns of expression," such as an allusion to Solomon and "Meehles (Michael?)" and echoes of one passage, possibly two, from the Psalms. After this he can conclude only "On the whole, Jewish influence is beyond doubt, but, as usual, Jewish authorship is not proved." To not a word of this can one take exception, any more than to his statement, "Not every person who wore a ring engraved with the words *Iao Sabaoth* was a Jew, not every pendant with a figure of Aphrodite arranging her hair was worn by a Greek woman" (p. 18). But in practice Bonner assumes throughout that an amulet with a Greek figure, or with Greek names, can be *assumed* to be Greek (or, *mutatis mutandis*, Egyptian), but that one needs *proof* for Jewish origin even in the face of overwhelming predominance of Jewish reference. This was entirely justified in view of the dominant conception that the history of Judaism is essentially a history of rabbinism, which Bonner had no reason to challenge in view of the very small percentage of Jewish art which had apparently come to his attention.

If, however, the total impact of the art from this period suggests that Jews may not have been at the time thus rabbinically controlled (a large problem I am opening up in a work whose first volume is now in press), then we shall have to face the amulets on the basis of a single standard. That is we must discuss whether an amulet with mixed Jewish and Greek motifs is to be called originally a "Jewish" or "Greek" amulet (whoever wore it) in exactly the same way that we would allocate another amulet similarly divided between Greek and Egyptian motifs and names. Techniques for such discrimination can seem plausible only after considerable testing, but I should suggest that the names on an amulet are the best guide to its source. A charm in which Greek and Jewish names were about evenly mixed I should call quite indeterminate; one with a few Greek names, or a single one, but with the predominant appeal to Jewish names I should call probably Jewish, done by a Jew who looked primarily to "Iao" or "Michael," but who could throw in Helios or another for good measure. Similarly when a Sun God is represented and the only name or names with it are Jewish, I should call the amulet Jewish as freely as Bonner, quoted above, said that the name Ares marked as Greek an amulet on which it appeared. A "Greek" amulet may, of course, have been made by a Jewish craftsman, and a "Jewish" amulet made by a Greek. The immediate wearer or engraver can never be identified, except that in cases where the individual is named on the stone one can discuss who he was and why he wanted the specific design. Still I think we can distinguish in many instances between Greek or Egyptian amulets as such, and Jewish ones. Actually there are a large number of amulets which it seems to me can be called "Jewish" in inspiration, whoever actually made or wore them. If that is true the evidence of these stones seems to me extremely important for the history of the Jewish religion, since I define a religion by the practices of its avowed devotees, not by the ideals of its leaders. But obviously the merits of such a methodology cannot be tested in a review.

The value of Bonner's study for investigating such a question, however, is only one of the ways in which the work will be useful.

To the history of religion, popular religion if you will, in late antiquity, and to the whole problem of the nature of fetishes and charms, this study is one which will be of indefinite value. Our heartiest congratulations to the author in completing so great a task, great in extent, and great in the power of its execution.

ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

-
- H. G. PFLAUM. *Les procurateurs équestres sous le Haut-Empire Romain*. Paris, A. Maisonneuve, 1950. Pp. 365; a folder with 13 large, separate sheets containing outlines of individual careers. Fr. 1500.

The great work of Otto Hirschfeld on Roman administrative history, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diokletian*, appeared for the first time in 1878 and the authoritative revised edition in 1905. Three years later Alfred von Domaszewski published his broad study of the grades and lines of promotion, *Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres*. These two books treated both the senatorial and equestrian officers. Moreover, the history, recruitment, social position and influence of the equestrian order as a whole were treated in a masterly study by Arthur Stein, *Der römische Ritterstand* (Munich, 1927). All three and the authors of numerous studies on various groups and individual offices have found sources in a few precious literary references, but the bulk of their material has come from inscriptions in an unremitting flow of new evidence. Similarly Pflaum in *Les procurateurs équestres* turns his attention to a few precious literary passages as in an excellent discussion of letters from Cornelius Fronto to the Caesar Marcus Aurelius and to Antoninus Pius on pp. 198-206, but the body of this new and very important study of the procurators of the Early Empire is an organization and evaluation of epigraphical material, which with rare exceptions the author has succeeded in dominating.

It is well known that whereas the Roman administrators of the Republic were drawn entirely from the senatorial order and whereas the administrators of the Late Empire came up for the most part through careers which were not differentiated on principle, the administrators of the Early Empire were appointed, even in the lowest grades and preparatory posts, by a system of differentiation as to whether they were senators or *equites*. Pflaum reinvestigates the equestrian administrators. He does not intend to replace the work of his predecessors but to correct and supplement it; and he is quite justified in handling summarily certain subjects for which Hirschfeld's discussion is still valid. On the other hand, the absence of an index of inscriptions or indeed an index of any kind is a major defect which will cut down the usefulness as a book of reference and the possibility of control. Moreover, it would have been easy and commendable to use brackets in the tables and career outlines rather than represent the restorations and the more uncertain inferences as factual data, especially where the texts are not given.

Also some explanation why the reader finds no references to European publications later than 1947 and to American publications later than 1943 might have been prudent. Among the preparatory studies which he has not mentioned the most surprising omission is R. H. Lacey, *The Equestrian Officials of Trajan and Hadrian* (Princeton, 1917).

The reviewer would give the reader some idea of the rich contents of the book, which is fundamentally historical throughout but is divided into two parts, one which describes the evolution of posts open to *equites* and one which emphasizes the person of the incumbent in various ways. In the first part Chapter I deals with the origins of the procuratorial posts. The victor of Actium set about integrating the equestrian order into his following, and he placed financial affairs in the hands of equestrian procurators. While Augustus and Tiberius tried to distinguish between the *princeps* as private citizen and as magistrate, this was hardly possible and the procurators appeared more and more clearly as public officials, until Claudius regularized their position. Titles in inscriptions of the first century emphasize the personal bond between the financial procurator and the emperor by the latter's full name, but the form *proc. Aug.* becomes gradually more common and at last normal. The provinces which the emperor accepted, in 27 B. C. and later, were regarded as in need of a garrison, but a shortage of legionaries and the difficulties of recruitment imposed restrictions, wherefore some provinces, inadequately provided, were organized under equestrian procurators as governors. The latter and the great equestrian prefects were at first appointed for the task alone and not promoted according to grade or seniority.

In the second chapter Pflaum traces the progressive increase in the number of posts, which he reckons at 25 under Augustus, 39 under Claudius, 49 under Nero, 55 under Vespasian, 62 under Domitian, 80 under Trajan, 107 under Hadrian, 127 under Marcus Aurelius, 136 under Commodus, and 174 under Septimius Severus. Through the reign of Vespasian new posts were created as the result of 1) annexations, 2) divisions of districts or bureaux, 3) extension of equestrian administration to new fields, but there was no co-ordinated plan. Domitian made a start by subordinating the freedmen who had been the real chiefs of two great bureaux (*ab epistulis* and *a patrimoniis*) to an equestrian chief in each, and in other ways, but there was still no properly graded service (hiérarchie), because the posts were divided topheavily between 29 *ducenarii*, 21 *centenarii*, and 12 *sexagenarii*. Trajan continued along the road opened for him by Domitian, but it was of course Hadrian who completed the development, to end up with a well balanced service of 36 *ducenarii*, 37 *centenarii*, and 35 *sexagenarii*, appointed according to grade, seniority, and ability, with a true *cursus*. "It is absolutely astonishing," says the author, "that 107 equestrian functionaries could have sufficed for a task which, beside the management of imperial finances, included the cabinet of the *princeps*, all the fleets, the administration of Egypt and of a considerable group of provinces organized under an equestrian government." Americans familiar with bureaucratic Washington will have no quarrel with the author's description of Hadrian's achievement as "this magnificent

economy of forces." An interesting point, well emphasized by the author, is the new type of collegiality first introduced under Trajan, who appointed an equestrian *a rationibus* and an equestrian *procurator summarum rationum*, so that the department practically had two chiefs, although one was in a lower grade than the other. The most important of Hadrian's reforms was the appointment of *equites* as heads of all the main bureaux, but one of the changes by which he built up the number of posts open to *sexagenarii* was the notable substitution of procurators from the emperor for assistants freely chosen by senatorial officials. Septimius Severus does not appear as a great innovator but as a continuator and exaggerator along lines developed under Domitian, Trajan, and Hadrian. He had 10 *trecentarii*, 37 *ducentarii*, 46 *centenarii*, and 71 *sexagenarii*. The enrollment of many centurions in the equestrian order, the accession of a new social group to power, marks the period of the Severi, and Pflaum gives Septimius Severus credit for the integration in the equestrian order without much violence.

In Ch. III entitled "Le pouvoir des procureurs-gouverneurs et des procureurs financiers des provinces" Pflaum takes up questions connected with differences between a praesidial procurator and a *legatus Augusti pro praetore*. Listing the honorary inscriptions with the word "praeses," he argues that the term began as a sympathetic description of senatorial governors, then became even more common for equestrian governors, and that by 250 A. D. the word "praeses" had imposed itself as the ordinary term for governor of either type.

In Part II, after a preliminary chapter on the motives which induced a man to seek a procuratorial career (political and social power and chances of enrichment), a section in which the author properly emphasizes the importance of patronage, Pflaum studies the local origins of procurators and their preparation via the praetorian guard, or the *tres (quattuor) militiae*, or the *duae militiae*, or *una militia*, or as *primipili*, or even as civilians without preparation but with some special knowledge or with aristocratic standing in some Italian city. A third chapter deals with the support of candidates by influential personages at court. In the very illuminating fourth chapter Pflaum works out the lines along which presumably good men were advanced and the factors which influenced their careers, especially after 117 A. D. He isolates as the most important factors predetermining the kind of career a good man with the right contacts would have as 1) his local or national origin, 2) his road of access (ex-praetorian, etc.). Three types of careers emerge from a study of the *ducentarii* between 117 and 192 A. D.: 1) that of the ex-praetorians and *primipili bis* and a small number of graduates from the *militiae equestres*, who often get praesidial procuratorships and military prefectures but seldom get posts in the capital; 2) that of most graduates of the *militiae equestres*, who get no praesidial procuratorships and few posts in the capital; 3) that of civilians and a very few others, who stay for the most part in Rome. The author furthermore points out a compensatory lag in the promotion of civilians, a phenomenon noticeable particularly in the ranks of the *sexagenarii*. The ex-praetorians enjoyed a very rapid promotion as a rule. Then careers divide naturally into Occidental and Oriental careers with a few cases classed as Mixed. Pflaum of course attri-

butes this to the division of the empire into a Latin-speaking half and a Greek-speaking half. He collects also figures for procurators of African origin, likewise evidence for African careers. (The figures are based on data and inferences from inscriptions giving a man's *cursus honorum*, so that an Athenian whose procuratorship of Cyprus is attested incidentally in an epigram would not be counted among the procurators of Eastern origin.)

An epilogue on the end of the procuratorial career of the Early Empire refers to the breakdown of the old requirements for eligibility and places a different emphasis on the role of Gallienus in the development toward the administrative system of the Late Empire.

This picture, which in the main inspires confidence, will be found untrue in details, so that readers will have to adjust the statistics here and there.

To go back to the theory of the new collegiality whereby many an important office had two chiefs, it is a great help in understanding the character of some posts of which we have only the titles. On the other hand, Pflaum has not worked it out well in the case of the *ratio privata*. On pp. 85 and 104 Pflaum asserts that there were two chiefs of this bureau, one a *trecentarius* and the other a *centenarius*, corresponding to the two chief *rationales* of the *fiscus*. When one consults the references one finds that Sex. Varius Marcellus, the father of Elagabalus, had indeed been *proc. rationis privat. CCC* (Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 478) and that M. Aquilius Felix had been *proc. rat. privat. Aug. n.* early in his procuratorial career, when he was probably a *centenarius* (the *cursus* from Cannae, *A. E.*, 1945, No. 80, plus 1946, p. 188). The reviewer, who does not dispute the possibility or probability or even certainty of a double directorship of the *ratio privata*, denies that the *cursus* from Cannae can be interpreted as containing a reference to any such assistant directorship of the *ratio privata*. For Aquilius Felix has exactly the same title as Varius Marcellus. The huge *res privata* dates from the enormous confiscations of the year 197 according to the well-founded opinion of Tenney Frank (*An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, V, pp. 78-79). The *res privata* previous to 197 A. D., i. e. the *patrimonium privatum*, was a far less important department, which could not have rated a *trecentarius* as director. The difference in salary of the two directors merely reflects the difference between the relatively small *res privata* in 193 A. D. under Aquilius Felix and the *res privata* after 197 A. D. under Varius Marcellus.

The career of M. Aquilius Felix receives abuse in another section. On p. 284 Pflaum counts as the man's third promotion the procuratorship *a censibus equitum Romanorum*, thereby overlooking the prefecture of the Ravennate fleet and depriving his slender table on p. 288 of a fifth case of five promotions.

As to the history of the office *a censibus*, on pp. 60 and 66 Pflaum attributes the creation of the unified office *a libellis et censibus* to Hadrian. The unification is well attested under Antoninus Pius, but the one piece of evidence which Pflaum cites for the reign of Hadrian is *I. L. S.*, 1338, the *cursus honorum* of a man presumed to be T. Haterius Nepos, prefect of Egypt from 120 to 124 A. D. The inscription shows that the man was *proc. Aug. Armeniae mai[oris]* (114-117 A. D.), then (*proc.*) *ludi magni*, then (*proc.*) *hereditarium*,

then (*proc.*) a *censibus*, then a *libellis*. The inscription does not attest unification of the posts a *libellis* and a *censibus* under Hadrian as in the time of Antoninus Pius, nor, as Pflaum mistakenly suggests on p. 255, does it attest the immediate rise of a *procurator hereditatium* to the Palatine office of the a *libellis*. Moreover, what exactly was the bureau a *censibus*? Perhaps the reader could supplement the treatment of the a *censibus* with that in *A. J. P.*, 1946, pp. 314-18, which Pflaum has overlooked, and which reviews also the passage of the *Fragmenta iuris romani Vaticana*, § 204, where Pflaum on p. 90 erroneously claims evidence for another cumulative title a *censibus* et a *libellis*.

A different interpretation is possible also of one period in the career of P. Cominius Clemens, who, Pflaum thinks, was first prefect of the Ravennate fleet and then of the Misenensis. The pertinent inscription, *I. L. S.* 1412, reads *praef. classium praet. Misenens. et Ravenn.* but enumerates separately the previous procuratorships, which were less important. According to Pflaum (pp. 241 f.) the only exception to the rule that the *cursus* of a graduate of the *militiae equestres* counts no more than four successive posts as *ducenarius* is that of P. Cominius Clemens. If, however, Cominius Clemens commanded both fleets simultaneously, there is no exception. Long before he ever heard of the aforesaid rule, the reviewer concluded that Cominius Clemens must have been the commander of a task force of both fleets during one of the large-scale naval operations of the reign of Marcus Aurelius.

C. Furius Sabinus Aquila Timesitheus, when *magister (vicesimae hereditatium)* at Rome, had merely the first of several procuratorships as *ducenarius* according to Pflaum's career No. 347. Timesitheus may have been the only chief, but the post was inferior in dignity to the posts of the great *trecentarii*. On page 103, note 2, Pflaum is obviously in contradiction with himself and mistaken in citing the same post as that of a *trecentarius*. On page 103 he cites also other *magistri* as *trecentarii*, and so it is well to examine these more closely, all the more so because Pflaum gives no reference to A. E. R. Boak, "The Roman *Magistri* in the Civil and Military Service of the Empire," *Harvard Studies Class. Phil.*, XXVI (1915), pp. 73-164.

1) —Priscus, after being *magister a censibus*, then *magister a libellis*, became prefect of the *vigiles* according to Pflaum's career No. 338 (see also p. 294), but merely subprefect according to the text in the *Corpus* and in *I. L. S.*, 1456. In the absence of any indication that Dessau was wrong, the reader must attribute the error to Pflaum and conclude that as *magister a libellis* Priscus was still *ducenarius*.

2) Q. Axilius Urbicus according to Pflaum's career No. 340 became first a *studii et a consiliis Augg.*, then *magister sacrarum cognitionum* (*I. L. S.*, 1459). One could argue either that by itself this inscription would not prove the priority of either office or that the a *studii* was merely *centenarius* (cf. G. M. Bersanetti, *Epigraphica*, IX [1947], pp. 56-61). There is some reason to infer that Urbicus, as *magister sacrarum cognitionum* was *ducenarius*, no reason to infer that he was *trecentarius*.

3) L. Vibius Fortunatus according to Pflaum's career No. 339 became first *proc. ducenarius stationis hereditatium Romae*, then *magister a*

studiis, but though this is probably true, it is no reason to doubt that his next promotion was, as usual, still within the grade of a *ducenarius* (*I. L. S.*, 1458).

4) Pontius Eglectus Julianus (*C. I. L.*, VI, 37096) rose from [*pro*]c. *prov. Asiae* to be [*magi*]ster a *studiis Augg.* The latter, his last recorded post, could easily, even more easily, be that of a *ducenarius*.

5) C. Attius Alcimus Felicianus according to Pflaum's career No. 327 (see also p. 204) became *magister summarum rationum*, then *magister summae privatae*, then *praefectus vigilum*, then *praefectus annonae vice praef. praet.* The main question is: To what post did Attius Felicianus rise after being *magister summae privatae*? The man's *cursus honorum* is given in descending order in two inscriptions where an error of engraving and the uncertainty of punctuation give a certain amount of leeway for the interpretation. *C. I. L.*, VIII suppl., 23963 records the highest offices as follows: *vice praef. praet.*, *praef. annonae*, *vice praef. vigilum*, *mag[istro] summae privatae*, *magistro su[mmar]um rationum*; and *C. I. L.*, VIII suppl., 23948 records them *praef. annonae praef. praet.*, *vice praef. vig.*, *magistro summae privatae*, *magistro summarum rationum*. In the reviewer's opinion Boak (*loc. cit.*, p. 80) was quite right in talking about "the advancement of Attius Felicianus from Master of the *res privata* to Viceprefect of the Watch." It is no accident that on neither of the two inscriptions, which were erected in different localities, is it stated that Attius Felicianus became prefect of the *vigiles*: he did not yet have sufficient prestige to be appointed directly to a prefecture. The reviewer submits that as *magister summae privatae* Attius Felicianus was still *ducenarius*; then he became acting prefect of the *vigiles*, then prefect of the *annona*, and while still prefect of the *annona* he served as acting prefect of the Pretorian Guard (emend *C. I. L.*, VIII suppl., 23948 to read *praef. annonae <vice> praef. praet.*). But is not the *magister summarum rationum* merely the *procurator summarum rationum* under a slightly different title? We know that the *procurator summarum rationum* was 1) a junior colleague of the *a rationibus* and 2) a *ducenarius*.

As a result of this survey of the careers yielding the title, the reviewer suggests that the bureaucratic title *magister* in the third century implied a director, either the only director (*ducenarius*) or the junior member (*ducenarius*) of a college of two co-directors. The *magister summarum rationum* would usually be the junior member of a college consisting of the *a rationibus* and himself, and the *magister a censibus* might usually be the junior member of a college consisting of the *procurator a censibus equitum Romanorum* and himself, but in some cases either temporarily or permanently there may have been no expensive *trecentarius* serving as senior co-director, so that the title *magister* cloaked a lowering of the required grade. The choice of the word *magister* in this sense was suggested by the fact that when the Roman government introduced direct collection of taxes they had often retained the old staff of the previous *societas* with its *promagistri* in the provinces and its *magister* (director) at Rome, except that an imperial procurator (an equestrian career bureaucrat but not a specialist) was appointed over the *magister*.

One case will suffice to indicate especially the submerged problems beneath Pflaum's simplifying assertions as to the local origin of his procurators. It occurs in the Athenian inscription, *A. E.*, 1947, No. 89.

The monument was erected because a(n ex-)procurator of Asia with a career neither Occidental nor Oriental, Lucilius Pansa Priscillianus, one of the leading men among the older equestrian supporters of Caracalla and indeed the father of an intimate friend of the emperor, had used his influence in behalf of Athens ([τῆ]ς εἰς τὴν πα[τρίδ]α τὰς Ἀθῆν[ας εὐν]ο[ί]ας). In lines 4-5, [-¹⁶--- τοῦ] | κυρίου Αὐτοκ[ράτορος], where the reviewer urged in 1946 and still urges that no restoration be made, Pflaum believes that we have the culminating post, which by analogy with the career of one procurator of Asia he would actually identify (p. 283), and even cites evidentially (p. 291), as that of the *a cognitionibus*, as if no procurator of Asia ever became *magister a studiis Augusti*; but a reference to an early post or to something outside the *cursus* proper in line 4 would be less incompatible with the ascending order of the extant titles and with the climactic arrangement of line 10.

Now Pflaum describes Lucilius Pansa Priscillianus on pp. 192 and 266 unreservedly as an Athenian. The reviewer has looked for some trace of this family at Athens in the multitude of prytany and ephebic catalogues published in *Hesperia* and the Corpus, and since he can find none, the reviewer suggests that the word πα[τρίδ]α in line 12 means the polis of the dedicators but not of the patron. The reviewer suggests further, on the basis of *C. I. L.*, IX, 662 and 663, that Lucilius Pansa Priscillianus came from Apulia, where he erected a statue to a lady from the consular family of the Scipiones Orfiti. It is not inappropriate for an equestrian official with a mixed career to hail from a bilingual area like the Adriatic (so also C. Publicius Proculianus of Ravenna), but an Athenian in charge of the aqueducts at Rome and of fiscal affairs in Lower Pannonia would be a *rara avis* indeed.

The *ius gladii*. Theorizing about its evolution in the Early Empire, Pflaum (pp. 117-125) emphasizes the importance of Dio Cassius, LIII, 13, 6-7 as showing that the *ius gladii* meant the right of military commanders to put Roman soldiers to death without appeal, but he rejects as an anachronism the evidence of Dio Cassius, LIII, 14, 5 that in the time of Augustus the *ius gladii* could mean also the right of governors to put to death those under their rule, which he thinks was an extension due to Septimius Severus. Proof, however, that it antedates Septimius Severus lies in Philostratus, *Vit. soph.*, I, 532: (Polemon) "persuaded the Smyrnians not to let actions which they had against one another go anywhere outside the city, but to settle them at home. I mean real actions, because those against adulterers, temple-robbers and murderers, from the neglect of which pollutions arise, he bade them not only take out but throw out of Smyrna, for these cases required a judge with the *ius gladii*."

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

A. M. DALE. *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama*. Cambridge, The University Press, 1948. Pp. v + 220.

In this study, Miss Dale has set out to indicate "the prevailing movement of each type of rhythm" in the lyrics of fifth-century drama. After two preliminary chapters, devoted to the general characteristics of Greek dramatic lyric and to definitions, the author proceeds type by type through dactylic, anapaestic, iambic with trochaic and the combinations of the two, cretic-paeonic, dochmiac, ionic, aeolic (choriambic), aeolic (prosodiac-enoplian), and dactylo-epitrite, and ends with brief consideration of strophic construction and of performance (that is, the relation of music and motion or dance to metre). There is a useful synopsis of forms, an index locorum and general index, no bibliography. While the latter is not necessary, its absence gives some clue to the nature of the work. This is not a complete or comprehensive survey of Greek dramatic lyric, but an advanced essay on the nature of the principal metres.

It is perhaps also because of the independent, personal character of the work that definitions are given in abrupt, sometimes cryptic, form. There are times, in fact, when this reviewer simply does not understand what is intended. Here is an instance: "But a final syllable is only *anceps* in the sense that a long syllable has license to shorten, not vice versa, since no period or *στίχος* may end on a naturally short syllable" (p. 19, n. 1; the thought of a misprint is dispelled by the repetition of the principle on p. 26). That just above Miss Dale has quoted as "clausula of a period" the line *ἐν μάχῃ δ' ἀλώπекες* and marked the last syllable of the last word long, underlines the confusion and suggests that *ες* is not "a naturally short syllable" but "a long syllable with license to shorten," but as to why this should be so divination has so far failed to come up with an answer. Or again (p. 71): "hence . . . in the trochaic tetrameter, the rule against starting - - - ." What does this mean? From context and fact, it probably means either that the second half line must not start - - - - (generally true, but numerous exceptions) or, better, the second half line must not start with a *word length* amounting to - - - - as in a line quoted above. After numerous readings, I now think this is meant,¹ but the whole passage is bitterly obscure. And such obscurities are unfortunately of some consequence. They are not due to incapacity, for Miss Dale writes with style and finesse; more probably, it is a matter of undue condensation or cutting, inadequate illustration, or unwillingness to bore the advanced reader with the obvious. Thus, on p. 22, we meet the terms "pendant" and "blunt." They are not defined, here or elsewhere. Perhaps they are standard usage; if so, I do not know it. After some study, the reader emerges with a fair idea (dogged by an apparent contradiction or two) of what blunt and pendant mean, but also with the feeling that he has been forced to interpret an interpretation as if it were text to be interpreted.

Such problems arise, perhaps, out of the nature and form of the study, its limitation in length and scope. More significant is the

¹ But what is *apparently* meant, context or no, is that trochaic tetrameter must not begin with a metrical or word-length unit of - - - -, plainly untrue.

limitation involved in the following postulate: "that tragedy and comedy yield a particular kind of lyric metre which can legitimately be treated in some isolation from the rest of lyric metre" (preface). This may be true, at least to some extent. Miss Dale's approach to the subject is analytical rather than historical; the question is, for her, what the metres are rather than how they came to be what they are. And yet the two questions are not in practice entirely separable, and Miss Dale does get drawn into questions of origin and development (see e. g. pp. 102, 120, 138, etc.). Metres heavily used in drama were inherited from earlier lyric poets whose work was well known to the Athenian dramatists: in particular, glyconic and its variants from Sappho, Alcaeus, and Anacreon, perhaps also Corinna and Telesilla; ionic especially from Anacreon; dactylo-epitrite from choral lyric, notably Pindar. The dramatists take their own interpretations. Glyconic for drama is different from glyconic in Sappho, and dramatic dactylo-epitrite is not quite Pindar's, as Miss Dale knows and points out. But, in view of the dramatists' constant debt in all ways to the lyric poets, most demonstrably to Pindar, they cannot legitimately be thought of as offering their own independent interpretations on an equal basis; they are rather modifying, or perhaps misunderstanding, given forms. Either Miss Dale would not admit this, or she ignores it. "It was this fact that led some ancient metricians to represent the ionic ἀνακλώμενον as a dimeter in which the two middle syllables had somehow changed places, but the not uncommon $\sim\sim\sim\sim|-\sim\sim\sim$ disposes of that theory" (p.

116). The Attic line does *not* dispose of that theory, which is right, as shown from various poems of Anacreon, particularly 39 D², written long before any dramatic ionics we have. The variant shows the Attic interpretation (or misunderstanding) of Anacreon's line, just as $\sim\sim\sim\sim\sim\sim$ is atticized glyconic. Only such an exclusively Attic approach could lead a metrician of Miss Dale's stature to make the astonishing statement that "*like their Lesbian prototypes the aeolics of drama are for the most part hardly to be classified except as lengths of so many syllables*" (p. 131; my italics).

The foregoing principles of limit in definition and scope are responsible for much of the difficulty in this difficult but impressive study, and it has been ungrateful work for the reviewer to make plain his dissatisfactions. Be these dissatisfactions what they may, it is clear that much is to be learned from this book, and the serious student of dramatic metre cannot afford to ignore it. Metricians are peculiarly susceptible to the danger of advancing by imperceptible degrees into nonsense, of evolving schemes which, to any practicing poet, would have been meaningless or unworkable. But Miss Dale's good sense of reality is everywhere manifest, and her combinations are very generally credible for practice. The following points or tendencies seem particularly valuable. Overall, the tendency is to play down the minute metron ($\sim\sim$, $\sim\sim$, $\sim\sim$, etc.) and emphasize the line (or colon, as Miss Dale will have it). Particularly because of this, the analysis of Aeschylus' syncopated iambo-trochaics seems absolutely right and final. The theory, tentatively advanced, that occasionally syllable grouping or syllable counting replaces quantity (pp. 65, 77, etc.) is most interesting and might well be applied further; and this is true likewise of the notion of epiploce as "a

sort of matrix from which you could hack out iambic or trochaic segments." The chapter on dactylo-epitrite is disappointing, and the interpretation of the epitrite pair $\sim \sim \sim \sim \sim$ as two cretics with linking *anceps* (p. 169) so anomalous as to be unbelievable after the forthright practice of Pindar (see p. 177 for what the poet is supposed to have "conceived" as his "colon-ingredients"). The determination to exclude ictus in favor of pure quantity seems exaggerated. It leads to occasional contradictions (e.g. p. 66) and to unsolved problems.

On the whole, this is an advanced, original, and exciting book. It is too difficult to serve as an introduction; rather, it will force the student to re-examine, often to recast or reject, his hardened notions concerning dramatic lyric.

RICHMOND LATTIMORE.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

ROLAND G. KENT. *Old Persian Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*. New Haven, American Oriental Society, 1950. Pp. xiii + 216. (*American Oriental Series*, XXXIII.)

Unless, as is not impossible, additional texts be discovered, the distinguished Professor Emeritus of Comparative Linguistics at the University of Pennsylvania here gives the learned world, with that extreme meticulousity which scholars have come to expect from him, what may be regarded as the definitive edition of the Old Persian inscriptions. Based on a long series of preliminary studies and on careful reading of practically everything of moment hitherto written on his subject, he has enriched his work with almost unassailable restoration of *lacunae* and emendation of corrupt passages; his textual notes are admirable in their fullness; and if, here and there, I myself should translate otherwise, the differences are minimal (e.g., DB 1. 86,¹ *nāviyā* would be a little clearer if rendered 'navigable [only, not fordable]'; cf. his Lexicon, s.v.; DB 5. 24, 'by raft' seems more idiomatic both in OP and in English than 'by raft(s)'; DSe 43-45, appears to mean, rather, 'much handiwork that previously had not been put [or, made] in place, that I put [or, made] in place'; and DSf 56-57, 'much excellent [had been] ordered; much excellent there was').

In § 1. III, one might note that the metre of Middle Persian hymns written with Semitic logograms (Huzvarišn, "Book-Pahlavī") is quite non-existent, but becomes perfectly regular Iranian verse when the Iranian equivalents are substituted ("Pāzand"). A striking Aramaism (§§ 12, 315) not mentioned by Kent is the word-order verb + subject instead of subject + verb in the constantly recurring phrase *θātiy Dārayavauš xšāyatiya* 'saith D. the King' (cf. *כֹּה אָמַר הַמֶּלֶךְ הַגָּדוֹל הַמְּלִיכָה הַגָּדוֹל הַמְּלִיכָה אֲשֹׁר* 'thus saith the great King, the King of Assyria' [2 Kings 18. 19]). Kent (§§ 6, 12) says little more than that "Aramaic also seems to have had a certain influence on the phrasing and the syntax. . . it is to be expected that the style of

¹ So far as practicable, Kent's system of abbreviations is here followed.

the inscriptions should reflect the style of Aramaic; and it does"; with some very general remarks. The subject should be thoroughly investigated, preferably by a professed Semitist.² My own interpretation of apophony ("ablaut") is very different from Kent's (§ 121 against Gray in this JOURNAL, LXII [1941], pp. 476-84; *Foundations of Language* [New York, 1939, 1950], pp. 65-6).

Since a very exhaustive and competent review of Kent's volume has been written by Professor G. S. Lane (*Lang.*, XXVI [1950], pp. 412-17) for all but the vocabulary and the translation (on the latter of which I have already briefly touched), I may here restrict myself to some observations on the etymological material of the Lexicon, merely noting that I regard the Lat. "genitives" *eius*, *cuius*, etc., like Skt. *asmākam*, *yusmākam*, Lat. *nostrum*, *uostrom*, Germ. *unser*, as originally stereotyped neuter singular nominative-accusatives (*Foundations*, pp. 196-7, against Kent, p. 57^b).

I turn, then, to comments on thirteen words in the OP vocabulary.

1-2) *abīcarīš* (DB 1. 64-65). This is almost certainly the acc. sg. neut. of an -s-stem (§ 185. III), but I strongly doubt if it should be compared directly with NPers. *carīdan* 'to pasture' (p. 169^a). I connect it, rather, as a collective, with lexicographical Skt. *abhicāra* 'servant', i. e., 'servants, retainers' (cf. Gk. τὸ δοῦλον, Lat. *seruitium*, Fr. *le service* in the same collective sense). In this passage also occurs another ἄπ. λεγ., *māniya*, usually connected with GAv. *domāna*, LAV. *nmāna*-, Skt. *dāma*-, Gk. δόμος, Lat. *domus* 'house,' etc. (p. 202^b). Here, however, Kent seems not to have given sufficient consideration to the Aramaic rendering of *māniya*- by נַחֲשִׁי 'riches, treasure.' I again suggest (cf. *J. A. O. S.*, XXVIII [1913], pp. 281-3) that the OP word is to be compared with Skt. *mānya* 'honourable' (lit., 'to be thought of' > 'valuable'), not with Skt. *māna* 'building, house, dwelling.' I would, accordingly, translate this very troublesome sequence: 'the service (= servants, retainers) and the live-stock and the treasure and the houses.'

3) *avaḍaš* 'from there, from then,' *avaḥāš-tā* 'from thenceforward them' *dūradaš* 'from afar,' all ending in -š, not in -ša (cf. Benveniste, *Gramm.*, §§ 367, 389). With š cf. Hom. κακῶν ἔξ, θεῶν ἔξ, Lat. *ex*, etc., < *ēk-s < *ēgh-s (cf. Walde-Hofmann, *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*³, I (Heidelberg, 1938, p. 424), probably with adverbial -s (cf. Brugmann, *Gdr.*, II, 2, pp. 823-4, 737-8).

4-5) *āḥiyābaušna*-. I do not see why this nom. pr. is necessarily to be considered a determinative compound ('Freed from Misfortune'; so Kent, §§ 160. Id, 243, p. 166^a; cf. Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wb.*, col. 323); it may equally well be a possessive compound ('Having Misfortune-Freedom'), as proposed by Justi, *Iranisches Namenbuch*, col. 50^a, though with an impossible interpretation of the first component; similarly Av. *pouru-baoxšna*- 'possessing abundant freedom,' rather than 'bringing much freedom' (against

² I essayed this in a long out-moded paper, "Stylistic Parallels between the Assyro-Babylonian and the Old Persian Inscriptions" (*A. J. S. L.*, XVII [1901], pp. 151-9), where I also noted the similar constantly recurring Av. phrase *ātaš mraošt Ahurō Mazdā* 'then spake A. M.' (contrast the order in the Skt. type *Arjuna uvāca* 'A. spake').

Bartholomae, col. 901). The same type may recur in another nom. pr., *Bagābigna-*, where it seems needless to assume, with Kent (§§ 160. Ie, 243, p. 199^a), a ptc. in *-na-*, and so 'Begotten by God' (cf. also the conjectures of Bartholomae, col. 922). The view of Justi (*Iran. Namenb.*, 56^b, 489) that the name means 'Having the Glory of God' (or 'of the Gods') at least deserves consideration—i. e., *baga-ā-bigna-*, to the base **bheig(u)e-* 'shine,' Gk. *φοῖβος* 'pure, bright, radiant' (Walde-Pokorny, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der indogermanischen Sprachen* [Berlin and Leipzig, 1930-1933], II, p. 138). This interpretation is sustained by the OP nom. pr. *Ἀρια-βίγνης* 'Having Aryan Glory' (Justi, 22^a), where 'Aryan-Begotten,' or even 'Having Aryan Seed,' seems less likely. The Babylonian borrowed nom. pr. *Bagabigi(?)in* may perhaps be added here (T. Clay, *Business Documents of Murashû Sons of Nippur Dated in the Reign of Darius II* [Philadelphia, 1912], p. 12).

6) *kaufa-* 'mountain.' If one may assume an alternation *pH : p*, OP *kaufa-*, Av. *kaofa-*, NP *kōh* are not isolated in Iranian (so Kent, § 75. II), but find cognates in Lith. *kaūpas*, OCS. *kupŭ*, OHG. *hūfo* 'heap,' etc. (W.-P., I, pp. 372-3; W.-H., I, p. 311).³

7) *takabara-* 'petasos-wearing.' If the first component is correctly interpreted (cf. Kent, p. 185^b), it is apparently connected (against him, § 76. V) with the I-E base **tege-* 'weave,' seen in Osset. *taxun*, Arm. *t'ek'em*, Lat. *texo* (<*teq-s-*) 'weave' (W.-P., I, p. 716).

8) *tanū-* 'self.' This use of a word for 'body' as a quasi-reflexive pronoun, so also in Vedic and Av., might well be noted in a special paragraph 202A (cf. Brugmann, *Gdr.*², II, 2, pp. 401-2).

9) *nāmā* 'name.' I fail to see why Kent (§§ 187, 251C, p. 193^a) takes *nāma* as a suffixless loc. sg. neut., but *nāmā* perhaps as an acc. of specification (§§ 187, 249L, p. 193^{ab}), though he recognizes (§ 312) that *nāmā* is normally used in conjunction with a fem., otherwise *nāma* (Benveniste, §§ 152, 278, 312), and the OP word is found only in the nom.-acc. (Benveniste, § 278). I have long regarded *nāmā* in name-phrases as a nom. in apposition with the person or thing named, the pair forming an elliptical nominal phrase (nom. absolute) inserted bodily in the main sentence without grammatical connexion. Examples abound in OP (cf. Schwyzler-Debrunner, *Griech. Gram.*, II [Munich, 1950], p. 86), of which I quote the two excellent examples given by Kent (§ 312), though with my own translation, materially different from his: *Dādaršiš nāma Arminiya manā ba'daka avam frāišayam Arminam* 'an Armenian, D. his name, my subject—him I sent forth to Armenia'; *Sikayauvatiš nāmā didā Nisāya nāmā dahyāuš Mādaiy avadašim avājanam* 'a fortress—S. (its) name; a district in M., N. (its) name—there I smote him.' It seems unnecessary to suggest, as does Kent, that "these phrases are perhaps based on similar phrasing in Aramaic," since the same con-

³ As Lane remarks, Kent pays slight heed to the laryngeal hypothesis (why laryngeal, despite the universal usage?); cf. Kent's discussion of Skt. *ahám*: Gk. *ἐγώ* (§ 193), disregarding I-E **egHom*. He entirely neglects W.-P.

struction appears in Gk., e.g., *πόταμος Κύδνος ὀνομα, εὐρὸς δύο πλεθρών* 'a river, K. (its) name, (its) breadth of two plethra.'⁴

10) *naiba-* 'beautiful, (religiously) good.' Kent, stating that the word occurs only in Iranian (§ 75. V), fails to notice the cognate group of OIr. *nóib* 'holy' (W.-P., II, p. 321; H. Pedersen, *Vgl. kelt. Gram.*, I [Göttingen, 1909], pp. 156, 387).

11) *fraθara-* 'superior.' Av. *fraθara-* (p. 198^a, where read § 148. II instead of § 149. I) seems not to occur.

12) *raucak-* 'day.' The OP type *Anāmakahya māhyā XV raucabiš θakatā āha* (DB 2. 56), rendered by Kent (§ 252. D) 'of the month A., 15 by days were past,' goes, rather, as a general pl. case-form, in § 252. I ('of the month A., 15 days were past'). As he himself says (§ 252. I), Av. knows the same construction (add to his references, p. 82, n. 2, Reichelt, *Av. Elmb.*, § 427), and the OIran. gen. pl. has become the general pl. case in NPers. nouns. This use of *raucabiš* as a np. is confirmed by the ns. in DB 3. 8: *Garmapadahya māhyā I rauca^b θakatam āha* 'of the month G., 1 day was past.'

13) *vain-* 'see.' The etymology proposed by Kent (< **ueid-n-*, § § 83. I, 130, 210. III, p. 206^a) seems excellent, but is, like Av. *vaēn-*, NPers. *bīnād* 'see,' and perhaps also Skt. *ven-* 'desire,' a denominative in *-n-* (cf. Brugmann, *Gdr.*², II, 1, p. 263; 3, p. 313, on *ven-* : *vená-* 'longing, desire'), i. e. **ueid-n-* from the base **ueide-* 'know, see' (cf. Skt. *vēda-* 'knowledge' : Lat. *uideo*, SBal. *gindag* 'see'), the semantic development being 'sight' > 'desire' > 'knowledge' (for the base in general, W.-P., I, pp. 236-239).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

NEW YORK CITY.

FRANCESCO ARNALDI. *Da Plauto a Terenzio, II: Terenzio.* Napoli, Loffredo, 1947. Pp. 227.

The present volume is a sequel to Professor Arnaldi's earlier study of Roman drama, which, after a brief treatment of Livius Andronicus and Naevius, was devoted to an analysis of Plautus' comedies.¹ The first third of this book deals with three other dramatists, Ennius (pp. 5-54), Pacuvius and Caecilius Statius (pp.

⁴ *Nāma* and *ngma* are mere appositives in such passages as OP (DB I. 36) *I martiya maguš āha Gaumāta nāma hauv udapatatā* 'there was a man, a Magian—G. (his) name—he rose up'; Av. *vairiš yō Haosravd ngma* 'a bay—H. (its) name'; *Vayuš bā ngma ahmi* 'I am V., (my) name'; *mereyō yō parō-darš ngma . . . yim mašyāka avi dušvačaghō kahrkatāš ngma aōja'te* 'the bird—P. (his) name— . . . whom evil-speaking folk call K. (as his) name' (ns. as a direct quotation); Ved. *Havir asmi nāma* 'I am H. (my) name'; cf. also Arm. *ar koms i umenn Likianēs anum kočeceloy* 'with a count—L. the name was called' (where A. Meillet, *Altarm. Elmb.* [Heidelberg, 1913], p. 78, sees an acc. of specification).

¹ Cf. my review in *A. J. P.*, LXX (1949), pp. 221-4.

55-80); then follow two chapters of an historical and critical nature, on the life of Terence (pp. 81-102) and on the chronology of the comedies (pp. 103-138); the author's discussion of the six Terentian plays ("L'arte," pp. 139-218) provides the most significant chapter of the book, and this is followed by a short conclusion ("L'artista," pp. 219-226).

In the first two chapters Arnaldi discusses the multiplicity of Ennius' interests (p. 11), his importance as a predecessor of Vergil (p. 12), the manner in which he reflects the Roman culture of his period (p. 13); the analysis of Ennius as an epic poet is followed by a consideration of "Ennio tragico" (pp. 31 ff.) and especially of the lyrical nature of his plays (pp. 43 ff.); Arnaldi thinks that Ennius in tragedy and Plautus in comedy perhaps followed Livius Andronicus and Naevius in their use of meters, as Fraenkel maintained in his *Plautinisches im Plautus*, but admits that the paucity of the fragments of the first two poets makes proof impossible. Arnaldi looks upon Pacuvius as the spiritual heir of Ennius and considers his *Antiope* superior to the *Medea*, Ennius' masterpiece (p. 55), an assumption hardly supported by the Ciceronian passages which he cites as evidence. The author quotes numerous fragments, not only of Ennius and Pacuvius, but also of Caecilius Statius, and points out the Plautine nature of many of the latter (pp. 69 f.); he finds in Caecilius the *πρόσος* noted by Varro, but says that the playwright "è ancora lontano da Terenzio" (p. 72).

Arnaldi devotes sixty pages to Terence's life and the chronology of the plays, as against eighty on the comedies themselves—a somewhat surprising ratio. The statements given in the ancient *Vita* lead him into a lengthy discussion of the Scipionic circle and of Polybius, whose pages, along with the comedies of Terence, he considers an important document for the nature of the circle (p. 94), and he calls the famous words of Chremes in *Heaut.* 77 "la prima e più caratteristica espressione dell' *humanitas* del circolo degli Scipioni" (p. 96); is it really this, or merely an excuse on Chremes' part to concern himself in the affairs of Menedemus? Elsewhere (p. 168) Arnaldi says that *Hec.* 549-56 is chronologically the first formulation of the *humanitas* of the Scipionic circle. He agrees with Schanz and Jachmann that the chronology of the plays is as follows: *Andria*, *Hecyra I*, *Heauton Timorumenos*, *Eunuchus*, *Phormio*, *Adelphoe*, *Hecyra II* and *III*, but the conflicting statements in the ancient sources and the recent attempts of Gestri, Blum, and others to change the accepted order of the plays receive full consideration. Arnaldi makes a detailed analysis of the Terentian prologues, thus retracing the work of Fabia and Flickinger, and concludes (p. 133) that the accepted chronology is the only possible one. One feels, however, that this section, like that on the Scipionic circle, is unnecessarily prolix and would have profited from condensation.

Arnaldi's treatment of Terence's comedies resembles his procedure in Volume I—considerable attention to metrical matters, analyses of the structure of the plays and a consideration of their relation to the Greek originals, and many penetrating estimates of the plays themselves. He rightly stresses the novelty and the originality of the *Hecyra* (pp. 163 ff.) and, by viewing it as Terence's second play,

avoids the error of Norwood who based his theory of Terence's dramatic development in part upon his view of the *Hecyra* as Terence's fifth comedy. That there was a development seems undeniable: the first three comedies (*Andria*, *Hecyra*, and *Heauton*) are both less amusing and less conventional than the *Eunuchus*, *Phormio*, and *Adelphoe*, but the last three, on the contrary, reveal a far more successful handling of the "duality method" and contain some of the traditionally comic personages (*miles*, *parasitus*, *leno*); Terence was learning to compose comedies that combined greater artistry with broader comic appeal.² Both the *Hecyra* and the *Phormio* were adapted from Apollodorus, but the differences between the two are very striking; Arnaldi calls the *Hecyra* "la più sentimentale" of Terence's comedies, the *Phormio* "la più vivace, accanto all' *Eunuchus*" (p. 170), but he sees in both comedies a sense of justice and of truth which he ascribes to the Greek playwright.³

The author makes many other interesting points. The *Heauton* shows no evidence of *contaminatio* and in line 6 (*duplex quae ex argumento facta est simplici*) *facta* refers to the Greek original, not to Terence's play (p. 187; cf. pp. 122 f.); this is definitely preferable to Flickinger's view that *duplex* means two plays, one Greek, one Latin, but the verse can also be interpreted as meaning that the plot is double but nevertheless comes from a single Greek play—not from two originals as was the case with the *Andria*. Arnaldi points out many changes which Terence is known to have introduced into his comedies and states that "Terenzio, contaminatore di Menandro, è nettamente superiore a Menandro puro" (p. 195). The *Eunuchus* receives high praise for its vivacity, humor, and irony (pp. 201 f.), but the *Adelphoe* is Terence's masterpiece and surpasses the *Eunuchus* "per la profondità dei caratteri, la serietà dell' impostazione, la stessa sostanziosità dello spirito comico" (p. 204). Micio is the outstanding character of the comedy, and his dialogue with Aeschinus (635-712) Arnaldi considers perhaps the finest scene in all Terence, a "stupenda scena—nel suo equilibrio di toni comici e sentimentali" (p. 210).

The short final chapter is less a description of Terence's artistry than a defense of Leo's views concerning Terence against those of Jachmann, whose polemic Arnaldi likens to Caesar's polemic against Cicero.⁴ He believes that in *vis* and *comica virtus* the Menandrian

² I discuss this development in a new book, *The Nature of Roman Comedy*, now being published by the Princeton University Press. This work is concerned chiefly with the comedies, like Arnaldi's two volumes, and unlike Beare's *The Roman Stage* (1950) which treats mainly of the history and staging of Roman drama; I am less interested in *contaminatio* and the reconstruction of the Greek originals than in the features of the Roman comedies (stage conventions, plot-structure, characters, moral tone, suspense and irony, humor in situation, character, and language, etc.).

³ P. 178; cf. n. 6, where Arnaldi suggests that the Greek original of Plautus' *Epidicus* was the work of Apollodorus.

⁴ Cf. p. 225; Arnaldi does not accept, incidentally, the belief of Herrmann, Ferrarino, and others that the famous *dimidiata Menander* epigram is also to be attributed to Cicero, and he explains the phrase as meaning that the Menander of the Terentian comedies gives an incomplete picture of the Greek dramatist.

originals did not differ much from the Terentian comedies (p. 226), but he is convinced that Terence was a creative artist, not a mechanical translator (pp. 221 f.), a dramatist who presented in a literary form the *urbanitas* of his circle (p. 223); one of Arnaldi's best summaries of Terence's qualities appears in his discussion of the *Andria*: "la sua capacità di creazione, il suo senso sobrio del comico e la profondità e delicatezza di sentimento" (p. 143).

Arnaldi's second volume has the weaknesses of the first volume, but to a less striking degree; Norwood's *The Art of Terence* and Flickinger's article on the prologues are cited,⁵ but Post, Rand, Frank, Harsh, and other scholars who have written much on Menander and Terence are ignored. Perhaps American books and journals were not available to the author, but it is surprising that there is no mention of Beare, Enk, Kuiper, and other European authorities. Arnaldi's treatment of Terence's life and originality might have profited therefrom and at least would have presented a more up-to-date picture of Terentian scholarship. But the two volumes combine to give to the reader a competent and useful discussion of early Roman drama and a stimulating and often valuable analysis of the twenty-six extant Roman comedies.

GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

Hérodote, Histoires, Livre VI. Texte établi et traduit par PH.-E. LEGRAND. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1948. Pp. 140.

In this volume of the Budé Herodotus Legrand maintains the high standard which he set when he published the first volume in 1932. No papyrus fragments have been found from Book VI and consequently there is no new textual information to be taken into account since the third edition of Hude; nevertheless Legrand offers some interesting variations from Hude's text and new solutions of several difficulties. Some of his changes in the text are the result of his attempt to regularize the dialect and there is not space to list these novelties here. But there are several new readings which may be discussed briefly.

In VI, 102 we read that the Persians after conquering Eretria and waiting a few days, sailed on to Attica *κατέργοντες τε πολλόν* (so Hude, following ABCP; DRSV have *κατεργάζοντες*). But "making haste" hardly describes what the Persians are doing, since they have just taken several days rest. Accordingly Dietsch suggested *κατοργέοντες* "superbientes," and Legrand improves this to *κατοργώντες* "tout bouillants." For the Herodotean use of this word he might perhaps have referred to the famous anecdote according to which Herodotus told the father of Thucydides ὃ "Ὀλορε, ὀργῇ ἢ φύσει τοῦ νιού σου πρὸς μαθήματα (Marcellinus, *Vita Thuc.*, 54). Also new and interesting is the suggestion of a lacuna in 134, 2, in the description of the behaviour of Miltiades at Paros: τὸν δὲ διερχόμενον . . . ἐπὶ

⁵ Cf. pp. 157 f., where Thornton Wilder's *The Woman of Andros* is mentioned.

τὸν κολωνόν (" διερχόμενος doit être le débris d'un membre de phrase où il était dit que Miltiade avait atteint la colline en traversant une partie du προσστειον "). Less important and less convincing is his alteration of φέρει to φορέει in 61, 4 on the ground that φορέειν is used throughout the chapter to describe how the nurse carries the child to the temple of Helen. In 92, 1 Hude reads: ἐπεκαλέοντο τοὺς αὐτοὺς [οὓς] καὶ πρότερον (ABCP have οὓς, omitted by DRSV). Legrand reads τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς καὶ πρότερον, claiming this as his conjecture; but this reading was in fact adopted by Blakesley and by Stein, who credits it to Dobree. Other older emendations which he adopts and Hude rejected are Valekenae's ἀγνοίη for ἀνοίη in 69, 5; van Herwerden's βουλομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ for βουλόμενον δὲ αὐτόν in 81; the commonsense διότι of Richards for the meaningless διὰ τό or διὰ τὰ of the MSS in 64, where Hude obelizes; and Hude's own tentative conjecture, which he did not admit into his text, of διέβαλλε for διέβαλε in 61, 1.

Legrand also adopts some of the readings of D which were cited for the first time in the apparatus of Hude's third edition, e. g. the aorist participle ἀράμενοι in 14, 2 where other MSS have the present participle. The aorist participle is certainly an improvement here—"having hoisted sail they sailed away." On the other hand in 44, 1 he reads Θασίους οὐδὲ χεῖρας ἀνταειρομένους κατεστρέψαντο where all the MSS have ἀνταειραμένους, which is certainly defensible as a reading. In 73, 1 he adopts the reading of S, ὠρθώθη, in preference to the *difficilior lectio* of the other MSS ὠδώθη.

There is no introduction at the beginning of this book as the Ionian revolt was discussed in the previous volume, but after chapter 42 there is a discussion of some thirty pages devoted to the Greek expeditions of Darius, which includes an examination of the sources used by Herodotus for this part of his work. The translation is, as always, admirably lucid and its usefulness will not be confined to French students. Two of his notes may be singled out for mention: his suggestion that the "sleeve full of silver" on which Leotychides was found sitting during his expedition to Thessaly (72, 2) was really "une sorte de sac semblable à une manche étranglée aux deux bouts"; and his brief remark on the famous hoplite charge at Marathon (112, 3): "δρόμῳ. Il ne doit s'agir que d'un 'pas accéléré'."

LIONEL PEARSON.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

M. P. CHARLESWORTH. *The Lost Province or The Worth of Britain.* Cardiff, Univ. of Wales Press, 1949. Pp. vii + 89. (*Gregynog Lectures*, 1948.)

In his brief preface Professor Charlesworth says: "I have tried to set out why the Romans first conquered and afterwards remained in this island; then in what ways its occupation proved useful and profitable to them; finally what they have bequeathed to us. On this last topic I have ventured to stress some less familiar methods of approach, and if sometimes I may appear dogmatic I hope later to have fuller opportunity of justifying them." It is to be feared that

Professor Charlesworth's recent lamented death may have prevented this further treatment.

The lectures were delivered at Aberystwyth in March, 1948, and as was fitting there is a good deal about the Welsh language as well as about Welsh geography; for the latter there is a fine map of Roman Wales supplied by Dr. V. E. Nash-Williams. Charlesworth thinks that the Latin language of the Roman occupation made a strong impression on Welsh; he gives many words in modern Welsh which seem to derive directly from Latin.¹

There are four lectures, the first is called "The Years of Conquest." Before giving a historical outline the author asks a series of questions,—“Why did the Romans choose to incorporate this distant island in their Empire? Why, that once done, did they retain it for nigh on four hundred years? What did they gain from the occupation? And what have we gained or what did this island retain when the legions departed?”

The first question he endeavours to answer in the first lecture, beginning with the historical outline, and first Caesar's invasion. He thinks Caesar's chief object was the reputed wealth of Britain, but a geographical error also contributed. Caesar described the island as triangular, and the second side (the west) he said faced towards Spain; so Britain would be a link with the other provinces.

Britain served as a refuge for exiles from Gaul; also the disunity of the island made it seem an easier conquest. So Claudius decided on the invasion of 43 A.D., and at first the conquest proceeded very quickly. Camulodunum (Colchester) was made the capital. Charlesworth passes very lightly over the revolt of Boadicea and the destruction of Camulodunum (both unnamed!) in A.D. 61. Though the revolt was very formidable it was stamped out; and when Vespasian became Emperor he adopted a new "forward" policy, and the legions advanced to York and to Wales. Then in 77 came Agricola, to whose conquests full justice is done. He was, however, recalled by Domitian in 84, perhaps through jealousy.

The next great name is Hadrian, who came to Britain in 122. Just as he had given up some of Trajan's Eastern conquests so now he abandoned Scotland and built the Roman Wall from Newcastle to Bowness, "which even today in its ruins remains one of the most majestic abiding monuments of the past empire."

The second lecture is on "Romans and Britons," and begins with Septimius Severus, 192-211, and his great work in Britain. "This hard-headed ruler had decided that Britain was well worth keeping; he would never have expended this vast amount of energy, labour and money upon a non-paying proposition." Later Aurelian, 270-275, gave up Dacia and made the Danube the frontier. "But he did *not* abandon Britain. If we ask why, there can only be one answer: because Aurelian thought it of value."

Then came the time of the sea-raiders on the south and southeast coasts, and a line of forts was built along the Saxon shore, of which a sketch map is given. Constantine became Emperor at York in 306, and six years after that he started out to win Rome for himself.

Disasters came later, and Britain was deprived of the Roman

¹ See K. K. Jackson's article "On Some Romano-British Place-Names," *J. R. S.*, XXXVIII (1948), pp. 54-58.

legions. "Yet these Romanized Britons, though the west could do nothing for them, and the east had forgotten them, put up a splendid resistance. Think of the generations it took before Angles, Saxons and Jutes had thoroughly occupied England alone; Wales they never conquered."

The third lecture is headed "What Rome gained from Britain." "The comparatively mild climate of our country allowed Roman arms to penetrate further north than on the Continent.—The Roman Wall zone in England lies far to the north of any region on the Continent occupied by the legions."

Rome early began using Britain for recruiting auxiliaries. Charlesworth estimates that a total of 12,000 men was enrolled. It was also used as a "strategic reserve"; in times of danger some of the legionaries could be used for Germany or elsewhere. The British fleet was also of importance: under Agricola it circumnavigated Britain; inscriptions show that detachments from the fleet helped in building Hadrian's Wall.

The mineral wealth of the island was important, particularly lead and iron. Tin was worked early: then the mines were closed, but they were opened again in the third century. Cattle and sheep breeding was carried on in the large estates. "The Roman invasion had developed Britain into a rich and flourishing island." "Raiders made it their target because here was something worth raiding, cattle and sheep, cloth and hides, silver and lead and iron, a wealthy material civilization." "That was one of the reasons why the Romans clung to it. Some of the most experienced and wisest heads among the emperors—Vespasian, Hadrian, Severus, Aurelian, Diocletian, men not prone to act from motives of sentiment or of mere prestige—had decided to retain it; they had hard heads, they were good judges."

The fourth and final lecture is headed "What we have gained from the Roman occupation." To begin with there is the unification of the country, for the first time in history. Charlesworth stresses the effect on the language; modern Welsh still retains many words. "These new words for new things came over into Celtic, and have survived to this day as a lasting heritage." Roads are mentioned particularly, "many of our main roads are still built upon Roman foundations." "In time . . . a network of roads covered the whole island." A great variety of trees, fruits, vegetables, and flowers was brought in by the Romans.

"Even in the sixth and seventh centuries there remained both in Wales and in England the memory of the great and powerful civilization that could perform feats far beyond the resources of smaller kingdoms: there lingered the memory of a great tradition." Then and even later there could be seen the remains of walls and gates, bridges and buildings.

As will be seen from this summary Charlesworth sets the abiding results of the Roman occupation of Britain higher than the estimates of some other historians, but he ends on a sadder note. "Remember what was lost—the central organization and administration of the whole country broke down . . . as for the roads, they crumbled into tracks."

This volume, though so brief, is a valuable contribution to the study of Roman Britain. It is extremely well printed.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Pace (Biagio). G. M. Columba commemorato a Palermo il XXIX Gennaio MCMXLIX. Con una bibliografia degli scritti di G. M. Columba redatta dalla Dott. Palma Grasso. Palermo, *Edizione del comitato onoranze Columba*, 1950. Pp. 47.

Pellegrino (Michael), ed. M. Minucii Felicis Octavius. Turin, G. B. Paravia & Co., 1950. Pp. xxvi + 62. (*Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum*.)

Pepe (Luigi). Marziale. Napoli, Casa Editrice Armanni, 1950. Pp. 223. (*Biblioteca del "Giornale Italiano di Filologia."*)

Rackham (H.). Pliny, Natural History, Vol. V, Libri XVII-XIX. With an English Translation. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1950. Pp. vii + 544. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Radet (Georges). Alexandre le Grand. Paris, L'Artisan du Livre, 1950. Pp. 452.

Reinach (Julien). Gaius, Institutes. Texte établi et traduit. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1950. Pp. xxiv + 194. (*Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé*.)

Reiss (Samuel). The Rise of Words and their Meanings. New York, Philosophical Library, 1950. Pp. 301. \$3.75.

Renoirte (Thérèse). Les "Conseils politiques" de Plutarque. Une lettre ouverte aux Grecs à l'époque de Trajan. Louvain, 1951. Pp. 144. (*Univ. de Louvain, Recueil de Travaux d'Histoire et de Philologie*, 3^e Sér., fasc. 40.)

Rhodes (S. A.). Gérard de Nerval, 1808-1855. Poet, Traveler, Dreamer. New York, Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 416. \$4.75.

Robinson (David M.). Excavations at Olynthus, Part XIII: Vases found in 1934 and 1938. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 463; 267 pls. \$25.00. (*The Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Archaeology*, 38.)

Roussel (Louis). Pan! Sur l'Ion de Platon. Montpellier, chez l'auteur, 1949. Pp. 121.

Rupprecht (Karl). Einführung in die griechische Metrik. Dritte, gänzlich umgearbeitete Auflage. München, Max Hueber Verlag, 1950. Pp. 112.

Salvatore (Armando). Stile e ritmo in Tacito. Napoli, Luigi Loffredo, 1950. Pp. xi + 240.

Scargill (M. H.) and Schlauch (Margaret), transl. Three Icelandic Sagas: Gunnlaugs saga ormsstungu; Bandamanna saga; Droplaugarsona saga. Princeton Univ. Press, for the American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1950. Pp. 151. \$3.00.

Schachermeyr (Fritz). Alexander der Grosse. Graz Salzburg Wien, Verlag Anton Pustet, 1949. Pp. 534.

Schlesinger (Eilhard). El Edipo Rey de Sofocles. La Plata, Ministerio de Educación, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 1950. Pp. 141. (*Instituto de Lenguas Clásicas, Textos y Estudios*, II.)

Schmid (Wilhelm)—Stählin (Otto). Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, Erster Teil: Die klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur. Fünfter Band: Die griechische Literatur zur Zeit der attischen Hegemonie nach dem Eingreifen der Sophistik. Zweite Hälfte, Zweiter Abschnitt. München, Biederstein Verlag, 1948. Pp. x + 377. (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, Siebente Abteilung, Erster Teil, Fünfter Band.)

Schuster (Mauritius). Catulli Veronensis Liber. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1949. Pp. xiv + 153. (*Bibliotheca Teubneriana*.)

Schwyzler (Eduard). Griechische Grammatik, Zweiter Band: Syntax und syntaktische Stilistik. Vervollständigt und herausgegeben von Albert Debrunner. München, *C. H. Beck*, 1950. Pp. xxiii + 714. DM. 48. (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, Zweite Abteilung, Erster Teil, Zweiter Band.)

Scullard (H. H.). Roman Politics 220-150 B. C. Oxford, *Clarendon Press*, 1951. Pp. xvi + 335. \$6.00.

Snell (Bruno), ed. Bacchylidis Carmina cum Fragmentis. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1949. Pp. 142. (*Bibliotheca Teubneriana*.)

Stallknecht (Newton P.) and Brumbaugh (Robert S.). The Spirit of Western Philosophy. A Historical Interpretation including Selections from the Major European Philosophers. New York, *Longmans, Green and Co.*, 1950. Pp. xxiii + 540. \$4.75.

Stammeler (Wolfgang). Die deutsche Dichtung von der Mystik zum Barock, 1400-1600. Stuttgart, *J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung*, 1950. Pp. vii + 754.

Starkman (Miriam Kosh). Swift's Satire on Learning in *A Tale of a Tub*. Princeton Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. xix + 159.

Starr (Chester G., Jr.). The Emergence of Rome as Ruler of the Western World. Ithaca, *Cornell Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. ix + 145. \$1.00.

Strömberg (Reinhold). On Some Greek Proverbial Phrases. Göteborg, *Gumperts Förlag*, 1947. Pp. 25.

Strzelecki (Ladislaus). De Senecae Agamemnone Euripidisque Alexandro. Wratislavia, *Societas Scientiarum Wratislaviensis*, 1949. Pp. 25. (*Travaux de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Wrocław*, Seria A, Nr. 33.)

Sundermann (K. H.). Das oberste Bundesgericht der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und sein Einfluss auf das Arbeitsleben. Bielefeld, *Deutscher Heimat-Verlag*, 1950. Pp. 31.

Swain (Joseph Ward). The Ancient World. Vol. I: Empires and City States of the Ancient Orient and Greece before 334 B. C.; Vol. II: The World Empires: Alexander and the Romans after 334 B. C. New York, *Harper & Brothers*, 1950. Pp. xx + 578; xiv + 658. \$8.00. (*Harper's Historical Series*.)

Taeger (Fritz). Das Altertum. Geschichte und Gestalt der Mittelmeerländer. Vierte Auflage. Stuttgart, *W. Kohlhammer Verlag*, 1950. Pp. xvi + 980; 6 maps.

Tatlock (J. S. P.). The Legendary History of Britain. Geoffrey of Monmouth's *Historia Regum Britanniae* and its Early Vernacular Versions. Berkeley, *Univ. of California Press*, in coöperation with the Mediaeval Academy of America, 1950. Pp. xi + 545. \$7.50.

Thomson (H. J.). Prudentius, Vol. I. With an English Translation. Cambridge, Mass., *Harvard Univ. Press*; London, *William Heinemann Ltd.*, 1949. Pp. xvii + 401. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Ussani (Vincenzo). Storia della letteratura latina nelle età repubblicana e augustea. Seconda Edizione. Milano, *Casa Editrice Dottor Francesco Vallardi*, 1950. Pp. xx + 512.

Viëtor (Karl). Goethe the Thinker. Cambridge, Mass., *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. x + 212.

Vogt (Heinrich). Das Erbbaurecht des klassischen römischen Rechts. Marburg Lahn, *Simons Verlag*, 1950. Pp. 118. DM. 8.40. (*Forschungen zum römischen Recht*, 3. Abhandlung.)

von Fritz (Kurt) and Kapp (Ernst). Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts. Translated with an Introduction and Notes. New York, *Hafner Publishing Company*, 1950. Pp. xii + 238. \$1.25 (paper); \$2.50 (cloth).

von Hippel (Ernst). Die Krise des Staatsgedankens und die Grenzen der Staatsgewalt. Stuttgart, *J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung*, 1950. Pp. 67.

von Scheliha (Renata). Patroklos. Gedanken über Homers Dichtung und Gestalten. Basel, *Benno Schwabe*, 1949. Pp. 418. \$3.00.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY



VOL. LXXII, 4

WHOLE NO. 288

RYCK'S MANUSCRIPT OF TACITUS.

Pichena in 1607 established the pre-eminence of the Medicean manuscript of Tacitus XI-XXI (Laur. 68.2) and the latest text of the Teubner series recognizes no others as of any real value. New manuscripts have constantly turned up until today more than twice as many are known as were accessible to Pichena, but the tradition persists that they all derive from the Medicean. Halm represents almost unanimous opinion when he says of what he calls the *deteriores*: "quos omnes ex unico Mediceo fluxisse constat." This theory requires the assumption that a copy of M was made before it lost its four missing pages containing the text of *Hist.*, I, 69-75 and *Hist.*, I, 86-II, 2. That fact, in addition to the difficulty of the hand of M and the frightful condition of some of its pages, has led to a slight modification of the accepted theory, namely that all our manuscripts may derive from the immediate ancestor of M.

In the late seventeenth century, Ryck produced readings from a manuscript which showed striking differences from the accepted text. He was not a great Tacitean scholar and he was somewhat diffident about his own readings but, while he did not incorporate many of them in his published text, he was confident enough of their value to cite over twelve hundred of them in his volume of notes. The world of scholarship ignored this manuscript of Ryck's which, he claimed, had once belonged to Rodolphus Agri-cola and even questioned its existence. However, there have always been enough difficulties in the text of Tacitus and enough improbability in the "one tradition" theory to create the suspicion of a doubt. Ernesti's *non audeam affirmare* has always

found an echo in the minds of a few dissatisfied scholars. To some it has seemed possible that Ryck's manuscript might hold the key to the situation. And now Ryck's manuscript has come to light and the question must be reviewed. This so-called "Agricola" manuscript of Tacitus' *Annals* XI-XXI¹ suspected by Lipsius of being a myth, quoted extensively by Ryck, condemned by Ernesti to oblivion, has largely disappeared from discussions of the text of Tacitus in modern times. A few readings from it still appear in our editions as conjectures of Agricola. It is now certain that the Tacitus Manuscript BPL. 16.B, in the University Library in Leiden² is no other than the Agricola manuscript which Ryck made the basis of his notes in 1686. Moreover, it appears to be fully as important as Ryck suspected.

The war interrupted the investigation of Ryck's manuscript. Then, in the course of a seminar on Tacitus, we confirmed the previous findings, learned more about Agricola, his writings and his travels, and also more about Ryck and his connections, and finally turned up the entry of a Tacitus manuscript in the University Library at Leiden. This seemed a reasonable place in which to look for a volume used by Modius, Heinsius and Ryck. It developed later that Giaratano had also noted the entry and listed the manuscript (see note above) but without comment. In the summer of 1950 Mendell had the opportunity to visit Leiden and study the manuscript which confirmed in every way the claims of Ryck and the inferences that we had drawn from them. At first thought, it seems strange indeed that this manuscript in Leiden has not been brought to the attention of scholars long before this. The "one tradition" theory and the reverence

¹ Cf. Mendell, "Manuscripts of Tacitus XI-XXI," *Yale Classical Studies*, VI (1939).

² My thanks are due and enthusiastically given to the authorities of the Library, and especially to G. I. Liefstinck, Keeper of Western Manuscripts, for their generous hospitality and courteous co-operation in my study of their distinguished manuscript and for furnishing an excellent microfilm of it which has made possible further study of the readings. So far as can be ascertained this manuscript has been cited only by Caesar Giaratano in his edition of the *Histories* (Rome, 1939). No study of it has been made previous to September, 1950, and, according to the records of the Library, it has been consulted by only two people during the 150 years of its stay in Leiden.

paid the Second Medicean account for this neglect. Seven other manuscripts of these books of Tacitus have been brought to light in the last thirty years, none of them however so exciting as this one.

The first known mention of the Agricola manuscript is in Franciscus Modius, *Novantiquae Lectiones*, p. 64. This collection of letters was published in 1584 when Modius was librarian at Komburg. In the fifteenth letter, addressed to Lernutius, Modius states that he will send to their friend Lipsius a copy of a printed edition of Tacitus so old as to have the value of a manuscript and containing sundry notes by Rodolphus Agricola. At the same time he quotes as of interest to his correspondent certain readings of Agricola.

In the following year appeared the third edition of Lipsius' Tacitus in the preface to which the editor mentions the copy of Tacitus sent him by Modius with the notations in the hand of Agricola. Lipsius found these notes intriguing but expressed a doubt as to whether the suggested readings came from an old manuscript or were the brilliant conjectures of Agricola himself.

Not until 1686, when Ryck published his *Animadversiones ad Tacitum*, is the manuscript again mentioned. In his note on *Annals*, XI, 1, Ryck says: "In Cod. MS cujus Rodolphus Agricola quondam nunc ipse sum dominus." Throughout his commentary he cites this manuscript, sometimes as *Meus*, sometimes as *Agr.*, the total number of quotations being more than 1200. It was not, however, until 1687 that Ryck's text appeared. In the "Ad Lectorem" he gives more explicit information about his manuscript:

Cum itaque possiderem Codicem calamo exaratum, qui cum Annali undecimo incipit, e quo plurima Taciti loca hactenus conclamata restitui posse cernerem, et vitae ratio tum persona premere vix paterentur thesaurum publico debitum, Tacitum ad hunc librum emendare aggressus sum. Fuerat is olim Rodolphi Agricolae, uti partim ex huius manu alicubi oris adscripta, partim e lectionibus inde ab Agricola enotatis et a Francisco Modio ad Lipsium transmissis, quarum hic ad Tacitum, ille in Novantiquis Lectionibus meminere, colligitur.

In his note on *Ann.*, XV, 51, Ryck makes clear the reason for

Lipsius' scepticism with regard to the Agricola citations sent him by Modius:

Ita dedit Lipsius ex Cod. Vatic. cui adsentitur Flor. et Meus. Unde patet antiquam illam Taciti Editionem, cujus marginibus Rodolphus Agricola manu sua notas passim adjecerat, quam Franciscus Modius se ad Lipsium misisse testatur Novantiq. Lect. Ep. XV. non tantum continuisse lectiones ex MS. Cod. Agricolae petitas verum etiam conjecturas. Notat enim Modius ab Agricola in ista Editione notatum: *Neque se novum quid monere*. Agricolae enim MS. habet ut dixi: *Neque Senatui quid manere*. (This is in fact the reading of Leidensis.)

In his "Ad Lectorem," Ryck makes reference to another scholar who seems to have known the Agricola manuscript:

Insigne autem adminiculum prae-buit Codicis Agricolae collatio, olim ab illustri amico Nicola Heinsio instituta et passim conjecturis divinationibusque ejus foeta: quam cum ipse paullo ante labores, quibus mortalitatem exiit, nobis addixisset, Ioannes Goesius ab Absmada, Vir Amplissimus, cui ex heredibus tabularum executionem mandaverat, peractis iustis benevole tradidit.

Niklaas Heinsius, then, collated the Agricola manuscript but interspersed his own conjectures. In his *Miscellaneae Observationes*, published in 1738, long after his death, there are some notes on Tacitus, but his complete commentary did not appear until it was included in the Ernesti edition of 1772. In this work there are over five hundred of his citations from the Agricola manuscript.

In his introduction, Ernesti states that he is publishing all of Heinsius' notes which came to him from Burmann through Fr. Oudendorp. "In iis usus est uno libro scripto Agricolae, cujus lectiones longe plures, quam Ryckius, attulit." Actually there are less than half as many as there are in Ryck. Ernesti also notes that Heinsius introduced conjectures which have at times some brilliance but which too often are overdaring and show lack of final revision.

The evidence as cited indicates that Modius had a printed text of Tacitus which had belonged to Rodolphus Agricola, the Flemish humanist who died in 1485. In this text Agricola had written in certain readings, some of which Ryck proved to be

taken from the Codex Agricola, others to be mere conjectures. This book Modius sent to Lipsius, who used it in his third edition. The codex itself is thereafter first seen and quoted by Ryck and then by Heinsius, who for some reason gave to Ryck his collation, which contained also his conjectures. Ernesti published Heinsius' readings from the codex as well as his emendations, and from then on the Agricola manuscript has received less and less attention, until in recent years it has become the custom to express doubt as to its existence. P. Lehmann (*Franciscus Modius als Handschriftforscher* [Munich, 1908], p. 110) questions whether there ever was such a manuscript and Goelzer in his edition of 1920, while avoiding a flat statement, does the same. The most recent discussion is in an excellent monograph by José Ruysschaert, *Juste Lipse et Les Annales de Tacite* (Louvain, 1949). He states: "L'existence d'un manuscrit correspondant à ce qu'on appelle le *Codex Agricolae* n'est pas certaine." He then records his belief that only a comparison of the notes in the Stuttgart copy of the editio princeps with the notes of Agricola (the volume which Modius sent to Lipsius) could throw any more light on the question. He is sure that Ryck had only Heinsius' collation if indeed Heinsius himself had a manuscript.

Rodolphus Agricola³ (Roelof Huusman) was born in 1444 and is spoken of as a Frisian. He matriculated at Erfurt in 1456. He "became master" at Louvain in 1465, was at Pavia from 1469 to 1474, and in 1475 went to Ferrara, returning from Italy in 1478. While in the south he had become the friend of Johann von Dalberg who called him to Heidelberg in 1484. After a short trip to Rome the next year, he returned in bad health and died in 1485.

Agricola we know died at Heidelberg. Johann von Dalberg was with him but his physician, Adolphus Occa, summoned from Italy, did not arrive until after his death. Occa certainly received some of his papers which passed to his son and were evidently dispersed by him. The bulk of Agricola's library would seem to have gone to his friend and patron von Dalberg (d. 1503) who established them at Ladenburg whence they were removed, some

³ See *Nieuw Nederlandisch Biografisch Woorden-Boek* (Leiden, 1933), IX, p. 13.

to Heidelberg, more to Komburg by Dietrich von Plienigen who died in 1520. The MS of Tacitus may have been appropriated by von Plienigen and so have been among his books which went to Komburg or it may have found its way to Komburg with Agricola's own writings. It was not at Komburg when Graeter in 1812 wrote his account of that library. The fact, however, that Modius was librarian of Komburg from 1581 to 1584 and that he sent to Lipsius a set of readings from the Agricola MS would certainly suggest that it was at Komburg then.⁴ In 1631 the Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus sacked Komburg and removed books to the value of 3000 Taler. When, in 1803, the Foundation was secularized the 150 MSS which remained were moved to Stuttgart and the Agricola MS seems not to have been among them. It is by no means impossible that the MS went with many others to Stockholm in 1631 to the library of Queen Christina. Heinsius went to Sweden on invitation from the Queen in 1649 and was later ambassador there in 1654. The MS may have come back to Leiden with him. At any rate he made a collation of it for Ryck, his close friend. As Ryck later possessed the MS, the probability is that Heinsius, who died in 1681, five years before Ryck's notes were published, left the MS to his friend. From this point there is a gap of one hundred and twenty years in our information, for the next notice of the MS is of its sale at auction in 1806 with the books of Matthias Röver on which occasion it was secured by the University of Leiden in whose library it is today. There is a copy of the catalogue of this sale in the Newberry Library, Chicago, in which the MS is No. 245.

The Leiden manuscript is on paper, 11 5/8 by 7 5/8 inches in size, 192 leaves plus one blank, gathered in quinions, with 31 lines to a page. The title is: *Ex cor. taciti libro undecimo*. The pages are ruled both horizontally and vertically but the right hand margin is not carefully observed. The hand is scarcely a professional one, an almost running hand, slightly inclined to the right, presumably humanistic Italian. The ink is somewhat faded

⁴The copy of the Editio Princeps of Tacitus in which Modius made his notes went from Komburg to Stuttgart. It is supposed today to be in the Württemburger Landesbibliothek in that city but the catalogue has a note stating that it has been missed since 1924 and the librarian has been unable to find a trace of it.

in the latter half of the book with occasional words restored in a later, blacker ink. There are no titles or colophons apart from the opening title cited above and there is no illumination. Marginal corrections or insertions are in a very small hand with a different pen from that used in the text and apparently by a different person. There are some titular notes but very few; these are in two different hands one of which may be that of the scribe of the manuscript. A few comments of no importance appear in a fourth, scrawling hand. The binding is nineteenth century unadorned brownish-red leather put on by the Leiden Library. The last word of the text is *potiorem* (*Hist.*, V, 23), the regular ending of one group of manuscripts of which Vaticanus Latinus 1863 is the best example. The only indications of date are first, the death of Agricola in 1485 and second, the watermark of the paper which, according to Briquet (*Les Filigrames*, 11, G-K, p. 374, No. 6599), occurs only in three books, all dating between 1475 and 1481.

The most significant single characteristic of the Leiden manuscript is the fact that it is the only manuscript known which shows no sign of the transposition of pages involving *Histories*, IV, 46, 52, 53. This accident came about in the reassembling at some unknown date and in some unknown manuscript of the gathering within which it occurs, the second sheet from the center having been wrongly folded. Chapter 52, *ferunt*, through Chapter 53, *defuisse crede*, was thus misplaced so as to appear in Chapter 46 between the words *pecunia* and *tanta*. In order to improve on the resulting nonsense at the junctures, the fragmentary *batur*, left when *crede* was misplaced, was changed in the Medicean manuscript or in an ancestor of it to *dicebatur* and this was retained by all our manuscripts and in the early editions. In the so-called Genoan group of manuscripts, the fragmentary *crede* was changed to *creditum quo*. In some manuscripts the *ferunt* became *fer* or *ferme*. There are two manuscripts which show fairly successful attempts to correct the whole mistake. The manuscript from which Beatus Rhenanus printed his text (now Yalensis I) restored the misplaced passage to its original position but lost in the process the words *sed immensa pecunia ferunt*. The fact that it is a correction is further shown by the retention of *dicebatur* and *creditum quo* as well as by the insertion of *ob haec* to compensate for the loss

of *sed immensa pecunia ferunt*. Yalensis II also has a corrected text but one differently corrected. It has *sed immensa pecunia ferme* (the *ferme* betrays the correction) in the right place but *tanta vis hominum retinenda erat* in the wrong. It also reads *dicebatur* (which is not conclusive) but has neither *creditum quo* nor *ob haec*. These two manuscripts are then corrected or copied from corrected manuscripts. Puteolanus also corrected the mistake, but in a third way, for he retained both *dicebatur* and *creditum quo* but has no *ob haec*. *Sed immensa pecunia* does not appear in Puteolanus and did not return to the text until Croll's edition of 1779.

Leidensis does not show the transposition nor any of these signs of correction. It reads exactly like the text of today with one exception: it has *dicebatur* instead of *credebatur* which indicates a tradition different from all other manuscripts, a tradition which read *dicebatur* instead of *credebatur* and could not therefore have given rise to the *crede* of our manuscripts or of the *creditum quo* which developed from it. Ryck was completely mystified by what he found in his manuscript. He says in his note on *Hist.*, IV, 46: "In MS meo post *et* poterant sequuntur octo vocabula quae in vulgatis desiderantur: *sed immensa pecunia tanta vis hominum retinenda erat*. Ingressus c. Et in Flor. teste Pichena post idem verbum adiciuntur: *sed immensa pecunia fer*. Post quae, eodem teste, paginae transpositio ibi a librario facta, sed adeo evidens ut nullam pariat confusionem. Anticipata autem verba haec in meo Codice ex H.4.53.6." Ryck therefore printed his text without the eight words that should have been there in Chapter 46. In Chapter 53, his text reads: *creditum quo tanta vis hominum retinenda erat*. In Chapter 42, he reads with Puteolanus: *sermone orasse dicebatur ne criminantium*. His manuscript held the key to the situation but he did not realize the fact and followed the traditional "corrected" text. Hence the significance of his comment on the eight words which can refer only to Leidensis among our known manuscripts.

It takes only a comparison of the readings of the *Agricola* manuscript as cited by Ryck with the corresponding readings of Leidensis to confirm the identity of the two manuscripts. They agree throughout. The comparison also shows that Ryck quoted with great accuracy. In XIV, 7, he cites *promptior* where Leidensis seems to read *promptius* but this is not the word on

which he is commenting. In XIX, 65 he seems to make a real mistake, citing *aetate sensuque* where Leidensis shows *senecta sensuque*, but he is discussing only the *sensuque* which is not in the vulgate. This case is of particular interest because Lipsius' note reads: "vocem Rodolphus addit, senecta sensuque." In XII, 49 Ryck cites *comesaties* where Leidensis reads *comesationes*. These are the only slips which have appeared in a check of over two hundred of Ryck's citations.

In XIII, 56, the reading given by Ryck, *deesse nobis terra in qua vivamus: in qua moriamur non potest*, has always been taken as pure conjecture but this is the exact reading of Leidensis. In the following chapter Ryck has this note: *Meus a manu prima non habet victa*. He is quite correct: *victa* appears only in the margin of Leidensis by the hand of the corrector. So also in XVIII, 101 Ryck reads *Vitellium* but says in his note: *subiecta puncta* which is exactly what Leidensis shows. Lipsius felt that the reading in XIX, 20 which Modius sent him was a bold conjecture: *non si pateant portae non die nisi explorato intrandum*. But Ryck in his notes quoted this in identical words and so it appears in Leidensis. One more example of identity will suffice. In XII, 49 Ryck cites *comesaties* as the reading of Agricola with *comesatium* as a correction. The vulgate text reads *conversatione*. Leidensis reads *comesationes* corrected to *comesationum*.

The significance of the Leiden manuscript readings is far-reaching, for a tradition is indicated different from that of the Medicean. A later article will treat of that phase of the problem. For the present, the important point is that Ryck is vindicated in his claim to have had an actual manuscript, once the property of Agricola, and that this manuscript is the one now in Leiden, BPL.16.B.

C. W. MENDELL AND SAMUEL A. IVES.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

GREEK μέλλω.
A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY.

I

The etymology and semantic development of the Greek verb μέλλω, with its shifting and elusive meaning, has proved a difficult problem of philology. The problematic character of this verb can easily be perceived by a glance into the new Liddell-Scott. There we find the following list of meanings:

I. *to be destined or likely to*, indicating an estimated certainty or strong probability in the present (c. pres. inf.), past (c. aor. inf.), or future (c. fut. inf.);

II. *to be about to*, in purely temporal sense;

III. *to be always going to do* without ever doing: hence, *delay, put off*;

IV. μέλλων used quasi-adjectivally: *future*.

While meaning III appears to be easily obtained from II, and IV is only a special case of II, meaning I does not seem to admit of an easy and plausible semantic connection with the other usages. Small wonder therefore that philologists, groping in the dark regarding the original meaning, should have found it difficult to propose a satisfactory etymon. A look into the only etymological dictionary of the Greek language available and widely used in the first half of our century will be enough to prove the correctness of this statement. Indeed, Boisacq has the following to say about our word:

ion. att. μέλλω, fut. μελλήσω 'hésiter, tarder;—être sur le point de; être en situation de, être destiné à, devoir; être à venir.' Froehde BB. 3, 307 et Fick I⁴ 517. II⁴ 214 comparent lat. *promellere* (< *melnō*), v. irl. *mall* 'lent,' *amall*, m. irl. *tamall* 'hésitation, temporisation.' À cause de lat. *remulcum*, *promulcum* 'câble pour hâler,' IE **mel-* semble avoir développé le sens de 'hésiter, traîner' de sens physique de 'tirer,' cf. aussi *remeligo* 'remoratrix.'

Thus, according to Boisacq, and we may add at once that his view represents the *communis opinio* of scholars, the Greek verb

has no cognates within Greek itself, and as to its meaning, the original semantic kernel reduces to 'hesitate, tarry.' Widespread as this view is, it can easily be demonstrated to be wrong, and it is astounding to see scholars make statements on the etymology of a Greek word without taking the least account of the history of that word in the Greek language. For it would seem a self-evident principle that, in order to establish the etymology of a Greek word, we have to start, as far as possible, from the data of the Homeric epics. Now, although Boisacq's lemma is bound to convey the idea that μέλλω belongs exclusively to the Ionic and Attic dialects, it is still a fact that the verb is well attested in Homer. And it is this same Homeric usage that strikes a fatal blow at Boisacq's etymological constructions. This usage was correctly and emphatically summed up in the following concise statement of van Leeuwen (*Enchiridium dictionis epicae*, 1894, p. 277): "Verbum auxiliare μέλλω in dictione epica frequentius et paulo aliter quam apud posteros, *nusquam autem cunctandi significatione adhibitum* reperitur."¹

From this brief statement of the facts it becomes clear that

¹ The italics are mine. The same was clearly perceived by A. Platt in a paper in *The Journal of Philology*, XXI (1893), where, pp. 44-5, he comes to the following result as to the etymology of μέλλω: "It is clear that in considering the derivation of a word we must look to the use of it in the earliest authors in whom it is found. Considering then the Homeric use of μέλλω, we may be sure that the central idea of the word is simply *I am likely to do*, whether in past, present or future; hence flow naturally the other later meanings, *to intend*, *to delay*. Now though this in itself throws no light on the derivation, it ought at least to make us cautious of connecting μέλλω with any root meaning *I have a mind to do* or *I intend* . . . It would be equally perverse and preposterous to derive the other meanings from the specially Attic sense of *I delay*. That in truth nothing is really known about it may be judged from the fact that three distinct derivations are before the world, two of which presumably are wrong and very probably the third also." Although he does not say so, Platt must be thinking of the etymologies listed in Ebeling, *Lexicon Homericum*, I (1885), p. 1041: Skt. *smar*, *man* and *σμελ* 'in suspenso esse.' The same misgivings were opportunely repeated by Brugmann-Thumb in their *Griechische Grammatik* (4th ed., 1913), p. 570, n. 1: "Wie der Inf. Fut. zu μέλλω gekommen ist, bleibt so lange unklar, als der Ursprung und die Grundbedeutung dieses Verbums nicht aufgehehlt sind. Dass die älteste Bedeutung 'ich denke' gewesen sei, ist unbewiesen." All these warnings, however, were of no avail.

the prevailing etymology of μέλλω, based on the original meaning 'hesitate,' can be dismissed without any "hesitation." But to match this negative result with a positive solution, we have to embark on a closer study of this verb whose Homeric usage presents many puzzles and has not yet received a convincing explanation.

How difficult it is to grasp the semantic kernel of μέλλω should first be illustrated by a relevant passage from Kühner-Gerth, I (3rd ed., 1898), p. 178:

Es (i. e. μέλλω) bedeutet eigentlich 'ich denke'; dieses ist entweder 'ich gedenke etwas zu tun,' *will* etwas tun, oder 'ich bedenke mich etwas zu tun,' ich *zögere, zaudere*. Indem aber das Wollen, das an sich nur belebten Wesen zukommt, auch auf leblose Dinge übertragen wurde, schwachte sich das Wollen ab zum blossen Ausdrucke der Erwartung, dass das Subjekt etwas tun oder leiden werde: ταῦτα μέλλει συνοίσειν, es steht zu erwarten, dass das nützen werde; und je nachdem die erwartete Handlung als durch eigenen Entschluss oder durch fremden Willen oder durch die Beschaffenheit des Subjekts und die Lage der Verhältnisse hervorgerufen erscheint, wendet das Deutsche verschiedene Übersetzungen an.

This whole construction, very characteristic of the spirit of the time, is, in its point of departure, not only at variance with the established facts of Homeric usage, as pointed out above, but shows, in its final part, also the inadequacy of the solution, which leaves one in the lurch as soon as guidance is needed.

Far more important are two further discussions, which we have already touched on, namely Platt's above cited paper devoted to the elucidation of the usage of μέλλω down to the Koine, and the relevant section in Leeuwen's *Enchiridium*. According to Platt (*loc. cit.*, pp. 39-42), the "very elegant and interesting" construction of μέλλω in Homer can be reduced to the following formula:

μέλλω γίγνεσθαι = I am like to be becoming
 μέλλω γενέσθαι = I am like to have become
 μέλλω γενήσεσθαι = I am like to become in the future.

Regarding the Attic use, Platt states (pp. 42-8) that these distinctions were obliterated in Attic, the present and future, and in verse the aorist, being indifferently used in the future sense.

Although Platt's explanation seems to have carried the day in Britain, to judge, e. g., by the new edition of the authoritative dictionary of Liddell-Scott and its acceptance by Homeric commentators in this country,² I find it difficult to accept. As is well known, μέλλων is used quasi-adjectivally in the phrase ὁ μέλλων χρόνος 'the future' as early as Pindar (*Ol.*, X, 7). Is it, one may wonder, 'the likely time'? The greatest obstacle, however, is, to my mind, the extreme abstractness of the meaning which may well suit the turn of mind of a XIXth century philologist, but is hardly likely for so remote and primitive an age as Homer's and that of early Greeks in general.³

Leeuwen, *op. cit.*, p. 277, states that in Homer only the present and imperfect are found and goes on to say:

Et primo quidem praesens adhibetur ad indicanda ea quae quis veri similia esse contendat vel concedat, licet vera esse aut nolit probare aut nequeat; eodem igitur sensu quo ab Atticis adhibetur ἔοικεν quod verbum conferri solebat ab Aristarcho. Verti potest: consentaneum est, non est dubium quin, satis apparet, opinor. Sequitur inf. praes. de iis quae ad tempus loquentis pertinent, aor. inf. de rebus peractis.

After an examination of the relevant passages he continues (p. 279):

Impf. inservit ad indicandas res quae futurae erant vel expectari poterant tempore de quo sive poeta loquitur, sive is qui narrans inducitur. Hoc sensu ubi adhibetur, verbum auxiliare iure dici potest, constanter autem sequitur inf. fut. et ποιήσειν ἔμελλον idem significat quod factururus eram vel in fatis erat ut facerem.

Although Leeuwen's treatment of the intricate question is most useful, especially as it is a running commentary on all the relevant passages (see further on), it is clear that the same criticism applies to it as to Platt's explanation.

In order to gain a clearer insight into our problem and reach a satisfactory solution, it seems necessary to undertake a thorough

² Other languages would probably be hard put to it to find an exact equivalent for the English personal verb 'I am like or likely.'

³ I take this opportunity to note that another Greek verb, which is regularly used by the late Greek grammarians and scholiasts to gloss Homeric μέλλω, namely εἰκε, is of a similar origin to μέλλω as I shall prove in another paper.

examination of the Homeric usage of μέλλω. The special Homeric dictionaries, starting as they do, for the greatest part, from a purely descriptive point of view, can be expected to be of especial help in this undertaking. The most recent one, *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect* (London, 1924) by R. J. Cunliffe, establishes the following semantic categories:

a) To be about, be going, to do something; to be on the point of doing, e. g.

Z 52 καὶ δὴ μιν τάχ' ἔμελλε θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν
δῶσειν ᾧ θεράποντι καταξέμεν.

or ζ 110 Ἄλλ' ὅτε δὴ ἄρ' ἔμελλε πάλιν οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι . . .

b) To be destined or fated to be or to do, e. g.

B 36 ἄ ρ' οὐ τελέεσθαι ἔμελλον.

c) To be likely to be or to be doing or to do, to be presumably so and so or doing so and so, e. g.

K 325 sq. ὄφρ' ἂν ἴκωμαι
νῇ' Ἀγαμεμνονέην, ὅθι πον μέλλουσιν ἄριστοι
βουλὰς βουλεύειν, ἣ φεγγέμεν ἤε μάχεσθαι.

From this brief conspectus it seems to emerge that, on the whole, the different usages of μέλλω are most exactly reflected by the Latin Fut. Ptc. Act., an impression that is strengthened and borne out by the interesting fact that the Latin translation accompanying the Homeric text in the Firmin Didot series resorts, as a rule, to this form in order to obtain an adequate rendering of the Greek verb. As, however, the Latin formation is itself of rather doubtful provenience, this coincidence is of no help.

Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that Cunliffe was right in taking the meaning 'to be about, to be going' as his starting point. In fact, I submit that the basic meaning of μέλλω is nothing else than 'to go,' a meaning which, in the course of time, developed from an autosemantic content into a sort of synsemantic accessory, not unlike the development of English *go*, ranging from the autosemantic usage to the plain auxiliary form of *I am (was, etc.) going to*. . . . It would seem obvious that this is the only meaning that can account for the otherwise unexplainable μέλλων (χρόνος) quoted above; cf. also French *l'avenir* and, e. g., Eng. *the coming age* or Hungarian *jövő* ('idő') 'future (tense)' (lit. 'coming time').

A renewed study along this line of the Homeric passages thus

becomes indispensable and will, at the same time, prove of considerable consequence for Homeric interpretation.

It is clear from the outset that the passages coming under Cunliffe's heading (a) are most readily accounted for by our explanation. It will, therefore, suffice to quote just one characteristic passage in addition to those already quoted above:

Λ 700 *περὶ τρίποδος γὰρ ἔμελλον | θεύσεσθαι*
(the horses) were going to race for the tripod.

But it is equally clear that a passage like B 36 (see above), listed by Cunliffe under meaning (b), is in no way different from those exhibiting the ordinary or basic meaning 'to go.' Indeed, the clause means: 'that were not going to be fulfilled.' The same holds true of the following passages:

ῥομηναν δ' ἀνὰ θυμὸν ἄπερ τελέεσθαι ἔμελλον, (β 156)
τῆπερ δὴ καὶ ἔπειτα τελευτήσεσθαι ἔμελλον (θ 510)

which are identical in structure, and almost in wording, with B 36. It will be seen that also the following passages are covered by the meaning 'to go': ζ 164, η 270, ι 230, 477, λ 553, ν 293, φ 98, ψ 221, ω 28, and in the *Iliad* B 694, E 204, K 336, Λ 816, M 3, O 612, Υ 466 (= γ 146), Φ 47, Ω 85. In the following passages the most adequate translation seems to be that with the Latin part. fut. act. as will be shown by an inspection of the Latin translation accompanying the Firmin Didot edition of Homer: δ 107, κ 26, ν 383, ρ 364, υ 393 (~ M 34), φ 418, ω 470 (= M 113-5), B 724, E 686, M 323, Π 460, P 277, 497, X 356.

An inspection of these passages will also reveal that, in nearly all the instances quoted under (b), μέλλω is accompanied by the fut. inf. The only exceptions are B 36 and β 156, both with τελέεσθαι, and Φ 47 and P 497 with νέεσθαι; both, however, are most probably to be taken as fut. inf.

The same morphological uncertainty obtains regarding ἔδμεναι in ι 475:

Κύκλωψ, οὐκ' ἄρ' ἔμελλες ἀνάλκιδος ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρους
ἔδμεναι ἐν σπηϊ γλαφυρῷ κρατερῇφι βίηφιν

'Cyclops, that man, it seems, was no weakling whose comrades thou wast minded to devour by brutal strength in thy hollow cave'; but ἔδμεναι can also be a fut. inf., cf. ἔδομαι, as suggested by Platt.

Two further exceptions to the general rule show the aor. inf., but both are very much disputed. Thus we find in II 46:

ἧ γὰρ ἔμελλεν
οἷ αὐτῷ θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα λιτέσθαι.

Cunliffe "translates" this: "he was fated to find that his prayer had been to his own death"; W. Leaf, *The Iliad* (2nd ed., 1902), says in his note:

46-7 seems to be a late addition. It twice has a short vowel before the λ of λιτ-. Of this there is no other instance in II. . . . Further, the aor. λιτέσθαι (or pres. if we read λιτέσθαι with Ptol. Ask.) does not recur in Homer nor does either aor. or pres. agree with the Epic use of μέλλω. If the line is to be saved we must read λίσσεσθαι with van Leeuwen; he was destined to pray, not he was like to have been (or to be) praying.

It seems really hard to evade this conclusion, which also would fit very well the explanation here proposed. What the poet says, is: "(Unhappy, unknowing warrior that Patroclus was!) For he was going to pray, he was on the point of praying, death on himself." The textual tradition has, however, λιτέσθαι, and so this is the form that has to be interpreted. Now in the Homeric epics the old IE use of the aorist for the so-called perfective action is still very largely prevailing. The easiest way out, therefore, would appear to be to see in λιτέσθαι 'to obtain by prayer,' Germ. 'sich erbeten.' Thus the passage is to be translated as follows: "He was going to obtain by his prayer his own death." For the same use of the aor. inf., cf., e. g., Δ 27:

πῶς ἐθέλεις ἄλιον θεῖναι πόνον ἢδ' ἀτέλεστον

and Brugmann-Thumb, *op. cit.*, p. 546.

The other passage where the impf. of μέλλω is accompanied by the aor. inf. is Σ 98:

ἀντίκα τεθναίην, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμελλον ἐταίρω
κτεινομένῳ ἐπαμῦναι,

translated by Platt (p. 41): "Then may I die immediately after, since otherwise it appears I was destined not to have avenged Patroclus," but this can hardly be accepted. Murray has: "Straightway may I die, seeing I was not to bear aid to my comrade at his slaying." I think, that here, too, the aor. inf.

is used in order to express the perfective character of the action, implying in particular, by focusing the attention on the completion of the action, on its successful issue: "I wish I lay dead straightway since I was not going to defend successfully my comrade whilst he was being exposed to deadly attacks."

The third group of examples, entered in Cunliffe under the heading 'to be likely,' would seem to raise insurmountable difficulties to our interpretation. Closer scrutiny of the instances, however, will appear to corroborate rather the presupposition on which our explanation rests. An instructive example runs as follows:

τόφρα γὰρ ἐς στρατὸν εἶμι διαμπερές, ὅφρ' ἂν ἴκωμαι
 νῆ' Ἀγαμεμνονέην, ὅθι πού μέλλουσιν ἄριστοι
 βουλὰς βουλεύειν, ἣ φευγέμεν ἢ μάχεσθαι (K 325).

What Dolon means to say is quite clear. "I shall push forward into the camp of the enemy as far as the army-lord's station; I am sure the best of the Greeks will be sitting there and debating the great question: whether to abandon all efforts as hopeless, or to continue the struggle." Cunliffe's translation: "where it is likely they are conferring," conveys the idea intended by the poet, but does not help interpretation, as already pointed out at the beginning of our discussion. Nor is Leeuwen's translation (p. 278): "ubi duces iam consilia opinor ineunt" apt to throw light on the structure of the sentence. Our own explanation does not seem to do justice to the passage either: "where the best are going to discuss the questions of retreat and fight" is impeccable—in English, but reads a nuance into the clause which, we can be sure, is far from the poet's mind, as he is evidently supposing that they have already begun the session of the war cabinet.

The same exception must be taken to our explanation of yet another passage, and this time there can be no doubt that 'to go' as meaning of μέλλω must be ruled out altogether. I refer to Ξ 125:

τὰ δὲ μέλλετ' ἀκούμεν εἰ ἔτεόν περ.

The speaker, Diomedes, son of Tydeus, has been recounting the history of his forebears; now, at the end of this story, by way of confirmation, he appeals to the heroes standing around: "You have surely heard about this—whether it is true." Cun-

liffe has: "no doubt you know"; Platt (p. 39): "ye are like to hear of these things, i. e. to hear often of them"; Leaf, *ad loc.*: "Ye must have heard these things whether it (what I say) is true." Although all these scholars couch in different words the fairly clear meaning of the Homeric verse, their paraphrases can hardly be accepted as translations.

It would seem now that a slight extension of our explanation gives a key to these passages as well as to several others to be dealt with presently. As is well-known, the verb *go* is rather apt to become an auxiliary of the future tense, as shown, e. g., by the French construction *je vais+inf.* for the immediate future, or the Greek μέλλω itself which in Classic times admittedly had this usage in the phrase μέλλω λέγειν or ερεῖν, or the English *I am going to* (see him tomorrow) etc.⁴ On the other hand, futurity is liable to be considered as something not present, denoting therefore something not really existing, and the future tense thus tends to be used in the sense of an uncertain, but perhaps probable present, in other words as a potential mode. The best known case is, perhaps, to be found in German where, e. g., "Er wird im Garten sein," "Ihr werdet wohl gehört haben" do not in the least convey the idea of futurity but simply mean "He will be in the garden," "Ye will have heard," i. e. "He is in the garden, I suppose," "Ye have heard of that, I think."

Dealing with this usage, Behaghel, in his *Deutsche Syntax*, II, 1924, states (p. 259): "Die Umschreibung mit *sollen* [used with inf. as future] nimmt, wie die mit *werden*, gelegentlich potentiale Bedeutung an." From among his examples it is worth our while to quote the following one taken from Hans Sachs:

"Schaw, liebe Fraw, wer kumbt dort rein?
Sol wol der Teuffel selber sein."⁵

On p. 264, Behaghel goes into details: "In Einzelaussagen über das zukünftige Eintreten eines Ereignisses erhält neben Adverbia wie *wohl*, *vielleicht* das Futurum den Charakter einer Vermut-

⁴ Cf. also the first line of the well-known medieval hymn: *Vado mori* which, of course, simply means: "I shall die."

⁵ "Look, my dear wife, who is entering there?
It will be the devil in person."

ung und es wird die Futurform dann auch bei Vermutungen über die Gegenwart gebraucht," e. g.: "*du wirst ohne Zweifel sehr reich seyn*" (Erznarren) 'You are doubtless very rich.' "Dieser Potential," goes on Behaghel "wird weiterhin auch auf die Vergangenheit übertragen: er wird's nicht gefunden haben; So werd't Ihr seines Töchterchens Euch um so lieber angenommen haben. Dieser Potential ist in den heutigen Mundarten weit verbreitet, auch in solchen, die die Futurumschreibung als solche nicht kennen." Regarding the same phenomenon in modern English, G. O. Curme (*A Grammar of the English Language*, III, *Syntax*, p. 362) has the following note:

The future often, most commonly, however, in the English of England, indicates a present probability, the future form implying that upon investigation the truth of the statement will become apparent: "'This *will* be your luggage, I suppose,' said the man rather abruptly when he saw me, pointing to my trunk in the passage." The future perfect in such expressions, of course, points to the past: you will have seen from my postcard that we were at Ostend.

For the psychological explanation the relevant passage from O. Jespersen's *Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 265, is worth quoting as presenting also an alternative view: "It is true that we can assert nothing with regard to a future time but mere suppositions and surmises, and this truth is here linguistically reversed as if futurity and supposition were identical." On the other hand, Tobler (quoted by M. Deutschbein, *System der neuenglischen Syntax*, 1917, p. 119) gives the following explanation of the corresponding potential usage of the French future tense:

Man greift zu dieser Zeitform, indem man damit andeutet, es stehe eine Bestätigung dessen zu erwarten, was man mit dem Praesens auszusprechen einstweilen sich noch nicht erlaube. Denn, wenn zur Erklärung des Ausbleibens eines erwarteten Gastes ich sage '*il sera malade*,' so dränge ich doch in diese Worte den Gedanken zusammen: es wird sich herausstellen, dass er jetzt krank ist; mit '*il aura deviné*' spreche ich die Hoffnung, Furcht, Zuversicht aus, die gegenwärtige Annahme, er habe erraten, werde sich später als richtig erweisen.⁶

⁶ In view of this explanation of Tobler's which differs somewhat from my own given earlier in the text, I quote the following passage from H. Paul's *Deutsche Grammatik*, IV, 1920, p. 153: "Da das Zukünftige

This potential usage of the future tense casts, I think, bright light on the Greek phenomenon under discussion. It is a fact that μέλλω serves as an auxiliary of the future, much like German *werden*,⁷ English *will*, or French *sera/aura*. I submit now that the only necessary and sufficient corollary to this basic fact is the assumption that the Greek auxiliary, too, came to be used as a potential mode, especially in connection with adverbs denoting some sort of probability or modality.

Indeed, if we return to the first passage, the interpretation of which we have interrupted for the sake of this rather protracted digression (K 325), our assumption leads to the following translation: "I shall push so deep into the enemy's camp as to reach Agamemnon's ships where the heroes will presumably be discussing the question whether to leave or fight."

It will be seen that this interpretation, besides being strictly grammatical and in conformity with the relatively primitive mentality of the heroic age, also proves to be entirely satisfactory from the point of view of higher exegesis. This is confirmed by the other relevant passages.

One of the most interesting cases is Ξ 125, also already quoted above. The translation is now clear: "Ye will have heard it," i. e. "Ye will no doubt often hear of it whether it is true." As a curious coincidence, I quote the German translation of the verse in Kühner-Gerth, p. 178: "Ihr werdet wohl gehört haben."

The same holds true of nearly all the passages classified by Cunliffe in his third group. Almost identical in structure with Ξ 125 are

δ 94: καὶ πατέρων τάδε μέλλετ' ἀκούμεν . . .

Ye will have heard of this from your fathers . . .

and δ 200: μέλλεις δὲ σὸν ἴδμεναι . . .

you will know him . . .

immer ungewiss bleibt, ist das Futurum dazu gelangt, auch die Unge-
wissheit von etwas schon gegenwärtigem zu bezeichnen. Entsprechend
wird das Fut. Exact. für die Ungewissheit von etwas schon vergangenem
verwendet."

⁷ I note here that *werden* derives itself from an IE root denoting motion (= Lat. *verto* intr.) and that the modern German dialect of Luxemburg resorts to the verb 'go' in order to obtain a periphrastic

The advantages of this explanation will be most readily recognized in the following cases where the verb is accompanied by an aor. inf.:

§ 377 ἄλλά νυ μέλλω
ἀθανάτους ἀλιτέσθαι . . .

I shall have offended the immortals,

ξ 133 τοῦ δ' ἤδη μέλλουσι κύνας ταχέες τ' οἰωνοὶ
ρίνον ἀπ' ὅστεόφιν ἐρύσαι, ψυχὴ δὲ λέλοιπεν,

Dogs and swift birds will already have torn the flesh from his bones, and his spirit is not in him anymore,

N 776 ἄλλοτε δὴ ποτε μάλλον ἐρωῆσαι πολέμοιο
μέλλω,

I shall have shrunk from battle rather at any other time,

Σ 362 καὶ μὲν δὴ πού τις μέλλει βροτὸς ἀνδρὶ τελέσσαι
ὅς περ θνητὸς τ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τόσα μῆδεα οἶδε,

Surely even a man will have done so for another man although he is but mortal and does not possess such wisdom,

Φ 83 μέλλω που ἀπεχθέσθαι Διὶ πατρί,
ὅς με σοὶ αὐτὶς ἔδωκε,

I shall, somehow, be hated by father Zeus who delivered me to you again,

Ω 46 μέλλει μὲν πού τις καὶ φίλτερον ἄλλον ὀλέσσαι,
ἢ κασίγνητον ὁμογάστριον ἢ καὶ υἱόν,

Many a man will have lost one dearer even, a brother born) from the same womb or even a son (German: Gar mancher wird wohl einen noch teueren Freund verloren haben).

Other examples, classified together by Cunliffe with the passages just examined, are revealed by a closer scrutiny as coming under the basic meaning 'go.' The passages are as follows:

α 232 μέλλεν μὲν ποτε οἶκος ὅδ' ἀφνειὸς καὶ ἀμύμων
ἔμμεναι, ὅφρ' ἔτι κείνος ἀνὴρ ἐπιδήμιος ἦεν.

Cunliffe: "all know how flourishing it was"; Platt (p. 39): "this house was like once to be rich, i. e. this house probably was rich." The passage is from Telemachus' answer to Athena's reproach that he is bearing up with the wooers squandering away his paternal wealth. In reply he admits that his house was once

future: *ik gha sterven* 'I shall die' (Behaghel, *op. cit.*, p. 263, note) which can be compared to *vado mori* quoted above.

well on the way to be rich, but now that Odysseus "is gone out of sight, out of hearing," all the princes who hold sway over Ithaca and the neighbouring islands woo his mother and lay waste his house. To let him say that his house was once like to be rich, as Platt does, blunts the argument. Telemachus evidently means to say that his house was once going to be a wealthy house, but since then twenty years have passed and it has become clear that that was only a start, which, in the absence of the strong-handed ruler, has not achieved its course.

The same train of thought recurs in

σ 138 καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ποτ' ἔμελλον ἐν ἀνδράσιν ὀλβιος εἶναι.

Odysseus is addressing Amphinomus, the wooer who wished him a happier future, and after some philosophical remarks on the ups and downs of men's fortune, he adds as a personal justification of his view the line quoted above. Platt (p. 39) translates: "for I myself also was like once to be rich, must have been rich." It hardly needs to be proved how incongruous a twist this translation gives to Odysseus' thought. This gross error is avoided in Monro's commentary (*Od. XIII-XXIV*, 1901) which says: not 'I was destined'—which would require a fut. inf.—but 'I was like to be,' i. e. it seemed that I ought to be ὀλβιος. As a circumlocution, this is adequate, but full justice is done to the verse only if we translate: I was myself on the point of becoming, I myself made a good start at becoming, a rich man. . . .

σ 19 ὀλβον δὲ θεοὶ μέλλουσιν ὑπάζειν

is translated by Platt, *ibid.*: "methinks it is the gods who give wealth." Monro has: "μέλλουσιν with pres. inf. 'are like to,' i. e. it would seem to be the gods who grant wealth." Again everything falls in line if, without trying to force more into the verse than there is to be found, we translate: "As to wealth, it is the gods who are going to apportion it."

Obviously the sense 'go' gives also a satisfactory explanation of the following passages:

A 564 εἰ δ' οὕτω τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἐμοὶ μέλλει φίλον εἶναι,

If this is so, it is going to be alright with me.
In the same way

B 116 = I 23 = Ξ 69 οὕτω· πον Διὶ μέλλει ὑπερμενέει φίλον εἶναι,
and with a slight variation

N 225-6 ἀλλά πον οὕτω
μέλλει δὲ φίλον εἶναι ὑπερμενέει Κρονίωνι,

although in this stereotyped verse, perhaps, our other possibility would be still more in place: "It will, presumably, be the good pleasure of Zeus . . ."

Two further passages make choice difficult between the two nuances discovered to exist side by side in the verb μέλλω.

Λ 363 = Υ 450 νῦν αὖτε σ' ἐρύσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων,
ὃ μέλλεις εὐχεσθαι ἴων ἐς δοῦπον ἀκόντων.

Cunliffe: "to whom you must pray"; Leaf: ironical "to whom no doubt you pray"; Platt (p. 39): "to whom, belike, thou art wont to pray." The general sense is, needless to say, fairly clear. But, to my feeling, the proper grammatical understanding is ensured only by our explanation, though we might hesitate between the two possibilities: "Once more Apollo has saved you, Apollo to whom you are going to pray when setting out for the hurtling of the speers," or "Apollo to whom you will pray when you set out for war." Personally, I am inclined to give preference to the latter version.¹

Another sort of difficulty arises in χ 322:

πολλάκι πον μέλλεις ἀρῆμεναι ἐν μεγάροισι
τηλοῦ ἐμοὶ νόστοιο τέλος γλυκεροῖο γενέσθαι,
σοὶ δ' ἄλοχόν τε φίλην σπέσθαι καὶ τέκνα τεκέσθαι.

To v. 322 Leeuwen (p. 278) remarks "ἀρῆμεναι notabilis forma; si aor.: saepe opinor precatus est." If we are really justified in taking ἀρῆμεναι as aor. inf., the passage becomes clear at once: "You will often have prayed." And since there is no other form which could contain the reference to the past, required by the context, we have to resort to this expedient.²

¹ Having discussed Σ 96-99 (see above), Platt, p. 41, goes on: "The false construction with this tense (aor.) came in early: Hesiod Theog. 478:

ὀππότ' ἄρ' ὀπλοτάτην παίδων ἤμελλε τεκέσθαι."

Exception is taken to this inf. also by Leeuwen (p. 280/343) who declares: "immo τέξεσθαι ἔμελλε (Fick) qua correctione duplex tollitur incommodum nam ἤμελλε quoque forma est doctior quam sanior"; and

Two further passages remain to be discussed, both of which have come down with a fut. inf. in the manuscript tradition. The easier one is δ 181:

ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν που μέλλεν ἀγασσεσθαι θεὸς αὐτοῖς,
ὅς κείνον δύστηνον ἀνόστιμον οἶον ἔθηκεν.

The text as it stands would seem to be capable only of the interpretation: "Surely the god was going to envy (this happiness of ours)." As, however, a slight alteration (*ἀγασσασθαι*) yields the more satisfactory sense: "The god will have become jealous (of this happiness of ours)," it might be justified to accept this emendation, advocated also by Platt.

δ 274 ἦλθες ἔπειτα σὺ κῆϊσε · κελευσέμεναι δέ σ' ἔμελλεν
δαίμων, ὃς Τρώεσσι ἐβούλετο κῦδος ὀρέξαι.

The story is about Helen coming to the wooden horse wherein all the chieftains of the Danaans are biding their time. It is evident that Menelaus, recalling this final episode of the Trojan war, intends to say: "It must be that thou wast bidden by some god" (Murray). This sense, however, can only be found in the text if *κελευσέμεναι* is taken, with Platt, to be the inf. of an aor. mixtus. The verbal translation is then: "A god will have bidden you who was willing to confer glory on the Trojans."

From this examination of the Homeric usage, the following facts would seem to emerge. Cunliffe's threefold classification does not conform to the Homeric usage. His second category is, in its entirety, identical with his category (a); the basic meaning

the Teubner edition by Rzach (2nd ed., 1908) prints this emendation, giving however as its author Kinkel. None the less, χ 324, quoted in the text, is apt to arouse doubts about the correctness of this procedure. Fortunately no one has yet tried to emend the Homeric verse, and so also the Hesiodic verse has to stand. Both are obviously to be interpreted as aorists of statement or of 'perfective action,' as *ἐπαμῦναι* in Σ 99 and *λιτέσθαι* in Π 47, see above pp. 352 f. A different question is whether *ἔμελλε* can be kept. Herwerden (cf. Rzach's critical apparatus) made the intriguing suggestion of reading *ἦ μέλλε* which would solve the problem without altering the manuscript tradition. But in view of the fact that *ἡμέλλεσσα* occurs already in Theognis, and similar forms with long augment appear also in Aristophanes, I am rather doubtful whether we are justified in being so definite about this analogical formation being impossible at as early a date as Hesiod's age.

in both is 'to go.' His third category contains, in its majority, examples in which μέλλω has not the meaning 'to be like,' but simply 'will,' i. e. the future in its potential meaning, as illustrated by the usage of several living languages.

Thus all the Homeric instances attest, in reality, one basic meaning of μέλλω, a fact which, as will be seen presently, is in agreement with its etymology.

Before concluding, however, this part of our investigation, some further remarks are necessary on the use and distribution of the two meanings of μέλλω. The basic meaning, as will be seen from the examples quoted, is found, with two exceptions only (σ 19, A 564) in the impf. of μέλλω. It is accompanied, in the overwhelming majority of the cases, by the fut. inf., only twice each by the inf. pres. and aor.; it should be noted, however, that the inf. aor. in these two cases, used as it is with its 'perfective' value, comes very near a fut. inf.

In sharp contrast to this, μέλλω in the sense of the potential mode appears almost without exception in the present, accompanied by the inf. pres. (ἵδμεναι is one for all intents and purposes) and, in even greater number, by the inf. aor. In two cases (both in δ, vv. 181 and 274 respectively) the impf. of μέλλω is used, apparently, with the fut. inf. In both cases we followed Platt in seeing in the inf., or emending it to, an aor. inf. As, however, both instances presenting the same syntactical peculiarities occur in δ, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the usages of μέλλω had become mixed up by the time of the composition of this book of the *Odyssey*.

It would appear, then, that the two meanings are distributed between the present and imperfect, the latter being followed, in general, by the inf. fut., the former by the inf. pres. or aor. This state of affairs was already recognized by Leeuwen,⁹ although with an inadequate semantic foundation, due to the fact that the basic meaning of μέλλω had not been grasped.

II

As a result of our investigations in section I, we now know that the original meaning of μέλλω, and the only one appearing

⁹ P. 280 he has: "praesens apud Homerum adsciscit inf. praes./aor., imperfectum adsciscit inf. fut."

in the epics, is 'go.' This meaning is prevalent throughout the Classical period of Greek, although in the Vth century B. C. a new meaning came into existence stressing the point that one is always only going to do something; hence: *delay, put off*. But even this nuance would seem to be only ephemeral, as the verb appears to preserve in New Greek only the meaning 'to be going (to do something).'

As we have seen, comparative etymological research has been misled by starting from false assumptions regarding the original meaning of the verb. The same cause is responsible, however, for scholars having been unable to discover the cognates of μέλλω within Greek itself.

It is a well-known fact that only the present and imperfect (once the pres. opt.) of μέλλω occur in Homer. The same is true of Hesiod, the Lyrics, and the Tragedians. The sigmatic aor. first occurs in Theognis, but it is not met with again before the prose authors. The future, too, first appears in Attic prose.

This curious state of affairs becomes at once clear if we re-establish the old relations between two different sets of derivatives of the IE root *mel- 'go, run' which have lost contact in Greek. I submit, indeed, that μέλλω represents the present stem of the verbal root from which the well-known forms aor. ἔμολον, fut. μολοῦμαι, inchoat. pres. βλώσκω, perf. μέμβλωκα derive as well.

In Greek, as is well known, there exists a number of verbal roots which form their strong aorist with *o*-vocalism of the root-vowel, as ἔθορε|θρώσκω|θόρνυμι; ἔπορον|πέπρωται. Schwyzler (*Griech. Gramm.* I, 1939, p. 747) thinks that in most of them *o* replaces an earlier *e*; thus ὄλε|ο- in ὤλεσα|ὠλόμην stands for *ἔλε- after an *ἰλέω which has to be supposed. In contradiction to this view, in an earlier part of his work (p. 362) he maintained that it could not be regarded as ascertained that μολ- was a root with *e* as root-vowel.

This strange, "defective" root becomes "normal" the moment we recognize that it belongs together with the *yo*-present μέλλω. Indeed, although there is only a small number of verbs forming their aorists with *o* as root-vowel, some of them show some striking features that have a bearing on our problem. As is well known, at the side of the aor. ἔθορον there are two present formations: θόρνυμι and θρώσκω. This is in no way surprising since

the two presents have (or at least originally had) entirely independent meanings, corresponding to the special formans attached to the root.

Even more instructive is the case of ἔτορε (Λ 236) 'he pierced' since it has the two present formations τέιρω and τιτρώσσω at its side. We thus have a complete parallelism in the paradigm:

	*mel-	*ter-
pres. μέλλω	< mel-yō	τέιρω < ter-yō
	βλώσσω < mlō-skō	τιτρώσσω < (ti)trō-skō
aor. ἔμολε		ἔτορε
perf. μέμβλωκα	< me-mlō-ka	τέτρωκα < te-trō-ka. ¹⁰

And now it becomes also clear why in the early Greek literature μέλλω is used "only in the present and imperfect." This state-

¹⁰ In the light of the paradigm ἔμολον : μέλλω it is hard to find support in the facts for Chantraine's statement (*Grammaire Homérique*, 1942, p. 391): "Quelques aoristes qui semblent tirés de racines dissyllabiques présentent un vocalisme o repondant à un vocalisme à ω au présent," quoting ἔμολον | βλώσσω, ἔπορον | πέπρωται, ἔθορον | θρώσσω, ἔτορε | τρώω. This theory had been disposed of in advance by Schwyzler (*loc. cit.*) when stating that all these forms with o replaced more original formations with e. It is thus a great surprise to see F. B. J. Kuiper take up this theory in order to establish Greek evidence in favour of a third IE laryngeal (*India Antiqua*, 1947, p. 199): "The existence of h₃ is however in my opinion firmly established by some interesting umlaut-phenomena in Greek. While IE r and l are represented in Greek by ap, al (pa, la) we find throughout op, ol when the liquid was followed or preceded by h₃." As an especially decisive instance Gk. ὄρσο ὄρμενος are adduced as showing that the IE root *her-* must be determined as beginning with h₃. The astounding fact is that Kuiper clearly sees and admits (*ibid.*, note 4) that there "remain some exceptions which cannot be explained as yet," namely ἔρνος and the verbal forms ἔρσεο ἔρση ἔρετο preserved by Hesychius. In fact the number of forms showing the root-vowel to be e can be *ad libitum* increased from the lemma *er- 'set oneself in motion' in W. P., I, pp. 136 f. Nor can it be accepted by way of explanation that "στόρνυμι must have been remodelled after ἐστόρεσα etc. (*sterb₃, cf. ἔστρωται)." It rather seems to be the other way round since, if the laryngeal was h₃, we should expect *ἐστέρεσα (or perhaps, through assimilation, ἐστόροσα), whilst if we start from *στάρνυμι assimilated to στόρνυμι (a-u > o-u) it is easy to understand why the original aor. ἐστέρεσα was remodelled to ἐστόρεσα; cf. Schwyzler, p. 752 (after Specht, *K. Z.*, LIX [1931], pp. 106 f.). I add here that Hom. ἀγχίμολον has been put in an entirely new light by the ingenious paper of the late Wackernagel (-Debrunner): "Das 'Absolutivum' ἀγχίμολον," *Museum Helveticum*, I (1944), pp. 226 ff.

ment is simply untrue. In the epics the root **mel-* 'go, run' has a complete set of verbal forms: μέλλω has the aor. and perf. ἔμολον and μέμβλωκα, and vice versa. However, hand in hand with the development of the language, this original unity of the verbal paradigm became disrupted, mainly—we can assert—on account of semantic differences which had become ever sharper between μέλλω and ἔμολον, the latter being "perfective," and rapidly becoming obsolete, at least in the living language, whilst the former tended to play the part of an auxiliary.

As soon as this disruption was completed, there was no reason why the "defective" paradigm of μέλλω should not have been completed by adding to it an aorist and a future, both formed in accordance with the new ruling pattern, that is as weak formations. The lateness of these forms (ἐμέλλησα, μελλήσω) is revealed, besides the date of their appearance which never is quite conclusive, by the fact that the suffix -η-, widely used in the post-epic period as "enlargement" of verbal roots,¹¹ is attached not to the verbal root, but to the present stem μελλ-.

We can even advance a step further in our endeavour to account for these new formations. There can be little doubt, in my opinion, that the immediate models for ἐμέλλησα and μελλήσω are to be sought in ἡθέλησα and ἐθελήσω which occur already in the Homeric epics, because in the post-epical period μέλλω came to be restricted to the sense 'I am going to = I want to.'

This new insight into the etymological relationships of μέλλω inside Greek itself will, of course, reorientate our research also in the cognate languages.

To mention first the other Classic language, Latin has the verb *mōliōr* which, according to the last word on the subject (Walde-Hofmann, *Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, II, 2, 1948, pp. 101-2), is a denominative verb from a noun **mōlis*, ultimately deriving, as **mō-li-*, together with *mōlēs*, -is and *μῶλος* 'effort, endeavour,' from IE **mō-* 'sich mühen,' cf. W. P., II, pp. 301-2.¹²

¹¹ Cf. my paper "Graeca" in *Égyetemes Philologiai Közlöny* (*Hungarian Archivum Philologicum*) for 1947, pp. 101 f.; Schwyzer, p. 774; Chantraine, *B. S. L.*, XXVIII (1927), pp. 33 f.

¹² The alternative etymology, suggested by Schulze, *Kl. Schriften*, p. 438, and mildly described by Hofmann as "kaum besser," is to be discarded altogether. Indeed, to derive *mōlēs* from **mogzdhes-*, in order to connect it with *μόχος* and *μόςος*, defies all the rules of Latin phon-

Without entering into a discussion of the far from evident relationships within this group, I only point out that the meanings given for *mōliōr* by Hofmann, namely 'setze mit Anstrengung in Bewegung; schaffe, unternehme; führe im Schilde, mühe mich ab' ignore the not infrequent meaning 'to go, move, set out.' This use may be illustrated by the following passages taken from Livy: *molientem hinc Hannibalem* (XXVIII, 44), *dum naves moliantur a terra* (XXXVII, 11). But the verb is also used with the transitive sense: *montes sede sua moliri* (IX, 3) 'move.'

It is clear that this meaning is hardly accounted for by positing a composite basis 'mit Anstrengung wegschaffen.' I propose, therefore, to derive *mōliōr* from IE **mel-* 'go, run' as found in μέλλω. For the formation, I refer to *sōpiō* from IE **sweep-* 'sleep,' which is a causative formation with vowel-lengthening in the root. In the same manner, *mōliōr* (or perhaps earlier *mōliō*?) was a causative, meaning 'make go, set in motion.' The "deponens" to this form, quite naturally, came to denote 'to move, set out.' The connotation of 'endeavour, exertion,' which is undeniably perceptible in many usages of the verb, will be due to a process by which *mōliōr* and *mōlēś*, being near in sound, came to influence one another's meaning as well.¹³

This derivation calls for, and, at the same time, provides an explanation of Lat. *promellere*. As we have seen at the beginning of our discussion, Boisacq had already connected it with μέλλω on the basis of an IE **mel-* 'tarry,' a view still accepted by W. P., II, p. 291. As, however, the mainstay of this theory, the existence of a Greek verb 'tarry,' has been disproved, the whole

ology; *mogzdhes-* could only have led to **moksthes* > **mokstes* and ultimately a stem-form **mostes-* since *-zdḥ-* always becomes *-st-*. The verb *crēdō*, seemingly favourable to the assumption of a development (*-ddḥ-* >) *-zdḥ-* > *-d-* is on an entirely different footing as will be shown in a paper on the IE Mediae Aspiratae in Latin, to be published shortly in *Archivum Linguisticum*.

¹³ After this had been written, I looked up the *Dictionnaire Étymologique* by Ernout-Meillet (2nd ed., 1939). There, s. v. *mōlēś*, Meillet posits a root **mel-*, with a root-formation **mōl-* to account for the vowel grade of *mōlēś*, and continues: "*mōliōr* serait une formation de causatif-itératif du type de *sōpiō*." I am glad to be in agreement on this point with that past master of our science, although it should be noted that he makes no attempt at establishing the meaning or cognates of this root **mel-*.

lemma in W. P. becomes null and void, since Lat. *remulcum* (and *promulcum*), which had been considered by earlier philologists, including Boisacq, as independent derivatives from this root **mel-*, had been shown in the meantime to be Latin adjustments of Greek ῥυμουλκός 'tow.'

The Latin word receives a quite satisfactory explanation if we take into consideration that several IE roots combine the two meanings 'go' and 'carry' whether we take their relation as being in the nature of basic verb/causative derivative or transitive/intransitive. Such are the well-known instances:

IE **bher-* 'ride, rush' in Iran. *barata*, Gk. *φέρεται*, Arm. *ber* 'Ertrag, Frucht; impetus, Bewegung, Lauf' and **bher-* 'carry' in Lat. *fero*, Gk. *φέρω*, etc. (see W. P., II, p. 153 and also p. 157 s. v. 2. *bher-* 'sich heftig bewegen, wallen' together with the enlarged form **bhereu-*).

IE **nek-* 'go, arrive' in Lat. *nanciscor*, Skt. *naśati* 'erreicht, erlangt,' OIr. *tánaic* < **t-ōnonke* 'came' and **nek-* 'carry' in *ἡνεγκον* (< **ne-nk-*?), Slav. *nesq*, Balt. (Lithu.) *nešù* (in W. P., I, pp. 128-9: **enek/nek/enk/ṇk* 'reichen, erreichen, erlangen' und 'tragen').

Thus Lat. *promellere* is 'carry forward, carry on'; *litem promellere* (Paul. Fest., 301 L) 'protract the law-suit,' or, in the words of the glossator, "promovere."

The original meaning is, however, attested in yet another Latin word which has been unexplained hitherto. I have in mind the word *remeligo* on which Festus has the following note (344 L): *remeligines et remorae †memorando dictae sunt a Plauto in Casina (804): Nam quid illae nunc tam diu intus remorantur remeligines?, ab Afranio in Prodito (277): remeligo a Laribus missa sum †hanc quae cursum cohibeam*. In a paper on the suffix *-igō*, etc., A. Ernout says of this word: "Peut-être dérivé de *remeare* ou d'un verbe **remellō* qui serait le contraire de *promellō*" (*Philologica*, 1946, p. 180). Whilst the meaning of *remeligo* is not easily grasped in the Plautine passage, the verse quoted from Afranius leaves hardly any doubt that it denotes a sort of ghost and the apposite parallel of French "revenant" points the way to the etymological interpretation: the word has nothing to do with *remeare*, as its formation would be unexplainable, but stems from our root **mel-* 'go, come,' **remellere* 'to come back, haunt'; *remeligo* is exactly 'le revenant.'

Finally, the root **mel-* 'go' is attested in yet another group of IE, namely Slavonic. In order to be able to account for Serb. *iz-moliti* 'hervorzeigen, etc.' and Gk. *μολεῖν, βλώσσω*, etc., W. P. established (II, p. 294) an IE root **melā** 'go,' that is a disyllabic heavy base apparently called for by the long reduction vowel *ω* in *βλώσσω* and *μέμβλωκα*. It is hardly necessary to repeat that these forms are more readily accounted for by an *ō*-enlargement, analogous to that found, e. g., in (*τέρω ~*) *τιτρώσσω τρωτός* (also *τρώω*) discussed above. Moreover, *μολεῖν*, etc. were shown to derive from a root **mel-* and it is obvious that this accounts also for the Slavonic derivatives enumerated by W. P., *loc. cit.*

The same general criticism applies to W. P.'s root **mel-* 'Glied'—the fifth in the series of homonyms—established for the sake of Greek *μέλος* 'limb' and the Celtic forms: Bret. *mell*, Corn. *mal*, pl. *mellow* 'Knöchel,' Welsh *cym-mal* 'articulus, iunctura, commissura' (to be derived from **melsā*). However, Greek *μέλος* is nothing else than a noun derivative from our root **mel-* 'go,' a semantic development well-attested over the whole IE area; I only quote Goth. *leiþan*, OE *līþan* 'go' from which derive NGerm. *Glied*, ON *liþr* 'joint,' NE *lim(b)* and Skt. *jānghā*, Av. *zanga* 'Knöchel' as compared with Goth. *gaggan* 'go,' etc. The Old Norse word also gives the clue to the semantic change found in the Celtic words.

To sum up. The Homeric usages of the verb μέλλω which have hitherto puzzled philologists and lexicographers have been shown to derive from a primitive meaning 'to go.' Besides this basic meaning, a secondary auxiliary meaning and usage have been discerned, the function of which ranged from the "immediate future" to a "putative present," the latter being a convenient mode, paralleled by several modern languages, of expressing probability or a mere supposition.

With the original meaning of μέλλω thus established, it becomes clear that this verb is nothing else than the "defective" present stem to the equally "defective" forms *ἔμολον μολοῦμαι μέμβλωκα*. In other words, Homeric Greek had a complete set of verbal forms from a root **mel-* 'to go.' However, the increasing distance between the meanings of the *actio imperfecta* and *actio instans* was bound to lead to the disruption of the primitive unity and this stage was reached by the early post-Homeric

JUVENAL'S BOOKCASE.

It is always interesting to try to discover what books an eminent writer liked best. In fact, without knowing them, it is impossible to understand him fully; for they were part of his experience, they moulded his mind, they gave him subjects to ponder over, forms to adapt, thoughts to assimilate, and suggestions to reject with a violence which was itself a stimulus. This is particularly true of the Roman poets, who preferred tradition to revolution, and who often thought more of literature than they did of life, its raw material.

This essay will attempt to set out the favourite reading of the satirist Juvenal. Is it a pointless task? At first sight we might think so. Juvenal professes to hold that most books are silly or useless, that they are unreal and irrelevant, and that even when they are being most boldly imaginative they are still feeble in comparison with the horrible truths of daily life.¹ Yet, as we read him, we realize that he was not attacking literature as a whole, but declaring that in his own time it ought to concern itself more closely with life and have a social purpose. The great writers of the past he admired. But he felt that what was needed in his generation was satire.²

Also, his poetic technique is undoubtedly very skilful. Rhythms varying all the way from disjointed conversation to nobly sustained rhetoric, bold and subtle sound-effects, brilliant epigrams, unforgettable images, light jokes and formidable denunciations, a voice that can speak in nearly all tones, even those of pity—such an art does not grow spontaneously but is nourished by years of meditation on literature, and refined by emulation of the best and cleverest authors. Then, a good deal of his thought is drawn from books. He takes many illustrations from myth and history. He builds many arguments on philosophical themes, and has some acquaintance with Stoic, Cynic, and Epicurean doctrine. Further, he is a successful parodist, and no one can write parody without a fairly intimate sense of literary craftsmanship. And finally, a careful study of his work

¹ See Juv., 1, 1-14, 52-7, 162-4; 6, 634-61; 15, 13-32.

² *hoc potius . . . campo* 1, 19; 1, 51-4; 6, 634-40.

reveals a surprising number of deliberate imitations—reminiscences of many different authors, as well as multitudinous echoes, often subconscious, coming from many recesses of a complex and richly stored memory. If, therefore, we can reconstruct Juvenal's bookcase, we shall have penetrated a little further into his curious and powerful mind.

First, his subject-matter. How much did he take from his own observation, and how much did he owe to books? Surely much of his work is original? His 4th and 15th satires are about events of his own lifetime. The ugly 2nd and 9th are on subjects apparently new to satire; we hear of nothing like the huge attack on marriage, the 6th, before his day in poetry; and others, such as the 3rd and 12th and 16th, would be hard to parallel, at least on the scale to which he develops them. Also, he alludes in passing to many topical events which he saw himself and did not copy from others: Crispinus, waving his sweaty fingers with their light summer-weight ring, and Eppia adoring her bleary-eyed gladiator.³

Yet he owes more to earlier satirists than he might care to acknowledge. Persius he never names; but Persius' second satire is one of the main models for his 10th.⁴ Horace as a satirist is mentioned only once; but the frugal dinner in Juvenal 11, the attack on avarice in 14, and other disquisitions on morals owe much to Horace's thought. As for Lucilius, whom he claims as his model, the fragments of Lucilius' satires are usually too scanty to show whether Juvenal copies many themes from him or not.⁵

His friend Martial gave him more subjects than any other extant poet. Again and again, if we study the two poets together, we can see how a neat little epigram by Martial has been taken over, expanded, deepened, often cleaned up and given a moral purpose, and at last developed into one of Juvenal's most striking descriptions, sometimes into a whole satire.⁶ Thus, satire 3, with its main theme:

quid Romae faciam? mentiri nescio,

³ 1, 26-9; 6, 82-110.

⁴ See pp. 390-1.

⁵ But note Lucilius, fragments 676-87, on the troubles of marriage: although no close resemblances are visible, the themes and the attitudes of the two poets are similar.

⁶ This subject, discussed in essays by Nettleship ("Life and Poems of

is essentially an elaboration of Martial's general complaints against the huge cruel city, of several of Martial's epigrams such as III, 38, IV, 5, X, 96, and perhaps of Martial's own departure for the remote and quiet Bilbilis. The 5th satire, basically a variation on the traditional satiric topic of the horrible meal, is inspired by several poems of Martial, who had himself suffered in the same way; while the pleasanter dinner described in Juvenal 11 is also based on Martial.⁷ Some of the women in Juvenal come from Martial's *chronique scandaleuse*, as well as a certain number (though fewer than we might at first think) of his objectionable men.⁸ One of Juvenal's most interesting achievements was to make serious and positive poetry out of Martial's little intimations of immorality.

Of history, Juvenal had a picturesque but superficial knowledge. He seems to have read the historians not with the aim of understanding the deeper causes of past events, but in order to find illustrations which would be dramatic, or laughable, or odd. Many of his references to historical figures clearly come from handbooks used in the rhetorical schools, such as Hyginus, Valerius Maximus, and Cornelius Nepos.⁹ But he also read more serious historians. Gercke thought Juvenal got a good deal from the elder Pliny's *History*; but it is absolutely lost, and philoso-

Juvenal," *Lectures & Essays* [2nd series, Oxford, 1895]) and Wilson ("The literary influence of Martial upon Juvenal," *A.J.P.*, XIX [1898], pp. 193-209), has now been fully explored by Dr. R. E. Colton in a Columbia University dissertation, *Juvenal and Martial*, to which I am indebted for quotations and parallels. See also G. Boissier, "Relations de Juvénal et de Martial," *Revue des Cours et Conférences*, VII, 2 (1899), pp. 443-51.

⁷ See L. R. Shero, "The Cena in Roman Satire," *C.P.*, XVIII (1923), pp. 126-43; Martial, III, 60, III, 82, IX, 2; Martial, V, 78, X, 48.

⁸ Fabulla (Juv., 2, 68, Mart., IV, 81); Glaphyrus (Juv., 6, 77, Mart., IV, 5); Hamillus (Juv., 10, 224, Mart., VII, 62); Matho (Juv., 1, 32; 7, 129; 11, 34; Mart., VII, 10, X, 46); Naevolus (Juv., 9, Mart., III, 71, III, 95); Saufeia (Juv., 6, 320; 9, 117, Mart., III, 72).

⁹ The Nepos suggestion comes from W. Christ, *Sitzungsb. Münch. Akad.*, 1897, p. 131, n. 1. It was Ribbeck who first developed the Valerius Maximus parallels in *Der echte und der unechte Juvenal* (Berlin, 1865): see pp. 22-3. On Val. Maximus and Hyginus see also K. Alewell, *Ueber das rhetorische Paradeigma* (Leipzig, 1913), pp. 115-17, and F. Gauger, *Zeitschilderung und Topik bei Juvenal* (Bottrop, 1936), pp. 47-8, 63, 71-2.

phers tell us that an unverifiable statement is meaningless.¹⁰ Gercke also suggested that he used Suetonius.¹¹ This is more difficult to believe: Suetonius is full of wonderfully vivid details, often driven home with a barbed and poisoned malice, which Juvenal would have loved to use if he had seen them. But so few of them appear in the satires, and the divergence between Juvenal's and Suetonius' views of emperors such as Tiberius and Caligula is so great that we may conclude that Juvenal made little, if any, use of the *Caesars*.

But what about Tacitus? Juvenal and Tacitus were contemporaries. Under Domitian they had both endured the torture of silence and the threat of death. They both loathed the imperial system and the corruption which it enforced on all but the best of citizens. Both, as Norden said, worked in the "grand manner," and both were retrospective satirists, showing the vileness of the present by exposing the vices and sins of the past.¹² They had much in common, from their fundamental pessimism to the proud and sombre dignity of their style.¹³ Yet Juvenal never mentions Tacitus by name, and sneers at one of his greatest public achievements.¹⁴ In his survey of contemporary literature he passes slightly over history.¹⁵ And once at least he appears to mock Tacitus' work as a historian. In a particularly savage account of a group of male homosexuals he describes a pervert using a mirror which once belonged to the emperor Otho and has apparently been handed down in that society; and then he gives ten lines of contempt and hatred to

¹⁰ A. Gercke, *Seneca-Studien* (Leipzig, 1895), pp. 186 f.

¹¹ Gercke, *op. cit.*, points to the story about Caligula in 1, 44, which he says is so obscure that it is more likely to have come out of a book (Suet., *Gaius*, 20, cf. Dio, LIX, 22, 1) than to have lived on in popular memory. But A. Hartmann, *De inventione Juvenalis* (Basel, 1908), pp. 17-18, n. 1, remarks that many of the details Gercke believed must come from history-books can be more easily traced to commonplaces of the rhetorical schools: e.g. *nigros maritos* in 1, 72 and "Quintilian," *Decl. mai.*, XV, 4, 10.

¹² E. Norden, in *Vom Altertum zur Gegenwart* (Leipzig, 1921²), p. 42.

¹³ See Pliny, *Ep.*, II, 11, 17, on the lofty style of Tacitus.

¹⁴ In 1, 49-50 Juvenal says that the impeachment of Marius Priscus by Pliny and Tacitus—which Pliny describes in *Ep.*, II, 11-12 with an eager sense of its importance—was quite useless.

¹⁵ 7, 98-104.

Otho himself, filling them with the ludicrous antitheses that characterize a homosexual's life (*occidere Galbam/et curare cutem*) and closing with a comparison of Otho to two other warlike queens, Semiramis and Cleopatra.¹⁶ This paradox, he says, the paradox that a hand-mirror was part of Otho's equipment in a civil war, ought to be brought out in the new *Annals* and the recently published *History, novis annalibus atque recenti /historia*. Evidently he means that Tacitus' characterization of Otho was too kind, made Otho too noble, concealed his basic corruption. The report that Galba was killed by Otho's soldiers Juvenal corrects, putting the responsibility on Otho himself.¹⁷ He mocks the will power and determination of which Otho boasted, and the titles he took.¹⁸ Perhaps he thinks that Tacitus, himself an aristocrat, has a blind eye for the weaknesses of another aristocrat—since Juvenal is never tired of repeating that the Roman nobles, once strong and proud, are now grown weak and nasty. Certainly the passage is a sneer at Tacitus, a pointed and bitter sneer.

But in later satires Juvenal introduces a number of impressive scenes and characters from periods in the earlier Empire which were described by Tacitus: Nero, Sejanus, Messalina, Lateranus.¹⁹ It seems likely that he was (however unwillingly) impressed by the vividness and vigour of Tacitus' *Annals*, which directed his mind, as with age it turned away from the present, more and more towards the monstrous history of the Julio-Claudian house. Yet it is difficult to point to any one large description in Juvenal and say that it came from Tacitus—whether because the parallel parts of the *Annals* are lost, or because Juvenal deliberately chose scenes which Tacitus had

¹⁶ 2, 99-109. On the passage see J. Dürr, *Die zeitgeschichtlichen Beziehungen in den Satiren Juvenals* (Cannstatt, 1902), p. 9, n. 24.

¹⁷ Juv., 2, 104: *summi ducis est occidere Galbam*; contrast Tac., *Hist.*, I, 41.

¹⁸ Contrast *constantia* in Juv., 2, 105 with Tac., *Hist.*, II, 47: "*nec diu moremur, ego incolumitatem uestram, uos constantiam meam*"; *summus duæ, summus ciuis* in Juv., 2, 104-5 with Tac., *Hist.*, II, 47: "*alii diutius imperium tenuerint, nemo tam fortiter reliquerit*."

¹⁹ Nero, 8, 211-30; Sejanus, 10, 56-107; Messalina, 6, 115-32; Lateranus, 8, 146-82.

omitted. The latter is probable, but while Tacitus' books are incomplete it cannot be proved.²⁰

In philosophy, Juvenal said he had read no books.²¹ But this is an exaggeration. He began, apparently, with a very thin and sketchy knowledge of philosophical systems, but learnt a number of Stoic doctrines, and towards the end of his life became more and more firmly converted to Epicureanism.²² It was the Epicurean mode of life which he came to follow, and his attitude to pleasure and pain and ambition was fundamentally Epicurean. Much of his philosophical material came from sources now impossible to trace—popular lectures, the poems of his contemporaries, lost handbooks. But the extant author whom he surely read was Seneca: not to study him and follow or refute his arguments, but (as with Tacitus) to extract striking ideas and vivid phrases. Again and again we find that Juvenal will adapt a sentence or two from Seneca, and then break away from Seneca's argument to draw a different conclusion.²³ Still, there are a number of striking resemblances which prove either that Juvenal read Seneca with an alert but skipping eye, or that he was familiar with the philosophical commonplaces which Seneca put so crisply. Here are two from a long list:

hic ultra vires habitus nitor, hic aliquid plus
quam satis est interdum aliena sumitur arca.
commune id uitium est, hic uiuimus ambitiosa
paupertate omnes. quid te moror? omnia Romae
cum pretio. J., 3, 180-4

nos sine duce erramus et dicimus, "non ego ambitiosus

²⁰ For further discussion of Juvenal's debt to Tacitus see Dürr, cited in n. 16; Gercke, cited in n. 10; and F. Wolffgramm, *Rubellius Plautus und seine Beurtheilung bei T. und J.* (Prenzlau, 1871). Gercke thought Juvenal got the mirror from Pliny's history *A fine Aufidii Bassi*; the scholiast mentions Cornelius (Tacitus) and Pompeius Planta.

²¹ 13, 120-3.

²² Details of this argument in G. Highet, "The philosophy of Juvenal" (*T.A.P.A.*, LXXX [1949], pp. 254-70).

²³ Contrast Juv., 1, 22-80 and *De Ira*, II, 7-9; Juv., 10, 28-53 and *De Ira*, II, 10, 5; Juv., 10, 188-288 and *Ep.*, 96, 2-3; 99, 10-11; 107, 6-7; Juv., 1, 135-41 and *Ep.*, 94, 69-70; Juv., 1, 87-88 and 147-9 and *Ep.*, 97, 1.

sum, sed nemo aliter Romae potest uiuere. non ego sump-
tuosus sum, sed urbs ipsa magnas impensas exigit."
Sen., *Ep.*, 50, 3

cantabit uacuum coram latrone uiator. J., 10, 22

nudum latro transmittit: etiam in obsessa uia
pauperi pax est. Sen., *Ep.*, 14, 9

Besides these, there is reason to believe that some of the arguments and several vivid illustrations of the 6th satire, against women, come from a lost work by Seneca *On Marriage*.²⁴

Turn now to style. Here Juvenal uses the work of his predecessors in four different ways.

The first of these is *parody*. He is a skilled and dangerous parodist. Since he thinks that satire is real and natural, he takes most pleasure in parodying the grand style and mocking famous passages from epic poetry. The poor man whose apartment-house is burning beneath him is compared to Aeneas caught in the conflagration of Troy—by one word only, the name of Aeneas' neighbour. Vergil (*Aen.*, II, 311-12) says:

iam proximus ardet

Vcalegon

and Juvenal (3, 198-9) makes it:

iam poscit aquam, iam friuola transfert

Vcalegon.

The nervous lawyer appearing in one of the lowest types of case, a slave's claim to citizenship, is likened to Ajax claiming the arms of Achilles. Ovid begins book thirteen of the *Metamorphoses* with his speech:

consedere duces, et uolgi stante corona
surgit ad hos clipei dominus septemplex Ajax.

Juvenal compresses it into one line, followed by a delightful onomatopoeia (7, 115-17):

²⁴ For further discussions of Juvenal and Seneca, see F. Bock, *Aristoteles Theophrastus Seneca de matrimonio* (Leipziger Studien, XIX [1899], pp. 46 f.); F. Gauger, *Zeitschilderung und Topik bei Juvenal* (Bottrop, 1936); C. Schneider, *Juvenal und Seneca* (Würzburg, 1930); R. Schuetze, *Juvenalis ethicus* (Greifswald, 1905).

consedere duces, surgis tu pallidus Ajax,
dicturus dubia pro libertate bubulco
iudice.

Cicero in one of his greatest speeches defied Antony in a nobly cadenced sentence: *contempsí Catilínae gladiós, non pérti-méscám tuós* (*Phil.*, II, 118). After quoting one of the worst lines of Cicero's poetry, Juvenal adds (10, 123-4):

Antoni gladios potuit contemnere, si sic
omnia dixisset.

He has many more parodies, equally amusing. Perhaps the main body of his 4th satire comes under this head. It tells, in language and rhythms which are often mock-heroic,²⁵ of a council called by Domitian to discuss the best way to cook a giant turbot; it lists and describes the eleven councillors as they arrive. The Renaissance editor Valla, who had access to a set of scholia now lost, here quotes four lines from "a poem by Statius on the German war conducted by Domitian":

lumina; Nestorei mitis prudentia Crispi,
et Fabius Veiento (potentem signat utrumque
purpura, ter memores implerunt nomina fastos),
et prope Caesareae confinis Acilius aulae.

Crispus, Fabius Veiento, and Acilius are three of the ministers in Juvenal's satire, and they are described in terms closely similar:

uenit et Crispi iucunda senectus . . .
proximus eiusdem properabat Acilius aevi . . .
et cum mortifero prudens Veiento Catullo . . .

Perhaps the blind Catullus was described by Statius in the clause ending with *lumina*. We know nothing more of the piece, but this resemblance is close enough to make it probable that Juvenal's entire satire was a mock-heroic gibe at an epyllion in which Statius glorified the emperor and flattered his chief satellites.²⁶

²⁵ E. g. 4, 34-6, 45-6, 60-1, 65, 130-5. On the subject of serious and parodic grandeur in Juvenal there is a valuable treatise by I. G. Scott, *The Grand Style in the Satires of Juvenal* (Northampton, Mass., 1927), to which I am much indebted.

²⁶ Surely *dux magnus* in 145 is a scornful allusion to the title of

Sometimes Juvenal uses the thoughts and phrasing of his predecessors with no intention of mockery, but merely to recall an idea or a description which had already been so well put that it could scarcely be bettered. Usually he quotes a few words, but rewrites the passage so that it blends with his own style and is not set off, as it were, by quotation marks. For instance, in the 8th satire, on true and false nobility, he is contrasting the noble scoundrel Catiline with the patriotic Cicero. What, he asks (8, 231 f.), could be loftier than the descent of you, Catiline, and your accomplice Cethegus?

arma tamen uos
nocturna et *flamas* domibus templisque paratis . . .
sed *wigilat* consul uexillaque uestra coercet.

This is an allusion to Cicero's first denunciation of Catiline, in which (I, 8-9) he shouts "Recognosce tamen *noctem* illam superiorem; iam intelleges multo me *wigilare* acrius . . .; discripsisti urbis partis ad *incendia*. . . ." This type of allusion could be called *reminiscence*.

Again, when saying good-bye to his friend Umbricius, Juvenal turns with him into the grove of Egeria, which like Rome itself has been spoilt by artificial luxury (3, 17-20):

in *uallem* Egeriae descendimus et *speluncas*
dissimiles ueris. quanto praesentius esset
numen aquis, uiridi si *marginē* cluderet *undas*
herba, nec *ingenuum* uiolarent marmora *tofum*!

Here he is recalling Ovid's graceful description of the woodland

Domitian, *magnus dux*, used by Stat., *Silu.*, III, 1, 62. Elsewhere in Juvenal the most notable parodies are these:

1, 25 and 10, 226 ~ Verg., *Buc.*, I, 28; 1, 43 ~ Hom., *Il.*, III, 33-5 and Verg., *Aen.*, II, 379-80; 1, 81-4 ~ Ov., *Met.*, I, 260-1, 381, 400-2; 2, 12 ~ Hor., *Carm.*, II, 1, 23-4; 2, 77 ~ Cat., 103, 2 and Lucan, *B.C.*, I, 146; 2, 99-100 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, III, 286 and XII, 94; 2, 149-51 ~ Prop., IV, 7, 1 and Verg., *Aen.*, VI, 296, 302-3; 3, 250 and 7, 213 ~ Verg., *Buc.*, II, 65; 5, 137-9 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, IV, 328-30; 5, 142-3 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, XII, 475; 6, 8 ~ Cat., 3, 18; 6, 43 ~ Verg., *Georg.*, III, 188; 6, 177 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, VIII, 42-8; 6, 238 ~ Lucan, *B.C.*, VI, 424; 6, 559 ~ Lucan, *B.C.*, IX, 190; 9, 37 ~ Hom., *Od.*, XVI, 294; 9, 69 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, I, 207; 9, 102 ~ Verg., *Buc.*, II, 69; 10, 178 ~ Ov., *Met.*, I, 264; 10, 230-2 ~ Hom., *Il.*, IX, 323-4; 12, 110 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, X, 427 and 737; 14, 213-14 ~ Ov., *Met.*, XV, 855-6.

spring of Gargaphie, which Diana and her nymphs loved, as Egeria once loved this spot now ruined by extravagance and avarice; and, by recalling it, he emphasizes the contrast (Ov., *Met.*, III, 155-62):

*uallis erat piceis et acuta densa cupressu . . .
cuius in extremo est antrum nemorale recessu,
arte laboratum nulla: simulauerat artem
ingenio natura suo. nam pumice uiuo
et leuibus tofis natium duxerat arcum.
fons sonat a dextra, tenui perlucidus unda,
margine gramineo patulos incinctus hiatus.*

In such passages Juvenal probably expects some at least of his readers to pick up the reminiscence and to hear not only his own voice but the voice of the master whom he has recalled. But there is a third type of borrowing, which is less easy to detect. Sometimes one poet expresses a certain thought so gracefully or so pungently that a successor is haunted by the cadence, and finally copies the words and the rhythms in a slightly different context. The Greek and Roman poets evidently did not think this was plagiarism, provided the copyist did not borrow extensively and did not use his borrowings in exactly the same kind of poem. Sometimes, as when Vergil quoted Lucretius and Varius and Gallus, and Vergil's admirers quoted him, it was intended as a compliment. Sometimes, as when we use phrases from famous writers in daily speech (e.g. Shakespeare's "foregone conclusion" and Churchill's "iron curtain"), it is a tribute to the power of the phrase, which has detached itself from its author and become public property. Sometimes it is the inevitable result of close study, as when Strauss and Schönberg in their early works use Wagner's chords, rhythms, and orchestration. This could be called, with no injurious overtones, *imitation*.

For instance, Lucan in a famous passage describes the prodigies that preceded Caesar's advance. There were omens and prophecies (I, 566-7):

*crinemque rotantes
sanguineum populis ulularunt tristia Galli.*

Four of these words appear in Juvenal (6, 315-17):

cornu pariter uinoque feruntur
attonitae crinemque rotant ululantque Priapi
maenades.

The context of course is different—and yet is it so different? Lucan is evoking the antics of a group of frenzied oriental dervishes, Juvenal the madness of a group of drunken Roman women worshipping the Good Goddess: in both there is the same atmosphere of frenzy, of sexual perversion, yes, and of the impending doom of Rome.

Again, Juvenal makes at least one quotation from Lucilius which fits fairly neatly into his verse, and which we should never have recognized if the scholiast had not told us. The tyrant is dead, he cries (10, 65-6):

pone domi laurus, duc in Capitolia magnum
cretatumque bouem. Seianus ducitur unco.

At most, we might have remarked the repetition *duc . . . ducitur*; but it is the scholiast who says “ut Lucilius,

cretatumque bouem duc[it] ad Capitolia magnum.”²⁷

This is fragment 1145 in Marx's collection, but its context in Lucilius is lost, so that we cannot tell how Juvenal has altered the line apart from rearranging it metrically. The history of Roman satire would be a great deal clearer if we had even one book of Lucilius.

One further example. Here the resemblance is so tenuous that it may scarcely have been felt by Juvenal himself. Horace criticizes Lucilius for carelessness. Might it not, he says in *Serm.*, I, 10, 56-9, have been Lucilius' own character and the character of his subject that kept him from writing smoothly?

quid uetat et nosmet, Lucili scripta legentes,
quaerere num illius, num rerum dura *negarit*
uersiculos natura magis factos et euntes
mollius?

Juvenal sets out to tell us why he follows Lucilius. Rome, he cries, is so full of horrible and unnatural sights that he must write satire, he has no choice, he cannot sleep for thinking of

²⁷ *duc* for *ducit* Müller; *magnum* for *magna* Wessner.

them; and then, in an imitation emphasized by the context, he says (1, 79):

si *natura negat*, facit indignatio *uersum*.

Sometimes these resemblances are made more cogent by strong similarity of thought, together with one or two memorable words, as when Lucan (*B.C.*, VII, 404-5) speaks of the degenerate metropolis

nulloque frequentem
ciue suo Romam sed mundi *faece* repletam,

and Juvenal protests (3, 60-1):

non possum ferre, Quirites,
Graecam urbem—quamuis quota portio *faecis* Achaei?

Sometimes we are helped in interpreting a difficult passage when we see that the author was not being intentionally obscure, but was merely adapting a phrase he took from a favourite writer. How many modern printers have tried to correct the last word in a sentence like "the best of all these proposals are only such stuff as dreams are made on," without knowing that it closed a concealed quotation from *The Tempest*? There are several passages like this in Juvenal. For instance, he warns the poor client Trebius that the only way to become a real friend of his patron is to be childless, so that the patron can expect to be remembered in his will. Then (a little inconsistently) he goes on to say (5, 141) "but since you are poor now, it doesn't matter if you have triplets . . ."

sed tua nunc Mycale pariat licet . . .

The commentators have wondered why the wife should be called by this odd name Mycale. The scholiast read Migale, and says *nomen mulieris: ex ipsa coitione etymologia*, which means that he did not know, and guessed at a rather improbable derivation from *μύγμα*.

Ruperti was led by this guess to think that Mycale must be the name of a mistress, so that the children were illegitimate and could not affect the patron's chances in the will. Weidner said Mycale was a comic name for a wife, and meant *Schnäuzchen*, Nosy, presumably deriving it from *μύξα*, a far-fetched idea.

Friedländer followed Buecheler and Lenel (apparently a legal expert), who followed Ruperti. Duff in one of his usual sensible notes disproved Ruperti's suggestion, but still could not explain the fertile lady's name, except by saying that she might be a freedwoman. Dunbabin (*C.R.*, XXXIX [1925], p. 112) suggested that she might be a Jewess, and implied that her name was a variation of that borne by Saul's daughter, Michal.

However, Juvenal was not so subtle as some of these interpretations make him, and in particular he was not very subtle at names. Many of the names Horace uses in his satiric writings have ironic or wounding meanings: few of Juvenal's names have any concealed meaning at all. Mycale is (as Duff saw) the client's wife. He is poor and ignoble, so she does not bear an aristocratic name like Cornelia. But why should she be called Mycale? Because she is fertile, and because Juvenal (perhaps unconsciously) is recalling one of his favourite passages in Ovid, the fight of the Centaurs and Lapithae (*Met.*, XII, 210 f., cf. Juvenal, 1, 11), and from it the phrase (XII, 263)

mater erat Mycale.

Mycale here is only one of several women whom Juvenal has named after figures from his best-liked poem: Cyane (8, 162 ~ Ov., *Met.*, V, 409), Psecas (6, 491 ~ Ov., *Met.*, III, 172), and Phiale (10, 238 ~ Ov., *Met.*, III, 172).

Now and then these imitations are not taken from one single passage, but blended from two or more. To mock the ambition of Alexander, Juvenal says (10, 168-9):

unus *Pellaeo* iuueni *non sufficit orbis*,
aestuat infelix angusto limite mundi,

which is a composite of Lucan on Caesar (*B.C.*, X, 456, cf. V, 356):

hic cui Romani spatium *non sufficit orbis*,

and Lucan on the civil war (*B.C.*, VI, 63):

aestuat angusta rabies ciuilis harena,

with a hint from Lucan on Alexander (*B.C.*, III, 233-4):

hic ubi *Pellaeus* post Tethyos aequora ductor
constitit, et magno uinci se fassus ab *orbe* est.

Similarly, to describe the Egyptians sailing in their clay boats (15, 127-8),

paruula fictilibus solitum dare uela phaselis
et breuibus pictae remis incumbere testae,

Juvenal combines Vergil's (*Georg.*, IV, 289)

et circum pictis uehitur sua rura phaselis

and Ovid's (*Met.*, III, 639)

meque iubent pictae dare uela carinae.

Often we come upon a passage in which Juvenal has used only two or three words which coincide with a phrase in one of his favourite authors. Although these may be interesting and distinctive, they are scarcely enough as they stand to convince us that they are a deliberate quotation. The two poets might have written the same phrase by sheer coincidence—although, if one lived two generations after the other and knew his predecessor's work well, the chance of sheer coincidence is much reduced. Or Juvenal may have had them floating vaguely in his mind, as we all have fragments of music and wandering phrases, and so he may have used them with no clear consciousness of their source. But then we find that, in another poem, Juvenal has introduced another phrase from the same passage of the same author. For example, Horace says to Maecenas, in his whimsical first letter (*Ep.*, I, 1, 101-4),

insanire putas sollemnia me neque rides,
nec medici credis nec curatoris egere
a praetore dati, rerum tutela mearum
cum sis.

In his 14th satire (112) Juvenal says that a greedy miser is praised

tamquam parcus homo et rerum tutela suarum.

A coincidence? Possibly, but look on to line 288 of the same satire, where Juvenal says that a greedy miser is crazy:

curatoris eget qui nauem mercibus implet.

We can scarcely believe that a poet would twice in one poem

accidentally hit on phrases used in one single sentence by one of his most distinguished predecessors: the chances are enormously against it. If we agree that he knew and remembered the poem we shall be prepared to admit other fainter echoes of the same poem as imitations, such as (5, 1)

si te propositi nondum pudet atque *eadem est mens*,

from Hor., *Ep.*, I, 1, 4:

non *eadem est aetas*, non *mens*.²⁸

Here, for convenience, is a list of the most striking such verbal imitations in Juvenal. (Many of the references come from the parallels given in Friedländer's edition, but they have been revised to suit the definition set out on p. 378 above, uncertain and improbable parallels cut out, and others added.)

Juvenal 1:	46-7	~ Sen., <i>Ben.</i> , IV, 27, 5
	73	~ Sen., <i>Oed.</i> , 879
	79	~ Hor., <i>Serm.</i> , I, 10, 57-8
	143	~ Hor., <i>Ep.</i> , I, 6, 61 and Pers., 3, 98
Juvenal 2:	168	~ Ter., <i>Andr.</i> , 126 and Lucan, <i>B.C.</i> , I, 173.
	25	~ Lucr., II, 842
	37	~ (?) Cic., <i>Phil.</i> , V, 8
	51-2	~ Hor., <i>Serm.</i> , I, 9, 39
	72-4	~ Ov., <i>Fast.</i> , I, 207
	125	~ Mart., VI, 21, 9
Juvenal 3:	155	~ Lucan, <i>B.C.</i> , II, 46.
	30	~ Ov., <i>Met.</i> , XI, 314-15
	35	~ Mart., III, 95, 7
	41	~ Mart., III, 38, 13
	72	~ Lucan, <i>B.C.</i> , VII, 579
	91	~ Mart., XIII, 64, 1
	100-1	~ Lucr., I, 919 and II, 976
	121-2	~ Lucan, <i>B.C.</i> , I, 290-1
	130	~ Hor., <i>Serm.</i> , II, 6, 24
	190-2	~ (?) Hor., <i>Carm.</i> , III, 4, 22-3
	196	~ Lucan, <i>B.C.</i> , I, 494-5
	254-6	~ Sen., <i>Ep.</i> , 90, 9
Juvenal 4:	279-80	~ (?) Sen., <i>Tranq. An.</i> , II, 12
	290	~ Mart., I, 53, 12.
	74-5	~ Ov., <i>Met.</i> , II, 775
	93	~ Lucan, <i>B.C.</i> , X, 55
	117	~ Mart., II, 19, 3.
Juvenal 5:	10	~ Ov., <i>Met.</i> , VIII, 791
	12	~ Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , I, 708
	57	~ Hor., <i>Carm.</i> , IV, 7, 15
	94-6	~ Sen., <i>Ep.</i> , 89, 22
	107	~ Hor., <i>Serm.</i> , I, 1, 22
	113	~ Mart., IX, 2, 1

²⁸ Another of these double coincidences is Lucan, VIII, 542-4 with *hos animos* in Juv., 1, 89 and *barbara turba* in Juv., 15, 46.

- 147 ~ Mart., I, 20, 4
 162 ~ Mart., I, 92, 9.
 Juvenal 6: 11 ~ Lucr., V, 907
 12 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, VIII, 315
 146 ~ (?) Petr., 81, 1
 207-8 ~ (?) Hor., *Carm.*, II, 5, 1
 272-5 ~ Ov., *A.A.*, III, 291-2 and 677
 306 ~ Ov., *A.A.*, II, 222
 406 ~ Ov., *Am.*, II, 8, 28
 556 ~ Hor., *Carm.*, III, 29, 29-30
 634-6 ~ Verg., *Buc.*, VIII, 10
 together with imitations of Seneca, *De matrimonio*.
 Juvenal 7: 8 ~ Mart., II, 44, 9 and IX, 84, 3
 20-1 ~ Stat., *Silv.*, V, 2, 125
 27 ~ Mart., IX, 73, 9
 130 ~ Mart., II, 40, 7
 145 ~ Petr., 83, 10
 190-1 ~ Hor., *Serm.*, I, 3, 124-5.
 Juvenal 8: 1-9 ~ Sen., *Ep.*, 44, 5
 145 ~ Mart., XIV, 128, 1
 161 ~ Mart., X, 10, 5
 218 ~ Lucan, *B.C.*, III, 135-6
 235 ~ Mart., X, 25, 5
 270 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, III, 234 and VIII, 535.
 Juvenal 9: 32 ~ Manilius, IV, 14
 89 ~ Lucilius, fr. 1337.
 Juvenal 10: 50 ~ Hor., *Ep.*, II, 1, 244
 188 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, III, 85
 196-7 ~ Ov., *Am.*, II, 10, 7
 202 ~ Mart., XIII, 17, 1
 268 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, V, 481
 297-8 ~ Ov., *Her.*, XV, 290
 299 ~ Ov., *Am.*, II, 4, 15.
 Juvenal 11: 38 ~ Hor., *Ep.*, I, 4, 11
 82 ~ Ov., *Met.*, VIII, 648
 116 ~ Lucan, *B. C.*, IX, 519
 121-2 ~ Cic., *Acad.*, fr. 11 Müller
 203 ~ Mart., X, 12, 7.
 Juvenal 12: 83 ~ Ov., *Met.*, XV, 677
 110 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, X, 427 and 737
 125 ~ Hor., *Epod.*, 15, 17-18
 130 ~ Cic., *Lael.*, 52.
 Juvenal 13: 193 ~ Lucr., III, 1018-19 and Verg., *Aen.*, I, 604 and
 Ov., *Met.*, VIII, 531
 239 ~ Hor., *Ep.*, I, 10, 24.
 Juvenal 14: 25 ~ Hor., *Ep.*, I, 2, 42
 45 ~ Ov., *Met.*, XV, 587
 69 ~ Ov., *Frist.*, II, 110
 111-12 ~ Hor., *Serm.*, I, 3, 49
 112 & 288 ~ Hor., *Ep.*, I, 1, 102-3
 133 ~ Mart., XIII, 18, 1
 139 ~ (?) Ov., *Fast.*, I, 211
 188 ~ Verg., *Aen.*, V, 83
 214 ~ Ov., *Met.*, XV, 856
 215 ~ Verg., *Georg.*, II, 363
 218 ~ Ov., *Am.*, I, 10, 37
 250 ~ Ov., *Met.*, VIII, 71.
 Juvenal 15: 34 ~ Ov., *Rem. Am.*, 101

- 46 ~ Lucan, *B.C.*, VIII, 542-4
 86 ~ Ov., *Met.*, X, 305-7
 146-7 ~ Ov., *Met.*, I, 84-6.
 Juvenal 16: 54-6 ~ Hor., *Serm.*, II, 5, 57 f.

We have looked at three different ways in which Juvenal uses the work of writers whom he admires: parody, reminiscence, and imitation. But there can scarcely be sharp distinctions between these methods of borrowing, and the last of the three shades off into something approaching unconscious recall, or chance parallelism. Most often, when we find that Juvenal uses a few words which appear in an earlier poet, we see that there is no cogent resemblance in the contexts, and that the words form a neat metrical unit which, divorced from meaning, might well have occurred to several authors independently. And often we find that such a metrical unit—one foot, *si uacat*; a foot and a half, *inque uicem*; or a hexameter ending, *pectora palmis*—has been used by several different authors in different contexts. There is an admirable essay on this by C. Hosius, *De imitatione scriptorum Romanorum imprimis Lucani* (Greifswald, 1907), who points out that it is natural (for example) that *Bootes* should appear at the end of a hexameter line, and equally natural that it should then be preceded by a third-declension ablative singular (*axe Bootes*, Val. Fl., VII, 457) or a neuter plural (*plaustra Bootae*, Lucan, *B.C.*, II, 722; *serraca Bootae*, Juv., 5, 23). Or again, if a poet mentions a spider, *aranea*, her name is bound to suggest *tela* as a following spondee (Cat., 68, 49; Ov., *Met.*, VI, 145; Mart., VIII, 33, 15; Juv., 14, 61). Just now and then we can trace how an interesting phrase has been apparently coined by one poet, improved by another, parodied by a third, and revitalized by a fourth: for instance—

ueteris uestigia poenae	(Cat., 64, 295)
ueteris uestigia flammae	(Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , IV, 23)
ueteris uestigia pugnae	(Ov., <i>Am.</i> , III, 8, 19)
Pudicitiae ueteris uestigia	(Juv., 6, 14).

But clichés like *proelia miscet* and *quid referam?* became part of the general rolling stock of poetry, so that it would be pointless to trace them from one author to another.

There are dozens of these parallelisms in Juvenal's satires. They are scarcely more than *echoes*. Some are quite faint: for instance, *nouissimus exit* applied to the morning star in Ov.,

Met., II, 115 and XI, 296 and to the bankrupt knight's gold ring in *Juv.*, II, 42. Others are strong and surprising, like *manantia fletu* in Catullus, 101, 9 and Juvenal, 15, 136. Others again are very doubtful, like *devia rura* in Juvenal, 14, 75 and Prop., II, 19, 2 and Ov., *Met.*, I, 676 and Ov., *Fast.*, II, 369. At this point, the search for sources becomes meaningless—or indeed before it, in the work of a boldly original poet like Juvenal. Since so many of his finest lines are all his own, we need not look too far for the origins of his more ordinary remarks. Deliberate borrowing, as in his parodies, his reminiscences, and his imitations, is part of his poetic purpose, and is therefore important in assessing his competence as a writer; but the echoes in his work are simply chords of the rich resonance of Roman poetry.

Now we are in a better position to name Juvenal's favourite authors. First comes his friend, the master of miniature, the versatile little Spaniard Martial. Apparently Martial did not think of Juvenal as a productive author, only as someone "interested in literature";²⁹ and certainly he had come to the end of his career in Rome and gone back to Spain before Juvenal published any of his extant poems—although some of the satires were based on much earlier experiences. But the two men knew, some of the same people, they had lived the same kind of life, they both enjoyed sharp-edged and keen-pointed witticisms, they had a similar taste for slang and conversational jokes (though Juvenal avoided most of the dirty words that Martial enjoyed), and both were fundamentally pessimistic about the standards and the future of Rome. Juvenal knew Martial's works book by book, and studied them with care.³⁰ From Martial he took jokes, such as Claudius' mushroom;³¹ neat metrical patterns such as *moveat fastidia*;³² odd words, like *uardaicus* and *umbella*;³³

²⁹ *Facunde . . . Iuvenalis*, Mart., VII, 91, 1.

³⁰ It is inexplicable that Friedländer, who knew both poets so well, should have written, "Ihre Uebereinstimmung in Worten und Wendungen ist grösstenteils zufällig und natürlich: eine absichtliche Beziehung möchte ich nur bei Juvenal 5, 147 auf Martial I, 20, 4 annehmen" ("Jahresbericht über die Litt. des Juvenal 1886-91" in Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, LXXII [1892], p. 191).

³¹ *Juv.*, 5, 147-8 ~ Mart., I, 20, 4.

³² *Juv.*, 10, 202 and Mart., XIII, 17, 1.

³³ *Juv.*, 16, 13 and Mart., IV, 4, 5; *Juv.*, 9, 50 and Mart., XI, 73, 6.

personalities, or at least names, such as Chione and Matho;³⁴ many subjects of complaint and derision; the observant eye and the open notebook, which he used in the earlier satires, but which gradually closed as he grew older; a feeling of empathy with the rich busy corrupt fascinating metropolis; and the art of cutting epigrams as sharp, as bright, and as hard as diamonds. The arts of satire and epigram are clearly akin. They differ chiefly in length and in purpose. Just as Martial marks the culmination of the Roman epigram, so Juvenal marks the culmination of Roman satire; and some at least of Juvenal's best work would have been impossible without Martial.

Next comes Ovid, of whose poems there are at least fifty adaptations in Juvenal, and probably ten or twenty more. About half of these come from the *Metamorphoses*, and a surprisingly large number from the *Amores*. Probably Juvenal read Ovid at school. Even so, it strikes us as a little odd that Ovid, who loved women, irresponsible debauchery, and mythological learning, should have appealed to Juvenal, who hated all three. However, Ovid is such a skilful writer, so constantly interesting, witty, various, and lively, that he has charmed many men who might seem quite unsympathetic to him: Milton and Montaigne, Wordsworth and Macaulay. What Juvenal admired most in him was his craftsmanship with words. The myths Juvenal despised and parodied; the apples of love had turned sour in his mouth; but Ovid's graceful verse, as smooth as conversation and as melodious as a flute, haunted him, and partially created his poetic technique.

Third is Vergil. Practically every Roman author who lived after Vergil knew much of his poetry by heart. Seneca is full of Vergilian quotations. Ovid and Lucan had to make great efforts to rival Vergil without imitating him. His poems had much of the authority possessed in the nineteenth century by the Bible, and all the pervasive charm of Shakespeare. Juvenal recalls him in his satires at least fifty times, and must have known some of his poems very intimately indeed. For instance, in listing the different parts of the Greek world which send

³⁴ Juv., 3, 136 and Mart., I, 34, 7, etc.; Juv., I, 32; 7, 129; 11, 34, and Mart., VII, 10, 3-4, X, 46.

Rome greedy immigrants, he says (3, 69-70) that one man comes from Sicyon, another from Amydon,

hic Andro, ille Samo, hic Trallibus aut Alabandis. . . .

Notice the gap in the verse at *Samo//hic*. Why does Juvenal do that? Because he has the first page of the *Aeneid* at the back of his mind. There (I, 15-17) Vergil speaks of Carthage as the city

quam Iuno fertur terris magis omnibus unam
posthabita coluisse Samo.// hic illius arma
hic currus fuit. . . .

That allusion, too slight to be called parody, perhaps too tenuous to be deliberate, shows a close knowledge of the author Juvenal himself says he loved.³⁵

The other school author was Horace.³⁶ He was also one of Juvenal's predecessors in the field of satire. Temperamentally they were not sympathetic. Juvenal could not admire the friend of Octavian, the protégé of Maecenas.³⁷ He thought that folly was vice and sin was damnable, while Horace thought most vices were merely follies and most sins excusable. Juvenal hit hard, Horace teased and tickled. Lucilius (whom Horace mocked a little) was the chief model claimed by Juvenal, who speaks of Horace's satires only once, in a periphrasis.³⁸ And the peculiar style which Horace developed in his hexameter poems, that very light, chatty running metre with many little words and jolty rhythms and casual unpoetic verse-endings, is markedly different from the heavier, more sonorous, more energetic style of Juvenal. Still, Horace was a skilful poet. His phrases stick in the mind.

³⁵ Juv., 11, 180-2. Cf. 7, 233-6 for an exaggeration which shows how eagerly and closely Vergil was studied. On this subject see also J. Gehlen, *De Iuvenale Vergilii imitatore* (Göttingen, 1886), who finds that Juvenal copies Vergil much more in his early books than towards the end of his career. Gehlen wildly exaggerates scanty resemblances such as Juv., 10, 310 and Verg., *Buc.*, II, 17, but he is good on the persistence of echoes such as Verg., *Aen.*, I, 708 in Juv., 5, 12.

³⁶ Juv., 7, 226-7. The two are coupled again in 7, 56-71.

³⁷ On Octavian, see Juv., 5, 3-4; 8, 241-3; on the supine Maecenas, 1, 66 and 12, 39, with only one meagre compliment in 7, 94.

³⁸ 1, 51.

Juvenal was bound to admire him as a craftsman, and quotes or echoes him at least forty times.³⁹

These four were the poets he knew best. Next to them comes a small group of authors whom he apparently read less thoroughly, with an eye for bold pictures or striking phrases. Homer he says he admired.⁴⁰ In 9, 37 he produced a wicked parody of him, and he has eight or ten allusions, all rather obvious, to characters and incidents in the epics. There is no clear evidence that he knew any other Greek author. If this is true, it means that the bilingualism of the Golden Age of Roman literature was disappearing by Juvenal's time. He would not (like Horace) pack Plato next to Menander for vacation reading; he would not (like Persius) study Greek philosophers, or (like Martial) borrow effects from Greek poets. In this he looks forward to Augustine⁴¹ rather than back to Horace and Vergil. Anyhow, he loathed Grocco and the Greeks.

Cicero he respected personally, as a lover of freedom, a patriot, and a middle-class man from a country town like himself, who saw through the corrupt noblemen.⁴² His tribute to Cicero in 8, 231-44 seems more genuine than his gibes at Cicero's poetry and ambition in 10, 114-26. From the *Tusculan Discussions* and other philosophical treatises of Cicero Juvenal apparently took some arguments, and he alludes six or eight times to his speeches.⁴³

Although he never mentions Persius, and although his style, bold and expansive, differs widely from Persius' constricted, distorted wit, Juvenal apparently knew and occasionally imitated

³⁹ See further H. Berning, *Dissertatio de satirica poesi Q. Horatii Flacci collata cum satirica poesi D. Junii Juvenalis* (Recklingshausen, 1843); P. Schwartz, *De Juvenale Horatii imitatore* (Halle, 1882).

⁴⁰ 11, 180-2.

⁴¹ Aug., *Conf.*, I, 13, 20; 14, 23.

⁴² According to one theory, Juvenal himself at the outset of his career had been a *municipalis eques* like Cicero (8, 238).

⁴³ It is as usual difficult to determine whether these are real and conscious parallels. For instance, when Juvenal makes a hypocrite cry "*ubi nunc lex Iulia?*" (2, 37), is he thinking of "*ubi lex Caecilia et Didia?*" in Cic., *Phil.*, V, 8? For more on this subject see H. F. Rebert, "The literary influence of Cicero on Juvenal" (*T.A.P.A.*, LVII [1926], pp. 181-94), who derives part of Juvenal 10 from the *Oato maior*, and E. Strube, *De rhetorica Juvenalis disciplina* (Brandenburg, 1875), p. 2. On the *Tusculans* see H. J. Nutting in *A. J. P.*, XLIX (1928), pp. 253-266.

Persius' satires. There are of course a number of coincidences which are probably due to use of a common theme, a proverb, or a piece of slang: for instance, *rara avis* in Pers., 1, 46 and Juv., 6, 165, and purification in the Tiber in Pers., 2, 15-16 and Juv., 6, 523-4.⁴⁴

A few close imitations, however, show that Juvenal occasionally remembered his young predecessor's work. When he writes of the poor lawyer getting his fees in kind (7, 119-21):

quod uocis pretium? siccus petasunculus et uas
pelamydum, aut ueteres, Maurorum epimenia, bulbi,
aut uinum Tiberi deuectum, quinque lagonae,

he is surely thinking of Persius' description of the same humiliation (3, 73-6):

nec inuideas quod multa fidelia putet
in locuplete penu defensis pinguibus Vmbris,
et piper et pernae, Marsi monumenta clientis,
maenaeque quod prima nondum defecerat orca.

Persius describes a glutton seized with syncope after having a hot bath during a heavy meal, and goes on to sketch his funeral procession. Juvenal does practically the same, restating several of the most striking details, but compressing the whole picture.⁴⁵

But Juvenal's chief debt to Persius is like his debt to that other miniaturist Martial—for suggestions which he expands into large, apparently independent portraits or tirades. The whole of Persius 2 deals with foolish prayers: it is 75 lines long. The whole of Juvenal 10 deals with foolish prayers: it is 366 lines long. One of the foolish prayers is for long life—Persius gives it three lines (2, 41-3) and Juvenal a hundred and one (10, 188-288). Another is for good looks and happiness in love—Persius gives it nine lines (2, 31-40) and Juvenal fifty-six (10, 289-345). Persius ends (2, 71-5) by saying that what we really ought to pray for is

compositum ius fasque animo sanctosque recessus
mentis et incoctum generoso pectus honesto.

⁴⁴ So also Pers., 1, 112-14 and Juv., 1, 131. Odd little echoes in Pers., 2, 7 and Juv., 6, 18, Pers., 3, 26 and Juv., 3, 261.

⁴⁵ Pers., 3, 98-106 ~ Juv., 1, 142-6; compare also Pers., 1, 129-30 ~ Juv., 10, 100-102.

Virtue: yes, but Juvenal, who knew more of life, expanded this (10, 354-62) into the immortal

orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano:⁴⁶
fortem posce animum mortis terrore carentem. . . .

Juvenal speaks with envious deference of the rich young Lucan "content with his glory."⁴⁷ Several times he pays him the compliment of parody, and copies or echoes him ten or twelve times.

He based a number of striking phrases on the prose of Seneca, although he refused to accept Seneca's conclusions—and, what is more striking, he gives no sign of knowing the most sensational stories told by Seneca about vicious millionaires and cruel emperors. Some of Seneca's worst character-sketches would make not only Juvenal but his own Naevolus turn pale. We can conclude, then, that he did not read Seneca with sustained attention but knew some of Seneca's work and could not help admiring it.

These nine authors were the chief extant sources of Juvenal's style. We cannot say what he owed to others now lost. In a jest at the practice of hunting for sources, Housman once said that some scholar would soon assure us that the satires of Juvenal were all copied from the satires of Turnus.⁴⁸ There is scarcely enough evidence for even the most imaginative *Quellenforscher* to do that, and yet, when we hear that Turnus was a freedman's son who became influential in the courts of Titus and Domitian, and when we see that his only extant lines deal with Nero and the court-poisoner Locusta—two of Juvenal's own subjects, treated in Juvenal's method of retrospective satire—we cannot help wondering how closely Juvenal followed him.⁴⁹

Throughout the satires there are traces of Juvenal's acquaint-

⁴⁶ Here are other such expansions of brief passages:

Pers., 1, 114-23 ~ Juv., 1, 150-70;

Pers., 3, 27-9 ~ Juv., 8, 1-23;

Pers., 5, 132-42 ~ Juv., 14, 190-209, probably;

Pers., 6, 75-80 ~ Juv., 14, 322-31.

⁴⁷ Juv., 7, 79-80.

⁴⁸ Preface to Housman's edition of Juvenal (Cambridge, 1931²), p. xxviii.

⁴⁹ See Schol. Vall. on 1, 20 and Schol. on 1, 71.

ance with other Roman writers whose work survives. Apparently he cared very little for Republican poetry.⁵⁰ There are six or eight *known* borrowings from Lucilius;⁵¹ possibly three from Catullus⁵² and one or two from Terence.⁵³ From Lucretius Juvenal got four or five turns of phrase: probably he also knew Lucretius' diatribe on the passion of love, and his analysis of the growth of sympathy among mankind.⁵⁴ Odd as it seems, he knew Propertius' love-poems; he read them with Ovid's when his heart was young and soft.⁵⁵ Scholars have pointed out a few reminiscences of Livy, and there are parallels in Juvenal for the antiaristocratic bitterness of Sallust.⁵⁶ There are one or two parodies of Statius and one imitation.

Did he know Petronius? Any resemblances we might find between the rich nonchalant prosateur and the poor grim poet would surely be rather remote. And yet look at these:

Juv., 6, 146 collige sarcinulas ~ Petr., 81, 1: collegi sarcinulas

rara in tenui facundia panno (Juv., 7, 145)

sola pruinosis horret facundia pannis (Petr., 83, 10)

Note also that in 1, telling of the dangers of satirizing the

⁵⁰ In 9, 28 and 12, 127, *operae pretium* is too general a phrase to prove that he knew Ennius (fr. 14 Warmington): it is not a parody like Persius, 6, 9.

⁵¹ Lucilius, fr. 203-5 ~ Juv., 14, 322-9; fr. 331-2 ~ Juv., 10, 198-206; fr. 504-5 ~ Juv., 6, 461-5; fr. 1120 ~ Juv., 3, 142-3; fr. 1145 ~ Juv., 10, 65-6; fr. 1337 ~ Juv., 9, 89; possibly fr. 638 ~ Juv., 9, 18, and perhaps fr. 1378 ~ Juv., 14, 207 (see Marx *ad loc.*).

⁵² Cat., 3, 18 ~ Juv., 6, 7-8; also Cat., 62, 2 ~ Juv., 8, 87; Cat., 101, 9 ~ Juv., 15, 136; Cat., 103, 2 ~ Juv., 2, 77, these last three very tenuous.

⁵³ Ter., *Andr.*, 126 ~ Juv., 1, 168, and probably *Haut.*, 77 ~ Juv., 15, 142; but *Haut.*, 77 and Juv., 6, 284, *Andr.*, 314 and Juv., 3, 209 can be neglected.

⁵⁴ Lucr., I, 919 and II, 976 ~ Juv., 3, 100-1; Lucr., III, 1018 ~ Juv., 13, 193-4; Lucr., V, 907 ~ Juv., 6, 11; Lucr., V, 1011 f. ~ Juv., 15, 151-8. We can probably neglect Lucr., III, 299 and Juv., 1, 166, Lucr., III, 1048 and Juv., 1, 57, the contexts being so widely different.

⁵⁵ Prop., II, 32, 2 ~ Juv., 13, 210 perhaps; Prop., II, 9, 41 and IV, 11, 37 ~ Juv., 8, 146-50; Prop., III, 25, 1 ~ Juv., 15, 42; Prop., IV, 7, 1 ~ Juv., 2, 149.

⁵⁶ Livy, I, 13, 2 ~ Juv., 6, 164; Livy, V, 32, 6 ~ Juv., 11, 111-14; Livy, XXV, 40, 2 ~ Juv., 11, 100; Sall., *Jug.*, 85, 23 ~ Juv., 8, 139.

living, he foretells disaster for anyone who attacks Tigellinus. Now, although the *Satirica* is not a direct satire on Nero's courtiers, it is possible that the vulgar millionaire Trimalchio is an indirect caricature of Tigellinus,⁵⁷ and it was Tigellinus who was responsible for Petronius' death. It was not far behind Juvenal, all that. He had seen men who had joined in Nero's revels.⁵⁸ But perhaps his pervasive grudge against the rich and noble would keep him from giving the Arbiter of Taste his due.

Other assertions about Juvenal's knowledge of literature have been made, but sometimes they are based on inadequate parallels and sometimes they suffer from the twin assumptions that he must have known *all* the books available to us and could have known *no others*. For example, his first words are a protest against the constant outpouring of meaningless literature which he hears at recitations. He exclaims

Semper ego auditor tantum?

as though he had sprung up from his seat in a recital hall and turned to face the audience. Many have suggested that the angry phrase was inspired by Horace (*Ep.*, I, 19, 39):

Non ego nobilium scriptorum auditor et ultor.

Yet the word *auditor* is common enough; the contexts are only remotely similar; the rhythms are quite different. Again, it is usually said that the opening of satire 6, on the Golden Age, is taken from Hesiod's *Works and Days*; yet there are no clear verbal parallels, there is no proof that Juvenal ever thought of reading Hesiod (would anyone, with Vergil's *Georgics* available?), and he could find dozens of Roman mythological poems and manuals about the Golden Age which have now disappeared. He himself complains that there is far too much contemporary poetry for anyone to cope with.⁵⁹

So then we have looked through Juvenal's bookcase, as far as we can still read the titles and recognize the books.⁶⁰ It

⁵⁷ See G. Highet, "Petronius the moralist," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXII (1941), p. 190, n. 42.

⁵⁸ Juv., 4, 136-40: *tempestate mea*.

⁵⁹ Juv., 1, 2-18.

⁶⁰ Besides those cited in the notes, the following are useful in discussing Juvenal's sources: J. de Decker, *Juvenalis declamans* (Ghent,

tells us several things about him. As we could have guessed, he cared little for Greek literature, and would have scorned to justify himself, as Horace did, by parading a list of Greek models.⁶¹ In Latin he knew the best available non-dramatic poems and knew them very well, with the general exception that (like all Silver Age writers) he neglected the poets of the Republic. His style was really formed by Vergil, Ovid, and Martial more than by his fellow-satirists. His thought came from the bitter experiences of his own career and from the absurd and revolting sights he saw around him every day in every street and house.⁶² It was partly the earlier satirists who helped him to give it artistic form, partly the philosophical essayists and propagandists of the Silver Age, and partly the neat, compact, vivid skill of Martial. When he himself speaks of his own work, he claims that it is in the most energetic tradition of satire, that of Lucilius, but also that it rivals epic and tragedy, either by mocking them or by outdoing them in gravity; and he says that thereby it has transcended the limits set by his predecessors.⁶³ Evidently he did this by combining the strong common sense of Lucilius and the moral purpose of his own philosophical models like Seneca, with Martial's acute and pitiless observation and his power to create deathlessly bitter epigrams, with the variety and verbal dexterity of Ovid, and finally with the scope, the power, and the loftiness of Vergil. It was through the multiplicity and the grandeur of his models that Juvenal raised satire to the level of great poetry.

GILBERT HIGHET.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

1913); C. Hosius, *Apparatus criticus ad Iuvenalem* (Bonn, 1888); R. Weise, *Vindiciae Iuvenalianae* (Halle, 1884), III. Friedländer's edition gives many parallels, which vary so much in probability that they have to be scrutinized with care before acceptance.

⁶¹ Hor., *Serm.*, I, 4, 1-2, *Ep.*, I, 19, 23-5.

⁶² Juv., I, 63-4, *medio quadriuiro*; 13, 160, *una domus*.

⁶³ Juv., I, 19-20; 4, 34-6 (jestingly, but note the mock epic tone); 6, 634-61, an important passage; 15, 13-32.

THE PLATONIC SYNONYMS, ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ
AND ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ.

I.

One of the main Platonic theses is the unity of the virtues. But two of the cardinal virtues—δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη—bear a closer relationship to each other than usually is meant by “the unity of the virtues.” In Plato’s most characteristic usage these terms are practically synonymous.

Anyone who has read the *Republic* carefully has been irked by the difficulty of establishing exactly the difference between the two virtues as they are discovered in book IV, 430 D-434 C, where, to make matters worse, Socrates apparently assumes that the difference is obvious. But the commentators, after careful examination of the text, do supply distinctions. The effort of Barker is a typical one. He says,

If justice, which is faithfulness in discharge of function, is deficient without its corollary of a harmony, or fitting together, of the different functions, self control, in the sense in which it is defined by Plato, supplies that corollary. It has the nature of harmony and symphony (430 E): it extends to the whole of society, running through all the notes of the scale, and producing a harmony of the weaker, the stronger, and the middle class (432 A).¹

Or consider the lines recently drawn by John Wild:

Justice, which runs through the whole and is not especially restricted to one part, is simply the order itself, viewed from the higher down to the lower, each part *determining* what lies beneath it, or “managing its own affairs.” Temperance, which also runs through the whole, is the hierarchy viewed from the lower up to the higher, each part being *determined by* what lies above it or being properly harmonized. . . . Justice is active and causal, temperance is passive and consequential. . . . Justice comes first. . . . Temperance follows as a result. . . .²

¹ *Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors* (2nd ed., London, 1925), p. 178.

² *Plato's Theory of Man* (Harvard U. Press, 1946), p. 157 and note 94 on that page.

Finally, look at the distinction proposed by that great Platonist, Paul Shorey:

Σωφροσύνη . . . is in man and state the willing acceptance by all the psychic faculties and the corresponding classes in the population of a harmonious scale of subordination from the higher to lower. It is thus the precondition and obverse aspect of justice which is the fulfilment of its own function by each faculty and class. . . .³

All of these definitions express the essential unity of σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη which is posited in Plato's presenting both as virtues of the relationship of parts to the whole. Moreover, they are scrupulously accurate restatements of points in *Republic* IV, 430 D-435 B, 441 C-444 A. The dependence upon this limited segment of Plato's work is what is wrong with the definitions if they are taken to represent the Platonic outlook as a whole. For the lines so carefully drawn in these pages of the *Republic* do not hold for the rest of Plato, although, as I shall show later, the essential meaning of the two terms is constant throughout.

The trouble is that these interpreters have allowed themselves to be deceived by the half seriousness of the method of residues, despite the commonplace that the method of residues is simply a literary device for presenting ideas which Plato has assumed at the outset. That these over-carefully constructed definitions are not to be rigidly adhered to is indicated already in *Republic*, IV, 444 B-C. Here injustice is defined as civil war (στάσις), meddlingness, interference, revolt of one part against the other—a situation which is the direct opposite of σωφροσύνη as well as of δικαιοσύνη as these are defined in the context. And here too, justice is presented as the health of the body, the "natural relation of controlling and being controlled"; but this description fits both notions equally well, and elsewhere actually is applied to σωφροσύνη as well as to the other.

For a reliable conception of Plato's ideas of justice and sobriety one must study all his works, and not depend on book IV of the *Republic* alone. Moreover, one must compare the Platonic drift with the notions of these virtues found in his predecessors and contemporaries. One must see which of the factors in the current notions he tends to emphasize and what

³ *The Unity of Plato's Thought* (U. of Chicago Press, 1903), pp. 15-16.

new interpretations he gives; then one will see what are characteristically Plato's conceptions.

It is the thesis of this paper that Plato's characteristic use of *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη* is a loose one in which the two virtues are essentially synonymous. In Plato both of them denote three things: (1) the natural differentiation of the faculties of the soul (and, by analogy only, of persons in society); (2) the appropriate subordination of the ruled elements to the ruling; (3) the resultant harmony or orderliness which is the normal condition of health in the soul (and in the state). The *differentiae* are supplied by a varying group of connotations. These usually are holdovers from the current notions; sometimes they shift from one virtue to the other, and often they are shared by both of them.

The thesis does not hold that Plato always or even most of the time uses the terms in exactly the manner outlined. In fact, often he uses them to say only what everyone else in his day understood by them. Each term still carries usages peculiar to itself. This is particularly true of *σωφροσύνη* which, for example, in *Phaedrus* 237 E means restraint or self-control, quite as the pre-Platonics used it. And the fact that Plato uses the state and political affairs in the *Republic* to furnish the illustration of the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη* suggests that he still respects the associations which that term had for his predecessors and contemporaries. Likewise, however, the fact that for Plato the political discussion of the *Republic* is just an illustration in large of a virtue in the soul suggests that he was not satisfied with a current understanding which had *δικαιοσύνη* growing from primarily legal roots. So he redefines it very carefully in the direction of *σωφροσύνη* by means of an analysis of the three denotations listed above. And this new use of the two terms occurs in such crucial passages and so frequently that it cannot be considered the result of chance or a passing fancy. It must be taken as that which is *distinctively Plato's own* understanding of the two virtues.

The procedure in the remainder of this paper will be four-fold: first, to sketch the usage of the two terms in the pre-Platonic period; second, to summarize briefly certain data gathered from the study of all the dialogues; third, to examine in detail Plato's treatment of the two virtues in four crucial dialogues—the *Gorgias*, the *Republic*, the *Statesman*, and the *Laws*; and

fourth, to consider the significance of the tendency studied. In addition, it should be noted at the outset that although this paper is based upon a study of every occurrence of *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη*, it is not a report of everything related to these terms. It does not deal, for example, with any of the concrete principles such as the restriction of private property or the abolition of the family which are urged in the *Republic's* consideration of *δικαιοσύνη*. On the other hand, it does not list the uses of *σωφροσύνη* which fall into the traditional categories of that word. It is concerned only with Plato's tendency to use these virtues of the soul as equivalents for each other, a fact which is seen primarily in his treatment of political subjects where the new use, involving mainly a redefinition of *δικαιοσύνη*, demands it.

II.

In the pre-Platonic usage there are three facets of *σωφροσύνη*. First, it indicates sound judgment, wisdom, as in Homer's *Odyssey* Penelope says to Eurycleia,

Μαῖα φίλη, μάργην σε θεοὶ θέσαν, οἷ τε δύνανται
ἄφρονα ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐπίφρονά περ μάλ' ἔοντα,
καὶ τε χαλιφρονέοντα σοοφροσύνης ἐπέβησαν. (XXIII, 13)⁴

Second, it indicates moderation in life, restraint of passion. Euripides furnishes the clearest example:

μάκαρες οἳ μετρίας θεοῦ
μετά τε σωφροσύνας μετέ-
σχον λέκτρων Ἀφροδίτας
γαλανεῖα χρυσάμενοι
μαινολῶν οἴστρων.⁵

The third facet involves a combination of both these meanings in a particular way so often that it should be given a separate category. This is the use of *σωφροσύνη* as the opposite of *ὑβρις*,

⁴ See also *Od.*, XXIII, 30; *Theognis*, 701; Thucydides, I, 32, 4; and Aristophanes, *Aves*, 1540.

⁵ *Iph. Aul.*, 544. See also *Medea*, 636; *Hipp.* fragment 18, 2 (I, 1463 in the Loeb Classical Library edition); *Theognis*, 1138; Thucydides, I, 84, 3; III, 37, 3; and VIII, 64, 5; Aristophanes, *Plutus*, 563; *Lys.*, 508; Critias in Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (5te Aufl., Berlin, 1934-37), II, p. 379, line 14; and Antiphon the Sophist in Diels, II, p. 363, lines 13 ff.

overweening arrogance and outrage. So Thucydides says, 'Εν δ' οὖν τῇ Κερκύρα τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν προετολμήθη, καὶ ὁπόσ' ἂν ὕβρει μὲν ἀρχόμενοι τὸ πλεόν ἢ σωφροσύνη ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν τιμωρίαν παρασχόντων οἱ ἀνταμυνόμενοι δράσειαν. . . .⁶ All these facets are closely related, of course, and it is not always possible to determine which of them predominates and how in a given passage, especially if a large context is not available. Hence the inability to classify such sayings as these of Democritus: πατρὸς σωφροσύνη μέγιστον τέκνοις παράγγελμα. ἰσχὺς καὶ εὐμορφίη νεότητος ἀγαθὰ, γήραος δὲ σωφροσύνη ἄνθος.⁷ Here the elements have been combined into a term of virtue in which none of them rules. But such general passages are rare in pre-Socratic writing.

In the same period δικαιοσύνη is found much less frequently than σωφροσύνη. It means justice or righteousness in two primary senses. First, it points to lawfulness, legality and justice in connection with judging in governing, as in Herodotus' noting that Deiocles προθυμότερον δικαιοσύνην ἐπιθέμενος ἤσκει· καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι εὐούσης ἀνομίης πολλῆς ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν Μηδικὴν ἐποίησε (I, 96). The same idea is found in a writing of the Pythagorean school which comes to us by way of Aristoxenus and Iamblichus, in which it is held that constitutions, laws, righteousness, and justice (δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ τὰ δίκαια) are established by the gods.⁸ Thucydides uses the term twice in the context of reference to government and judging,⁹ and Antiphon the Sophist says that δικαιοσύνη is not transgressing any of the ordinances of the state.¹⁰ In the second sense δικαιοσύνη means faithfulness, reliability, such, for example, that one could be depended upon to keep safely a deposit of money for another. Herodotus twice uses it so and also in the wider sense of faithfulness of allies.¹¹

More frequently than σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη occurs as a virtue

⁶ III, 84, 1. See also Theognis, 379; Sophocles, *Ajax*, 1259; Euripides, *Hipp.*, 1365; and Aristophanes, *Plutus*, 563.

⁷ Diels, II, p. 187, line 16 and p. 206, line 12.

⁸ Diels, I, p. 468, lines 38 ff.

⁹ I, 96; II, 151.

¹⁰ Diels, II, p. 346, line 1. The relation of law to δικαιοσύνη is suggested also by the title of the spurious work attributed to Archytas, *περὶ νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης*; see Diels, I, p. 349, line 26; and by Hecataeus' saying that the Egyptians laid down laws on the subject of δικαιοσύνη; Diels, II, p. 242, line 23.

¹¹ VI, 86; VII, 164 and 52.

with no specific character designated. Theognis says that it "contains the sum of all virtue" and that "every good man . . . is righteous" (147-148). And Thrasyarchus observes that *οἱ θεοὶ οὐχ ὁρῶσι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθῶν παρείδον τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ταύτην μὴ χρωμένους*.¹² Philodemus quotes Damon as holding that the study of music advances one in all virtue, *μὴ μόνον ἀνδρείαν . . . καὶ σωφροσύνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ δικαιοσύνην*.¹³ But Herodotus, who uses the term seven times, never has it without a particularizing context.

Thus the two terms in this period have definite characters, in no sense intermingled, although each is a part of virtue in man. They cannot be merged until the legality side of *δικαιοσύνη* is at a minimum and has come to mean primarily a state of the psyche characterized by order and harmony. This redefinition toward *σωφροσύνην* Plato makes, as we shall see in the following sections.

III.

Running through the dialogues is a series of associations of justice with sobriety which strongly hints an intimate connection between them. The mere frequency with which they are mentioned in the same breath is suggestive. Justice and temperance go together as no other pair of virtues do.¹⁴ But this association of the two is by no means peculiar to Plato. It is found frequently in Isocrates, and once definitely in Theognis.¹⁵

One of the basic ties between them is that both are known as distinctively social virtues. Hence both of them concern the relation of the classes of the state to one another. In the discussion of the transmigration of souls in the *Phaedo*, Socrates says,

. . . the happiest . . . and those who go to the best place,

¹² Diels, II, p. 326, line 17.

¹³ Diels, I, p. 383, lines 14-15.

¹⁴ See, e.g., *Symp.*, 196 CD; *Meno*, 73 B, 79 A; *Prot.*, 323 AB; *Rep.*, 500 D, 501 B, 506 D, 591 B; *Laws*, 632 C, 660 E, 696 C, 710 A, 906 AB; also *Phaedr.*, 247 DE, 250 B.

¹⁵ *Demoniacus*, 15; *Nicoles*, 29, 41, 43; *On the Peace*, 63; *Ag. the Sophists*, 21; *Panathenaicus*, 138. Theognis, 377-380. See too Damon, *On Music*, in Diels, I, p. 383, line 15.

are those who have practised, by nature and habit, without philosophy or reason, the social and civil virtues which are called moderation and justice (οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην). . . .¹⁶

A similar conception is attributed to Protagoras, who says that Zeus, in distributing the virtues, decided that αἰδώς and δίκη should be given to all the members of the populace, for otherwise cities could not be formed. And, for this reason, he explains,

people in cities, and especially in Athens . . . , when they meet for a consultation on civic art, where they should be guided throughout by justice and good sense (δικαιοσύνης . . . καὶ σωφροσύνης), naturally allow advice from everybody, since it is held that everyone should partake of this excellence, or else that states cannot be (*Prot.*, 322 D-323 A).

Isocrates expresses a similar idea in the *Panathenaicus* where he recalls that in Athens' better days her kings trained the people "in virtue and justice and great sobriety" (ἐν ἀρετῇ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ πολλῇ σωφροσύνῃ, 138).

Both excellences are described as orderliness in the soul and state. The terms used vary, the most frequent ones being order (κοσμιότης), harmony (ἁρμονία), and health (ὕγεια).¹⁷ From this point Plato proceeds to show that law is rightly called justice, since it is the expression of the natural order in the state.¹⁸ This is the basis of his refutation of ethical relativism.

Finally, each of the two is called the virtue *par excellence*. In the *Charmides* Socrates himself says practically nothing constructive about his own notion of σωφροσύνη except that he has a presentiment that it is good and that it "is admitted to be the noblest thing in the world (ὁ γε κάλλιστον πάντων)." ¹⁹ In

¹⁶ *Phaedo*, 82 B; cf. also *Rep.*, VI, 500 D; *Laws*, IV, 711 D. The text and translations of the Loeb Classical Library have been used, although in a few instances necessary changes in the translation have been made.

¹⁷ *Gorg.*, 504 D, 507 AB, 524 E; *Rep.*, IV, 430 E, 444 D, 445 B; *Laws*, V, 728 BC, 734 A-E. Cf. *Phaedo*, 69 B. See W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (Oxford U. Press, 1939-44), II, p. 242.

¹⁸ *Crito*, 53 C, 54 B; *Gorg.*, 504. Cf. *Symp.*, 196 CD; *Rep.*, II, 359A; *Statesman* 294 E; *Laws*, V, 730 D. See Jaeger, *op. cit.*, II, p. 202. See too R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes* (Leipzig, 1907), p. 199, note 1.

¹⁹ 169 B, 175 A; cf. also 159 C, 161 A, 165 D, 172 D, 174 B.

the *Gorgias* Socrates defines the superior man as the one who first of all rules himself (491 D); but the conclusion of the dialogue is that the goal and way of life is that of justice and all virtue (*καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν*, 527 E). We have already noticed the blessedness declared to be awaiting the just and sober one after this life (*Phaedo*, 82 B). The *Republic* and the *Laws* give both of them as the supreme virtue,²⁰ the sum of all virtue,²¹ the *sine qua non* for having human goods,²² and the goal toward which laws and statesmen are oriented.²³

IV.

The *Gorgias* is the first of the Platonic dialogues in which there is a sustained consideration of the notions involved in both of the virtues. The conversation between Callicles and Socrates revolves around that axis. Callicles argues that justice is simply a matter of convention, is contrary to nature, and is heeded only by those too weak to satisfy their desires by their own strength and wit. This is but a more blatant and aggressive form of the stand taken by Antiphon the sophist, and, we may suppose, was a widespread view in that day.²⁴ Socrates replies that the good man and the happy man is the temperate one (*σώφρονα ὄντα*), who first of all rules himself (491 D), whose soul is orderly; and men say that such orderliness is law and such a person is law abiding (504 D).

In 506 E-508 C the unity of *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη* is clearly seen. Socrates reasons that the virtue of anything is the orderliness appropriate to it, and the orderly soul is temperate (*σώφρων*). Since the temperate man (*ὁ σώφρων*) does what is fitting toward the gods and men, he is, therefore, pious and just (*δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον*). Being also brave, he is altogether the perfection of a good man. Summarizing this argument, Socrates says that "anyone who desires to be happy must ensue and practise temperance (*σωφροσύνην*), and flee from licentiousness

²⁰ *Rep.*, I, 335; *Gorg.*, 527 E. Cf. *Laws*, V, 733 E, X, 906 AB, XII, 964 B. Cf. Thrasyarchus, Diels, *op. cit.*, II, p. 326, line 17.

²¹ *Laws*, I, 630 C; cf. V, 734 D. Cf. also Theognis, 145-148.

²² *Laws*, II, 660 E-661 C; *Rep.*, IV, 433 B; *Laws*, III, 697 B, IV, 710 A.

²³ *Gorg.*, 491; *Laws*, I, 630 C, 632 C, IX, 862 E; cf. *Laws*, XII, 963 A.

²⁴ Grenfell and Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* (London, 1915), XI, no. 1364, pp. 92-104. Cf. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, II, p. 202.

(ἀκολασίαν) . . ." (507 D). But a few lines further down his summary has changed slightly in appearance, though not in meaning:

he should concentrate all his own and his city's efforts on this one business of providing a man who would be blessed with the needful justice and temperance (δικαιοσύνη . . . καὶ σωφροσύνη); not letting one's desires go unrestrained and in one's efforts to satisfy them—an interminable trouble—leading the life of a robber (507 E).

Here the same excellence of the soul is called "justice and temperance." This happens again in 508 A and B.

But if temperance is the key virtue, as Socrates has shown, why should it yield way at all to justice in the crucial summary? The reasons are clear. (1) The central discussion of the dialogue is on justice, temperance having been introduced as a bridge in the argument, and so Socrates returns to justice in the summary. (2) The two terms are basically synonymous, otherwise Socrates could not have conjoined them here without a qualification which he does not give. (3) Another factor, which superficially appears to be that qualification, enters the picture. Socrates insists that if a man is not free of wrong-doing, he will do better to be corrected than not; this correction is called δίκη (507 D). Thus in 508 B he explains the proper work of the rhetorician to be that of accusing a wrong-doer so that he may be corrected. For this reason the rhetorician must be just and well informed on the ways of justice (τῶν δικαίων). The use of δίκη for punishment is ancient; but here Plato interprets punishment as the remedy establishing the needed temperance and orderliness in the wrongdoer. Thus appears another association of the general notion of justice with that of temperance. But this association in itself does not explain the joining of δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη; for in Plato the former word never denotes simply the result of punishment or correction (δίκη). That union is due to the inner bond which Plato sees between the two ideas.

Somewhat later Socrates indicts the leaders of Athens who cater to the desires of the people rather than treat their ills. The body of Athens is stuffed, bloated, and diseased. Yet the people praise those who brought on the condition, those who "with no regard for temperance and justice (σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης)

. . . have stuffed the city with harbors and arsenals and walls and tribute and suchlike trash" (519 A). Again justice is used in a context which ordinarily would refer only to temperance.

At the conclusion of the dialogue (523-527) *σωφροσύνη* as a term has dropped out of the picture entirely and its place is filled by *δικαιοσύνη*. The latter is now seen to be the larger, more inclusive term. It takes in being corrected and cured as well as living the sober life. It carries some of the usual connotations, such as paying what one rightfully owes another (520 D).

Plato's use of the two terms in section three of the dialogue, between Socrates and Callicles (481-end), contains a definite *tendenz*. Both point to the order and health in the soul which results when a man properly subordinates the appetitive element to the reasoning one. And this basic idea is the thing Plato emphasizes; the customary associations, though present, receive no attention. So we understand perfectly that he points to the temperate life when in the closing words Socrates urges, "Let us therefore take as our guide the doctrine now disclosed, which indicates to us that this way of life is best—to live and die in the practise alike of justice and of all other virtue" (*καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν . . .* 527 E).

The main problem of the *Republic*, which is set in the second book after several notions of justice have been dismissed in book one, is essentially the same one that faced Socrates in the *Gorgias*: how rout those who think justice is mere convention? And although the *Republic* is more comprehensive, it revolves in large part around the same crucial conception of temperance and justice as the healthy order of the soul and state. The ideal of health and harmony is explicitly introduced in the latter part of the third book. Plato draws an extended analogy between the physician and the judge (405-410); the latter treats the illnesses of the state and of individuals. But the young men who through simple "music" have had sobriety engendered in them will "guard themselves against falling into the need of the justice of the court-room (*δικαστικῆς*)" (410 A).

The definitions of the two virtues in the fourth book are the most careful ones in Plato; hence they deserve and have always received much attention. *Σωφροσύνη* is described as

a kind of concord and harmony . . . a kind of order and a

continence of certain pleasures and appetites, as they say, using the phrase "master of himself" . . . [i. e., in that] the superior rules the inferior . . . (430 E, 431 B).

[It is] the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and in the individual (432 A).

Justice (δικαιοσύνη) is "the principle of doing one's own business (τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν)"; and this phrase, catching the attention of all, has been over-emphasized (433 A). Plato himself repeatedly hedges it: "this . . . or some form of this, is justice" (433 A); ". . . we were speaking of it in a sense (τρόπον τινά)" (432 E); ". . . if taken in a certain sense (κινδυνεύει τρόπον τινά)" (433 B). These reservations are first deliberately explained pages later. Socrates, having tested his principle by applying it to the individual, then gives the first fully rounded definition of δικαιοσύνη. The principle they chanced upon at the outset, that each one ought to do what he is naturally fitted for, is only "a sort of adumbration of justice":

. . . ἡ δικαιοσύνη is indeed something of this kind (τοιούτου μέν τι), yet not in regard to the doing of one's own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one's self, and the things of one's self—it means that a man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose well of what in the true sense of the word is properly his own, and having first attained to self-mastery and beautiful order within himself, and having harmonized these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms, quite literally the lowest, the highest and the mean, and all others there may be between them, and having linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit, one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to practise it if he find ought to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendance of the body or it may be in political action or private business, in all such doings believing and naming the just and honorable action to be that which preserves and helps to produce this condition of the soul, and wisdom the science that presides over such conduct . . . (443 C-444 A).

It is understandable that the catch-phrase of the earlier pages should be preferred to this page-long, one-sentence, all-inclusive

definition. But which more accurately and completely reveals Plato's meaning? And in the face of this analysis what becomes of the sort of distinction made by Popper (and others): "Temperance . . . can be clearly distinguished from justice. Justice means to keep one's place; temperance means to be satisfied with it."²⁵ The comprehensive description of justice swallows up the individuality of temperance. But, more important, Plato could have substituted *σωφροσύνη* for *δικαιοσύνη* at the beginning of that page and he would have had just as true a definition. Indeed, elsewhere he does present temperance as that supreme and all-inclusive virtue.²⁶

That Plato intends justice to be understood in terms of the long definition is indicated by the fact that he places this statement at the climactic end of the patient search. But the basic synonymy of justice and sobriety is visible in a critical scrutiny even of the shorter definitions. Exactly what does Plato mean in saying that *σωφροσύνη* is "the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and in the individual" (432 A)? He is explicitly affirming that there is a natural differentiation of faculties and an appropriate subordination among them which results in the normal harmony of the soul. This is precisely what he means when he says that justice is the principle of "doing one's own business," and is ". . . a quality which made it possible for the other three virtues to grow up in the body politic and which preserves them as long as it is present" (433 A-B).

To establish a distinction between the two one must stress the element of "harmony" in temperance and the "doing of one's own" in justice. Actually in both terms there are these two factors, agreement and doing. Temperance makes the first explicit and implies the second; justice implies the first and makes the second explicit. But certainly Plato was not really interested in such precious distinctions. (He could make them, yet with his tongue in his cheek, as the *Cratylus* testifies. But is one to approach the *Republic* in the same mood as one does the *Cratylus*?) Moreover, such definitions depend upon the common connotations of the words. And these are not in themselves the key to the interpretation of Plato, but are merely the key to the

²⁵ K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, I: *The Spell of Plato* (London, 1945), p. 85.

²⁶ See notes 10-13.

world of discourse which he inherited and upon which he was to place his peculiar stamp.

If one insists on the narrow definitions, then he is confronted almost immediately by a blurring of the lines. In 433 D δικαιοσύνη is described as self-mastery, order, harmony. A little later injustice is presented as civil strife (στάσις), meddlesomeness, interference with one another's functions (444 B); but this is just as clearly the opposite of temperance. And the same is true of 444 C, D, and 445 A where justice and injustice are matters of health and disease, of dominating and being dominated, of controlling and being controlled.

The remainder of the *Republic* strengthens this impression. Justice, in the descriptions of the oligarch²⁷ and the tyrant,²⁸ is forcibly holding down the evil desires, and injustice (ἀδικεῖν) is being ruled by one's appetites. The tyrant, the most unjust and evil one, is intemperance incarnate; he is the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal.²⁹ In contrast, Socrates proclaims "the best man and the most righteous (δικαιότατον) to be the happiest, and . . . he is the one who is most kingly and a king over himself . . ." (580 C). There can be no doubt. The opposite of injustice is justice or temperance, for the latter two mean essentially the same.

When we move to the *Statesman* we encounter a purpose and mood quite different from that in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*. Here Plato is striving to define the office and appropriate mode of action of the statesman in a practically functioning state. His primary concern is no longer in the realm of the ideal good or of the *virtue* justice. Now he looks to the way in which justice will manifest itself in the state. For this reason the word δικαιοσύνη, which denotes the sphere of personal and ideal virtue, does not occur in the dialogue. Justice in this work deals specifically with things customarily understood by that term, such as good government or legislation³⁰ or the obligation of contracts.³¹ To refer to these he uses the regular terms—ὁ δίκαιος, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ ἄδίκον, and so on.

Nevertheless, the basic conception is regulative even though it is not the main subject of discussion; and it is brought to the

²⁷ VIII, 554 CE.

²⁸ 571-580 C.

²⁹ 573 BC.

³⁰ 266 C, 293 E, 296 D, 297 A; cf. *Crito*, 53 C, 54 B, *Symp.*, 196 CD.

³¹ 294 E, 305 B.

foreground at the end of the dialogue (305 E-311 C) when the essence of *πολιτική* itself is described. The kingly art is that of weaving into a state all the types of natures to be found among its citizens. Three presuppositions underlie this interpretation of *πολιτική*. In the first place, there are natural differences among people. Some persons are by nature bad and must be disposed of. Others are good or potentially so; these are to be educated and given right opinion by the ruler. And there are two sorts of the good people, (1) those who tend to be positive, active, impetuous, and brave, whose virtue is *ἀνδρεία*, and (2) those who tend to be restrained, quiet, orderly, with the virtue of *κοσμιότης* or *σωφροσύνη*. In addition, there is the nature of the ruler who combines both traits and is preëminently wise. The second presupposition is that this natural differentiation calls for the subjection of the people to the ruler (and the laws) so that he can combine the several natures. Thirdly, the result of his work is the smooth, well-woven fabric. Thus analysis shows that the characteristically Platonic conception of *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη* rules in the *Statesman* too.

But further analysis also reveals the customary interchange of connotations while Plato deals with this regulative idea. We have noticed previously the association of the notions of justice and order. In this dialogue Plato presents the closest affiliation between *σωφροσύνη* and *κοσμιότης*.³² In addition, the Athenian stranger puts justice in the category of the gentle and orderly. He holds that the rugged nature without "inspiration of the kingly art" tends to be brutal, but with it is "made gentle (*ἡμεροῦται*) and would . . . then be most ready to partake of justice (*τῶν δικαίων*)" (309 DE). Those of self-restrained natures without admixture of the opposite are "exceedingly careful and just and conservative, but they lack keenness and a certain quick and active boldness" (311 A).

On the basis of these data one is compelled to judge that Barker fails to specify the *characteristically Platonic* when he says,

. . . justice, in the sense of the discharge of specific function, is not the ideal of the *Politicus*, but rather the virtue which in the *Republic* is called temperance or self-control; and it is the blending of different types in a unison, rather

³² 308 E, 309 B, 310 CD; cf. *Gorg.*, 504 D, 508 A.

than the specialization of different classes on their separate functions, that is emphasized.³³

Doubtless it is true that the *Statesman* stresses blending. But for Plato himself this is not *the* determinative element in temperance. It is only one of several basic notions which both justice and temperance denote.

In mood and heightened interest in practical matters the *Laws* resembles the *Statesman*. It is similar also in the scarcity of the word δικαιοσύνη, which occurs only about a dozen times, although nearly always in crucial passages. Here too justice—still a dominant idea—usually is expressed by the other forms of the root. And far more frequently than in the *Republic* one finds the word justice carrying the ordinary connotations.

However, the political structure which Plato outlines and implements with copious legislation still is determined by the threefold conception of differentiation, subordination, and harmony. He does not take pains to explain clearly and justify these presuppositions. He could assume that his readers would know them from the *Republic*. But the cleft between the synod—the brains of the state—and the populace is sharp enough. So too is the proper position to be held by each. And the ideal of a unified, orderly, and self-sustaining city is omnipresent.

The question is then: do justice and temperance hold such a position in the work that these controlling postulates may fairly be said to be aspects of them? And are justice and temperance in this work fundamentally synonymous? To both parts the answer is yes. Let us approach the problem by way of the latter.

The first hint of the unity is the blurring of the boundaries of the respective terms through exchange of connotations. Plato repeatedly sets justice as the opposite or injustice as the synonym of excess and licentiousness, especially of ὕβρις.³⁴ He returns several times to the familiar motive of justice and temperance as the health of the soul or state. Δίκη here as in the *Gorgias* is nothing but a beneficial cure to be sought by the one needing it; one must not call this punishment bad or a shameful thing.³⁵

Such clues lead the way to the deliberate definition of justice in book nine. The context is the effort to distinguish injustice

³³ *Op. cit.*, p. 283.

³⁴ E. g., II, 661 E, IV, 713 C, IX, 863-4, X, 906 BC.

³⁵ V, 728 BC, 735 B-736 C, IX, 862-3, X, 906 BC, XII, 962.

from injuries (βλάβαι), which, in turn, is a part of the Athenian's argument that no man does injustice voluntarily (860 C-864 C). His point is that injustice is a quality of the character of the individual, not of his act itself, and is quite distinct from the "acts causing loss" which he does.³⁶ Having established this point, the Athenian summarizes,

Now I will define for you clearly and without complication my notion of justice and injustice (τὸ τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον). The domination of passion (θυμός) and fear and pleasure and pain and envies and desires in the soul, whether they do any injury or not, I term generally "injustice"; but the belief in the highest good (τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξαν)—in whatsoever way either states or individuals think they can attain to it,—if this prevails in their souls and regulates every man, even if some damage be done, we must assert that every thing thus done is just, and that in each man the part subject to this government is also just, and best for the whole life of mankind . . . (863 E-864 A).

He then recalls the three main types of sinning:

Of these, one kind . . . is painful; and that we term passion (θυμός) and fear. . . . The second kind consists of pleasure and desires; the third, which is a distinct kind, consists of hopes and untrue belief regarding the attainment of the highest good (ἀρίστου).

This definition of justice immediately points to temperance. The picture of injustice given here without a single change would qualify as a characterization of intemperance, either for Plato or his contemporaries. And the definition of justice obviously points back to the delineations of both justice and temperance in book four of the *Republic*, especially if one has read beyond the first catch-phrases there.

Such a definition of justice in terms of temperance is entirely concordant with the ideals which dictate the legislation of the *Laws* and which are presented now under the name of temperance, now under justice, and now under both. At the outset peace and harmony are established as the aim toward which the lawgiver should work; the practice of legislating with a view to insuring strength in war is rejected. So Tyrtaeus' championing bravery in war as the highest virtue cannot be accepted. On the contrary,

³⁶ See Loeb ed., II, p. 226, note 1.

. . . every legislator who is worth his salt will most assuredly legislate always with a single eye to the highest goodness (τὴν μεγίστην ἀρετὴν) and to that alone; and this (to quote Theognis) consists in "loyalty in danger," and one might term it "complete righteousness (δικαιοσύνην . . . τελέαν)" (630 C).

Just a page after this the Athenian stranger briefly outlines what he thinks should be the aims and methods of the lawgiver. At the conclusion the completed statutes are to be turned over to the wardens, who will administer the laws under the guidance of wisdom or true opinion, "to the end that Reason (ὁ νοῦς), having bound all into one single system may declare them to be ancillary neither to wealth nor ambition, but to σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη" (632 C). Temperance is that without which other goods are not goods.³⁷ The ideal government is a tyranny under a well-favored tyrant who is naturally temperate (710 AB). However, if you cannot start with such an individual as king, the next most blessed thing is for a "heaven-sent desire for temperate and just institutions" to arise in the hearts of the men who hold high positions (711 D). This supremacy of the restrained and moderate is sustained throughout the work. But as often as it is called temperance it is called justice, and this in the critical and climactic passages.³⁸

Still, if it be granted that the two terms point to essentially the same meaning, need one therefore conclude that this is anything other than exactly what is meant by "the unity of the virtues"? Are not other virtues than these also presented as the supreme one? Yet we do not assume that all of them are synonyms.

There are, indeed, other virtues declared to be the supreme or chief ones—particularly φρόνησις or νοῦς.³⁹ But no other combination persists like this one. Moreover, the definitions of the *Republic* set these two quite apart from the others. And these two civic and social virtues have been used synonymously with a frequency that can be claimed for no other pair.

The relation of this pair to the whole of virtue may be seen

³⁷ III, 696 B-697 B, IV, 709 E-710 B, 711 D.

³⁸ I, 630 C, 632 C, II, 660 E-661 C, III, 696 B, 697 B, IV, 710 A, IX, 862 E, X, 906 AB.

³⁹ See e. g., *Laws*, I, 631 CD, IV, 714 A, X, 906 AB, XII, 963 A.

through an examination of the concluding pages of the *Laws* (961 C-969 D). Here the Athenian shows the necessity of having the synod of the state strive to grasp the unity of virtue, which neither the Athenian nor his friends can explain. They can understand that the laws have a single object—virtue. They understand also that virtue consists of four things, of which the chief is reason (*νοῦς*). But they can get no further, and the work closes with the affirmation that the divine synod, if set up, must find for itself a method of higher education which may teach them the secret of that ultimate unity.

However, as we have seen, there is no lack of a unified good in respect to men's conduct. It has been described as justice and temperance. There is here no quarrel with wisdom for the rank of supreme virtue. In the *Laws* reason (*νοῦς* or *φρόνησις*) is the chief virtue, the *ἡγεμών*. This means primarily leader or commander. Both human and divine goods look to *νοῦς* for guidance (630 D, 963 A); *νοῦς* pulls all the laws together and declares them subservient to the goal of justice and temperance (632 C); its decisions are given the name of law (714 A). For reason is that trace of the divine which dwells in us and directs us to the goal of harmony. Justice and temperance, when guided by wisdom, bring us to salvation; they *are* salvation in this life. "But what destroys us is injustice and insolence (*ὑβρις*) combined with folly."⁴⁰ Here we have an ultimate functional if not speculative unity. 'Αρετή in human conduct is that harmonious order which results when the natural faculties of the soul stand in the proper relation to each other, with divinely given reason guiding the soul. 'Αρετή, in the sense of the ideal kind of human conduct to which reason leads, is called *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη*; but to Plato both of them are the same.

V.

What is the significance of the thesis of this paper? In the first place, it reveals Plato at work moulding the language and

⁴⁰ X, 906 A. That *μετὰ φρονήσεως* be translated "with the guidance of wisdom" is demanded by the context which has several metaphors of leadership—general, pilot, drivers—and by the clear allusions back to IV, 714 A where the activity of wisdom is seen in *τὴν . . . διανομήν*. On this use of the leader, reason, cf. *Rep.*, IV, 433 E: *σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστάτουσαν . . . ἐπιστήμην*.

ideals of his time to fit his own conceptions. The heterogeneous notions floating about in the Athenian milieu are unified and re-interpreted so as to form an integral whole. Yet Plato does this without tearing these notions wholly out of their contexts of significance, and so he avoids alienating his readers. Most occurrences of *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη* in Plato convey meanings quite familiar to his contemporaries; but by association and careful definition the two are almost imperceptibly brought together. Thus Plato tends to draw toward coincidence two circles of meaning which have always overlapped to some degree.

This tendency dictates the method to be followed if one is to understand him. One must read from within, finding the points where Plato begins to shape his social and intellectual inheritance. Then in order to convey the *Platonic* meaning, one must show how *he* shapes the common material to his own purposes. It follows that if Plato tends to think *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη* together, then it is the scholar's task to reveal that fact. But too often, under the influence of inertia and of the pseudo-scientific method of residues in the fourth book of the *Republic*, students striving to distinguish between temperance and justice miss the fact that Plato himself was more interested in their unity than in their dissimilarity. The superficial phrases identifying his definitions were all common property in his day. Socrates even says that *τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν* as a definition of justice is a commonplace to them.⁴¹ To find Plato one must examine more than the tags.

In a comparison of Plato's underlying interpretations and Isocrates' use of the terms the uniqueness of the former stands out. As previously observed (*supra*, pp. 400-2 and notes 15-23), Isocrates verbally associates justice and temperance, thinks of them as the peculiarly social and the greatest virtues, says that they produce harmony in home and state. (And all this probably reflects Platonic influence.⁴²) Nevertheless, Isocrates has none of the fundamental synonymy found in Plato. The two remain separate virtues. Indeed, he ridicules those who enjoy arguing for an absurd or self-contradictory proposition, such as the identity of the virtues!⁴³

A second significance of the thesis here developed is that it

⁴¹ *Rep.*, IV, 433 A. ⁴² See Jaeger, *op. cit.*, III, p. 48. ⁴³ *Helen*, 1.

underscores the unity of the Platonic works, which Paul Shorey so vigorously championed. Against those ⁴⁴ who hold, for example, that the *Laws* is governed by an ideal, *σωφροσύνη*, fundamentally different from that of the *Republic*, which centers in *δικαιοσύνη*, it shows that both terms at their most important level in Plato present the same ideal.

Thirdly, it is clear that this re-interpretation of justice in terms of temperance (for the movement is mainly in this direction rather than vice versa) is a part of Plato's attack on the ethical and political relativism which were breeding cynicism. It facilitated his explication of justice and law as the expression of the order inherent in nature. Besides, the *rapprochement* undercut the position of those like Antiphon the Sophist admitting the prudential validity of temperance while denying the claims of an absolute justice.

The fourth, and probably most important, thing to be said is that Plato by his union breaks the phalanx of the multiplicity of the virtues and gives content to the formal ultimate called the idea of the good. He has *one* ideal for human conduct. Bravery is laid aside and wisdom is made the *παιδαγωγός*, the physician, the general, the divine guide leading men to the goal of *δικαιοσύνη-σωφροσύνη*. This *ἀρετή* at its end is, as Shorey says, the "Dorian and Pythagorean ideal of order, harmony, discipline and restraint opposed to the laxity of Athenian democracy."⁴⁵

One thing more. To what extent does this fusion of justice and temperance influence Plato's successors and determine the content of the terms in the Hellenistic world? The answer to this question is of the utmost importance. Manifestly the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη* is one of the central pillars in the religion of Paul. If this Platonic fusion tendency has deeply colored the term Paul used, then New Testament students must join classical scholars and philosophers in tracing the profound effects of Plato's work.

CURTIS W. R. LARSON.

DENISON UNIVERSITY,
GRANVILLE, OHIO.

⁴⁴ E. g., Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

⁴⁵ Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said* (U. of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 230. Cf. also *The Unity of Plato's Thought*.

REVIEWS.

BRUNO SNELL, ed. *Bacchylidis Carmina cum Fragmentis*. Leipzig,
B. G. Teubner, 1949. Pp. 54 + 142. \$4.75 (bound).

The famous papyrus of Bacchylides (Snell's A) was discovered in 1896; next year the British Museum published a facsimile (no. DCCXXXIII) and the *editio princeps*, edited by F. G. Kenyon. Blass brought out his recension of the text first in 1898; other editions followed in 1899, 1904 and (revised by Süß) in 1912; Snell published the fifth edition in 1934, and the sixth in 1949. This differs from the fifth not only in that it of course reports later emendations, etc.; Snell has again collated A and other London papyri; examined the Berlin papyrus (16, 140) for fr. 64; used a new Oxyrhynchus scrap reported to him by Lobel; and incorporated readings from the two Florentine fragments published by Medea Norsa in *Annali della R. Scuole Normale Superiore di Pisa*, 1941, pp. 155-163.

The MS, very clearly written, has however been mutilated by time and probably by the Egyptian discoverers. It is arranged in cola, no doubt on a system derived from Alexandrian scholars, but correspondence often fails. In Ode V the thirteenth verses of strophe and antistrophe are for instance

13 χρυσάμπυκος Οὐρανίας
93 τὸν δὲ προσέφα Μελέαγρος

Jebb (*Bacchylides* [Cambridge, 1905], p. 96) comments: "It was, no doubt, the aim to make such a division as seemed to suit the rhythm; but formal considerations, reasons of space and of calligraphy, also came into account; and in particular there was a wish to limit as far as possible the number of instances in which a word was divided between two verses. The result was a division which, in fact, usually coincided with that which Bacchylides seems to have intended; but the coincidence was in some measure accidental." He puts this right in (e.g.) V, 13 by printing χρυσάμπυκος Οὐρανίας κλει- with τὸς in the next verse. See further Snell's important paragraph (p. 26 *) on Alexandrian colometry.

Let us get periods out of the way. My long-held opinion that they are useless to modern students (cf. *Pindar* [Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945], p. 198) has developed into a belief that even in ancient days they were mere affectation. See Blass' first edition, pp. xxvi-xxix, a bewildering jungle; Snell, pp. 25* f., especially "nonnumquam dubium est, ubi finis periodi statuendus sit"; Jebb, p. 94: "In many cases there is room for difference of opinion as to the points at which, within a strophe of Bacchylides, the periods begin and end." What sort of basic unit is that? Snell even goes so far (pp. 18,* 26 *) as to allow "finis periodi post praepositionem," at V, 74 f. tearing ἐξείλετο apart with the help of an additional accent:

χαλκῳκρανον δ' ἔπειτ' ἐξ
εἴλετο ἰὸν . . .

Their reason for that is \times . Here, to be sure, it is a long syllable; but in the corresponding line 171 *πενίας τ' ἀμαχάνου*, it is short. If we examine the longer and almost unmutilated Ode V, we find in the fourth verse of strophe and antistrophe the ninth syllable marked \times , three examples being short, nine long. Snell sees great importance in these variations. On p. 20 * he writes, after setting out $e = - \cup -$ etc. (see above): "Quibus signis certe non explanatur origo horum versuum, sed pro certo habeo non solum commode, sed etiam recte hoc modo describi, quid [quam?] huius metri rationem esse Bacchylidis temporibus poetae putaverint (cf. Wil. GV. 418). Nam dactyloepitriti Bacchylidis ita compositi sunt, ut membra D et E et e (vel etiam d^1 et d^2) coniungantur singulis syllabis longis (vel etiam brevibus) plerumque interpositis ('anceps interpositum')." \times , then, is vital to the metre, because by marking off D, etc. it proves them units. But, firstly, if so vital, why is it not present always instead of *plerumque*? Secondly, why is it not always long or always short, instead of startling us with variation of a basic factor? Thirdly, D, etc. are often separated otherwise in Snell's schemes, namely by —, an isolated syllable (like \times) but invariably long (unlike \times): why have two methods . . . if two they are, not one with two faces? Can we not handle things more simply?

Occasionally Pindar too gives a short syllable where all the corresponding lines have a long syllable. For instance, in *Ol.* VI, 18, *ἀνδρὶ κόμου δεσπότη πάρεστι Συρακοσίῳ*, the eighth is short, though long in all the four corresponding lines, the obvious "old-fashioned" scansion being $- \cup - - | - \cup - - | - \cup \cup | - \cup \cup | - \pi$. These divergences are so rare that—leaving on one side a few unmistakably artistic variations (see *Pindar*, p. 210)—they are best called oversights: it is perfectly reasonable to scan Pindar as above, marking no short eighth syllable but adding a rather shame-faced footnote. Shall we treat Bacchylides so? Certainly not. For (by my count) of his 107 instances \times is short 37 times, a number altogether too big for any suspicion of oversight. But that is no reason for evolving so complicated a metrical system as Snell's. Rather we should merely admit the variation into our plainer scheme: $- \cup - - | - \cup - \cup - \cup - \cup | - \cup \cup | - \pi$. That, surely, is better for mind, taste, and eye.

If, finally, we ask why the younger poet thus differed from his illustrious contemporary, it is probably enough to remark that he was an Ionian, whereas Pindar came of Achaean stock and was swayed by a temperament largely Dorian. The relation between them as regards verse-making recalls Horace's romanization of Alcaeus and Sappho.

Let us now look at certain interesting or difficult textual problems. The Greek of course is cited as printed by Snell.

III, 21 f.

θεὸν θ[εός]ν τις
ἀγλαΐζέθω γὰρ ἄριστος ὄλβων.

A clearly gives . . . *λαΐζέθωγαρ* (*ἀγ*, though nearly invisible, is no doubt right). *ἄριστος ὄλβων* is the ancient reviser's correction of *ἀριστον ὄλβον*. What of the monstrous *ἀγλαΐζέθω*? Crusius sug-

gested that $\theta\omega$ is a crasis of $\tau\omega$ and δ : hence Snell's rough breathing. That scans and makes sense; so Jebb prints ἀγλαΐζέτω, δ —not crasis but synizesis. Can we accept either? Jebb owns that "it is difficult to understand how so graceful and facile a poet could have written such a verse." Surely we are compelled to emend; and the least feeble expedient is that of Housman and Richards, ἀγλαΐζέτω παρ' ἄριστον ὄλβον ("let a man glorify the god in the hour of highest prosperity").

III, 64.

ὦ μεγαίνητ' Ἰέρων, θελήσει . . .

Scansion—cf. 18, ὑψιδαιδάλτων τριπόδων σταθέντων—demands a lengthened ϵ , and a hiatus. The two together are intolerable. True, another hiatus occurs in 92, Μοῦσά νιν τρέφει. Ἰέρων, σὺ δ' ὄλβον . . . The last four letters of τρέφει are, indeed, supplied by editors to fill a hole in the MS, but the word is certainly right. That hiatus is perhaps condoned by its occurring at the close of a sentence. But the MS reading in 64 cannot stand: none of Snell's parallels on p. 17 * is convincing. We should choose between Wilamowitz' ὦ μεγαίνητ' ὦ and Ludwig's ὦ μέγ' αἰνῆθεις. The former is simpler, but the double ὦ is very poor and leaves a hiatus; the latter removes both difficulties.

III, 90 f.

ἦβαν. ἀρετᾶ[ς γε μ]ὲν οὐ μινύθει
βροτῶν ἅμα σ[ώμ]ατι φέγγος, . . .

But the quantities of μινύθει are $\sim\sim-$, and we need $\sim--$ as δὲ πόντου for example shows (86). Snell's excuse for boldly marking a short as long cannot stand. He gives on p. 17 * a list of vowels long or short "pro numerorum necessitate," such as *μόνος* beside *μοῦνος* and the equally familiar shortening of diphthongs (e.g. *Βῶιωτίοισιν*, fr. 21, 4). But none of these supports μινύθει, which cannot be paralleled, for μινύθεν in V, 151 is Snell's own suggestion for the MS μίννθα. Jebb there reads μινύνη and here suggests μινύνη or μινύθη (gnomic aor.) but too cautiously prints μινύθει, which Crusius and Blass defended on the dubious ground that in this part of the verse $\sim\sim\sim$ can replace $\sim\sim--$.

IV, 4-12. Here Snell's new edition differs markedly from the fifth, because of the new Florentine papyrus, which gives 4-12 in a much less incomplete state than A.

τρίτον γὰρ παρ' [ὀμφα]λὸν ὑψιδείρου χθονός
Πν[θ]ώνικος ἀ[είδε]ται
ὦ[κυ]πόδων ἀρ[ετᾶι] σὺν ἱππων.
ἐ[....]ἀδυεπὴς ἀ[να-
ξιδόρ]μγγος Οὐρ[ανί]ας ἀλέκτωρ
.....εν· ἀλλ' ἐκ[όγ]τι νόωι
.....ο υσεπσει. [...] ὕμνους
.....τρατον εἴ τις ορ-
.....(.) εἶλκε Δίκας τάλαν[τον,

In A nothing whatever survives of the last two lines, but Blass assigned to this place a separate scrap (fr. 19, Kenyon, p. 207 con-

taining]*is op* with the note "ends of long lines"). That he
]*as ταλαν*[
 was right the Florentine papyrus now proves. Maas' suggestion
ἀναξιοφορμύγιους is excellent: this splendid word opens Pindar's
 second Olympian, written for a victory in 476 B. C., six years earlier
 than that celebrated by Bacchylides and by Pindar's First Pythian.
 In 10 Snell attractively suggests *ῥουσε πεσεῖν ἐς ὕμνους*. A good deal
 of discussion about 8 has been antiquated by the Florentine papyrus,
 which gives *οὐρ...ας ἀλέκτωρ*, where Norsa naturally proposes
Οὐρανίας, of course accepted by Snell. This Muse is named by
 Bacchylides (never by Pindar) in V, 13, VI, 11, XVI, 3 as the
 queen of song.

One cannot refrain from noting that *ἀλέκτωρ*, which is certainly
 genuine, would have been spurned at sight had it been offered as an
 emendation. Unquestionably it here means "husband," and seems
 oddly below the level of lyric poetry. That it occurs with this sense
 in Sophocles (fr. 851, Pearson) helps nothing. The play was satyric,
 as the whole fragment shows: *οὐμὸς δ' ἀλέκτωρ αὐτὸν ἤγε πρὸς μύλην*
 must be Alcestis' description of Admetus' accepting Apollo as his
 serf.

V, 84. *οὐ τοι δέος*. Snell notes "*τοι = σοι*"; Jebb, Blass, and others
 read *οὔτοι*. These words close the greeting of Heracles by Meleager's
 ghost when they meet in Hades. *οὔτοι δέος* would be less than
 courteous to such a hero: "there is nothing to be afraid of." *οὐ τοι*
 is surely right: "thou fearest nothing: so why bend thy bow?"
 (75).

V, 140 ff.

καί τε δαιδαλέας
 ἐκ λάρνακος ὠκύμορον
 φιτρὸν ἔγκλαύσασα.

Though *ἐγκλαύσασα*, "weeping upon it," is good in itself, and Jebb's
ἀγκλαύσασα a little better, we badly need a participle that shall
 mean "taking it out" (*ἐκ λάρνακος*). Wackernagel's *ἐξαύσασα* is
 perhaps to be preferred; Hesychius has *ἐξαῦσαι = ἐξελεῖν* and the
 verb is so unfamiliar that it would inevitably be altered by an ancient
 editor.

VI, 1 ff.

Λάχων Διὸς μεγίστου
 λάχε φέρτατον πόδεσσι
 κῦδος ἐπ' Ἀλφεοῦ προχοαῖσ[ι νικῶν
 δι' ὅσσα πάροιθεν . . .

Blass's supplement, supported by Wilamowitz, should have been
 rejected by Snell in favour of Housman's *ἀέθλων*, which gives clear
 syntax to the otherwise very obscure *δι' ὅσσα*.

IX, 27 ff.

πενταέθλοισιν γὰρ ἐνέπρεπεν ὥς
 ἄστρον διακρίνει φάη
 νυκτὸς διχομηνίδος εὐφεγγῆς σελάνα.

διακρίνει has been queried, but needlessly. Snell remarks "*certe non
 attingendum*," quoting Headlam's view that *δ.* = *διακριδὼν ἐλέγχει*. I

find that hard to accept, indeed to understand: it is altogether unlike our poet's usual limpidity. Nevertheless I would retain *διακρίνει* as meaning "threads her way through," on the strength of Plato, *Crat.* 388B, which Jebb waves aside.

XI, 118-123. ἄλσος δέ τοι ἱμερόεν
 Κάσαν παρ' εὐνδρον †πρόγο-
 νοι ἐσσάμενοι† Πριάμοι' ἐπεὶ χρόνῳ
 βουλαῖσι θεῶν μακάρων
 πέρσαν πόλιν εὐκτιμέναν
 χαλκοβοράκων μετ' Ἀτρειδᾶν.

ἐσσάμενοι has no syntax. The simplest remedy is to read *ἐσσαμένων*, genitive absolute. Then all (save *πρόγονοι* and its hiatus) becomes easy. Jebb translates: "And a lovely grove is thine, (the Achaeans [113 f.]) having founded it by the fair stream of the Casas . . ." Blass and Wilamowitz read *προγόνων ἐσσαμένων*. But *προγο-*, with whatever ending, seems out of the question. Metre demands — —, and few will believe that a short syllable in the middle of a word divided between two verses could be regarded as anacp. Jebb prints *πρὸ να-οῦ*, "in front of thy temple." But Platt's *πρὸ γον-νοῦ* has a better claim: it is very like A's reading, and *γοννός* is rare enough to be misunderstood and "corrected." Jebb's objections to it (p. 482) are very slight: and cf. Pindar, *Pyth.* IV, 7 f.:

νᾶσον ὥς ἦδη λιπὼν κτίσσειεν εὐάρματον
 πόλιν ἐν ἀργυρόνenti μαστῶ.

XIV, B (p. 51). This is the opening of a hitherto unknown epini-
 cian ode, which for the reader's convenience I set out in the most
 readable form. The only supplements are certain, viz. line 2
ἀφνε[ῶν]; line 5 *Θεσσαλία[s]*; lines 10 f. *Λαρίσα[s ἀ]ναξίππου*.

Ἔστία χρυσόθρον', εὐ-
 δόξων Ἀγαθοκλεαδᾶν ἄτ' ἀφνεῶν
 ἀνδρῶν μέγαν ὄλβον ἀέξεις
 ἡμένα μέσαις ἀγυαῖς
 5 Πηνειὸν ἀμφ' εὐώδεα Θεσσαλίας
 μηλοτρόφου ἐν γυάλοις
 κείμεν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης Κίρ-
 ραν πρὸς εὐθαλέα μολῶν
 10 δις στεφανώσατο Λα-
 ρίσας ἀναξίππου χάριν
 κλυ [] . os

(*εὐθαλέα* scans as — —, with synizesis.)

This passage we owe to Lobel (see above, p. 415). Snell notes
 "14B = pap. L 7-17 + fr. 22 K. (v. 1-5) + fr. 11 K. (v. 5-8) inser.
 dubitanter suppl. Lobel." Kenyon's fr. 22 (p. 207) is:

]σοθρο[
]αθοι[
]μεγα[
]μεσαι[
]ἀμφ[

and his fr. 11 (p. 200):

ε]ὐάδεα Θεσσα[λ
] ἐν γυάλοις·
]ν τέλης κ[
]ε[....]ων

Lobel saw that these appeared in an unpublished papyrus discovered at Oxyrhynchus. The inscriptio mentioned above is [API-ΣΤΟΤΕΑΕΙ ΘΕΣΣΑΑΩΙ (vel ΛΑΡΙΣΑΙΩΙ) ΙΙΗΘΙΣ—] ΠΙΑ Except for the last three letters, which appear in L and are very doubtful—Lobel thinks them possible remnants of *Πύθια* (cf. lines 7 f., *Κίρραν*)—the inscriptio is of course made up from details in the poem. Jebb had printed Kenyon's fr. 11 at the end of XIII (Snell's XIV) with *Παντέλης*, remarking that the accent in the MS proves these letters to be parts of a proper name. Snell in the fifth edition followed Jebb exactly, save that he read a preceding α. Hestia is invoked by Pindar also at the opening of his Eleventh Nemean.

Fr. 4 (pp. 75-7). This is the content of Snell's papyrus T (see below, p. 422). He prefixes it to the well-known passage (Jebb, fr. 3) quoted by Stobaeus, *Flor.*, 55, 3 as from Bacchylides' paeans: *τίκτει δέ τε θνατοῖσιν εἰρήνη μεγάλα κτέ.* Our fragment is described by Grenfell and Hunt (*Pap. Ox.*, 3, 426, p. 68) as "parts of thirty-two lines from a lyric poem in dactylo-epitritic metre and Pindaric style, which is not improbably to be attributed to Pindar himself." It is, no doubt, possible that Pindar wrote this: he has some commonplace passages; it is equally possible that Bacchylides wrote it.

Fr. 64 (pp. 103-5). Snell writes (p. 13 *): "Fr. 64, Pap. Berol. 16.140, scripturam praebens primi vel secundi saeculi primum edita est anno 1935 a C. M. Bowra in editione Pindari (fr. 341); Bacchylidi hoc carmen ipse attribui (*Herm.* 75, 1940, 177), denuo edidit Ernestus Diehl, *Anthol. lyr.*² suppl. p. 49 sqq."

This is a vigorous passage of some thirty lines, which have all lost their endings. It narrates the incident of Heracles, Deianira, and Nessus; but the poison, so vital in other versions, cannot have been mentioned, for Nessus is effectually quelled by the hero's club. (See further Snell, pp. 46 * f.) Snell is justified in printing this fragment among the *dubia* of Bacchylides. But, though Sir Maurice Bowra has done excellent service in publishing these impressive lines, he should not have given them a place in his edition of Pindar (though as "incerti auctoris"): the detailed account of Nessus' injuries seems quite un-Pindaric.

To such a book and such a review literary criticism is almost completely foreign; but a few sentences under that head may perhaps be admitted. How delightful, after so much pondering of *lacunae* and the like, to realize that what is best worth reading has been best preserved: the meeting of Heracles and Meleager (V, 56-175); Menelaus' speech at Troy (XIV, 37-63); Theseus' adventure on (and off) Minos' ship (XVI), the finest and most characteristic poem of Bacchylides that we possess; and above all the Eagle in V, 16-30!

On lines 29 f. of this last Jebb remarks: "The phrase ἀρίγυρος μετ' ἀνθρώποις, as applied to the soaring bird, can be explained only as a bit of rather careless writing. The thought in the writer's mind is that the eagle's flight is 'much noted among men'; i. e. a number of men follow his course with their eyes." (His italics.) This from the brilliantly discerning editor of Sophocles! Firstly, "soaring" half spoils a superb picture: this eagle is already high and wings his course *across* the heavens. Secondly, μετ' ἀνθρώποις is a master-stroke: it calls up a vertical perspective to reinforce the horizontal perspective aloft, summoning the reader's inward eye down from the empyrean to our earth-level and the upturned faces of lowly human beings. Ovid (more verbosely) gains the same effect when he describes (*Met.*, VIII, 217-220) the flight of Icarus and Daedalus, directing our imagination to the fisher, the shepherd, and *stiva innixus arator*.

Later, the same ode shows Heracles in the lower world. "There, by the waters of Cocytus, he perceived the souls of hapless mortals, countless as leaves quivering in the wind, where flocks graze on the gleaming headlands of Ida" (Jebb). On this Headlam admirably quoted Marlowe's *Tamburlaine* (Pt. II, III, 5 f.):

In number more than are the quivering leaves
Of Ida's forest.

Let that be a lesson to the *Quellenforscher*! For once we are certain that the later poet cannot have read his predecessor. Were we not, this "parallel passage" would have been hailed as throwing "a welcome and invaluable light on Marlowe's knowledge of Greek poetry."

The following errors are to be noted. P. 6,* line 12: for "dua" read "duo." P. 13,* 13 f.: "Pap. Oxyrh. 3, 426 nunc conservatur in Museo universitatis Toronti in Canada." This papyrus is not in the Royal Ontario Museum at Toronto, but in the Victoria University Library there. For "Toronti" read "Torontonensis" (agreeing with "universitatis"). What the locative—or indeed the genitive—case of "Toronto" may be I confess I do not know, but cannot believe in "Toronti." P. 52*: Schadewaldt is omitted, and Smyth is still called "Smith," despite D. M. Robinson's correction of the fifth edition in *G. P.*, XXXI (1936), p. 269. P. 15, notes: for "posiss" read "possis." P. 44, notes: for "certum" read "incertum."

A tiny collection indeed! The editor's microscopic care excites no less admiration than his learning and diligence, which make his book invaluable to all students of our poet—indeed, of Greek lyric poetry in general. The printers have well performed a terribly exacting task; already in 1933 Snell commented on their extreme industry and patience "tot in rebus pusillis." Perhaps above all we must salute the "bibliopola humanissimus." That the house of Teubner should have continued, even in the year 1949, its immense services to Greek scholarship is an impressive and moving witness to the German virtues.

GILBERT NORWOOD.

MARTIN P. NILSSON. *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion*. Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, 1950. Pp. xxiv + 656; 208 text figs. Kr. 50. (*Skrifter utgivna av Kungl. humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund*, IX.)

Any major publication by Professor Nilsson is an event of importance to classical scholars, particularly to those who study the religion which serves so largely to interpret Greek culture. Interest in the book is scarcely lessened because it is a second edition. The first appeared in 1927, since which time new discoveries in Crete and, in a lesser degree, at mainland sites, have been extensive and significant. The author has included in his survey as much of this new material as the limits of his book permitted, with the result that the volume has been substantially enlarged, and his conclusions somewhat modified here and there. The far-sighted liberality of the Lund Academy, which produced the book on fine paper, in clear type, and with numerous illustrations, is fully justified by the results.

The general plan of the work remains the same as before. There is an introduction of 33 pages, after which the bulk of the work is divided into two unequal parts. The first, "The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion according to the Monuments," is more than twice as long as the second, "Minoan-Mycenaean Religion in its relations to Greek Religion." Within these major divisions the number of chapters, their titles, and the character of their contents are the same as in the first edition. After the introduction, however, the author has inserted an "Appendix" of 17 pages, apparently with a view to clearing the ground of certain disputed points. In the first section of this appendix, he discusses supposed mythological representations, for some of which he proposes interpretations at variance with those previously suggested, while in others he questions the possibility of relating the scenes to any known myth. In the second section, "Suspect Objects," he discusses and rejects certain pieces which well-known authorities have accepted as genuine and made the basis for far-reaching inferences—the "Ring of Minos," the "Ring of Nestor," and some objects belonging to the Thisbe hoard. Nilsson is aware of the difficulty which the careful archaeologist experiences in pronouncing upon such pieces, but his doubts are fully warranted. Nobody to whom Professor Xanthoudides has shown the remarkable, and sometimes beautiful, forgeries confiscated in Candia and elsewhere can question the need for extreme caution.

The present edition is about 75 pages longer than the first, and contains almost a hundred more illustrations. Several plates, which followed the first edition, have been omitted, probably to allow the insertion of more text figures, which serve the purpose almost equally well for material of the kind collected in the volume. The growth of the second edition is due to the inclusion of new discoveries or to fuller publication of older ones; for example, several pages (96-104) are required to do justice to finds at Hagia Triada, Gazi, and Karphi, which were made after the appearance of Nilsson's first edition, or else had been inadequately published up to that time. The reader will note other passages inserted for similar reasons.

Nilsson's method has not changed. Here, as before, the chapters of Part I take up, one after another, the various things that are believed to have a religious significance—natural and domestic sanctuaries, altars, sacral furniture and dress, "horns of consecration," double axes, pillars, and columns—and the author discriminates with patient care between objects that are monuments of a religious cult and those which can be differently explained. He then proceeds to the topics of tree cult, idols, epiphanies of the gods as birds or in human form, the Minoan-Mycenaean pantheon, and ends Part I with a careful analysis of the theories about the sarcophagus of Hagia Triada, and an exposition of his own view of that famous discovery. Much of the archaeological evidence consists of small objects, such as seals and impressions, gems, and figurines, none of which a conscientious investigator can safely neglect, even though the contribution of the individual pieces may be very small. It is not to be denied that the character of the material conduces to a treatment that grows tedious by repetition, especially when the author is obliged to dispense with illustrations of the objects under consideration. Nilsson, however, does not shrink from the labor of examining a formidable array of small archaeological monuments, and throughout the discussion of them he maintains a judicious, often wholesomely skeptical attitude. This is most gratifying to students who want the truth, but, I suspect, may be rather maddening to some imaginative religionists whose fine-spun theories are in no close contact with the evidence.

The second major division of the work, treating of the relation of the Minoan-Mycenaean to the Greek religion, is the part that is most useful to students concerned with the culture of historical Greece; but since its teachings have been partially incorporated in other books and articles of Nilsson's since 1927, there is less need to comment upon it here. Applying again his patient analysis of both archaeological and literary sources, he shows that elements of Minoan cult survived in certain localities, and that many Minoan cult-places continued to be used in the later age. Then follows a chapter on Greek goddesses of Minoan origin—Athena and Hera; Artemis, with the lesser related goddesses, Britomartis, Diktyнна, and Aphaia; Eileithyia, Ariadne, and Helen. Chapter XVI shows that the cult of a divine child apart from his mother, best exemplified by the Cretan cult of the infant Zeus, is a heritage from Minoan times; and a final chapter of great importance sets forth the evidence for the Minoan origin of the hero cult.

In the preface Nilsson says that his views have changed in only one important respect since the first edition of his book. He now thinks that despite agreement in sundry items of archaeological evidence, the Mycenaean religion may have differed materially from the Minoan. As he puts it (p. viii and similarly p. 30), one must consider "whether a Minoan exterior does not among the Mycenaeans cover very different religious ideas." In minor matters, however, he modifies or corrects his former opinions more than once (e. g., pp. 454 f.; 508, n. 86; 527, n. 68).

It is not easy to single out details of special value in a work whose

general worth and authority have long been recognized. The reviewer noted with approval Nilsson's deductions from the excavations at Asine (pp. 110-116); the sensible note 39 on p. 202, and, apropos of the pillar cult, the prudent remark (p. 248) that "a cult object . . . may be placed in front of a pillar without turning the pillar itself into a cult object"; the sound criticism of certain views of Persson (p. 288) and Miss Harrison (pp. 338-40); the comments on dubious statuettes that have appeared in various collections (pp. 313-14); the negative attitude towards the assumption that Minoan bull-fighting was a sacral performance (p. 374); the cautious discussion of the goddess commonly called the Mountain Mother, and the skeptical attitude towards the theory of a "universal nature goddess"; the previously mentioned chapter on the sarcophagus from Hagia Triada; and the admirable remarks on method at pp. 533-34.

I cannot accept Nilsson's view of Homer's enigmatic word *ἀνόπαια* (p. 491), and in one of the few passages where he resorts to a hypothesis, cautiously stated, it is true (pp. 541-2), he seems to me scarcely more successful than some writers with whom he elsewhere takes issue. To judge by fig. 181 (p. 373), the so-called Minotaur is not only "influenced by" the cynocephalus ape but actually represents that animal; compare fig. 178, which, unless I am much mistaken, is upside down. But these and such other faults as may be detected are mere details where there is room for difference of opinion. Some references within the book have not been adjusted to the new numbering of pages and text figures, as, for example, p. 206, n. 52, p. 346, n. 21, p. 414, n. 63; but since the old page numbers are given in the margins, and the old figure numbers are added in parentheses after the new ones, little inconvenience results from such oversights. (On p. 225, n. 40, read "below, p. 347, fig. 158.") Other minor errors are easily corrected though fairly numerous; it is remarkable that there are not more in an English text set by Swedish printers.

Here and there one feels that Professor Nilsson's English idiom, which was a little less natural in 1927 than now, might have been slightly improved by a more watchful English reviser, e.g., the sentence ending at the top of p. 268. But it would be ungrateful indeed for students who do not read Swedish to enlarge upon errors in the self-sacrificing labor of an author who undertook to compose so exacting a work in a language not his own. The Swedish *och* for *and* in a sentence on p. 540 is obviously due to absentmindedness on a type-setter's part.

One final criticism. A book which necessarily deals so largely with the chronology of archaeological materials might well provide, for readers who are not specialists, a table showing in parallel columns the epochs of the Minoan, Helladic, and Cycladic cultures, and at least the later Egyptian dynasties. One can find such tables elsewhere, of course; yet it would be a convenience to have the use of one within the covers of this volume.

CAMPBELL BONNER.

MAX POHLENZ. *Die Stoa, Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, I (1948), pp. 490; II (1949), pp. 230.

Pohlenz' book climaxes a lifelong study of Stoic philosophy. Concerned with particular aspects of Stoicism ever since he published his dissertation in 1898 (II, pp. 7 f.), he now traces the entire development of the school and its influence on other movements. He does not restrict himself to an analysis of the philosophical problems, but also sets the Stoa against the background of ancient civilization. The same familiarity with Greek and Roman literature and life which distinguishes all of Pohlenz' writings and which is to be found now only in few others is characteristic of this new work and is not in need of my further praise.

Of the two volumes, the first gives the history of the Stoa uninterrupted by the discussion of controversial matters, and generally even without reference to the passages on which the interpretation rests. The second contains the "footnotes" and the criticism of modern literature. Such an arrangement, no doubt, has the advantage of making the text eminently readable. The disadvantage, to my mind, is that if one wishes to find out about the arguments underlying any of the views stated, he must constantly switch from the first tome to the second, where the material is arranged according to paragraphs and lines of the former.

As for the general approach to his subject, Pohlenz tries to strike a balance between the older attitude of overemphasizing the unity of Stoic thought and the more recent attempts at restoring the individual tenets of the various members of the school. The doctrine of the Old Stoa is represented as one, yet the specific contributions of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and their pupils are clearly marked. With the Middle Stoa, the school dogma begins to be contrasted with individual systems, namely those of Panaetius and Posidonius. In regard to the final period, from which alone complete works have survived, short outlines of the common Stoic teaching are followed by characterizations of the various philosophers, such as Musonius, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.

Pohlenz' concept of Stoic philosophy is determined first of all by his belief that Zeno's doctrine was formulated in answer to that of Epicurus and in opposition to the latter's ideas (e. g. I, pp. 23; 113). Now, it is true that Epicurus was older than Zeno, and he seems to have started his school before the Stoa was founded. Zeno's dependence on Epicurus may therefore appear plausible, although, as far as I can judge, it cannot be proved. The Zenonian fragments never mention Epicurus directly, nor is it possible to demonstrate an implied polemic of Zeno against his contemporary. Diogenes Laertius, VII, 85, a passage which Pohlenz singles out as evidence of such a polemic (II, p. 65), is not necessarily directed against Epicurus alone, to disregard the fact that Zeno's name does not occur here.¹ However, Pohlenz makes one aware of the insufficient

¹ Epicurus' concern with the Stoics, on the other hand, is attested (cf. Diogenes Laertius, VII, 9), and a coloring of certain of his state-

reasons for the usual treatment of the two schools which in the histories of philosophy almost without exception are dealt with independently of each other, the Stoic teaching being placed in advance of that of the Epicureans.

Another basic consideration emphasized by Pohlenz throughout his book is the influence which the Semitic origin of most of the Stoic philosophers presumably had on their thought. To discriminate between the Semitic and the Greek components in the Stoic doctrine indeed constitutes one of his "main problems" (I, p. 31; cf. *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*, II [1926], pp. 257 ff.). Of course, Pohlenz is not unaware of the difficulties of this attempt; as he says himself, little is known about the culture of the countries from which Zeno or Chrysippus sprang (e. g. pp. 31; 164). Nevertheless, he hazards judgments and compiles a whole catalogue of Semitic traits. Hairsplitting (p. 51), fanaticism, fatalism, the postulate of the "you ought," an uncompromising dualism of body and soul, a lack of half tones, of anything between love and hatred (pp. 164 f.)²—all these, to Pohlenz, are Semitic characteristics, and they are those that he finds "foreign and disagreeable" in Stoic philosophy (p. 165). With the advent of the Middle Stoa, or as Pohlenz prefers to say, with the Hellenization of the Stoa (p. 191), they "disappear by themselves" in the system of the Dorian, Panaetius (p. 207; cf. p. 192). Even the Syrian, Posidonius, because of his intellectual attitude, is now considered to have had "predominantly Hellenic and Macedonian blood in his veins" (p. 208).

Reading these statements one wonders about the hairsplitting of early and late Greek sophists; about the one Greek among the older Stoics, Cleanthes, who unlike Panaetius failed to Hellenize the Stoa and in his fanaticism went so far as to demand that Aristarchus be punished for impiety; about the fatalistic astrological theories of Hipparchus; about Plato's moral imperatives and, most of all, about his dualism (cf. Pohlenz, p. 377). Moreover, if Zeno as a foreigner was inclined to stick to the "true meaning" of words, to be interested in their etymology (p. 116), what about the etymologies recounted even in Attic tragedies (or to use a modern example, those adduced by Hegel)? Needless to add that Pohlenz' theory does not hold its ground even within his own interpretation. He admits that Zeno and Chrysippus separated themselves from the land of their birth and found a new physical and spiritual home in Greece (p. 367); Zeno, whose thought was deeply Hellenized (p. 113; cf. p. 164), was able to convince people because he spoke to them in their own spirit (p. 165); Diogenes, the Babylonian, recognizing the significance of music in education thereby made himself the interpreter of old Hellenic views (p. 184). The reader cognizant of these inconsistencies and perhaps less certain than Pohlenz of a scientific

ments by Stoic terms has been shown to be probable by C. Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (1928), pp. 531 f. Cf. also Pohlenz, I, p. 363.

² The two last categories Pohlenz borrows from S. A. Cook's analysis of the Semitic spirit (*The Cambridge Ancient History*, I [1923], p. 196).

basis for the assumption that racial factors determine the human intellect, can easily remove the racial tag attached to almost every one mentioned, be it Ariston (p. 163) or Marcion (p. 410), Musonius (p. 303) or Tertullian (p. 437). But one truly lamentable weakness resulting from these speculations, I think, remains: the individual character and personality is not given its desert (e.g. p. 69); sentiments and impulses (pp. 68; 107 f.) are the main categories in explaining ideas, while the history of problems is depreciated (p. 68), and with it, the search for truth in which the philosopher is engaged. What constitutes the Greek character—the political, the ethical combined with the aesthetic, the sensuous in addition to the rational (p. 207)—is inferred from its manifestation at one arbitrarily chosen point, rather than from its display during the entire process of Greek history, and thus the attempted and badly needed rehabilitation of the Hellenistic period (pp. 166 f.) is fundamentally vitiated.

To turn now to Pohlenz' evaluation of the various phases of Stoicism, the Old Stoa (pp. 22-190) is seen in the following way. Zeno devised the scheme of the whole doctrine (p. 161); Cleanthes contributed hardly more than his pantheistic religious pathos, without changing the essence of the system (p. 163); Chrysippus, the second founder of the Stoa, seemingly expounding Zeno's views, but actually responsible for its extreme monism, built up an intellectualistic psychology, clarified the issues of fate and of the freedom of the will, and, great systematizer that he was, also created a systematic dialectics (pp. 163 f.). This appraisal restores Chrysippus to his rightful place, of which he has been deprived by those who believe Stoic philosophy to be the achievement principally of Zeno (e.g. F. Ueberweg—K. Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums*¹² [1926], pp. 410 ff.), or of Zeno and Cleanthes (e.g. A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes* [1891], p. 48), thus reducing the share of Chrysippus to a mere systematization of earlier ideas. Sometimes Pohlenz may be too ready with a "probably Chrysippus" (e.g. p. 74), but in general he seems to make good his claim as to Chrysippus' importance. Zeno, on the other hand, occasionally is credited with more than is his due. That he was the one who formulated the doctrine of self-preservation and self-love (pp. 113 ff.) is at least doubtful, for the evidence marshalled (II, p. 65) is but indirect. And no full justice is done to the role of Cleanthes. The decisive theory of "tension," if not altogether his addition, certainly was greatly elaborated by him, as was the whole topic of natural inquiry.³ In connection with this, Cleanthes reshaped ethics; the introduction of the term "nature" into the Zenonian

³ Pohlenz, on the evidence of Frs. 99 and 106 Arnim, traces the doctrine to Zeno (II, pp. 42 f. *ad* I, pp. 74 f.). But in Fr. 99 *τελευταία* is a conjecture of Diels, and in Fr. 106 (p. 30, line 35), as Pohlenz says himself, the words *πνευματικός νόμος* may be a later addition. Cf. also Pearson, *op. cit.*, pp. 41 f. and *ad* Fr. 56, line 54; in general P. Barth-A. Goedeckemeyer, *Die Stoa*⁶ (1946), p. 49, a book that makes the philosophical implications of Stoicism admirably clear and that I should be inclined to judge more favorably than Pohlenz seems to do (II, p. 12).

definition of the aim of life (I, pp. 116 f.), is only one of his significant contributions. Cleanthes' discussion of poetry and its place in philosophical teaching also is of wider significance than one would gather from Pohlenz' mention of it (pp. 53 f.).

The interpretation of the Middle Stoa (pp. 191-276) summarizes Pohlenz' well-known investigations of Panaetius and Posidonius and integrates them into an impressive picture of their teaching and of their impact on their contemporaries. The method followed in the reconstruction of these systems is quite different from that applied in the chapter on the Old Stoa. There, Pohlenz generally clings to the attested material and tries rigorously to separate the known from the unknown (to name one outstanding example, he shows that the famous terms *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *λόγος προφορικός* are not to be found in the fragments of the older Stoics and probably are not even of Stoic coinage [II, p. 21]). Here, he concerns himself with passages which he assumes echo the views of Panaetius and Posidonius. Nowhere, so far as I can see, does Pohlenz argue about the objections which during the past few decades have been raised by many scholars against such a procedure, and I shall not attempt to restate them now. As regards Panaetius, the matter has been settled, I think, by van Straaten's recent collection of the fragments. As for Posidonius, a final decision will have to wait for the reediting of the testimony.⁴

In the next chapter, on the Stoa of the imperial age (I, pp. 277-366), Pohlenz maintains the common thesis that the Roman Stoa marks the return to Chrysippus' doctrine (pp. 291 f.), yet he also makes it evident—and perhaps more evident than any previous writer—how many new and different trends appear in the philosophy of the Roman Stoics. There is Musonius' insistence on habituation and practice in ethics (p. 301); Seneca's concept of anticipation (pp. 307 f.) and premeditation (p. 309), his gentlemanly *ars vivendi* (p. 313), his stress on man's conscience (p. 317) and on man's will (pp. 319 f.); Epictetus' division of philosophical topics (p. 329), his theory of choice (p. 332), his evaluation of *αἰδώς* and *πίστις* (p. 335); and Marcus Aurelius' anthropology (p. 343). One might add that the *principium individuationis* obtained a metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, and pedagogical significance which it hardly had in earlier times (Seneca, *Ep.*, 113, 13-16; 114; 115). Moreover, this generation lives in the here and now. Teaching by example replaces teaching by theorem, and models are found in contemporary men and events, rather than in the ancient poets.⁵ Not only do the

⁴ Cf. A. J. P., LVII (1936), pp. 286-325; LXXI (1950), pp. 78-83. The collection of the Posidonian fragments on which I am working is scheduled to appear in the near future. I should add that Pohlenz in a book that has just come out (*Stoa und Stoiker* [1950], 386 pp.) has translated not only fragments hailing from the Old Stoa, but also fragments of Panaetius and Posidonius, as well as passages which he thinks can be traced to these authors.

⁵ This is especially true of Epictetus. Cf. also his general criticism of poetry, I, 4, 26; 28, 12, 32. Chrysippus was famous for his predilection for poetical quotations (I, p. 29), and the same is true of Posidonius,

Roman Stoics emphasize the inner, subjective moment in man's decisions, but also the realization of philosophical truth in action—one is almost tempted to say, in the philosopher's own existence—becomes one of their principal concerns (Epictetus, I, 29, 55-57). In some of these traits one might discern the influence of Panaetius and Posidonius on the Roman Stoa, and I should be inclined to rate this influence higher than does Pohlenz, at least where he speaks in general terms (p. 291; but e.g. pp. 321; 338; 348). Cleanthes' admiration of Zeus permeates the monotheism of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Many of the new doctrines take their departure from Chrysippus. Nevertheless, the thesis of the preponderance of Chrysippus' authority seems much in need of a revision, and it might be well to take the words of Epictetus more literally when he says that Chrysippus "shows us the way" (I, 4, 30). Chrysippus may have provided the intellectual tools for the younger Stoics. Fundamentally, their views are new, and these representatives of Stoicism, no less than their predecessors, in their factiousness and independence of judgment are like "oligarchs," to use Numenius' happy phrase (II, 20 Arnim).

Another view that Pohlenz shares with many interpreters of Stoicism also, in my opinion, calls for reconsideration, namely the assumption of a special affinity between the Roman spirit and that of Stoic philosophy. This thesis, propounded by Pohlenz first in his chapter on the Middle Stoa (pp. 257-76), naturally gains momentum in his analysis of the later Stoa. Is it really true that in the first centuries of our era Stoicism among all the philosophical schools "remained the only one which suited the Romans and acquired significance for their way of life" (p. 279)? Certainly, during the first 150 years in which philosophy made an impress on Rome, the Epicureans were in the ascendancy. Cicero's assertion *Italiam totam occupaverunt* (*Tusc.*, IV, 3, 7) may be exaggerated. Yet, the poets of the late Republic testify to the strong hold which Epicureanism alongside Stoicism had over the Roman mind. And was it not the typically Roman attitude that shaped also Epicureanism? Is Lucretius' Epicurean ethics not expressive of the Roman *Willenshaltung* (cf. W. Y. Sellar, *The Roman Poets of the Republic*³ [1899], pp. 358 f.)? Just as Seneca infuses into the Stoic language the Roman simile of war and of the warrior, so does Lucretius revel in pictures of war and fighting.⁶ Varro dared to contend that the dissension between the Stoa and the Garden was but a *Logomachia* (*Menippeae*, 243; cf. Pohlenz, p. 275), and he was quite right for his own time, in which Epicureanism changed greatly and acknowledged even political responsibility. In the first century of our era Epicurus'

who in addition used examples from past history (Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, p. 372 M.).

⁶ For the Roman simile of fighting and military service, cf. Pohlenz, I, p. 314, and O. Regenbogen, *Die Antike*, XII (1936), pp. 115 f. However, one should not overlook the fact that the simile is also related to the language of the mysteries, cf. R. Reitzenstein, *Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*² (1927), p. 192; the comparison of philosophy with the mysteries is significant for Lucretius, as well as for Seneca and Epictetus.

doctrine did not cease to have faithful adherents among the Romans, not to mention that the Stoic, Seneca, showed an outspoken friendliness toward its teachings (pp. 306; 322); in the second century its authority rose steadily.⁷ Even granting that under Augustus it may have looked for a moment as if Stoicism would emerge as the national philosophy of Rome (p. 276), this dream did not come true. The initial opposition to the monarchy, so prominent among the Stoics, though not absent among the Epicureans, gave the Stoa the prestige of upholding the old Roman creed. But the Stoa, too, eventually made its peace with the empire (pp. 286; 314), and the ethics which a man like Hierocles taught his pupils, despite its lip service to patriotism, is concerned mostly with the petty problems of daily life (p. 288). Under these circumstances I think it would be safer to speak of an affinity between individual Romans and Stoicism, rather than of one between Rome and the Stoa.

Pohlenz' last chapter (pp. 367-465) deals with the influence of the Stoic doctrine on other philosophies. He makes much of the Stoicism of Philo (pp. 367 ff.), whom Wolfson, admitting the frequency of Stoic terminology and phraseology, has just characterized as more of a critic than a follower of the Stoa (*Philo*, I [1947], pp. 111 f.). In opposition to Reitzenstein, Pohlenz sees a Stoic tinge in the Gnostic doctrine (p. 381), he underlines the Stoic views in the Hermetic writings (p. 383) and sifts out the Stoic elements in Neopythagoreanism and Neoplatonism (pp. 386 ff.). Special attention is paid finally to the sway of Stoic ideas over Christianity (pp. 400 ff.). While in its very beginning Christianity was impervious to philosophy—even the thought of St. Paul and St. John was not tinted with Stoicism (pp. 403; 405)—from the time of the Apologists (pp. 406 ff.) the development of the new religion cannot be understood without taking its contact with the Stoa into account (p. 463).

To be sure, in this survey on late ancient beliefs Pohlenz does not neglect to underline the Platonic trend noticeable in the various philosophical schools, as well as in Christianity. He points to the fact that Stoic materialism was abandoned in favor of Platonic idealism; that monism receded before dualism. Yet he is inclined to put the decisive emphasis on the Stoic share, especially in the formulation of Christian ethical concepts (e.g. p. 415). That he should speak of the Stoic explanation of evil as the necessary antithesis of the good (pp. 430; 445), an explanation which Chrysippus himself used with express reference to Plato (*II*, 1169 Arnim; cf. *Phaedo*, 60 C; also *Theaetetus*, 176 A), can be but a slip of the pen.

⁷ For the history of Epicureanism in general, cf. H. Usener, *Epicurea* (1887), pp. LXXIII ff.; for the second century, cf. F. Ueberweg-K. Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums*¹² (1926), pp. 578 ff. For the names of Roman Epicureans, cf. E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 1^a (1880), p. 375. The claim that the philosophers expelled by Vespasian practically were all Stoics and Cynics (Pohlenz, I, p. 286) seems not justified to me.

To what an extent Stoic ethics itself is tinged by Platonism is a vexed problem.⁸ This much, however, is certain: the "Socratic medicine" of which Chrysippus talked (III, 424 Arnim) became more and more potent in Musonius, in Seneca, and in Epictetus, the very men who transmitted Stoic ethics to the Christians. Even in regard to their moral doctrines, then, Clement and the other Christian philosophers took over almost as much Platonism as Stoicism. Nor should one forget that the Stoa had learned a good deal from its interchange with the Academy and the Peripatos (pp. 248 ff.; 354 ff.).

Saying this, I do not wish to identify myself with Shorey's opinion that Stoicism is only an episode in the history of Platonism, much as I agree with his strictures on the usual representations of the influence exercised by Stoic philosophy on later generations (*Platonism—Ancient and Modern* [1938], pp. 19 ff.). The peculiarity of the Stoic dogma has clearly been demonstrated by Pohlenz and he has set in sharp relief the originality of the Hellenistic systems against those of the Pre-Socratics, of Plato, and of Aristotle. The Stoic sage is more than "the stony similitude of a Platonist," and Stoic philosophy as a whole is more than decayed Platonism. In their metaphysics, and above all in their interpretation of natural phenomena, their teleology, the Stoics held their own. Their contribution to all natural sciences, no less than to the humanities, was great indeed. It is on the basis of such an evaluation alone that one can understand the survival of Stoic ideas in the Middle Ages, and the impetus that Stoicism gave to the philosophers of the Renaissance, as well as to the rationalists of the succeeding centuries.⁹

In this review I have outlined only the principal components of Pohlenz' picture of Stoicism. I have not attempted to give an impression of the innumerable details which he discusses and clarifies, or of the wealth of material incorporated into his book. In this regard, it may suffice to say that the reader will find a most complete account of all aspects of Stoicism, of the lives of the philosophers as well as of their theories. I need hardly add that the modern literature too is thoroughly covered. There is now no more comprehensive and no more up-to-date introduction to Stoic philosophy than the one which Pohlenz provides, and therefore the book will be widely read. However, using it the reader, in my opinion, should be aware that the main theses of Pohlenz' interpretation are still controversial, and it is for this reason that I have drawn attention to them here.

LUDWIG EDELSTEIN.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

⁸ Cf. the remarks of O. Rieth, "Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik," *Problemata*, IX (1933), pp. 169 f.

⁹ Cf. Pohlenz' short survey of the Stoa in the Middle Ages and in modern times (pp. 466-73), and for the latter period also Barth-Goedeckemeyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-49.

RAGNAR HÖISTAD. *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man*. Uppsala (B. H. Blackwell, Ltd.), 1948. Pp. 234. 10 Swedish crowns; 12 shillings.

FARRAND SAYRE. *The Greek Cynics*. Baltimore, J. H. Furst Co., 1948. Pp. viii + 112 + 1 loose sheet (Addenda). \$1.50.

According to tradition, Socrates' pupil Antisthenes founded the Cynic school, and was succeeded by Diogenes of Sinope and Crates. Cynicism continued to have representatives till late antiquity, though at some times it died out almost completely. However, Cynicism has none of the closely organized continuity which characterized other ancient schools, and it has been possible to cast grave doubt on this historical tradition, and even on the connexion of Antisthenes and Diogenes. This is the "problem of the Cynics" which gives Höistad the title for his introductory chapter; and on this problem the two books under review take widely different positions.

Sayre's book is a revised edition of his *Diogenes of Sinope: A Study of Greek Cynicism* (Baltimore, 1938). The bibliography and list of sources have been omitted, the chapter on "Antisthenes the Socratic" has been relegated to the end, and appendices have been added with translations of the fragments of Crates and Bion of Borysthenes. The text has also been extensively rewritten, but the general point of view remains the same.

Sayre follows those who have rejected the traditional view, but pushes their thesis to an extreme. He not only denies that Antisthenes was the teacher of Diogenes and the originator of Cynicism, but even that Diogenes had any serious ideas at all, or any connexion with the history of Greek philosophy. In his first chapter, he draws a composite picture of the Cynics, using material from all periods and all sorts of writers. It is obvious that with such a procedure the abundant anecdote material must come to the fore, at the expense of the more serious doxographical statements. He is aware of the varying value of his sources, but thinks that since there must be some background of truth for any report, any report is worth repeating. Since there were a good number of Cynic charlatans, and many ancient writers are hostile to all Cynicism, and many friendly reports can be interpreted *in malam partem*, a very unfavorable picture of the group emerges. They are immoral, lawless vagabonds, seeking happiness through the rejection of responsibility, exalting idleness, improvidence, and poverty, sanctioning or advocating thievery, sacrilege, incest and cannibalism, and with all this making a hypocritical pretense of wisdom and claiming special privileges from society.

Antisthenes, in Sayre's view, is too respectable to fit this picture; he was a "Socratic." Diogenes, on the contrary, is too disreputable even to be considered a Cynic. He was "a vagrant beggar with a criminal record . . . who did nothing, taught nothing and wrote nothing" (p. 68). He "gained publicity through a chance meeting with Alexander" (p. 50) and won fame through being mistakenly identified with two other characters named Diogenes. Thus the origin of Cynicism is placed much later than usual. Crates had some influence upon it, but even he is not classed as a Cynic. "He was a

well-known and respectable citizen, a religious and well educated man" (p. 31).

It is apparent that Sayre's general judgment of the Cynics is largely influenced by shocked repugnance at their unconventional views. This influences his choice of source-material, and also his use of terms, some of which are understood in too unfavorable a sense. For example, *ἀναιδέα* ("shamelessness") need not mean a complete rejection of decency; it is simply the ability to eliminate the influence of conventional attitudes in determining one's course.

On all these questions Høistad takes a very different point of view. He questions the validity of the "anti-Cynic" picture painted by Sayre and his predecessors, and attempts to emphasize the positive side of Cynicism—to determine its serious purpose and the nature of its doctrines. He wishes to put the Cynic ideas in their "idea-historical context," and show that they fall naturally into the pattern of Greek fourth-century thought.

The first task is of course evaluation of the source-material. Contrary to Sayre, who believes that the Cynics were illiterate, Høistad speaks of "a considerable body of literature" (p. 16)—the writings of Antisthenes and Diogenes, those of their successors in the next generation, and the Hellenistic diatribes. (Of this latter material he makes but little use, however, since he is interested mainly in "classical Cynicism.") He thinks much can be learned from the reports of Diogenes Laertius and other late authors who were influenced by Cynicism. In all this material there is a small amount of serious doxography and a vast number of anecdotes, principally about Diogenes. Høistad seems right in believing that most value should be assigned to the doxographical statements as against the anecdotes, and that this principle is justified by the coherent picture which emerges of the "idea-historical" relationship of the Cynics to their contemporaries and predecessors.

With regard to the relationship of Antisthenes and Diogenes, Høistad advances the principle that "we are justified in querying the traditional linking of Antisthenes and Diogenes only if we can establish some fundamental difference in their lives and teaching" (p. 8). Dudley and Sayre place great emphasis on an argument, based on certain defaced coins of Sinope, that Diogenes could not have been in Athens before 340, and consequently could not have met Antisthenes, who died about 366. Høistad restudies this evidence, and seems to have shown that there is no compelling reason, at least, to reject the ancient tradition. Likewise in regard to their teachings, he shows that the doxographical reports on Diogenes reveal "a different and intellectually more imposing figure than the burlesque clown of the anecdotes" (p. 8).

Høistad does not attempt a complete study of the Cynics, but limits his consideration to their "conception of man" as seen in their idealizations of the hero and the king as models for human behavior. In Chapter I, he discusses three examples of the Cynic ideal hero—Heracles, Cyrus, and Odysseus. The Heracles-conception is traced from the ethically neutral, martial figure of epic to Sophocles and Euripides, where he is "a deeply tragic figure who meets his fate in the conflict between the divine and the human" (p. 24), and the Ionian historical and sophistic tradition culmina-

ting in the allegorical treatment of Herodorus (*F. Gr. Hist.*, I, 218) and the *Choice of Heracles* by Prodicus (*F. V.*,⁵ II, 313). He then sets forth the evidence for Antisthenes' use of the figure of Heracles, and shows that it is a logical product of the tradition, with the "individual-ethical" emphasis, the ideas of asceticism and of the choice of life, and the glorification of the idea of *πόνος*. Heracles had become "the ethical superman-type, bent on his own perfection" (p. 37).

The use made by Diogenes of the Heracles-idealization is harder to show, for there is only one passage on which to rely, the argument for "double training" (mental and physical) in D. L., VI, 70-71. Höistad disputes the argument of K. von Fritz that this section has a Stoic source, and shows by a comparison with the Prodicus allegory and with the Aristippus-Socrates conversation in Xen., *Mom.*, II, 1 that the ideas attributed in this doxographical section to Diogenes were current in the late fifth and fourth centuries. But the connexion with Heracles is dubious. Unfortunately the name of the hero is separated from the main exposition by an expression which indicates that direct summary is at an end (*τοιαῦτα διελέγετο καὶ ποιῶν ἐφαίνετο*, 71), and is connected with another motif, that of freedom (*τὸν αὐτὸν χαρακτῆρα τοῦ βίου λέγων διεξάγειν ὄνπερ καὶ Ἡρακλῆς, μὴδὲν ἐλευθερίας προκρίνων*).

In Dio Chrysostom, Epictetus, and Lucian, the author finds "relatively unequivocal traces" of Cynic propaganda; but the proof is rather a matter of similarity of themes and general points of view than of positive evidence, at least as far as Diogenes and Antisthenes are concerned. In a fragment of Antisthenes preserved by Themistius (*Rh. M.*, XXVII [1872], pp. 450 ff.), is represented a meeting between Heracles and Prometheus in which the latter chides Heracles as concerned too much with the things of this world. In *Or.*, VIII, 33, a passage with a strongly Cynical tone, Dio also brings the two together, but here Heracles is the teacher; in VI, 25 and 29, too, Prometheus is presented in an unfavorable light. This seems to show that while Dio used Cynic ideas, he re-fashioned them freely to his own ends. There is little plausibility in Höistad's suggestion that Dio used as his source "a handbook of 4th century Cynic teaching which did not permit the ascription of the themes to a particular source or person" (p. 59). It is also significant that the "philanthropia-theme," which is not found in the fragments of early Cynicism, reappears in Dio. Höistad is perhaps too bold in saying that "we are entitled to draw from these late examples fairly concrete conclusions about the Heracles allegories of early Cynicism" (p. 73); and in fact he does not attempt to draw such conclusions.

Shorter sections of the chapter on the Cynic hero are devoted to Cyrus and Odysseus, and here again the early-Cynic evidence comes mainly from Antisthenes. He makes plausible the view that Antisthenes developed an "individual-ethical" treatment of Cyrus, as a slave who becomes king, and shows the similarity and contrast between his treatment and that of Xenophon. In discussing Antisthenes' surviving rhetorical pieces entitled *Odysseus* and *Ajax*, he seeks to show that even in these exercises, composed under the influence of Gorgias, there are Cynic and "Socratic-Cynic" themes.

Taking up the political ideas of the early Cynics, Høistad seeks to assemble evidence to show that Antisthenes and Diogenes did have a more seriously-developed theory of politics than the anecdote-tradition would indicate, and that this has points of contact with Greek fourth-century thought. These general objectives can be said to be attained, though there are many doubtful points.

Høistad points out that Antisthenes, like Plato and the Sophists, "carried on his literary work for long periods under the pressure of the conflict between state and individual" (p. 104), but in his desire to emphasize the positive side, he does not bring out very clearly the strongly negative reaction of Antisthenes to all forms of state activity. Antisthenes apparently shared the disillusionment of Plato with contemporary politics, but moved in a different direction. Almost all his pronouncements on political matters are truly "cynical." He criticized all sorts of political figures, he commented bitterly that in other departments of life we eliminate the unfit, but not in the state (D. L., VI, 6), and the sum of his wisdom was that government (*πολιτεία*) is like fire: if you come too close you get burned, and if you stay too far away, you freeze (Stob., *Anth.*, IV, 4, 28). Høistad takes up the concept of *δμόνοια* and tries to show that Antisthenes contributed to the development "which transformed it into a purely individual-ethical concept" (p. 111). But here again, though his general idea seems right, the proofs are largely irrelevant. By a complicated argument he attempts to establish that the *δμόνοια* in Antiphon's work *περὶ δμονομίας* is *δμόνοια ἑαυτῷ*, though in the extant fragments the word does not occur at all. He is anxious to place the expression *δμόνοια ἑαυτῷ* in the fifth century in order to attribute it to Antisthenes, but we find that the latter does not use it either. The *idea* is present in Antisthenes, however: *ἑρωτηθεὶς τί αὐτῷ περιέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἔφη, τὸ δύνασθαι ἑαυτῷ ὁμιλεῖν* (D. L., VI, 6). For its antecedents Høistad might better have mentioned the Pythagoreans and Plato, the division of the soul, the analogy between parts of soul and parts of society, etc. Antisthenes himself made this analogy explicit; he spoke of the agreement of brothers as a wall (D. L., VI, 6), but also of the walls of the soul: *τὰ δὲ τείχη τῶν πόλεων εἶναι σφαλερὰ πρὸς τὸν ἔσω προδότην, ἀσάλευτα δὲ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τείχη καὶ ἀρραγῇ* (Epiph., *Adv. haeres.*, III, 26, *Dox.*, 591). He wished to withdraw from the city of the world to the city of the soul; and of course the corollary of this was the strengthening and self-sufficiency of the soul. A good many of Antisthenes' anti-political criticisms are directed against democrats and the forms of the democratic state, but it is doubtful whether, as Høistad assumes, he was more hostile to democracy than to any other political form. Certainly the passage he cites from Aristotle (*Pol.*, III, 8, 1284a) cannot prove this. Here, speaking of ethically superior persons, Aristotle says, "Anyone who tried to legislate for them would be ridiculous; they might well say what the lions said (according to Antisthenes) when the hares made speeches demanding that everyone be equal." It is more than doubtful if this whole passage belongs to Antisthenes, especially since this is the conclusion of an important Aristotelian argument. And as a matter of fact, Aristotle may well have employed the fable in a

somewhat different sense from the original; Antisthenes probably intended a satire against all forms of political activity. The lions represent tyrants (whom he attacked elsewhere) better than virtuous aristocrats.

Diogenes seems to represent, in a more extreme form than Antisthenes, disillusionment with ordinary social and political forms, and insistence on the inner freedom and self-sufficiency of the individual. Along with this, however, he showed a very remarkable enthusiasm for propaganda or pedagogy; this is what lies behind most of the attention-seeking "stunts" enshrined in the anecdote tradition. He did not withdraw from the world so far as not to care for his fellow man, and it is difficult to make sense of the tradition without recognizing that he had a serious and positive program for human betterment. This summary lies very close to the views of Høistad. By taking seriously the doxographical statements in D. L., VI, 70 ff., he is able to maintain very convincingly that Diogenes was neither the "burlesque clown of the anecdotes" nor the unscrupulous scoundrel that Sayre makes him out to be. He is very eager, however, to establish the existence of "a Cynic political theory," and this seems to introduce certain exaggerations or distortions into his treatment of the material (pp. 116-49).

An example may be taken from the analysis of the story which tells of Diogenes' being sold to a man named Xenias and entrusted with the education of the latter's sons (D. L., VI, 29-31, 74). When asked what he can do, Diogenes says, *ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν*; but Høistad seems to press the evidence rather too hard when he makes of this phrase the equation *ἄρχων = παιδαγωγός*, and uses this, throughout the rest of the book, as evidence for the content of an "early Cynic" theory of education and politics. The framework of the story certainly has the appearance of anecdote, though it is not impossible that the pedagogical ideas set forth in sections 30-31 may go back to the ideas or practice of Diogenes. These ideas conform in spirit with those of the doxography in sections 70-71: *δσκησις* of both body and soul, as opposed to either one-sided intellectualism or athleticism; contempt for pleasure; devotion to the kind of effort (*πόνος*) which is according to nature rather than what is merely conventional; and all this in the search for the kind of freedom (*ἐλευθερία*) which means mastery of self and independence of external circumstances. In view of this ultimate aim, Høistad scarcely seems justified in saying that the pedagogical ideal is the same as Xenophon's (p. 123); in the latter there is a real "combination of education and politics." Nor is he right in drawing a close parallel between the Cynic political theory and Plato's (pp. 125-6). The latter had strong hopes of putting his program into effect; nothing in what we can learn of Diogenes' political writings need show more than a strong criticism of existing social institutions—marriage, religious taboos, war, etc. His positive program lay in the "individual-ethical" realm, and his famous "cosmopolitanism" (*μόνην τε ὁρθήν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ*, D. L., VI, 72) probably meant the rejection of particular states rather than the advocacy of a world-state. It is not true that "the biological idea of Plato, *φύσει σοφός*, is Cynic" (p. 126). It is possible to soften the rigidity of Plato's

class-system by emphasizing strongly the small amount of social mobility he does allow; but there is nothing to show that, in Cynicism, wisdom is determined by class or bound to it. In fact, Høistad himself quotes contrary evidence for both Antisthenes and Diogenes.

In his last chapter, entitled "The Cynic Paideia and the Cynic King in Dio Chrysostomus," Høistad presents an analysis of Dio's use of the *paideia*-theme and his portrayals of the ideal king. His principal aim is to establish the presumption that Dio was directly influenced by the writings of Antisthenes and Diogenes. This is an extraordinarily difficult task, for several reasons. Dio shows Cynic influence in many ways, and it is natural to suppose that he read early Cynic works, but he rarely cites sources, and not being the advocate of any kind of orthodoxy, he combines and uses for his own purposes material from earlier thinkers. In addition, our material on early Cynicism is extremely scanty, and it is often difficult to distinguish Cynic from Stoic traits. Høistad scarcely seems able to decide how much to claim, though he is clear that the difficulties of the investigation "preclude results which *really* can be proved" (p. 221). In some passages he finds that Dio has given—sometimes perhaps with the use of "early Stoic intermediaries," "a more or less faithful paraphrase of a Cynic work" (p. 169). His argument is a complicated one, tracing an intricate pattern of themes and motifs, and depends for its force largely on a cumulative effect. The parallelism in pedagogical theory is based mainly on the "double *paideia*" of Dio—human and divine—which is compared with the "double *paideia*" of Antisthenes and Diogenes. In D. L., VI, 70, however, the *διττὴ ἀσκησις* is physical and mental; and the idea of a "divine" *paideia* seems to enter only in the Heracles-Prometheus dialogue of the Antisthenes-fragment mentioned above.

As to the "Cynic basileus-idealization," there were many changes between Diogenes of Sinope and Dio the friend of Trajan. The *παιδαγωγός-ἄρχων* and *δοῦλος-ἄρχων* themes in early Cynicism do not imply a full-fledged political theory, as has been seen. Of course, the political meaning of *ἄρχειν* was in mind when Diogenes said his forte was *ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν*, but in a political sense the Cynic wanted to rule only himself, not others. This view was transformed, by the time of Dio, to a theory of the king as a lonely, suffering hero, a moral paragon who is the true king precisely because of these characteristics.

Høistad's book is a valuable contribution to the study of Cynicism. Perhaps its greatest lack—for a book on politics and education—is that, since the author's attention is confined almost exclusively to the interrelations of ideas and themes, he fails to show the movement in relation to its changing social and political environment. The importance of this aspect is recognized in both the books under review, but in neither is it consistently regarded.

EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.

DE PAUW UNIVERSITY.

J. G. BARRINGTON-WARD, J. BELL, C. M. BOWRA, A. N. BRYAN-BROWN, J. D. DENNISTON, T. F. HIGHAM, M. PLATNAUER.
Some Oxford Compositions. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949.
 Pp. 324.

In 1949 Oxford produced two books of great value to classical scholars. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* provides up-to-date information about Greece and Rome; *Some Oxford Compositions* represents another branch of scholarship, the art of composition, which is the best approach to the study of style. Though composition is of great importance, it is apt to be neglected today. And this is unfortunate, since it creates a far greater sensitivity to classical literature than is possible for those who are satisfied with translating Greek or Latin into English. Incidentally it gives a great deal of pleasure both to those who write the compositions and to those who read them. A rare treat is in store for those who will take the time to study this book with care.

It is the result of a fine cooperative venture. In 1923 seven classical tutors at several Oxford colleges formed a club for the practice of Greek and Latin composition in prose and verse. Every two weeks during term they used to meet and discuss one or two versions, which had been distributed in advance. Finally out of 232 versions 159 were selected by vote for publication. The members of the club freely gave each other the benefit of their criticisms and suggestions. Thus there was no competition, but only a happy meeting of minds from which all could benefit. This is a custom that might well be imitated elsewhere.

T. F. Higham of Trinity College, the Public Orator at Oxford who writes the fine Latin orations introducing candidates for honorary degrees, has written a stimulating introduction. The book is dedicated to the late J. G. Barrington-Ward of Christ Church, *qui plurimis discipulorum palmis suoque ipsius docuit exemplo quantum prodesset litteratis curiosa veterum imitatio*. It is a great loss to Oxford scholarship that he died in 1946 before the book could be published, and that J. D. Denniston, another brilliant member of this club, died shortly after the book appeared. John Bell left Oxford in 1927 and therefore could not contribute as much as the others. C. M. Bowra, now Warden of Wadham College, A. N. Bryan-Brown, and M. Platnauer complete the list of contributors.

It is interesting to compare this book with the famous *Cambridge Compositions* which appeared in 1899. This contained versions in Greek and Latin prose and verse by many different hands, but it tended to be uneven in quality. It is unlikely that the versions all received the same careful criticism that was given to these Oxford compositions. In the same year Oxford produced the *Nova Anthologia Oxoniensis*, but this was confined to Greek and Latin verse. Hence it is especially gratifying that Oxford has now supplied these examples of Greek and Latin prose. They should be invaluable as models for use in courses on Advanced Prose Composition. In fact, several of them have already been used at Columbia University in Greek and Latin composition courses for the A. M. degree.

Unfortunately little interest is taken today in verse composition,

so that the examples of Greek and Latin verse will not have as much practical value in most American colleges as the proses. But they should give immense pleasure to all who enjoy reading Greek and Latin. In his Introduction (p. xvii) Higham attaches great importance to the testimony of a scholar as great as Wilamowitz, who stated in his *Erinnerungen* (1928) that no school exercise had been of greater value than recasting really good German prose into Latin of fine quality, and at a later stage, recasting German poetry into Horatian lyrics.

The following table shows the contributions made by the individual authors:

	Latin prose	Greek prose	Latin verse	Greek verse	Total
J. G. Barrington-Ward...	6	6	24	1	37
J. Bell.....	5	0	0	0	5
C. M. Bowra.....	1	1	2	17	21
A. N. Bryan-Brown.....	8	4	1	0	13
J. D. Denniston.....	7	17	1	8	33
T. F. Higham.....	5	4	10	7	26
M. Platnauer.....	4	9	2	9	24
	36	41	40	42	159

The metres used are as follows:

	Latin verse		Greek verse
Elegiac	17	Iambic	24
Hexameter	16	Elegiac	9
Alcaic	3	Hexameter	4
Choliambic	2	Choral lyric.....	3
Phalaecean	2	Trochaic	1
	40	Anapaestic	1
			42

Where the standard is so high, all the contributions deserve praise, but if one were to award special prizes, probably Barrington-Ward and Higham would receive the prize for Latin prose, Denniston for Greek prose, Barrington-Ward for Latin verse, Bowra for Greek verse, and a special prize for all-round excellence would be given to Higham. For in the writer's opinion the best version in the book is No. 64, a brilliant translation into Latin elegiacs of an article by Berta Ruck, called "How to Hold Him." These thirty lines deserve to be added as an Appendix to Ovid's *Ars Am.* III. Their technique is perfect, they are written with great facility, and they display a delightful sense of humor. Barrington-Ward's versatility in handling five Latin verse metres is a notable feature of the book; the same is true of Bowra's remarkable range and technique in handling Greek metres. It is natural that one who has written with such discrimination on Greek poetry should be sensitive to its many aspects, but Bowra has gone far beyond the usual limits of Greek verse composition. Most people are satisfied if they can write tolerable iambs in the style of the tragedians. Bowra does this well, but he can also imitate difficult choral lyric metres, which is an

unusual achievement, and can write charming elegiacs and Homeric hexameters. But here again Higham must be mentioned; for his poem written in the style of Theocritus is a brilliant performance. It was to be expected that the learned author of *Greek Particles* would be sensitive to the fine points of Greek prose composition, and we are not disappointed; Denniston's proses are in a class of their own. And Platnauer has also made a splendid contribution.

Among the Latin prose versions No. 4 (J. G. B-W.) is a good Ciceronian version of a speech by Macaulay, No. 9 (M. P.) is a passage from Gibbon about Julian, which falls naturally into Tacitean style, No. 10 (J. D. D.) is Fanny Burney's lively description of the trial of Hastings (Verres) and the speech of Burke (M. Tullius). No. 11 (T. F. H.) is a character-sketch from Landor, translated with skill in two different styles, both Ciceronian and Tacitean. "On a Sunday morning" is appropriately rendered by *primo Quinquatruum die*, an unsuitable time for a duel. No. 19 (J. D. D.) is an interesting account of Tsar Nicolas II and the Kaiser, and in No. 20 (T. F. H.) Lord Cromer discusses the difference between Eastern and Western habits of thought. No. 26 (J. G. B-W.) is a speech by Bright referring to the scimitar set up by the Scythians as a symbol of Mars. "What are our contributions to charity, to education, to morality, to religion, to justice, and to civil government, when compared with the wealth we expend in sacrifices to the old scimitar?" Here English abstract nouns change naturally into Latin verbs: *Sane per multas quotannis pecunias erogamus ut plebi frumentum comparetur, ut instituuntur adulescentes, ut mores corrigantur, ius civile dicatur, civitas recte administretur, res divina non neglegatur; at, di boni, quam exigui videbuntur hi sumptus, si cum iis contuleris quos etiam nunc, ut ita dicam, veteri illi acinaci dedicamus.* And "the moral law" becomes *legem illam quam di humano generi dederunt*. The version shows the care with which these writers observe the *clausulae* that Zielinski proved were favored by Cicero. Thus *habere felicitatem* contains a cretic and two trochees, *qualis hic noster est* is a double cretic, and *iure tribuendum* is like Cicero's *esse videatur*, where the cretic has changed to a paeon.

No. 30 (M. P.) contains a statement made by H. H. Asquith, which might well be the motto for this book: "In my opinion it ought to be one of the serious functions of a University to inculcate the importance and to cultivate the practice of style." In No. 35 (A. N. B-B.), Napier's account of Wellington's campaigns, Napoleon becomes Hannibal and Wellington Q. Fabius. This question of proper names is discussed in section V of the Introduction; Higham prefers the substitution of an authentic Roman name for a modern name like Wellington, or the use of some subterfuge like *dux Romanus*, and regards the latinization of an English name as legitimate only as a last resort. About the only exceptions to this rule are found in Nos. 19, 29, and 45.

Among the Greek proses No. 89 from H. Sidgwick (M. P.) and No. 106 from G. Lowes Dickinson, *The Meaning of Good* (T. F. H.) are excellent philosophical passages, ably translated in the style of Plato, and No. 95 (J. D. D.), a speech by Fox about Buonaparte, makes a most convincing Greek oration. Other interesting pieces are No. 77 from Swift, *Gulliver's Travels* (J. D. D.), No. 91 from

Galsworthy (J. G. B-W.), No. 96 from Bernard Shaw (M. P.), No. 100 from the *London Times* (T. F. H.), and No. 113 from Bertrand Russell (J. D. D.).

In the section containing Latin verse No. 39 (T. F. H.) is a translation into hexameters of seventeen lines from Shelley's "Queen Mab"; here Higham shows unusual enterprise by writing three versions in the styles of Lucretius, Vergil, and Ovid. No. 53 (J. G. B-W.) is a beautiful translation into elegiacs of a poem by Thomas Campion; the last couplet ends with a striking pentameter: *fallant formosae, sit modo forma, viros*. Other good poems by Barrington-Ward are No. 48 (Fielding) in the choliambic metre, No. 51 (John Bartlet) in elegiacs, No. 58 (T. Campbell) in alcaics, and No. 69 (A. Cowley) in hendecasyllables. No. 64 is Higham's admirable imitation of Ovid (*quicquid agit invenis, facito mireris anhelans*); No. 71 ("There are numerous ways of foretelling rain") could be regarded as his contribution to Vergil's *Georgics*.

In the section containing Greek verse No. 131 (C. M. B.) is an attractive translation into elegiacs of a poem by J. E. Flecker ("I who am dead a thousand years"), in which the last two stanzas have great charm. Nos. 139 and 149 (C. M. B.) are extracts from the *Chanson de Roland* and *Beowulf*, appropriately translated into Homeric hexameters. Nos. 129, 134, and 156 are Bowra's brilliant translations into choral lyric metres. The passages are taken from Shelley's "The Cloud," Coleridge's "Kubla Khan," and Swinburne's "Atalanta in Calydon." No. 134 contains 90 lines in 3 strophes and 3 antistrophes; here Kubla Khan becomes Minos and Xanadu is Cnossos, and the demon-lover appears as Pan. No. 156 contains 98 lines in seven strophes; "the hounds of spring" is translated literally, and since the subject is Greek, the ideas fall naturally into Greek verse. No. 152 is Higham's fine translation of nine stanzas from Meredith's "Love in the Valley," containing a hundred Greek hexameters. A refrain, which is a prayer that Cytherea and Artemis may be propitious, follows each stanza, like the beautiful refrains in Theocritus. The poem is a revised version of a composition that won the Gaisford prize in 1912. No. 154 (T. F. H.) is an amusing poem on a lost golf-ball; the words "Gladly I left you, by some thorn reposing, No prize to find" seem like an echo of the poet Archilochus, who left his shield behind him.¹ The versions in iambs seem less interesting when they are compared with such original contributions, but good examples are No. 137 (J. G. B-W.) from Massinger's *Duke of Milan*, No. 140 (C. M. B.) from Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, and No. 143 (J. D. D.) from *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.

The Introduction is a valuable addition to the book, and the Notes with their useful references and variant readings are a distinctive feature. Higham carefully explains the difference between versions and "Contemporary Latin" (p. xxi) and rightly favors "a liberal interpretation of the general rule forbidding gratuitous tags" (p. xxxv). It is a pleasure to see the obvious interest he takes (e. g. note 9) in the views of the great American scholar, B. L. Gildersleeve.

J. F. C. RICHARDS.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

¹ E. Diehl, *Anth. Lyr. Graec.*, I, 3, frag. 6a.

J. MAROUZEAU. Quelques aspects de la formation du latin littéraire. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1949. Pp. 232. (*Collection linguistique publiée par la Société de Linguistique de Paris*, LIII.)

For half a century now, Professor Jules Marouzeau has been working on the Latin language both as an instrument of style and as a linguistic phenomenon. He sees it not only as the speech of the Roman townsmen and their country cousins, but as the intellectual medium through which they educated themselves and assimilated the thought of Greece, and as the aesthetic vehicle which was built and perfected by Italian immigrants to Rome until it became capable of effects bolder and not less subtle than those of the Greek writers who taught them. He has published several extremely valuable works on these aspects of the language, notably his *Traité de stylistique appliquée au latin* (Paris, 1946²) and *L'ordre des mots dans la phrase latine* (3 vols., Paris, 1922-49). He has for many years been lecturing on the same field at the École pratique des Hautes Études in Paris; it was he who founded the Société des Études Latines, he is the editor of the *Revue des Études Latines*, and he has deserved well of the republic of letters by organizing the indispensable *Année Philologique*.

He has now published a collection of articles on Latin style, which grew out of his course at the Sorbonne, but which have already appeared in periodicals and commemorative volumes here and there. Modestly, he calls it *Some aspects of the formation of literary Latin*, saying in his introduction "These studies . . . cannot claim to offer more than an outline of that systematic research into the formation of literary Latin which I hope will soon be undertaken by some younger scholar." Even if his articles were not so coherent as they are, we should still be grateful to him for assembling them in a convenient collection at a reasonable price: for a paper printed in the *Donum Natalicium J. Schrijnen* or the *An. del Inst. de lit. clas. de Buenos Aires* is not likely to reach so wide a public as it deserves. Savants who contribute to commemorative volumes sometimes make their sacrifice more cheerfully, but not less finally than the hero who killed his good horses to accompany his dead friend:

πίσυρας δ' ἐριαύχενας ἵππους
ἔσσυμένως ἐνέβαλλε πυρῇ μέγала στεναχίζων.

Yet these articles are not miscellaneous Collected Papers. They are bound together by Marouzeau's devotion to the difficult but important subject of Latin style, and they touch many of its essential problems. Although, therefore, we must regret that he felt unable to knit them into a comprehensive book, we are doubly thankful to him for making them available and enhancing their value by grouping them so skilfully. A book like this is often more attractive as an introduction than any systematic treatise: in fact, a student who thought of working on Latin stylistic phenomena might spend a useful summer merely reading the articles and books to which Marouzeau refers in footnotes and acknowledgments. (A good

deal of his material is drawn from dissertations and other detailed studies, as he points out.) There are twenty papers in all, in eight groups: *Aspects of old Latin*; *Derivation*; *Vocabulary*; *The "Copia dicendi"*; *The conquest of the abstract*; *The contribution of Greek*; *Syntax*; and *Stylistic*. The first group contains a neat little essay on the style of Plautus, in which Marouzeau points out that when Plautus is called *uerborum elegantissimus*, it means only that he wrote pure Latin without provincialisms, not that he was a careful and subtle artist in words. The book ends with a remarkable analysis, nearly 20 pages long, of the verbal artistry of Horace, which contains more delicate perceptions than anything of the kind I have seen. For instance, did you ever notice that Horace was echoing the whirr of the potter's wheel in *Ep.*, II, 3, 22:

currente rota cur urceus exit?

From her name we knew Lalage for a chatterbox, *dulce loquentem* (*Carm.*, I, 22, 24); but did we all notice the joke in Poor Richard, *pauper Opimius* (*Serm.*, II, 3, 142)?

In the linguistic field, Marouzeau's most interesting articles deal with the extremely fine shades of sound and tone which distinguish words of similar meaning from one another, and make some popular, others specialized, others again both "poetic" and "vulgar." He tells us, for instance, that *haud* is not used at all by Varro and Vitruvius, only once or twice by Caesar, Catullus, and Quintilian, never by Horace in his lyrics and never by Ovid in his elegiacs; but it is common enough in early authors, in archaistic writers like Lucretius and Sallust and Vergil, and in lofty, ambitious stylists like Livy and Tacitus. Not only that. When it is used, it occurs chiefly in set formulae such as *haud dubie*, *haudquaquam*, and *haud scio an*. To learn such facts about style makes us despair of translating any Latin author, but it surely makes us far better able to read Latin as the elegant and expressive language which its writers made it. No doubt we know that it was originally the speech of "workers and peasants," practical folk with little interest in broad views or abstract thinking, but most of us did not realize how many of the words to which we now give an abstract sense or a noble connotation were once concrete country words smelling of the soil: *pecunia* = value in cattle, *putare* = clean out or prune, *incohare* = harness up, *felix* = fertile, *egregius* = prize animal. Think of the brilliant, the imperial overtones of "cohort," "Forum," and "fasces." But the *cohors* was originally no more than the corral where the stock was driven from the fields; *fasces* was a bundle of faggots; and the *forum* was only the dooryard. It is in this kind of research that Marouzeau hopes his book will stimulate younger scholars to undertake the study of "the linguistics of a literary language"; and the charm of his style and the breadth of his knowledge make the duty of following in his footsteps both difficult and attractive.

GILBERT HIGHET.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

LUIGIA ACHILLEA STELLA. *Cinque Poeti dell' Antologia Palatina*. Bologna, Nicola Zanichelli Editore, 1949. Pp. viii + 383. Lire 2000.

Luigia Achillea Stella is a versatile Italian scholar who has published papers in the past twenty years on a large number of subjects, including Homer, the philosophers, Herodotus, and the dramatists. In *Cinque Poeti dell' Antologia Palatina* she turns to a new field, one much cultivated by her fellow-countrymen during the present century, namely, Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic epigram.

The nature and scope of Stella's study are indicated in a general way by her title. The book is really a collection of five essays, semi-popular in tone, on Aselepiades of Samos, Leonidas of Tarentum, Meleager of Gadara, Philodemus of Gadara, and Palladas of Alexandria. The five essays are loosely related one to another by a uniform method and a consistent critical point of view. Stella begins each chapter with a discussion of the epigrammatist's *race, moment, and milieu* (after the fashion of H. Taine). She then goes on to reconstruct his biography, so far as possible, and to interpret selected poems either in the light of the poet's personality, or in terms of the contemporary political, economic, social, and cultural situation. In conclusion, she provides a brief sketch of the poet's influence upon subsequent writers.

Each essay is followed by an appendix containing an admirably full bibliography for the author concerned, together with an exhaustive review of the chronological problems connected with his career. These appendices offer the literary historian much that is new and challenging. Particularly noteworthy is Stella's attempt to establish a new *floruit* for Meleager of Gadara, and by the same token a new date for the publication of his well-known *Garland*. In the past, scholars have generally accepted the testimony of the Palatine scholiast (p. 81) to the effect that the poet lived ἐπὶ Σελεύκου τοῦ ἐσχάτου, i. e. in the early part of the first century B. C. But Stella, following P. Capra-d'Angelo in *Rendiconti dell' Istituto Lombardo*, LXXIV, II (1941), pp. 292-6, prefers to accept the statement of Diogenes Laertius, VI, 99, that Meleager was a contemporary of the cynic Menippus, who flourished *ca.* 280 B. C. Stella alleges in support of the new chronology *A. P.*, VII, 418, 3 (Meleager), interpreting the "Zeus" of ἡ καὶ Δία θρεψαμένα Κῶς as a reference to Ptolemy Philadelphus; she also cites the last verses of Meleager's proem (*A. P.*, IV, 1, 49-55), where she takes the expression ἄλλων τ' ἔρνεα πολλὰ νεόγραφα as meaning "molti altri germogli di epigrammi scritti da poco." On the whole, Stella's attempt to move the *floruit* of Meleager back from the first century to the third century B. C. left this reviewer with the impression that either date must henceforward seem equally possible and equally indemonstrable, so that a further element of uncertainty has now been introduced into the highly precarious chronology of the poets of the *Anthologia Graeca*.

With regard to literary theory, Stella seems to accept without question most of the presuppositions of the Romantic criticism of

the nineteenth century. "Originality" is regarded as a prime virtue in poetry, but the term is left unanalyzed; one misses references to the rather extensive literature on the subject, especially to Mlle. A. Guillemin's excellent articles "L'imitation dans les littératures antiques" and "L'originalité de Virgile" in *R. E. L.*, I and VI, and to chapter one of Harold Ogden White's *Plagiarism and Imitation*. Similarly, Stella stresses the importance of "sincerity" and "spontaneity" and "self-expression," without bothering to consider the full implications of these terms. Familiarity with the recent work of such American literary theorists as Tate, Ransom, or Brooks might have saved the author a number of embarrassing oversimplifications, such as the statement on p. 191, that Meleager, thanks to the hot fire of his inspiration, "overcomes all imitation and forgets all convention" in *A. P.*, V, 175; or the remark on p. 178, that in comparison with Meleager's flower-poems, even the Shakespeare of the *Sonnets* seems "a bit stereotyped"; or finally the assertion on p. 114, that *A. P.*, VII, 478 was prompted not by Leonidas' desire to write a *genre* composition as a "purely rhetorical exercise," but by a spontaneous *moto di commozione*. In the opinion of the present reviewer, such remarks as these—and there are all too many—testify to a fundamental confusion regarding the office of the critic and the nature of the poetic process.

Owing to her preoccupation with biographical and historical detail, Stella seldom attempts to analyze the epigrams of these poets in their formal aspect. Matters of technique, so important to the authors themselves, are neglected; matters of literary priority, which the authors must have regarded as comparatively unimportant, are considered at some length. Most of the analyses which Stella offers reduce themselves to an attempt (a) to relate the poems to the author's environment, or (b) to reconstruct the emotional state of the poet at the moment of writing. In the long run, such methods yield not literary criticism, but rather a species of quasi-literary history or psychology. In this connection one may recall the celebrated dictum of T. S. Eliot, to the effect that "honest criticism and sensitive appreciation are directed not upon the poet but upon the poetry." This view has recently been eloquently expounded by Professor Cherniss in his magisterial essay "On the Biographical Fashion in Literary Criticism" (*California Publications Class. Phil.*, XII).

Stella's Italian prose style seemed to this reviewer to be easy and graceful, and it is a pleasure to be able to add that the author gives evidence of a catholic interest in literature: her book is enriched by frequent quotations from and allusions to a wide variety of poets, Greek, Latin, Italian, English, American, French, German, and even Japanese.

STUART G. P. SMALL.

YALE COLLEGE.

TRUEDELL S. BROWN. *Onesicritus. A Study in Hellenistic Historiography.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of California Press, 1949. Pp. viii + 196. \$3.00. (*University of California Publications in History*, XXXIX.)

Onesicritus, a student of Diogenes the Cynic, accompanied Alexander the Great on his expedition and afterwards wrote *The Education of Alexander*. This "was an encomium with utopian digressions"; while it may have seemed odd "that a Cynic should have painted a favorable portrait of Alexander, whom later Cynics regarded as a tyrant . . . his attempt to harmonize the deeds of Alexander with the principles of Diogenes was perhaps the main-spring of the whole work." This book, accordingly, has little to do with Alexander as such, but rather is a worthwhile "attempt to restore Onesicritus to his rightful position by analyzing the fragments and setting them against the background of other literature from the period."

The Onesicritus fragments are few in number—21 of the 38 fragments concern India—but the literature on them is extensive. Brown's method has been to present the fragments, not infrequently in connection with other ancient writings, and to couple this with a discussion of the modern literature. The advantage of his method is that the entire subject is laid out, and one is left generally with a sound decision between this or that theory. The disadvantage seems to me to lie in overly long summaries of what is already known, especially since it has not been possible to add much that is new. Where one does get Brown's own opinion, and not merely a reasoned judgment between others, it is too often an *ipse dixit*.

Except for two short Appendices, the book consists of five chapters. The first chapter summarizes the life and work of Onesicritus, and, after a discussion of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and *Agesilaus*, concludes in connection with the latter that "Onesicritus must have had a similarly subjective and emotional impression of a living personality when he wrote of Alexander." This brings us to a discussion of Onesicritus and the Cynics. In formulating his views on kingship—that the good man or the wise man ought to rule because his rule would benefit his subjects—Onesicritus was influenced more by his reading of Xenophon and by his personal relations with Alexander than by the teachings of Diogenes. Onesicritus' ideas, however, are not new, "but their application to a king whom he had known makes them less academic than Xenophon's idealization of the older Cyrus."

Chapter IV deals with Onesicritus as a natural scientist. His descriptions of plants and animals, his general theories on India and his comparisons between India and Egypt are noted and discussed. The conclusion of the last chapter—Onesicritus, Nearchus, and the voyage back from India—is this: "Primarily, these fragments have value in adding details to Nearchus or in clarifying his meaning. Only once have we found it possible to use Onesicritus to moderate a statement from Nearchus. Had Nearchus' account of the voyage survived in a similarly abbreviated form, it would still be

more useful than the long Onesicritus fragment, since Nearchus was much more systematic. If we had a good abridgment of Nearchus and the complete account of Onesicritus, on the other hand, we might conceivably be better off than we now are, for Onesicritus would probably have included much that Nearchus left out as trivial." I am not sure, however, that the evidence warrants this hope. In any case, Onesicritus' account as it stands is full of place-names that can no longer be identified. Moreover, when one suggests what Onesicritus may have related about Alexander, there is the danger of a contradictory or unsound reconstruction. For example, on page 120 Brown says, "If Onesicritus did tell this tale [a barbaric custom of the Carmanians described by Strabo], he probably added a remark to the effect that the custom had been suppressed by Alexander." But Onesicritus could assert his independence of Alexander, for on page 60 Brown speaks of "Onesicritus' condemnation of the science of war, strange sentiment to be voiced by the encomiast of Alexander." And if we are to assume that Onesicritus omitted a story, and if then we try to explain the reason for omitting it, at least we cannot have both of the following: "Onesicritus had already gone on down the Indus when Musicanus revolted, so it is highly probable that he failed to mention the revolt in his work. To have done so would have tended to place Alexander in an unfavorable light for punishing a people whose institutions Onesicritus had painted in such glowing colors" (p. 56).

It is probably, in Chapter III, Onesicritus and the utopian literature, that we get the key to an interpretation of Onesicritus' work: "Striking in Onesicritus' account of this region is that with every incentive to a life of indolence or debauch the natives lead a severe, almost a Cynic, existence. . . . The attitude shown by Onesicritus toward the life and the institutions of the Indians in the Land of Musicanus gives him a place in the development of the romance literature of the Greeks." I see little reason to protest, therefore, as Brown does earlier in the note at the conclusion of Chapter I: "Tarn's assertion that ' . . . Onesicritus wrote a professed romance ' goes much too far."

C. A. ROBINSON, JR.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

ÉDOUARD DES PLACES, S. J. Pindare et Platon. Paris, Beauchesne et ses Fils, 1949. Pp. 195. (*Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie*, Quatrième Section, Philosophie Ancienne, I.)

Father des Places, from whom we have had studies of the pronoun in Pindar and of certain particles in Plato, now devotes a volume to the "parallel lives" of his two subjects. The shift from a grammatical to a psychological and biographical approach has fortunately brought no change in the astute discrimination and sure judgment in the choice of readings and interpretations which characterized the earlier studies.

The book consists of two main sections, one for each author,

preceded by an introduction and a table of dates, and followed by a discussion of Plato's express quotations of Pindar, a conclusion entitled "Affinités," a bibliography, and indices. Within each major section the chapters parallel each other. Each starts with a discussion of the subject's "apologies." There follow chapters on Pindar's, or Plato's, relations with his own city and the attraction felt by each for a city not his own, on the Dorian ideal, religious views, genius and talent (Pindar), balanced by "the gifts of nature and of grace" (Plato), and, finally, chapters on each writer's keen visual sense.

It is the fashion in some quarters to regard Pindar and Plato as belonging to totally different worlds. Pindar, it is said, is primitive—he thinks like a child—while Plato is, of course, the great philosopher. It is perfectly true that the two have little in common in the extent to which their thought is rendered in discursive terms, though even in Plato's dialogues the discursive element is only a part of the communicated meaning. Father des Places, however, whose concern is with total meaning, has had no difficulty in demonstrating a large and significant area of agreement between his two subjects in their religious and political views and in personal temperament. This demonstration is valuable for our understanding of both men. It is a useful corrective, in view of the current tendency to deny him a position in the main stream of Greek thought, to regard Pindar as a "platonicien devant la lettre," while the comparison with an aristocratic poet nearly a century his senior illumines for us Plato's magnificently articulate conservatism.

This book is useful, but I think that it could have been even more useful were it not for the limitations of the biographical method employed. Some of the affinities seem either adventitious, e.g. that each had trouble in his relationships with his own city, or not of a sort to distinguish the two men from other Greeks of the classical age, e.g. that each fell victim to what another French scholar calls "le mirage spartiate." On the other hand what seem to this reviewer more significant relationships receive less thorough treatment than they deserve. There is a sense in which we can read Plato's theory of ideas as an interpretation in conceptual terms of the transcendental view of reality and value which Pindar apprehends and communicates in metaphorical terms. More could well have been written on this subject. Another related point of contact between the two writers, of which nothing is said, is their common view of the function of the seer, ὁ σοφός. In both he is a mediator between men and the realm of ideal reality. There are differences, of course. Pindar's wise man relies on inspiration, i.e. the workings of the subconscious, while Plato's philosopher supports his intuitions with ratiocination. Plato's wise man is a king while Pindar's tells a king what it is to be a king. Yet despite the differences the ancient tribal office of seer, most completely described to us by Pindar, and exemplified by him, stands behind Plato and his philosopher-kings as surely as Pindar's "Dorian" idealism stands behind Platonism. It would have been useful to have had a study of Plato as the last of the great Greek prophets rather than as the first great philosopher, or, as in this book, simply as an unclassified man.

But here I am criticizing the author for not writing a book which he had no intention of writing. Within the limits of the biographical and psychological approach which he adopts Father des Places has served excellently two of those whom Farnell calls "the four spiritual reasons for setting ourselves to the toil of mastering the Greek language."

H. N. PORTER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

CHARLES MUGLER. *Platon et la Recherche Mathématique de son Époque*. Strasbourg-Zurich, Éditions P. H. Heitz, 1948. Pp. xxviii + 427.

The thesis of this book is that Plato was an active and productive mathematician for whom mathematics was more often the end of metaphysical reflection than its point of departure. The author argues that Plato "dematerialized" the foundations of geometry; that he made fertile innovations in the theory of geometrical similarity; that he introduced into the physical sciences the principle of economy; that he was looking to a non-Euclidean geometry analogous to Riemann's as a means of resolving the contradictions between cosmological finitude and the implications of parallelism; that he inspired the attempt of Theaetetus to reconcile Theodorus' "Heraclitean" conception of the irrational with the Pythagorean conception, which Mugler calls "Parmenidean"; that he had hoped to find in this reconciliation a "mathematical demonstration of the Platonic theory of Becoming as a projection of Being" but, disappointed by Theaetetus' failure to achieve this result in adequately rigorous fashion, then anticipated the ultimate solution himself by the mythical representation of the relation between time and eternity in the *Timaeus*, a conception which at the same time made possible the formulation of the geometrical method of analysis, a method of which Mugler argues Plato was the author.

The book is likely to impress philologists by its mathematics and mathematicians by its philology. In fact its conclusions depend for the most part upon gross misinterpretations of Greek texts, unfamiliarity with relevant evidence, and untenable and often inconsistent notions of Plato's dialogues. Since the space required for a fair outline of the author's arguments and an adequate criticism of them is not here available, I can do no more than give the readers of *A. J. P.* this general warning and refer them for substantiation of it to my critical discussion of the book in *The Review of Metaphysics*, IV (1951), pp. 395-425.¹

HAROLD CHERNISS.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY, PRINCETON, N. J.

¹ Cf. also De Strycker, *L'Antiquité Classique*, XIX (1950), pp. 254-6. S. H. Gould (*Class. Phil.*, XLV [1950], pp. 136-7) does little more than give a table of contents of the book; his one point of criticism concerning the method of Theodorus is important, but he appears not to have seen the consequences of it for Mugler's whole thesis. The review by Van der Waerden (*Gnomon*, XXII [1950], pp. 63-5) is utterly inadequate.

WILHELM SCHMID. *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, I, Die klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur, V, Die griechische Literatur zur Zeit der attischen Hegemonie nach dem Eingreifen der Sophistik, II, 2. Munich, Biederstein, 1948. Pp. x + 377. (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, VII, 1, 5.)

This volume of the well-known Schmid-Stählin history of Greek literature is divided into two main sections; the first ("Die Geschichtsschreibung im Zeitalter der Sophistik," pp. 1-223) deals with Thucydides the historian, the second ("Der Ausgang der altionischen Naturphilosophie: Die Atomistik," pp. 224-349) concerns itself with Leucippus and Democritus. A page of "Nachträge und Berichtigungen" and an adequate index to Volumes IV and V complete the book.

The treatment of Thucydides is as full as one could wish. From the ancient *Lives* to the reputation of the historian in modern times scarcely a topic has been omitted. It does not lie in the nature of the undertaking to solve problems or to advance fresh theories. Thus it would be a mistake to expect any significant new contribution to Thucydidean scholarship. What Schmid does do, however, is to present an admirably detailed and documented survey of the position attained by about 1937. His views on the whole are conservative, even though he seems to me unduly to emphasize sophistic influence upon the thought and style of Thucydides.

Schmid's particular strength lies in his knowledge of the literature on Thucydides, especially that written in Germany. There are few pages that fail to attest his bibliographical erudition. Unfortunately, as he himself recognizes, the outbreak of World War II made it impossible for him to keep abreast of the work of the last thirteen years or so. In this interval a great deal has been done, some of it of major quality. For example, he is unable to take advantage of the contributions of Finley and Gomme. Schmid's volume is in this sense rather older in fact than its title-page would suggest. For this reason there is little profit in discussing Schmid's views of the controversies to which study of Thucydides gives rise.

I cannot claim familiarity with Leucippus and Democritus and am thus not in a position to control Schmid's judgements. Nevertheless, I again receive the impression of a systematic survey of modern theories by a meticulously thorough workman who has made his way conscientiously through the literature.

The book as a whole is not easy to read consecutively. The style is cramped and reveals much compression. The author has given us, however, a peculiarly full reference-book, in which the emphasis, as it should be, is placed upon literature rather than upon history or philosophy. The printing has been well done, the proof has been efficiently read.

Schmid has spent twenty years upon this history of Greek literature and the present volume, he tells us, is his last. His work will endure beyond our time and he may justly feel satisfied with his achievement.

MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Acheson (G. J.), transl. Dinner at Trimalchio's. An Extract from the *Satyricon* of Petronius Arbiter. Johannesburg, *Witwatersrand Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. 72.

Agard (Walter Raymond). Classical Myths in Sculpture. Madison, *Univ. of Wisconsin Press*, 1951. Pp. xvi + 203. \$5.00.

Appleton (William W.). A Cycle of Cathay. The Chinese Vogue in England during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. New York, *Columbia Univ. Press*, 1951. Pp. xii + 182.

Beaujeu (Jean). Pline l'Ancien. Histoire Naturelle, Livres I, II. Texte établi, traduit, et commenté. Introduction de Alfred Ernout. Paris, *Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres,"* 1950. Pp. 161; 282; 4 figs. (Budé.)

Beazley (Sir John Davidson). The Development of Attic Black-Figure. Berkeley and Los Angeles, *Univ. of California Press*; London, *Cambridge Univ. Press*, 1951. Pp. 127; 49 pls. \$6.50. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, XXIV.)

Bengtson (Hermann). Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die römische Kaiserzeit. Mit einer Karte in Text und 11 Karten auf Beiblättern. München, *C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung*, 1950. Pp. xvi + 592. DM. 40. (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, Dritte Abt., Vierter Teil.)

Bennett (Emmett L., Jr.). The Pylos Tablets. A Preliminary Transcription. With a foreword by Carl W. Blegen. Princeton, *Princeton Univ. Press* for the Univ. of Cincinnati, 1951. Pp. xiii + 117. \$2.00.

Bieber (Margarete). German Readings. A Short Survey of Greek and Roman Art for Students of German and Fine Arts, Selected and Compiled, with Vocabulary. Second Revised Edition. New York, *H. Bittner and Co.*, 1950. Pp. v + 59.

Biese (Y. M.). Some Notes on the Origin of the Indo-European Nominative Singular. Helsinki, 1950. Pp. 15. (*Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae*, Ser. B, Tom. 63, 5.)

Blegen (Carl W.), Caskey (John L.), and Rawson (Marion). Troy, The Third, Fourth and Fifth Settlements. Princeton, *Princeton Univ. Press* for the Univ. of Cincinnati, 1951. Vol. II, Part 1: Text, 325 pp.; Part 2: Plates, 318. \$36.00.

Blum (Rudolf). La Biblioteca della Badia Fiorentina e i Codici di Antonio Corbinelli. Città del Vaticano, *Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana*, 1951. Pp. xii + 190. (*Studi e Testi*, 155.)

Bolhuis (Andries). Vergilius' Vierde Ecloga in de Oratio Constantini ad Sanctorum Coetum. Inleiding, Tekst, Toelichting, Conclusie. Ermelo, *Drukkerij v. h. P. Bolhuis*, 1950. Pp. 86.

Boulogne (Reinier). De Plaats van de Paedagogus in de Romeinse Cultuur (La Place du Paedagogus dans la Culture Romaine). Avec résumé en française. Groningen-Djakarta, *J. B. Wolters' Uitgeversmaatschappij n. v.*, 1951. Pp. 104.

Bowen (Richard LeBarron, Jr.). The Early Arabian Necropolis of Ain Javan. A Pre-Islamic and Early Islamic Site on the Persian Gulf. New Haven, *American Schools of Oriental Research*, 1950. Pp. 70. (*Bull. of the Amer. Schools of Oriental Research, Supplementary Studies*, Nos. 7-9.)

Brand (Donald D.), assisted by José Corona Núñez. Quiroga, A Mexico Municipio. Washington, *U. S. Gov't. Printing Office*, 1951. Pp. 242; 25 pls. (*Smithsonian Institution, Institute of Social Anthropology Publication*, No. 11.)

INDEX TO VOLUME LXXII.

PAGE	PAGE
Alcuin's Epitaph of Hadrian I. A Study in Carolingian Epigraphy, 128-144	GORDON, ARTHUR E. and JOYCE S. Roman Names and the Consuls of A. D. 13, 283-292
Amafinius, Lucretius, and Cicero, 57-62	Greek μέλλω. A Historical and Comparative Study, 346-368
<i>Anth. Pal.</i> , VII, 476 (Meleager), The Composition of, 47-56	HELMBOLD, W. C. The Paradox of the <i>Oedipus</i> , 293-300
Aristophanes, <i>Knights</i> , 697- Περικόκκασα, 300-307	HIGHET, GILBERT. Juvenal's Bookcase, 369-394
Aristotle's Analysis of the Nature of Political Struggle, 145-161	HOWE, HERBERT M. Amafinius, Lucretius, and Cicero, 57-62
Athens, Ancient, A Political Slogan in, 181-184	IVES, SAMUEL A. Ryck's Manuscript of Tacitus (with C. W. MENDELL), 337-345
Berenice and Titus, 162-175	Juvenal's Bookcase, 369-394
BIELER, LUDWIG. A Political Slogan in Ancient Athens, 181-184	KIRK, GEOFFREY S. The Problem of Cratylus, 225-253
Bookcase, Juvenal's, 369-394	LARSON, CURTIS W. R. The Platonic Synonyms δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη, 395-414
BOOKS RECEIVED, 219-224, 335-336, 452	LAWLER, LILLIAN B. Περικόκκασα — Aristophanes, <i>Knights</i> , 697, 300-307
BRUNT, P. A. The Megarian Decree, 269-282	Lucretius, Amafinius, and Cicero, 57-62
Caesar's First Consulship, On the Chronology of, 254-268	Megarian (The) Decree, 269-282
Cicero, Amafinius, and Lucretius, 57-62	Meleager, <i>Anth. Pal.</i> , VII, 476, The Composition of, 47-56
Composition (The) of <i>Anth. Pal.</i> , VII, 476 (Meleager), 47-56	μέλλω, Greek. A Historical and Comparative Study, 346-368
Consulship, Caesar's First, On the Chronology of, 254-268	MENDELL, C. W. Ryck's Manuscript of Tacitus (with SAMUEL A. IVES), 337-345
Consuls of A. D. 13, Roman Names and the, 283-292	Names for the Truffle, Two Greek, 63-68
Cosmological Heresies, Epicurus and, 1-23	Names, Roman, and the Consuls of A. D. 13, 283-292
Cratylus, The Problem of, 225-253	<i>Oedipus</i> , The Paradox of the, 293-300
CROOK, JOHN A. Titus and Berenice, 162-175	Once or Twice? 176-181
Decree, The Megarian, 269-282	
Decree, The Prytaneion, Re-examined, 24-46	
δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη, The Platonic Synonyms, 395-414	
Epicurus and Cosmological Heresies, 1-23	
Epigraphy, Carolingian, A Study in. Alcuin's Epitaph of Hadrian I, 128-144	

	PAGE
On the Chronology of Caesar's First Consulship,	254-268
OSTWALD, MARTIN. The Prytaneion Decree Re-examined,	24-46
PAPANTONIOU, GEORGE A. Once or Twice?	176-181
Paradox (The) of the <i>Oedipus</i> ,	293-300
Περικόκκασα — Aristophanes, <i>Knights</i> , 697,	300-307
Platonic (The) Synonyms <i>δικαιοσύνη</i> and <i>σωφροσύνη</i> ,	395-414
Political (A) Slogan in Ancient Athens,	181-184
Political Struggle, Aristotle's Analysis of the Nature of,	145-161
POULTNEY, JAMES W. Volscians and Umbrians,	113-127
Problem (The) of Cratylus,	225-253
Prytaneion (The) Decree Re-examined,	24-46

REVIEWS:

<i>Aalto's</i> Untersuchungen über das lateinischen Gerundium und Gerundivum (JAMES W. POULTNEY),	210-212
<i>Arnaldi's</i> Da Plauto a Terenzio, II: Terenzio (GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH),	328-331
<i>Barrington-Ward, Bell, Bowra, Bryan-Brown, Denniston, Higham, Platanauer's</i> Some Oxford Compositions (J. F. C. RICHARDS),	439-442
Bell, <i>see</i> Barrington-Ward.	
<i>Benveniste's</i> Noms d'agent et noms d'action en indo-européen (JAMES W. POULTNEY),	106-108
<i>Bonner's</i> Studies in Magical Amulets, chiefly Graeco-Egyptian (ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH),	308-316
Bowra, <i>see</i> Barrington-Ward.	
<i>Brown's</i> Onesicritus. A Study in Hellenistic His-	

	PAGE
toriography (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.),	447-448
Bryan-Brown, <i>see</i> Barrington-Ward.	
<i>Carrière's</i> Théognis de Mégare. Étude sur le recueil élégiaque attribué à ce poète (CHRISTOPHER M. DAWSON),	185-190
<i>Carrière's</i> Théognis, Poèmes élégiaques. Texte établi et traduit (CHRISTOPHER M. DAWSON),	185-190
<i>Charlesworth's</i> The Lost Province or The Worth of Britain (GERTRUDE HIRST),	332-334
<i>Cohen's</i> La Grèce et l'Hellénisation du monde antique. Nouvelle (3ième) édition (STERLING DOW),	104
<i>Dale's</i> The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama (RICHMOND LATTIMORE),	323-325
<i>Delz's</i> Lukians Kenntnis der athenischen Antiquitäten (JAMES H. OLIVER),	216-219
Denniston, <i>see</i> Barrington-Ward.	
<i>des Places'</i> Pindare et Platon (H. N. PORTER),	448-450
<i>Diringer's</i> The Alphabet. A Key to the History of Mankind (KEMP MALONE),	108-110
Eranos Rudbergianus, Opuscula Philologica Gunnaro Rudberg a. d. XVI Kal. Nov. Anno MCMXLV Dedicata (FRANCIS R. WALTON),	81-85
<i>Goldschmidt's</i> La Religion de Platon (G. M. A. GRUBE),	212-213
<i>Grenier, Vendryes, Tonnelat, Unbegaun's</i> "Mana." Introduction à l'histoire des religions—2: Les religions de l'Europe ancienne. III: Les religions étrusque et romaine. Les religions des Celtes, des Germains et des anciens Slaves (ARTHUR DARBY NOCK),	72-74
<i>Haarhoff's</i> The Stranger at the Gate. Aspects of Ex-	

- | PAGE | PAGE |
|---|---|
| clusiveness and Co-operation in Ancient Greece and Rome, with some Reference to Modern Times (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR), 206-208 | latin littéraire (GILBERT HIGHET), 443-444 |
| <i>Hadas' A History of Greek Literature</i> (NORMAN W. DEWITT), 78-79 | <i>Mugler's Platon et la Recherche Mathématique de son Époque</i> (HAROLD CHERNISS), 450 |
| <i>Hanell's Das altrömische eponyme Amt</i> (LILY ROSS TAYLOR), 69-72 | <i>Nilsson's The Minoan-Mycenaeae Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion</i> (CAMPBELL BONNER), 423-425 |
| <i>Heinimann's Nomos und Physis. Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im Griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts</i> (FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN), 191-195 | <i>Oeri's Der Typ der komischen Alten in der griechischen Komödie, seine Nachwirkungen und seine Herkunft</i> (PHILIP WHALEY HARSH), 98-100 |
| Higham, <i>see</i> Barrington-Ward. | <i>Paap's De Herodoti reliquis in papyris et membranis Aegyptiis servatis</i> (LIONEL PEARSON), 100-102 |
| <i>Hofmann's Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen, 1. Teil</i> (ROLAND G. KENT), 79-81 | <i>Pflaum's Les procurateurs équestres sous le Haut-Empire Romain</i> (JAMES H. OLIVER), 316-322 |
| <i>Höistad's Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man</i> (EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.), 433-438 | <i>Pisani's Testi arcaici e volgari con commento glottologico</i> (ROLAND G. KENT), 195-198 |
| <i>Kahle's The Cairo Geniza</i> (W. F. ALBRIGHT), 105-106 | Platnauer, <i>see</i> Barrington-Ward. |
| <i>Kakridis' Homeric Researches</i> (H. N. PORTER), 204-206 | <i>Pohlenz' Die Stoa, Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung</i> (LUDWIG EDELSTEIN), 426-432 |
| <i>Kent's Old Persian Grammar, Texts, Lexicon</i> (LOUIS H. GRAY), 325-328 | <i>Sayre's The Greek Cynics</i> (EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.), 433-438 |
| <i>Labourt's Saint Jérôme, Lettres, Tome I</i> (ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE), 103-104 | <i>Schachermeyr's Alexander der Grosse: Ingenium und Macht</i> (TRUESDELL S. BROWN), 74-77 |
| <i>Legrand's Hérodote, Histories, Livre VI. Texte établi et traduit</i> (LIONEL PEARSON), 331-332 | <i>Schefold's Griechische Plastik, I: Die grossen Bildhauer des archaischen Athen</i> (A. E. RAUBITSCHKE), 213-214 |
| <i>Magie's Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ, 2 vols.</i> (JAMES H. OLIVER), 198-201 | <i>Schefold's Orient, Hellas und Rom in der archäologischen Forschung seit 1939</i> (HOMER A. THOMPSON), 214-216 |
| <i>Malcovati's Imperatoris Caesaris Augusti operum fragmenta, 3rd ed.</i> (JAMES H. OLIVER), 112 | <i>Schmalenbach's Griechische Vasenbilder</i> (A. E. RAUBITSCHKE), 213-214 |
| <i>Marouzeau's Quelques aspects de la formation du</i> | <i>Schmid's Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, I: Die klassische Periode</i> |

	PAGE		PAGE
der griechischen Literatur, V, Die griechische Literatur zur Zeit der attischen Hegemonie nach dem Eingreifen der Sophistik, II, 2 (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR),	451	Roman Names and the Consuls of A. D. 13,	283-292
<i>Snell's</i> Bacchylidis Carminum Fragmentis (GILBERT NORWOOD),	415-422	Ryck's Manuscript of Tacitus,	337-345
<i>Snell's</i> Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen (KURT VON FRITZ),	92-98	Slogan in Ancient Athens, A Political,	181-184
<i>Souter's</i> A Glossary of Later Latin to 600 A. D. (CORA E. LUTZ),	201-203	SMALL, STUART G. P. The Composition of <i>Anth. Pal.</i> , VII, 476 (Meleager),	47-56
<i>Stella's</i> Cinque Poeti dell' Antologia Palatina (STUART G. P. SMALL),	445-446	SOLMSEN, FRIEDRICH. Epicurus and Cosmological Heresies,	1-23
<i>Thomson's</i> History of Ancient Geography (LIONEL PEARSON),	90-92	σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη, The Platonic Synonyms,	395-414
Tonnelat, <i>see</i> Grenier.		SZEMERENYI, OSWALD. Greek μέλλω. A Historical and Comparative Study,	346-368
Unbegaun, <i>see</i> Grenier.		Tacitus, Ryck's Manuscript of,	337-345
Vendryes, <i>see</i> Grenier.		TAYLOR, LILY ROSS. On the Chronology of Caesar's First Consulship,	254-26
<i>Wendel's</i> Die griechisch-römische Buchbeschreibung verglichen mit der des Vorderen Orients (NAFHTALI LEWIS),	102-103	Titus and Berenice,	162-17
<i>Will's</i> Horaz und die Augusteische Kultur (FRANK O. COPLEY),	86-90	Truffle, Two Greek Names for the,	63-68
<i>Wycherley's</i> How the Greeks Built Cities (J. H. YOUNG),	110-112	Volscians and Umbrians,	113-127
<i>Yavis' Greek Altars, Origins and Typology</i> (ROBERT SCRANTON),	208-210	WALLACH, LUITPOLD. Alcuin's Epitaph of Hadrian I. A Study in Carolingian Epigraphy,	128-144
		WHEELER, MARCUS. Aristotle's Analysis of the Nature of Political Struggle,	145-161
		WINTER, WERNER. Two Greek Names for the Truffle,	63-68